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This dissertation reinterprets the history of  the relationship between late Qing China and its 
Central Asian frontiers by examining the politics of  the environment in the nineteenth century. 
Following the Muslim uprisings of  the 1860s and 1870s in northwest China, officials of  the Qing 
empire promoted the recovery and expansion of  agricultural production. Their policies were framed 
by notions of  natural profit, by their knowledge of  agrarian technology, and by their concerns over 
the demographic and ecological crises of  China proper. Scholar-officials sought to reap what they 
called the “profits of  nature”—profits they believed to be intrinsic to specific arrangements of  land, 
organisms, and labor—by deploying their knowledge of  agriculture and by implementing policies of 
agrarian development. In arid landscapes inhabited largely by Turkic and Chinese Muslims, they 
replicated patterns of  agricultural production from southern provinces of  China, promoted the 
cultivation of  crops imported from beyond local ecological boundaries, and facilitated Han 
colonization. These efforts were attempts to forge new, if  sometimes subtle, environmental and 
demographic connections between China proper and the northwest frontiers.   
Based upon a wide range of  published sources and archival documents from Beijing and 
Urumqi, this dissertation examines the intellectual background and agrarian practices of  Zuo 
Zongtang (1812-1885), the leading agent of  Qing agrarian expansion in the northwest in the late 
nineteenth century. It shows how ideologies of  nature were at the heart of  schemes to transform 
arid lands in Gansu and Xinjiang into highly productive landscapes. Zuo's considerations for the 
“profits of  nature” arose from his intellectual engagement with Qing-era scholarship about topics 
like geography and agricultural technology, as well as from the exigencies of  motivating farmers to 
reclaim land and grow crops. Although sometimes stymied by environmental conditions or 
uncooperative farmers, the efforts of  Zuo and other Qing officials nonetheless sought to render the 
northwest into a region where Han migrants could settle and farm the land, and thereby ease the 
ecological and social contradictions of  population growth in China proper.
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Connections in the Nineteenth Century
In the early days of  autumn in 1878, an army officer erected a stele in China's northwestern 
Gansu province to commemorate the growth of  trees. The stone memorial recorded half  a dozen 
years of  tree-planting campaigns following warfare between armies loyal to the Qing empire and 
groups of  Muslims hostile to imperial authority. Few trees and people had remained after warfare, 
but as refugees returned to open up land for cultivation, soldiers under the officer's command 
hauled tree saplings across mountains and valleys to plant them by roadsides. The idea was to create 
sources of  timber, to shade roadways for travelers, and to add color to devastated landscapes. 
Among the difficulties they encountered, none was more daunting than inhospitable terrain. The 
water was saline, flat land tended to be up in the hills, high above river valleys, and much of  the soil 
was simply “not suited for trees” (bu yi shu 不宜樹). Patches of  vegetation emerged from the land 
only intermittently. Having trees flourish in such a landscape was thus a sign that ecological 
limitations had been overcome by human effort. The stele recorded that soldiers had planted no 
fewer than 200,000 trees to the northwest and southeast of  the city of  Pingliang in eastern Gansu in 
an effort to replace postwar barrenness with fits of  greenery. What now marked the land was, 
according to the stele, “vigorously verdant and flourishing, motley and profuse with vegetation.”1 
The arboreal campaigns of  the stele's author, Wei Guangtao  魏光燾 (1837-1915), took place 
under the leadership of  one of  the nineteenth century's most famous officials, Zuo Zongtang 左宗
1
郁青青以鬯茂，紛卉卉而陸離. Wei Guangtao, “Wuwei jun ge ying pin nian zhong shu ji” 武威軍各營頻年種樹記 
[Record of  all battalions of  the Wuwei army planting trees over several consecutive years], GX4/8/0, in 
Pingliang shi zhi 平凉市志 [Gazetteer of  Pingliang city], ed. Pingliang shi zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1996), 831.
1
 棠 (1812-1885). Best known as a military general, Zuo led armies to defeat the Muslim rebellions in 
Gansu and neighboring Shaanxi province in the 1860s and early 1870s, and he oversaw the 
reconquest of  the empire's Central Asian territory, Xinjiang, a process which was complete by early 
1878. But Zuo's leadership in warfare and his military victories are only one side of  a more complex 
story involving material relationships between the central regions of  the Qing empire and the 
empire's northwest borderlands. In the wake of  warfare from the 1860s to the 1880s, Zuo Zongtang 
and other high-ranking Qing officials enacted a series of  policies in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang to 
promote and expand agrarian production. These agrarian campaigns were sometimes couched in the 
rhetorics of  environmental transformation, just as Wei's stone memorial had done for newly planted 
rows of  trees in Gansu, which he lauded for their potential to “add luster to the state and territory.”2 
Yet however truthful or fallacious the claims about verdant vegetation may have been, such rhetorics 
of  imperial victory were merely part of  much larger efforts to render northwestern lands into 
productive environments and integrate them more closely with the center of  the empire in the late 
nineteenth century. 
At the heart of  these agrarian campaigns were quotidian notions about how to create wealth 
from the combination of  labor, land, and technology. Like other scholar-officials in late imperial 
times, Zuo Zongtang talked repeatedly about ways to obtain the material rewards of  agriculture, 
which he phrased as the “profits of  nature” (ziran zhi li 自然之利), the “profits of  the land” (dili 地
利), or just “profit” (li 利). If  his agrarian campaigns were indicative of  a late Qing colonial move to 
expand agrarian production along the frontiers by transferring settlers and technology to those 
regions, the material practices of  that colonialism had intellectual roots. For it was in geographical 
and agricultural learning that Zuo grappled with the idea of  the “profits of  the land” and the 
2
社稷河山皆為之生色. Wei Guangtao, “Wuwei jun ge ying pin nian zhong shu ji,” 831. 
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question of  how best to obtain them through technological and social means. 
Histories of  the Qing empire's tumultuous nineteenth century have often been narrated as 
stories of  imperial declension centering on military and political crises born of  rebellion and foreign 
imperialism.3 This dissertation presents a different story, one that refocuses our attention on the 
intellectual and environmental history of  the century. Qing officials had to confront the challenges 
posed by demographic growth and ecological crisis, and they sought solutions in the intensification 
and geographical expansion of  agrarian production, which, in turn, had their own environmental 
and social consequences. Zuo Zongtang's thought and his continual attention to the problem of 
“profits” in agrarian production were never removed from these crises, and they formed the 
intellectual background for his agrarian campaigns, which employed technology, labor, and 
organisms from the heartlands of  the empire in the northwest borderlands. If  Zuo's agrarian 
campaigns did not always yield abundant landscapes, they are significant for another reason: they 
reveal a network of  relations between people, environments, technology, and ideology typically 
absent in considerations of  the late nineteenth century, the era preceding the downfall of  the Qing 
state in 1911.
Nineteenth-Century Crises
The empire of  the Great Qing  大清 (1644-1911) was a product of  territorial expansion 
through military conquest. When the leaders of  the Qing state, the Manchus, conquered the 
3 For a broad assessment of  earlier historiographic treatment of  nineteenth-century Chinese history, quite 
useful is the work by Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese  
Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). Older treatments of  the nineteenth century have 
considered it a period of  imperial decline. For examples, see Mary Clabaugh Wright, The Last Stand of  
Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957); Susan 
Mann Jones and Philip A. Kuhn, “Dynastic Decline and the Roots of  Rebellion,” in The Cambridge History  
of  China, vol. 10, pt. 1, Late Ch'ing 1800–1911, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1978), 107-162.
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territory under the control of  the previous Ming  明 dynasty (1368-1644) in the middle of  the 
seventeenth century, they appropriated the heartlands of  what was to become the Chinese nation-
state in the twentieth century. Scholars writing in the Qing period often called this region the “land 
inside” (neidi 内地), a term which English-speakers have tended to translate as “China proper.”4 The 
imperial reach of  the Manchus eventually extended well beyond China proper, especially along the 
northern and western frontiers. By the height of  its power in the middle of  the eighteenth century, 
the Qing included all of  present-day Mongolia. In the northeast, it reached to where the Amur River 
empties into the Pacific Ocean, and to northwest, it stretched to the shores of  Lake Balkhash in 
present-day Kazakhstan. It had also taken control of  the island that became known as Taiwan, and 
had extended its influence to the southwest and across the Tibetan plateau. Among the most famous 
of  Qing military campaigns to be commemorated in laudatory accounts was the conquest of  the 
territory that became known as Xinjiang —新疆 literally, the “new borderland” or “new domain.”5 
The creation of  Xinjiang through conquest in the 1750s marked the pinnacle of  Qing military 
power across its vast territories, which comprised one of  the largest landed empires in the early 
modern world. 
4 In this dissertation, I use the term “China proper” to denote the geographical region south of  the Great 
Wall and east of  the Tibetan Plateau. The term neidi was in use long before the Qing period, but in that 
period it came to refer primarily to the geographical unit commonly referred to as “China” in 
contradistinction to its peripheral territories that had not belonged to the Ming. The term's literal meaning 
of  “land inside” referred to the territory's geographical location within the checkpoint passes at either end 
of  the Great Wall: the Shanhaiguan, where the wall meets the Bohai Sea northeast of  Beijing, and the 
Jiayuguan, the landlocked western terminus of  the wall in northwestern Gansu. For traces of  the history 
of  the term “China proper,” see Zhihong Chen, “Stretching the Skin of  the Nation: Chinese Intellectuals, 
the State, and the Frontiers in the Nanjing Decade (1927-1937),” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Oregon, 2008), 9-10.
5 For the most complete English-language account of  the conquest, see Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West:  
The Qing Conquest of  Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of  Harvard University Press, 
2005). On official historical chronicles of  the campaigns, see Peter Perdue, “Embracing Victory, 
Embracing Defeat: Rewriting the Qing Frontier Campaigns,” in The Chinese State at the Borders, ed. Diana 
Lary (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 105-125.
4
Qing military conquests brought a bewildering array of  peoples and terrains into the empire, 
all of  which were under the imperial authority of  the Manchu ruling house in Beijing. Recent 
histories of  the Qing have argued that the empire and its forms of  governance made it similar to 
other early modern colonial empires.6 These forms of  governance included the discursive 
construction of  knowledge about imperial subjects and lands through various forms of 
representation more often associated with European Orientalism. Manchu emperors and Han 
officials alike created gazetteers, compendia, maps, ethnographic drawings and descriptions, and 
travel writings as they extended their power over people and places on the peripheries of  China 
proper.7 These imperial productions were especially numerous in the second half  of  the eighteenth 
century under the Qianlong  乾隆 emperor (r. 1736-95), who styled himself  a universal emperor and 
who relied upon a vast array of  information to govern the Qing territories.8 
Yet the interpretation of  the Qing as an early modern colonial empire has received much less 
attention in the nineteenth century. For this century, historians have largely focused on the crises of 
6 For a seminal collection of  essays arguing that the Qing was an early modern colonial power that should 
be comparable to other worldwide colonial powers in the same period, see the essays in a special journal 
issue on “Manchu Colonialism” in The International History Review 20.2 (June 1998), including Peter C. 
Perdue, “Comparing Empires: Manchu Colonialism,” 255-262, and Michael Adas, “Imperialism and 
Colonialism in Comparative Perspective,” 371-388.
7 For example, Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China 
(Chicago: The University of  Chicago Press, 2001); David Michael Deal and Laura Hostetler, The Art of  
Ethnography: A Chinese “Miao Album” (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 2006); James Milward, 
“'Coming onto the Map': 'Western Regions' Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of 
Chinese Empire in Xinjiang,” Late Imperial China 20.2 (December 1999): 61-98; Peter Perdue, “Boundaries, 
Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia,” The 
International History Review 20.2 (1998): 263-286; Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese  
Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); 
Laura Newby, “Lines of  Vision: Qing Representations of  the Turkic Muslim Peoples of  Xinjiang,” in 
Looking at the Coloniser: Cross-Cultural Perceptions in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Bengal, and Related Areas, ed. 
Beate Eschment and Hans Harder (Wurzburg: Ergon, 2004), 339-355; Laura Newby, “The Chinesë  
Literary Conquest of  Xinjiang,” Modern China 25.4 (1999): 451-474.
8 Pamela Kyle Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University 
of  California Press, 1999).
5
the Qing state rather than its colonial pretensions along its own borderlands—peripheral and liminal 
spaces of  imperial authority often on the ecological and ethnic fringes of  the empire.9 These crises 
were manifold, but two have appeared repeatedly in histories of  the nineteenth century.10 First, a 
series of  large, internal rebellions beginning in the middle of  the century devastated local 
communities in many regions of  China proper and laid waste to agrarian landscapes. The largest of 
these was the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), in which anti-Qing armies led by Christian converts 
marched across a wide swath of  southern China and attempted to set up an alternative state with its 
capital at Nanjing. The rebellion took more than a decade to suppress and ultimately cost the lives of 
roughly 20 million people.11 Second, the violence of  foreign imperialism along the seacoasts and 
landed frontiers challenged the power of  the Qing state to defend its territory. The quintessential 
example of  nineteenth-century imperialism in Qing China was the Opium War (1839-42), started by 
the British after the Qing state attempted to prohibit imports of  opium. The war ended with the 
Treaty of  Nanjing (1842), which granted to the British war indemnities, extraterritorial privileges, 
treaty ports, and the right to continue the opium trade. These were challenges that the Qing state 
never faced in the eighteenth century, when its military might was much greater and when challenges 
to its security tended to come from its vast landed frontiers to the north and west.  
Historical accounts of  Zuo Zongtang's life have paralleled longstanding views of  the 
nineteenth century as a period of  historical rupture and crisis marked by foreign imperialism and 
9 For the application of  recent theories of  the frontier to the Qing case, see James A. Millward, “New 
Perspectives of  the Qing Frontier,” in Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain, ed. Gail Hershatter, 
Emily Honig, Jonathan N. Lipman, and Randall Stross (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 97-129.
10 For an example of  the range of  crises and problems faced by the Qing, see the essays in Dragons, Tigers,  
and Dogs: Qing Crisis Management and the Boundaries of  State Power in Late Imperial China, ed. Robert J. Antony 
and Jane Kate Leonard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2002). See also the chapter 
entitled “Crises” in William T. Rowe, China's Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press of  Harvard University Press, 2009), 149-174.
11 Thomas Reilly, The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of  Empire (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2004), 3.
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internal rebellion. But while the Qing state as a whole may have fared rather poorly, studies focusing 
on Zuo have often emphasized his success in dealing with the military challenges to the authority of 
the Qing state.12 In confronting these dual sets of  crises, Zuo began his career as a military advisor 
to several governors in his native Hunan province in the 1850s, led armies to campaign against the 
Taiping Rebellion in the early 1860s, was dispatched to defeat the Muslim rebellions in northwest 
China in the late 1860s and early 1870s, and then went on to conquer Xinjiang in the late 1870s. The 
reconquest of  Xinjiang occurred at a time when Qing authority had been cut off  from much of  the 
territory by Muslim rebellions,13 when a Muslim military leader from the neighboring polity of 
Khoqand, Ya'qub Beg, had taken advantage of  the crisis to establish his own independent state in 
southern Xinjiang,14 and when military leaders in imperial Russia's Central Asian territory had 
opportunistically decided to occupy land in the fertile Ili Valley, in the northwest of  Xinjiang. 
Brokering the return of  most of  the Ili Valley from the Russians would have to wait until a series of 
12 The literature on Zuo Zongtang in English is relatively small and tends to focus on how Zuo confronted 
the military challenges to the Qing state, especially in the northwest. W. L. Bales, Tso Tsungt'ang: Soldier and 
Statesman of  Old China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1937); Chu Wen-Djang, The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest  
China, 1862-1878: A Study of  Government Minority Policy (The Hauge: Mouton & Co., 1966); Lanny B. Fields, 
Tso Tsung-t'ang and the Muslims: Statecraft in Northwest China, 1868-1880 (Kingston, ON: Limestone Press, 
1978). It is possible that the Qing tradition of  chronicling military victories over its enemies and the 
official accounts that it produced of  the suppression of  nineteenth-century rebellions has had an 
inordinate amount of  influence on writings about Zuo Zongtang. The Qing account of  Zuo's suppression 
of  the Muslim rebellions is Ping ding Shaan Gan Xinjiang hui fei fang lue  平定陜甘新疆回匪方略 [Account of  the 
pacification of  Muslim rebels in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang], ed. Yi Xin  奕訢 et al., 320 vols. (1896). 
Chinese accounts of  Zuo Zongtang's life have been much more broadly focused on other facets of  his 
life, including his economic thought, but narratives of  his military work still tend to predominate. For 
example, see Qin Hancai 秦翰才, Zuo Wenxiang gong zai xi bei  左文襄公在西北 [Duke Zuo Zongtang in the 
northwest], (Changsha: Yuelu shu she, 1984). 
13 On the Muslim rebellions, see Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of  Muslims in Northwest  
China (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 1997), 115-138; Chu Wen-Djang, The Moslem Rebellion in  
Northwest China, 1862-1878: A Study of  Government Minority Policy (The Hauge: Mouton & Co., 1966); Bai 
Shouyi 白壽彝, ed., Hui min qiyi  回民起義 [The Muslim uprising], vols. 3-4 (Shanghai: Shenzhou guo guang 
she, 1953).
14 On the emirate of  Ya'qub Beg, see Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese  
Central Asia, 1864-1877 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads:  
A History of  Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 118-123. 
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diplomatic meetings after Zuo's reconquest.15 But the reconquest was enough to demonstrate Zuo's 
strategic military acumen to the Qing court, which granted him several honorary positions and titles 
for his successes late in life (see Figure 1).  It marked the pinnacle of  his official career for the Qing 
state and signified the tenacity of  the Qing in the face of  two major threats to its security along the 
northwestern frontiers.16
Despite Zuo's success in saving Xinjiang, the security crises of  the Qing state in the 
nineteenth century were underscored by deeper, destabilizing changes in political economy that have 
framed the historical trajectory of  modern Chinese history. What was a colonial power in the 
eighteenth century became a fragile, semi-colonized state in the nineteenth century, historians have 
argued, with the arrival of  capitalism and Western technology. Historians in mainland China and 
elsewhere marked the crucial turning point for the beginning of  China's modern history (jindaishi 近
代史) around 1840 and the Opium War. The middle of  the nineteenth century witnessed a departure 
from the previous history of  the Qing empire insofar as capitalism connected Chinese society to 
new networks of  material exchange, put pressure on traditional handicraft industries, and initiated 
novel patterns of  technological transformation.17 
15 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of  Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1965). 
16 For his military accomplishments and his commitment to supporting the empire in its phase of  crisis, Zuo 
has often been grouped alongside other prominent generals of  the century, including fellow Hunan native 
Zeng Guofan  曾國藩 (1811-1872) and Zuo's opponent in the debate about reconquering Xinjiang, Li 
Hongzhang  李鴻章 (1823-1901). On Zeng Guofan, see Andrew Cheng-kuang Hsieh, Tseng Kuo-fan, A 
Nineteenth-Century Confucian General (Ph.D. diss, Yale University, 1975); Jonathan Porter, Tseng Kuo-fan's  
Private Bureaucracy (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of  California, 1972). On Li 
Hongzhang, see Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese  
Regionalism (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 1964); Samuel Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., Li  
Hung-chang and China's Early Modernization (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
17 One set of  historical interpretations has sought to understand what influence imperialism had on China's 
economic development in the nineteenth century. On the level of  the forces of  production, Mark Elvin 
argued that, with the nineteenth-century arrival of  European imperialism, China was jolted out of  what he 
called the “high-level equilibrium trap” whereby technologies were extremely productive yet technological 
innovation stagnated. See Mark Elvin, The Pattern of  the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
8
Thinking about European capitalism in China calls attention to the need to understand 
material connections in nineteenth-century history. By material connections, I mean the flows of 
people, commodities, and other material goods from one place to another, and the way in which 
relationships between groups of  people have been mediated by them. European merchants had long 
been interested in China as an endpoint on their journeys around the world precisely because it 
produced material goods like silks, porcelains, teas, and luxury items that could fetch high prices on 
European markets. In the nineteenth century, it was British opium grown in India that sat at the 
heart of  the connection—and the dispute—between the British and the Qing. The growing 
consumption of  this stimulating commodity by Chinese consumers resulted in silver flowing out of 
the empire at increasingly high rates, creating a windfall for British merchant capitalists and hardship 
for Chinese peasants who faced increasingly costly rates of  exchange between copper cash and 
silver, the monetary medium for remitting land taxes.18 The material connections of  opium pitted 
British and other European merchants, Indian producers, and Chinese consumers into a hierarchy 
of  new relations in which China increasingly became the locus of  the market.19  
Another view of  the material connections between Europe and China in the nineteenth 
century has focused on the transfer of  technology. Here, too, Zuo Zongtang's story has relevance. 
In the history of  China's nineteenth-century adoption of  Western technology, Zuo gained the 
reputation of  a modernizer for his promotion of  machine technology. Insofar as he urged the Qing 
1973). Others have suggested that European imperialism did not introduce capitalism to China but rather 
added new pressure and incentives for innovation in industries that may have shown signs of  “embryonic 
capitalism” prior to 1840. See Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, eds., Chinese Capitalism, 1522-1840, trans. Li 
Zhengde, Liang Miaoru, and Li Siping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). The original is Xu Dixin 許滌
 新 and Wu Chengming 吳承明, eds., Zhongguo zibenzhuyi de mengya  中國資本主義的萌芽 [The sprouts of  Chinese 
capitalism], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985).   
18 On the rising costs of  silver in the nineteenth century, see Man-houng Lin, China Upside Down: Currency,  
Society, and Ideologies, 1808-1856 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).
19 Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A study of  the Asian opium trade, 1750-1950 
(New York: Routledge, 1999). 
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government to purchase machinery from European specialists to increase the state's military 
prowess and to bolster its economic production in the late nineteenth century, he was one among a 
group of  proponents of  the “foreign affairs” (yangwu 洋務) or “self-strengthening” (ziqiang 自强) 
movements. In 1866, he founded the Fuzhou Shipyard on China's southeast coast as a site where 
British and French technicians trained Chinese workers in naval technology and shipbuilding. Zuo 
was also interested in machine technologies for commercial production, and he established a short-
lived woolen factory using German spinning and weaving machines in Lanzhou in the 1870s.20 If  the 
process by which Chinese officials like Zuo adopted and promoted European machine technology 
was never as straightforward as it may have seemed, the movement of  materials and knowledge 
nonetheless seemed to have a definite geographical trajectory: from Europe to China.
Material Connections as Environmental Crisis
Material connections drawn by flows of  commodities and people in the relationship between 
Europe and China were crucial in the course of  the Qing empire's nineteenth century. Yet if  we 
focus solely on the scope of  geographical relationships that were important to capitalism and 
nineteenth-century European colonialism, we miss a range of other material connections between 
China proper and the territories peripheral to it, including the imperial borderlands of  the Qing 
state. If  we make China proper the geographical center of  an analysis of  material relations in the 
nineteenth century, rather than merely a peripheral zone in a world system dominated by Europeans, 
a new range of  relationships emerges. These relationships involved the exchange of  material goods 
20 For official documents about late Qing naval affairs, see Chuan zheng zou yi hui bian 船政奏議彙編 
[Compilation of  memorials about naval administration], 51 juan (1888), esp. juan 1-2 for memorials by Zuo 
Zongtang. On the naval movement as exemplifying the urge for modernization, see David Pong, Shen Pao-
chen and China's Modernization in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Chen 
Qitian, Tso Tsung T'ang: Pioneer Promoter of  the Modern Dockyard and the Woolen Mill in China (Peiping: 
Department of  Economics, Yenching University, 1938). 
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between the imperial center or the wealthiest parts of  China proper and regions beyond the ambit 
of  Qing imperialism. Imperial dynasties long before the Qing had conducted trade in a panoply of 
commercial and strategic items, like horses, silver, silks, and tea.21 Extensive networks of  trade also 
formed around the tribute system, in which tributary states around China sent emissaries and gifts to 
the imperial capitals and received commodities and further trading privileges in exchange. Other 
connections between China proper and its peripheries in the Qing period included trade in luxury 
items like tortoiseshell from the Indonesian archipelago and sandalwood from the Hawaiian 
islands.22 
In the relationship between China proper and its geographic peripheries, people were central 
to making material connections not only because they were the agents of  exchange in organic and 
inorganic materials. They were also important because of  their numbers and their movement in 
search of  resources for survival. What Fernand Braudel has called the “weight of  numbers”23 is 
particularly relevant for assessing connections between China proper and its peripheries and for 
understanding the crisis of  the nineteenth century, for it was through population growth in the 
previous century that pressure on land and other resources in China proper pushed farmers and 
traders to seek new opportunities in the geographic and ecological peripheries. During the 
eighteenth century, relative peace and prosperity combined with a functioning famine-relief  system 
21 For a sense of  the vast range of  goods exchanged between China and neighboring or distant polities in 
the Song period, see Shiba Yoshinobu, “Sung Foreign Trade: Its Scope and Organization,” in China among  
Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), 89-115.
22 Heather Sutherland, “A Sino-Indonesian Commodity Chain: The Trade in Tortoiseshell in the Late 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast  
Asia, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 179; Gregory 
Rosenthal, “Boki's Predicament: The Material Culture and Environmental History of  Hawaiian 
Sandalwood, 1811-1830,” World History Bulletin 27.1 (Spring 2011), 49, 53-55. 
23 Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800, trans. Miriam Kochan (New York: Harper & Row, 
1973), 1.
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provided the foundations for unprecedented population growth.24 Between 1700 and 1800, the 
population of  the empire more than doubled from 160 million to 350 million, and shot up again to 
around 430 million by the middle of  the nineteenth century.25 
People were an important force in forging material connections between Qing hinterlands 
and frontiers insofar as they moved to the margins of  the empire where their patterns of  livelihood 
altered local environments. As population density and the intensity of  agrarian production increased 
in core areas like the lower Yangzi delta region, farmers migrated to the ecological margins—
riparian, lacrustrine, and piedmont—of  those areas as well as to the geographical margins of  China 
proper.26 New World crops, like maize, potatoes, and peanuts, enabled them to extend cultivation to 
less fertile and sandier soils on the margins of  arable land and up hillsides.27 While the growth of  the 
population in China proper had been a centuries-long trend, environmental changes from agrarian 
expansion accelerated during the late Ming and Qing periods. In the south and southwest, perhaps 
the most basic change was the clearing of  forests and the transformation of  river valleys into arable 
land suited for settled agriculture. Land clearance proceeded initially for the purpose of  subsistence 
24 Susan Naquin and Evelyn S. Rawski, Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987), 24-25. On the granary system, see Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong et al., Nourish the  
People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650-1850 (Ann Arbor: The University of  Michigan Center 
for Chinese Studies, 1991); Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1990); Lillian M. Li, Fighting Famine in North China: State, Market, and 
Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
25 The first two figures come from James Z. Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of  Humanity: Malthusian 
Mythology and Chinese Realities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 27. The latter figure comes 
from Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population of  China, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1959), 64.
26 Anne Osborne, “Highlands and Lowlands: Economic and Ecological Interactions in the Lower Yangzi 
Region under the Qing,” in Sediments of  Time: Environment and Society in Chinese History, ed. Mark Elvin and 
Liu Ts'ui-jung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 203-234; Eduard B. Vermeer, “Population 
and Ecology along the Frontier in Qing China,” in Sediments of  Time, 235-279.
27 On new food crops, see Ping-ti Ho, “The Introduction of  American Food Plants into China,” American 
Anthropologist 57.2, pt. 1 (April 1955), 191-201; Ping-ti Ho, “American Food Plants in China,” Plant Science  
Bulletin 2.1 (1956), 1-3. These two articles are reprinted in Agriculture and Rural Connections in the Pacific,  
1500-1900, ed. James Gerber and Lei Guang (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 1-16.
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production, but commercialization increased land appropriation by Han cultivators, who altered 
patterns of  land use to profit from market connections. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
distant markets in cotton, silk, sugarcane, and even mushrooms attracted new profit-seekers to 
provinces like Guangxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan and compelled older settlers to switch out of  rice 
production. At the very least, the pressure of  commercialization and the growing scope of  market 
connections pushed farmers to intensify rice production where it existed and to expand it to other 
areas where it did not.28 
 Agrarian expansion and intensification did not occur at the same pace along the frontiers of 
the empire, for the Qing maintained—but did not uniformly or consistently enforce—prohibitions 
against migration to many of  its northern and western frontiers, especially in the first two centuries 
of  its rule. At least in principle, the Manchu rulers imposed these prohibitions to preserve local ways 
of  life and to preclude any disruption arising from permanent settlement by agrarians and traders 
from China proper. This was nowhere more so the case than in their northeast homeland, 
Manchuria. By the start of  the dynasty, Qing rulers seemed to recognize the complex relationship 
between geography and identity, and for most of  the period between the mid-seventeenth-century 
conquest and the early twentieth century, they restricted or prohibited migration from China 
proper.29 The attempt to preserve the ecological conditions for hunting and foraging in Manchuria 
was perhaps one of  many reasons for blocking Han migration.30 Although the exclusion of  settlers 
from Manchuria was clearly a special case, such policies existed for other imperial regions well into 
28 Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 249. 
29 Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of  Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies,” Journal of  
Asian Studies 59.3 (August 2000), 608, 617-618.
30 David Bello, “The Cultured Nature of  Imperial Foraging in Manchuria,” Late Imperial China 31.2 
(December 2010), 1-33.
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the nineteenth century, including Mongolia and southern Xinjiang. 
Despite the prohibitions, the decline of  environmental conditions in China proper and in 
frontier zones continued and accelerated in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the extent of 
environmental degradation caused by population growth and by the intensification and expansion of 
agriculture reveals that nineteenth-century Chinese society was facing an environmental crisis.31 The 
emerging crisis had many manifestations. The resiliency of  local ecologies in the face of  floods 
diminished in places like the lower Yangzi delta region as population expanded and encroached upon 
waterways and forests, causing deforestation and erosion.32 The empire's northern Zhili province 
“experienced China's highest rate of  natural disasters in the nineteenth century” despite the 
extensive efforts of  hydrological and disaster relief  planners.33 Pressure on the environment was also 
manifest in contentions over common resources, including disputes over the illegal construction of 
dikes around lake shores in Hunan and Zhejiang provinces and the sometimes violent 
confrontations over fisheries off  the eastern coast of  Zhejiang.34 In provinces like Yunnan, 
Guizhou, and Guangxi, the expansion of  cultivation sometimes led to the destruction of  forests and 
hillsides long used by non-Han upland peoples for their subsistence practices of  swidden cultivation, 
31 Robert Marks has concluded that “To these social, political, and intellectual crises that wracked China in 
the second half  of  the nineteenth century and helped to define what modern China was to become, I 
think we must now add an environmental crisis.” Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment  
and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 333. Lillian M. Li 
has also made a case for “environmental decline” and has referred to an “ecological crisis of  the 
nineteenth century” despite—and partially because of—the successes of  hydrological engineering in the 
preceding century. See Li, Fighting Famine in North China, 3-4, 73.  
32 Anne Osborne, “Highlands and Lowlands: Economic and Ecological Interactions in the Lower Yangzi 
Region under the Qing,” in Sediments of  Time, 203-224. 
33 Li, Fighting Famine in North China, 282.
34 For examples of  these cases of  contention over environmental resources, see Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting  
the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500-1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East 
Asian Studies, 1987); R. Keith Schoppa, Song Full of  Tears: Nine Centuries of  Chinese Life at Xiang Lake 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2002); Micah S. Muscolino, Fishing Wars and Environmental Change in Late Imperial  
and Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009). 
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hunting, and gathering.35 In regions that had already come to specialize in cash crops, energy-
intensive regimes of  multi-cropping required fertilizer inputs from locales near and far. Lower 
Yangzi delta farmers purchased night soil in local cities, but they also imported soybean cake 
fertilizer all the way from Manchuria, halfway across the empire.36 And by the early nineteenth 
century in parts of  Guangdong province, deforestation and land clearance had forced some farmers 
to use fertilizer materials like straw and dung instead of  wood as fuel, an indication of  dwindling 
energy supplies and of  the emerging contradictions between the need for fertilizer to support highly 
productive regimes of  agriculture and for fuel to cook food.37 
Chinese scholars in the nineteenth century recognized the impact that demographic growth 
had on environmental decline. They noted with great regularity that “the population is daily 
increasing” (sheng chi ri fan 生齒日繁) and they expressed deep apprehensions over the landlessness 
among a growing number of  farmers, the social delinquency resulting from urban opulence, and the 
exhaustion of  environmental resources. Attempting to come to terms with the mounting 
contradictions of  demographic and geographic expansion, contemporary observers used phrases 
like the “peril of  overpopulation” (renman zhi huan 人滿之患) and the “disturbance of  growth” (zi zhi  
rao 滋之擾).38 In the middle of  the century, a scholar from Jiangsu province, Wang Shiduo 汪士鐸 
35 Christian Daniels, “Environmental Degradation, Forest Protection and Ethno-History in Yunnan: (I) The 
Uprising by Swidden Agriculturalists in 1821,” Chinese Environmental History Newsletter 1.2 (November 
1994), 8-10; Mark Elvin, The Retreat of  the Elephants: An Environmental History of  China (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), especially the chapter on “Chinese Colonization: Guizhou and the Miao,” 
216-272.
36 Yong Xue, ““Treasure Nightsoil As If  It Were Gold:” Economic and Ecological Links between Urban 
and Rural Areas in Late Imperial Jiangnan,” Late Imperial China 26.1 (June 2005): 41-71; Li Bozhong, 
Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620-1850 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 113-114. 
37 Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt, 320.
38 Frank Dikotter, Sex, Culture and Modernity in China: Medical Science and the Construction of  Sexual Identities in the  
Early Republican Period (Honolulu: University of  Hawaii Press, 1995), 104; Lu Fu'en 陸黻恩, “Mu min tun 
bian yi”  募民屯邊議 [Discourse on recruiting people to garrison the frontier], in HJWX, 39:88a.
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(1802-1889), described the connection between population growth and land use:
The harm of  having so many people is that mountaintops have already been planted 
with grain. Along the [Yangzi] River, there are already islets serving as fields. In 
Sichuan, old forests have already been cleared. In the dells of  the Miao [people], the 
deep bamboo forests have already been opened up. Still, it is not sufficient to 
provide for [everyone], and the strength of  Heaven and Earth is exhausted.39
人多之害，山頂已殖黍稷，江中已有洲田，川中已闢老林，苗洞已開深箐，猶不足養，
天地之力窮矣。
Wang recognized that demographic pressure could easily lead to social disturbances, and he blamed 
the chaos of  his own era on the fact that there were simply too many people in the empire.40 
Perhaps just as alarming, population growth and expansion had also caused what he called the 
“strength of  Heaven and Earth” (tiandi zhi li 天地之力) to be completely used up. This observation, 
which he wrote in 1856, is just one example of  how nineteenth-century Qing scholars had come to 
see the material relationships between demographic change and environmental decline in peripheral 
zones within China proper and closer to the frontiers of  the empire. 
The Intellectual History of  Environmental Change
Although historians have begun to analyze the diverse manifestations of  ecological crisis in 
the Qing period, there remains confusion about the intellectual or cultural basis for this crisis. 
39 Wang Shiduo 汪士鐸, Wang Huiwen yibing riji   汪悔翁乙丙日記 [The diary of  Wang Shiduo, 1855-56], (Beijing: 
Liulichang wenyunge, 1936), 3:26b. Translations of  this passage are quoted in Dikotter, Sex, Culture and 
Modernity in China, 106; Frank Dikotter, “The Limits of  Benevolence: Wang Shiduo (1802-1889) and 
Population Control,” Bulletin of  the School of  Oriental and African Studies 55.1 (Feb. 1992), 112; and Eduard B. 
Vermeer, “Population and Ecology along the Frontier in Qing China,” in Sediments of  Time, 276. 
40 Wang Shiduo, Wang Huiwen yibing riji, 3:28b.
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Indeed, if  there is one way to describe the historic relationship in China between intellectual 
considerations of  the environment and the material practices of  using the resources of  the natural 
world, consensus may very well lie with the word “contradiction.” In his wide-ranging study of 
environmental change in Chinese history, for example, Mark Elvin has asserted that philosophies 
and ideas had little influence upon what he shows was a secular trend of  environmental degradation. 
He writes: “the dominant ideas and ideologies, which were often to some degree in contradiction 
with each other, appear to have little explanatory power in determining why what seems actually to 
have happened to the Chinese environment happened the way it did.”41 He does acknowledge that 
religious beliefs sometimes served as a basis for the preservation of  specific landscapes, flora, or 
fauna. For instance, sacred trees in the yards of  Buddhist monasteries may have been spared from 
felling because of  their religious value. But most of  the time, Elvin claims, the conceptual worlds of 
Chinese people had no relation to their destructive uses of  the natural world. Another example of 
this stark division between culture and materialism is found in the writing of  Robert Weller and 
Peter Bol, who have argued that the “contrast between popular practice and intellectual 
prescription” has yawned in the modern era but had always existed to a certain degree. They suggest 
that “one has only to compare Taoist prescriptions about doing nothing against the natural Way with 
the widespread deforestation and dramatic geographic transformations through terracing and water 
control that have always accompanied Chinese agriculture” to perceive the dichotomy of 
environmental thought and practice.42 
41 Mark Elvin, The Retreat of  the Elephants: An Environmental History of  China (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), 470. On the next page he goes on to say: “There seems no case for thinking that, some 
details apart, the Chinese anthropogenic environment was developed and maintained in the way it was 
over the long run of  more than three millennia because of  particular characteristically Chinese beliefs or 
perceptions.”
42 Robert P. Weller and Peter K. Bol, “From Heaven-and-Earth to Nature: Chinese Conceptions of  the 
Environment and their Influence on Policy Implementation,” in Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of  
Heaven, Earth, and Humans, ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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In part, the perception of  a division between thought and practice may arise precisely for 
reasons geographer Yi-fu Tuan pointed out over forty years ago: that European and American 
scholars have tended to pay attention to Chinese philosophies that prescribed harmony between 
people and nature and highlighted people's ability or willingness to adapt to the cycles of  the natural 
world. “As to China,” Tuan wrote, “Western humanists commonly show bias in favour of  that 
country's Taoist and Buddhist traditions. They like to point out the virtues of  the Oriental's 
quiescent and adaptive approach towards nature in contrast to the aggressive masculinity of  Western 
man.”43 Recent accounts have generally dispensed with the notion that Chinese philosophy ever 
placed humans into a singularly harmonious relationship with the natural world.44 Yet there remains 
a sense that, if  historians want to search for conceptions of  “nature” in Chinese history, they ought 
to look to major philosophical traditions like Daoism or to practices like fengshui 風水, which harbor 
the intellectual resources for living in the natural world without destroying it. Perhaps attending to 
such philosophies or practices has became all the more significant in the modern world, given the 
perceived failure of  western philosophy to overcome the division between nature and culture and to 
forestall the destruction of  the global environment. From this perspective, to search for patterns 
within Chinese thinking that pay attention only to a supposed harmony between nature and 
humanity, and to think of  environmental degradation as erring from or contradictory to this 
harmony, suggests that, in orientalist fashion, historians have been using the East as a foil for the 
University Center for the Study of  World Religions, 1998), 327.
43 Yi-fu Tuan, “Discrepancies between Environmental Attitude and Behavior: Examples from Europe and 
China,” Canadian Geographer 12.3 (1968), 181.
44 Heiner Roetz, “On Nature and Culture in Zhou China,” in Concepts of  Nature: A Chinese-European Cross-
Cultural Perspective, ed. Hans Ulrich Vogel and Gunter Dux (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 200-203, 217; also Mark 
Elvin, “Introductions,” in Concepts of  Nature, 66-67.
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environmental mistakes of  the West.45 
In this framework, moreover, Chinese philosophy has been abstracted from history, from 
patterns of  work, from the material uses of  the environment, and from its social contexts.46 
Historians of  Chinese thought have not adequately addressed the conceptual worlds that arise 
dialectically alongside productive practices, which are dismissed as little more than progenitors of 
ecological destruction. Elvin seems to dichotomize conceptions and actions when he notes that 
Chinese “beliefs and perceptions” were relatively unimportant “in comparison with the massive 
effects of  the pursuit of  power and profit in the arena provided by the possibilities and limitations 
of  the Chinese natural world, and the technologies that grew from interactions with them.”47 In 
other words, the pursuit of  power and profit and the technologies with which people have engaged 
the natural world lie squarely in the realm of  material practices, and the philosophical framework of 
that materialism requires little explication. For, from the perspective of  Elvin, as well as of  Weller 
and Bol, laboring for profit appears to be little more than a path toward environmental degradation
—an interpretation that neglects the significance of  work as a meaningful site of  social and, one 
could say, natural relations.48  
I do not want to suggest that nineteenth-century endeavors to maximize production and 
45 For an example of  this orientalism, see Hou Wenhui, “Reflections on Chinese Traditional Ideas of 
Nature,” Environmental History 2.4 (October 1997), 482-493. 
46 This is the complaint that Benjamin Elman has leveled against customary treatments of  Chinese 
philosophy and intellectual history. Benjamin A. Elman, “The Failures of  Contemporary Chinese 
Intellectual History,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 43.3 (Spring 2010): 371-391.
47 Elvin, The Retreat of  the Elephants, 471.
48 Richard White, “'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature,” in 
Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1996), 171. By calling work a site of  social and natural relations, I am not trying to suggest that relations 
with the natural world somehow stand outside of  or beyond social relationships. Rather, my intention is to 
highlight two different aspects of  the same complex network of  relationships, that human and non-
human agents are both connected to the process of  work. 
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profit did not lead to environmental degradation. Historical evidence from the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries clearly shows how policies to extend and intensify agrarian production 
exhausted many of  the environmental resources on which people had relied for their sustenance. Yet 
judging the degree of  environmental destruction need not be the primary paradigm for assessing the 
notion of  the “profits of  nature,” the techniques of  agriculture, the processes of  frontier settlement, 
or the outcomes of  peasant labor. Another way to analyze the relationship between humans and 
environment and the conceptual considerations that inhere in that relationship is to take technology 
as an axial point in the constellation of  connections among humans, nature, and ideology.49 
Technology may be an ideal jumping off  point insofar as it embodies the ability and logic of 
humans to appropriate and make use of  the materials of  the natural world, because it manifests 
material and ideological commitments to living on earth, and because it is a core component in the 
“co-production” of  society and nature.50 Technology and the processes of  production are not, in 
other words, devoid of  significant ideological or philosophical commitments. Rather, pace Elvin and 
other scholars who have seemingly overlooked the ideological nature of  production, the ways in 
49 In an oft-quoted passage that seems to belie a straightforward materialism, Karl Marx wrote that 
“Technology reveals the active relation of  man to nature, the direct process of  the production of  his life, 
and thereby it also lays bare the process of  the production of  the social relations of  his life, and of  the 
mental conceptions that flow from those relations.” Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of  Political Economy, vol. 
1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 493n4. Quoted in Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr., 
First the Seed: The Political Economy of  Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000, second ed. (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2004), 1. Far from being a statement of  technological determinism, argues David 
Harvey, Marx was describing an unending negotiation between all parts of  the material and ideological 
nexus. He interprets Marx as arguing not that technology determines social relations or the relations to 
nature, but that “technologies and organizational forms internalize a certain relation to nature as well as to 
mental conceptions and social relations, daily life and labor processes.” Harvey, A Companion to Marx's  
Capital (New York: Verso, 2010), 193. 
50 From the field of  science and technology studies, Sheila Jasanoff  has written about “co-production” as 
“shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and 
society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it.” Jasanoff, “The idiom of  co-
production,” in States of  Knowledge: The Co-production of  Science and Social Order, ed. Sheila Jasanoff  (New 
York: Routledge, 2004), 2. 
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which Chinese people attempted to draw what they called “profit” (li 利) from lands, plants, animals, 
and their labor were integral to their implicit understandings of  the natural world and how they have 
historically lived within it, regardless of  whether their actions happened to preserve or destroy their 
local environments at any given point in history.51 
Zuo's Intellectual Background
The enthusiasm with which Zuo Zongtang attempted to mobilize peasants and disseminate 
productive technologies during his agrarian campaigns reflected his strong desire to find profit in 
certain forms of  land use, especially irrigated or dryland agriculture. To be sure, many Qing scholars 
and officials talked about urging farmers to reap the “profits of  the land” (dili 地利) as a way to 
ensure society's sustenance through the material and moral fruits of  agriculture. Officials in earlier 
Chinese and conquest dynasties had also had the responsibility to promote agriculture. What sets 
apart Zuo's agrarian campaigns in the northwest was not only the nineteenth-century context of 
demographic growth and environmental crisis, as well as the urgency of  finding ways to boost 
production immediately following warfare in environments completely different from that of  his 
home. What makes Zuo's campaigns unique was also his background as a scholar-farmer who 
approached the “profits of  the land” as an intellectual problem.
Zuo's understanding of  the value of  land, production, and profit were heavily influenced by 
51 The problem of  environmental history aside, this is essentially Francesca Bray's point about writing 
histories of  technology in late imperial China: that the material practices of  employing technology were 
extremely significant for the construction of  social ideology, for the creation and maintenance of  social 
order over long periods of  time. She writes: “To think more creatively about the meaning of  technical 
choices, rather than reducing them to purely pragmatic considerations, let alone to capitalist rationality, we 
should re-embed technologies in their social and cultural context to see what agendas they served, or what 
conceptions of  society they made possible.” Bray, “Towards a critical history of  non-Western technology,” 
in China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies of  Sinological Knowledge, ed. Timothy Brook and Gregory Blue 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 207. Her book, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of  Power in  
Late Imperial China, explains in greater detail the social ideology embedded in work in late imperial China. 
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Qing-era scholarship about geography and agriculture. In both of  these fields of  learning he 
pondered questions related to the advantageous use of  land, and part of  the intellectual puzzle was 
to determine the best sources of  knowledge for understanding how to derive profit from the 
technological and social constitutions of  agriculture. In Zuo's studies of  historical geography, the 
concept of  dili (“profits of  the land”) was tied to strategic concerns about topographical positions 
and the utility of  geography for military maneuvers. When Zuo turned his attention to agricultural 
learning, dili became a question of  agrarian technology and technique. Despite their different 
readings of  functions of  land, both geography and agriculture belonged to the realm “practical 
studies” (shixue 實學) that occupied Zuo's attention in his twenties and thirties, during the 1830s and 
1840s, as his prospects for passing the highest level of  the imperial examinations dimmed. 
Geography and agriculture as fields of  learning were also central concerns for scholars in Hunan 
involved in the vogue for learning about “statecraft” (jingshi 經世) just as Zuo was coming of  age as a 
scholar. He and other Hunanese scholars took interest in statecraft subjects in part to solve daunting 
problems facing the empire, including the growing array of  dilemmas related to demographic 
expansion. 
Styles of  learning also demonstrated Zuo's great debt to intellectual trends in the Qing 
period. Zuo took many of  his intellectual cues and his language of  study from an earlier generation 
of  scholars, seventeenth-century loyalists of  the Ming dynasty who had seen their society crumble in 
the face of  the Manchu conquest. Motived by political crisis to make their scholarship meaningful to 
society, many of  these scholars were forerunners in the movement of  so-called “evidential 
learning” (kaozheng xue 考證學) who critically examined sources of  knowledge and who carefully 
located and presented evidence to support their analyses of  social and natural phenomena. In 
dealing with the concept and value of  dili, for example, Zuo grappled with the usefulness of 
22
experiential, tacit, and localized knowledge on the one hand, and codified, mobile, and printed 
knowledge on the other hand. This problematic shaped his ideas for how to balance sources of 
knowledge when determining how to use land profitably and how to entice farmers to adopt 
agrarian technologies. In this sense, Zuo's search for profit was framed by an underlying concern to 
ascertain how best to know land and its productive capacities, and in the 1830s and 1840s, he turned 
toward research and experimental practice in Hunan to resolve these questions. 
In the same period, Zuo began to learn about a body of  scholarship collectively called 
“northwest studies” (xibei zhi xue 西北之學) and, for the first time, he acquired knowledge about 
distant lands along the northern and western imperial frontiers that the Qing had conquered in the 
previous two centuries. He read sources that introduced him to information about Xinjiang, 
including the mid-eighteenth-century Illustrated Gazetteer of  the Western Regions (Xiyu tuzhi 西域圖志) 
commissioned by the Qianlong emperor as well as guidebooks and travelogues penned by scholars 
who had gone to Xinjiang in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.52 In the mid-1840s, 
as a young man in his thirties, Zuo even met with Lin Zexu  林澤徐 (1785-1850), the high-ranking 
Qing official who had been exiled to Xinjiang for his supposed bungling of  the Opium War and 
who had tried to promote agrarian production and to develop irrigation systems in several of 
Xinjiang's oases during his three-year exile. Another vein of  scholarship about Xinjiang in the 1830s 
came from scholars who had begun to see the imperial borderlands as an open space ready for 
colonization by landless farmers from China proper. Zuo read their proposals and even appropriated 
52 ZZN, 1:16a. On “northwest studies,” see several articles by Zhao Lisheng, “Lun wan Qing xibei zhi xue 
de xingqi”  論晚清西北之學的興起 [On the rise of  northwest studies in the late Qing]; “Xibei xue de tuohuang 
zhe zhi yi—Xu Song” 西北學的 —  拓荒者之一 徐松 [A pioneer of  northwestern studies—Xu Song]; and “Xibei 
xue de tuohuang zhe zhi yi—Zhang Mu” —  西北學的拓荒者之一 張穆 [A pioneer of  northwestern studies—
Zhang Mu]; all three essays are in Zhao Lisheng 趙儷生, Zhao Lisheng shixue lunzhu zi xuanji 趙儷生史學論著自
 選集 [Collection of  self-selected historiographical essays by Zhao Lisheng], (Jinan: Shandong daxue 
chubanshe, 1996), 461-491.
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their language to describe the far northwest as an “outlet” for demographic pressure within China 
proper. In this sense, Zuo's intellectual background did not just enable him to find technical 
solutions for northwest agriculture. It also prepared him to envision northwest lands as a geographic 
solution to the “weight of  numbers” in China proper, to turn the task of  solving environmental 
crises into an issue of  spatial relations. 
If  there was one more intellectual consideration relevant to Zuo's agrarian campaigns, it may 
have been the hierarchical view of  the agents of  worldly phenomena in which humans had the 
decisive role in bringing to fruition what the natural world had initiated. Behind his campaigns was a 
logic about the relationship between human work and the natural environment in which labor 
enabled crops to flourish out of  conditions that had existed prior to human activity. As Wei 
Guangtao had inscribed in the stele about tree-planting campaigns in 1878, “The myriad creatures 
are fundamentally nurtured by the natural environment of  Heaven and Earth, but their fruition lies 
with people.”53 Sentiments like this that made human actions the counterpart of  the workings of 
Heaven and Earth had precedents in classical political philosophy. Yet when Qing scholars repeated 
this type of  claim, they more often rendered the agents that appeared in classical philosophy—
Heaven (tian 天), Earth (di 地), and humans (ren 人)—as factors of  production in agriculture. In 
pursuing his agrarian campaigns, Zuo Zongtang attempted to balance the relationship between these 
factors, to make the most of  human labor and agrarian knowledge, and thereby overcome the 
obstacles presented by ecological conditions in the northwest.
Agrarian Campaigns, Material Connections, and Ecological Resemblance
The material connections between China proper and the northwest frontiers wrought by 
53
萬物本乾坤鍾毓而成之在人. Wei, “Wuwei jun ge ying pin nian zhong shu ji,” 831.
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Zuo Zongtang's agrarian campaigns began with his travel to the region. In the wake of  devastation 
caused by his own armies, he witnessed the ruins of  destroyed villages and abandoned landscapes, 
first in Shaanxi and then in Gansu. He reported seeing and hearing the victims of  starvation in 
communities largely absent of  people but increasingly inhabited by wolves.54 He gradually moved his 
military headquarters westward across these provinces after his army had quelled signs of  rebellion. 
He planted himself  for nearly four years each in the capital of  Gansu, Lanzhou, and later in a 
smaller city some 700 kilometers to the northwest and close to the end of  the Great Wall, Suzhou 肅
州.55 In the summer and fall of  1880, he spent some five months stationed in Hami, an oasis city in 
the east of  Xinjiang which marked the westernmost point of  his journey. It was from these various 
locations that he oversaw the agrarian campaigns.
These campaigns were part of  wider efforts for reconstruction (shanhou善後) throughout the 
Qing empire following the military crises of  the mid-nineteenth century.56 They involved 
provisioning food aid to refugees as a measure of  disaster relief, resettling farmers, promoting 
agriculture, repairing irrigation systems, planting trees, and rebuilding roadways and city 
infrastructure. Yet in promoting agriculture and settlement, Zuo and others did not hope merely to 
rebuild what had previously existed. Zuo's agrarian campaigns were aimed, in some measure, at 
transforming the productiveness of  northwest lands through the application of  specialist 
knowledge, technology, and labor. For example, Zuo initiated a program to develop Xinjiang's 
sericulture industry by importing specialists, mulberry trees, and silkworms from Zhejiang province, 
a project in which he claimed to be “spreading the profits of  Zhejiang” into the northwest. As he 
54 Letter of  TZ8/12/16 (1870), ZZQ, 13:145.
55 Not to be confused with the famous Jiangnan city named Suzhou 蘇州. 
56 For a perspective on reconstruction in post-Taiping Nanjing and on the meaning of  shanhou, see William 
Charles Woodbridge, “Transformations of  Ritual and State in Nineteenth-Century Nanjing” (Ph.D. diss, 
Princeton University, 2007), 199. 
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disseminated agrarian know-how to farmers by consulting with them or by circulating texts, and as 
he brought tools and organisms from other regions of  the empire, Zuo strove to make Xinjiang's 
sericulture resemble Zhejiang's sericulture, an endeavor that proved much more difficult than he 
imagined. 
Other aspects of  Zuo's agrarian campaigns were demographic. Abandoned or unused land 
required human labor to become productive and Zuo's fellow officials devised policies to promote 
resettlement. Here was an underriding irony of  late nineteenth-century settlement policy. The 
violence of  rebellion and its suppression had greatly reduced the population in some of  the core 
regions of  China proper, including the region south of  the lower reaches of  the Yangzi River, 
Jiangnan, where the Taiping Rebellion had wreaked havoc on local communities.57 This 
depopulation temporarily eased the demographic pressure on land and the consequent 
environmental degradation in these regions. But one major thrust of  population policy into the last 
decades of  the nineteenth century remained sending people to the frontiers. As he planned for the 
colonization of  the northwest, Zuo relied foremost on his soldiers to take up farming tools and 
cultivate land. But civilians, too, would be required, and he intended them to come from China 
proper. It was this combination of  military and civilian labor that began to enable the expansion of 
agricultural production in Xinjiang in the 1880s. 
This, then, was Zuo's colonial project in the northwest. Thousands of  kilometers from his 
home, he attempted to create productive landscapes along the ecological margins of  the empire and 
to make those territories more integrated into the Qing state. These had the potential to be 
“transplanted landscapes”—the “familiar and useful landscapes” that arose as Chinese moved 
57 On the destruction and depopulation in Zhejiang, see Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political  
Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 55-56.
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overseas or far afield and put land to the same patterns of  use that they had back at home.58 
Bringing people and plants into the northwest held open the prospect of  drawing new, tenuous lines 
of  demographic and ecological connection and resemblance between far flung regions of  the 
empire. Replication—of  agrarian technologies, patterns of  landholding, organisms, seeds—became 
a fundamental motif  in Zuo's campaigns to promote agriculture and remake devastated lands into 
fecund landscape. 
Insofar as it was Zuo and other people from southern and eastern China leading the quest 
for replication, it put the southeast and the northwest, and the people of  both of  the those 
locations, into new relations. Zuo strove to promote colonization and to reproduce technologies and 
plants from China proper in its northwest provinces and in the oases of  Xinjiang. While stipulations 
sometimes enabled Muslim war refugees to return to their land or migrate to claim open land, 
resettlement policies typically identified migrants from China proper as the best laborers for new 
farm lands. Zuo took this one step further. In a debate with another scholar about how to handle 
masses of  landless Manchus in Beijing, Zuo asserted that the farmers to be settled in Xinjiang 
should be Han farmers, to whom he ascribed a level of  technical knowledge about and experience 
with agriculture unsurpassed by other groups. In this sense, productive agriculture in the northwest 
would be replicated alongside a particular identity that had been objectified in the ethnonym “Han” 
漢. Zuo then articulated the technological aptitude of  people subsumed within this unified Han 
identity vis-a-vis the knowledge and skills of  other groups of  people whom he identified using other 
ethnonyms.59 The first group, who primarily inhabited cities and countrysides in Shaanxi and Gansu 
58 J.R. McNeill borrowed the term from Edgar Anderson, Plants, Man and Animals (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1952). See J.R. McNeill, “China's Environmental History in World Perspective,” in Sediments of  Time:  
Environment and Society in Chinese History, ed. Mark Elvin and Liu Ts'ui-jung (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 45.
59 The postwar agrarian campaigns were carried out in regions populated (or previously populated) by 
peoples who Zuo recognized as unlike himself  and many of  his own troops. On ethnicity in Zuo's army, 
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provinces as well as some oasis cities in northern Xinjiang, were those whom Qing scholars 
identified as Hui Muslims (hui 回).60 The second group, who resided almost exclusively in the oasis 
cities and surrounding countrysides of  Xinjiang and whose modern ethnonym would likely be 
Uyghur, were Turkic Muslims to whom nineteenth-century Chinese referred by noting the “wrap” 
or “binding” (chan 纏) worn around their heads.61 As Zuo encountered these people and the lands on 
which they had resided, he took the agrarian technologies and cultivation practices of  China proper
—and even the central part of  China proper, what he called the “central lands” (zhongtu 中土)62—as 
the benchmark for appraising local production and for promoting its transformation. Documents 
about northwest China from the late nineteenth century rarely provide descriptions of  agrarian 
practices in these regions. Yet a few sources reveal Zuo's scorn for local practices and his desire to 
replicate technical knowledge, plants, and labor from China proper.  
The idea of  transforming inferior and uncivilized people on the peripheries of  a cultured 
and governed Chinese polity through moral instruction and education, the so-called “Confucian 
civilizing project,”63 had long been central to literati identity and had shaped the way cultured people 
see Lanny Bruce Fields, “Ethnicity in Tso Tsung-t'ang's Armies: The Campaigns in Northwest China, 
1867-1880,” in Ethnicity and the Military in Asia, ed. Dewitt C. Ellinwood and Cynthia H. Enloe (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 1981), 53-88.
60 On the problems of  ethnic terminology and for the history of  the category now called “Hui” in the 
contemporary People's Republic, see Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of  Muslims in  
Northwest China (Seattle: University of  Washington, 1997), xxii-xxv.
61 There is no one single Chinese term that late Qing officials like used to describe Turkic Muslims in 
Xinjiang. Common referents included chanmin  纏民 (“wrapped [headed] people”), chantou  纏頭 (“wrapped 
heads”), or chanhui  纏回 (“wrapped [headed] Muslim”). A Uyghur mentor commented that such referents 
are considered derogatory nowadays (April 2009), but from nineteenth-century Chinese documents alone 
it is hard to determine the tone of  these referents at the time. A less common term also used in 
nineteenth-century documents is huamen  花門 (lit. “flower door”). 
62 The term “central lands” zhongtu has no single definition in historical sources prior to the nineteenth 
century. It seems likely that Zuo used the term to refer broadly to the historical centers of  Chinese 
population along the lower and middle reaches of  the Yellow and Yangzi rivers and the land in between 
them. 
63 Stevan Harrell, “Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them,” in Cultural Encounters on 
China's Ethnic Frontiers, ed. Stevan Harrell (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 1995), 18-20. 
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articulated their own identities vis-a-vis people on the frontiers. But Han travelers to the peripheries 
and officials serving in those regions also sometimes expressed transfomative rhetoric about the 
lands, vegetation, and natural environments they encountered. Indeed, there was precedent for the 
idea of  environmental transformation in the northwest prior to Zuo Zongtang's intervention. The 
poetry of  Ji Yun  紀昀 (1724-1805), for example, imagined that spontaneous environmental 
transformations had followed the Qing conquest of  Xinjiang. Exiled to the borderland for several 
years owing to malfeasance while in office, Ji wrote many poems about his experience, and in a note 
accompanying one poem, he claimed that climate change had coincided with the transformation of 
the territory's political status. According to the note, temperatures in the largest northern city, 
Urumqi, had risen since the arrival of  Qing power in the region, such that the climate had “gradually 
become similar to China proper” (jian tong neidi 漸同内地).64 
Scholars like this harbored aesthetic interests in transforming northwest environments on 
the basis of  their knowledge of  natural environments in China proper. Such desires were not fully 
explained by regular references to agrarian production and profit. For Zuo Zongtang, the aesthetic 
commitment to transformation could be as simple as his personal desire to import vegetable seeds 
from the southeast to be grown in gardens that he established in the northwest, including gardens at 
his military outpost in Hami. These gardens reportedly provided him with vegetables unavailable 
64 Ji Yun 紀昀, Wulumiqi zashi  烏魯木齊雜詩 [Assorted poetry from Urumqi], fengtu 3, reproduced in Wu Aichen 
吳藹宸, ed., Lidai xiyu shicao  曆代西域詩鈔 [Copies of  poetry of  the western regions from past eras], 
(Urumchi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2001), 79. The poem and its accompanying note are quoted in 
James A. Millward, “Towards a Xinjiang Environmental History: Evidence from Space, the Ground, and 
in Between,” in Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in 17-20th Centuries, ed. James A. Millward, Shinmen 
Yasushi, and Sugawara Jun (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2010), 292. On Ji Yun, see also Peter C. Perdue, China 
Marches West: The Qing Conquest of  Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of  Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 428; Peter C. Perdue, “Sustainable Development on China's Frontiers,” in Natures  
Past: The Environment and Human History, ed. Paolo Squatriti (Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 
2007), 187. Other examples of  the aesthetic appropriation of  Qing landscapes through travel writing can 
be found in Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan's Imagined Geography. 
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locally, allowing him to replicate and to savor the flavors of  home. This was transformation-via-
replication on a small but noticeable scale. But the rhetoric of  transformation always seemed to tend 
toward grandiose visions. In reports back to Beijing, Zuo described how postwar dearth had been 
changed into verdant fields through the labor of  his army. A similar tone pervaded Wei Guangtao's 
stele: the greenery provided by rows of  trees had given color to a landscape previously barren and 
had made Gansu a more integral part of  the empire.  
To be sure, the rhetoric of  successful environmental transformation was often overblown. 
Officials along the frontier papered over the frustrations and reversals of  their attempts to promote 
agriculture with terse fabrications about green, bountiful landscapes or hospitable climes. They had 
an incentive to report the success of  their policies, which sometimes meant reveling in the 
environmental transformation caused by them regardless of  their effectiveness. In this regard, Qing 
officials may not have been different from their counterparts in other early modern empires, whose 
reporting made imperial power seem more efficacious and more coherent that it was in reality. Zuo 
Zongtang and other officials around him may have had special incentive. His military ventures into 
the northwest were extremely costly and required massive foreign loans from colonial British banks 
backed by customs duties in the treaty ports.65 This fact alone suggests that the venture to remake 
agriculture along the colonial peripheries was much less unitary than nationalist historians have 
suggested. Nor was the environmental transformation ever as complete as official documents 
sometimes claimed. The discourse of  transformation was at once laudatory and imaginary, and in 
these ways it served imperial officials like Zuo, for whom success in agriculture was a significant part 
65 For Zuo's reconquest of  Xinjiang, Beijing authorized a loan of  five million taels from the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank, with an equal amount coming from other sources. See C. John Stanley, Late Ch ing Finance:ʻ  
Hu Kuang-yung as an Innovator (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1961), 
48-54; Chu Wen-djang [Zhu Wenzhang], The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, 1862-1878: A Study of  
Government Minority Policy (The Hague: Mouton, 1966). 
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of  claiming and appropriating territory.  
Yet to suggest that the rhetoric of  environmental transformation along the frontiers was 
sometimes hyperbolic is not to dismiss the significance of  material relationships created by Zuo's 
interventions in northwest agriculture in the late nineteenth century. In a century best known for 
imperial disintegration, perhaps even the report of  some trees growing green in the soils of  Gansu 
is an indication that we should look more closely for connections between intellectual life and 




Learning about Land: Imperial Geography and Local Knowledge
“When I was eighteen or nineteen years of  age,” Zuo Zongtang said years later, “I bought 
books with abandon.”1 Like many aspiring scholars in their youth, Zuo spent hours reading and 
memorizing classical texts and their commentaries. Studying such books was the established route to 
scoring well on the examinations for degrees at the local (shengyuan 生員), provincial (juren 舉任), and 
metropolitan (jinshi 進士) levels within the Qing bureaucracy. Although exams at the provincial and 
metropolitan levels included policy questions, the majority of  exam questions in the nineteenth 
century focused upon the textual exegesis of  eight different passages from classic works of 
philosophy, history, and poetry.2 At the age of  six Zuo had begun to read standard canonical works 
like the Analects (Lunyu 論語) and the Mencius (Mengzi 孟子).3 Works like this were not the kind of 
books he so enthusiastically purchased in 1829. The texts that he bought, which were all treatises 
about historical geography, elicited skepticism and scorn among many others preparing to climb 
their way up through the hierarchy of  examinations and into coveted bureaucratic posts. “Scholars 
only know that there are works for the imperial examinations,” Zuo complained. “They saw me 
taking a liking to these books, and all of  them snickered and thought it useless.”4  
Zuo never succeeded in winning a high-ranking position in the Qing bureaucracy by means 
1 This age refers to his sui 歲. Zuo Xiaotong 左孝同, Xiankao shilue  先考事略 [Biographical sketch of  my 
deceased father], quoted in ZZN, 1:7a. Zuo Xiaotong's work appears to be no longer extant.
2 On the composition of  questions on bureaucratic examinations in late imperial times, see Benjamin A. 




士人但知有舉業，見吾好此等書，莫不竊笑，以為無所用之. Zuo Xiaotong, Xiankao shilue, quoted in ZZN, 1:7a, 
emphasis added.
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of  the examination system. In the 1830s, he thrice failed to pass the metropolitan exam, held in the 
imperial capital at Beijing roughly every three years. For several decades, Zuo's career options were 
limited to small-time teaching jobs in his home province, Hunan. And so it may seem that the 
criticism leveled against Zuo was vindicated by his failure to achieve a bureaucratic post. Yet the 
books about geography that Zuo purchased in 1829 propelled his studies well beyond the normal 
subject matter of  the examinations. They gave him grounding in so-called “practical studies” (shixue  
實學) that enabled his indirect route into the bureaucracy beginning in the early 1850s, when he was 
recruited to be a private advisor to the provincial governor of  Hunan. 
Zuo Zongtang's intellectual upbringing on texts other than those central to the imperial 
examinations influenced his vision of  the natural and social worlds of  the Qing empire in the 
nineteenth century. It was his studies of  geography and agriculture that shaped his notions of  how 
to use land strategically in two ways, for security and for production. His research into historical 
geography and his practices of  map-making enabled him to learn about military strategy as a 
function of  topography. Significantly, they also led him to appropriate the geographical scholarship 
of  Ming loyalists for his own political concerns, namely to support the social and territorial integrity 
of  the Qing empire during the nineteenth-century decades of  its deepest crises. In this chapter, I 
examine how Zuo's studies of  geography manifested his commitment to “practical studies” and to 
the ethos of  empiricism that ran through much of  Qing scholarship. I also demonstrate that, in his 
search for geographical knowledge, Zuo faced the question of  how best to learn about topographies 
that were beyond his personal knowledge. What could he learn from maps and texts about lands 
distant from Hunan? What was the place of  local knowledge in his studies of  geography?
Despite the scorn heaped upon him by other scholars, Zuo's excitement about geography, 
agriculture, and other subjects was not out of  the ordinary in early nineteenth-century Hunan. The 
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province was a hotbed of  late imperial scholarship that refocused scholars' attention away from 
esoteric intellectual concerns to the practical affairs of  governance, one of  the important scholastic 
treads that is often grouped together with other Qing-era trends under the name “statecraft” (jingshi 
經世).5 Schools in the provincial capital, Changsha, were particularly well-known for their promotion 
of  studies of  practical matters pertaining to governance. The city's Yuelu Academy (Yuelu shuyuan 岳
麓書院) was at the forefront of  statecraft scholasticism and practical studies under the leadership of 
Luo Dian  羅典 (1717-1808). It was this emphasis on practical studies that made the school a site of 
intellectual dynamism in the 1820s, right as Zuo Zongtang was moving quickly to acquire accessory 
knowledge for a successful career.6 In 1830, Zuo became acquainted with one of  the Yuelu 
Academy's top early nineteenth-century alumni, He Changling  賀長齡 (1785-1848), whom he 
repeatedly sought for conversation and for the chance to borrow books. The following year, Zuo 
enrolled in a school closely related to Yuelu and also in Changsha, the Chengnan Academy (Chengnan 
shuyuan 城南書院).7 It was at Chengnan that Zuo studied with He Changling's younger brother, He 
Xiling  賀熙齡 (1788-1846), who later become one of  Zuo's regular correspondents in the years 
before Xiling's death.8 Through his studies in Changsha, his connection to the He brothers, and his 
own penchant for books dealing with the geography and other practical subjects, Zuo tapped into 
the early nineteenth-century Hunan vogue for statecraft. 
Researching imperial geography also connected Zuo to longstanding scholarly trends in the 
Qing period. He was deeply influenced by the spirit of  the widely variegated movement of 
5 Peng Minghui 彭明輝, Wan Qing de jingshi shixue  晚清的經世史學 [Historiography of  late Qing statecraft], 
(Taibei: Maitian chuban, 2002). 
6 Daniel McMahon, “The Yuelu Academy and Hunan's Nineteenth-Century Turn Toward Statecraft,” Late  
Imperial China 26.1 (June 2005): 72-109.
7 ZZN, 1:8a.
8 On the biographies of  He Changling and He Xiling, see ECCP, 281-282.
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“evidential learning” (kaozheng xue 考證學).9 Evidential learning had arisen in the seventeenth century 
in wake of  the Manchu conquest of  China and the downfall of  the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). Its 
early proponents reacted strongly to what they saw as the abstract or superficial concerns of  Neo-
Confucian philosophy that had occupied scholars during the Song (960-1276) and Ming eras. 
Instead, they embraced scholarship grounded in textual empiricism, and they turned their attention 
to new topics of  study. For instance, in his Record of  Daily Knowledge (Ri zhi lu 日知錄), one of 
evidential learning's early practitioners, Gu Yanwu  顧炎武 (1613-1682), “would scrutinize every fact 
and thoroughly confirm it with supporting evidence; only then would he write it down in his 
book.”10 This method of  research set Gu and other proponents of  evidential learning apart from 
scholars of  previous eras who had relied on deductive logic or speculative reasoning. Moreover, 
many Qing scholars favored evidence found in ancient texts rather than more recent ones and they 
criticized the mistakes of  republished texts burdened by textual errors and misleading 
interpretations. In other words, they placed a high value on thorough textual research that would 
lead them back to original sources as a means to correct the errors of  scholars in the intervening 
centuries.11 Finally, evidential scholars shifted their focus away from what they considered useless 
subjects of  study—especially the idealist concerns of  Neo-Confucianism—toward subjects that 
were purportedly more grounded and relevant to governance, including history, geography, 
linguistics, hydrology, astronomy, and mathematics. Research in these subjects was a means to 
9 On Qing intellectual trends, see Benjamin Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of  
Change in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984); 
Liang Qichao 梁啟超, Qingdai xueshu gailun  清代學術概論 [Survey of  Qing dynasty learning], (Shanghai: 
Shangwu yinshuguan, 1934); and for an English translation, see Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Intellectual Trends in the  
Ch'ing Period, trans. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959). 
10 From the Siku quanshu passage on Gu's book, cited in Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period, 
31. On Gu's biography, see ECCP, 421-426. 
11 Liang Qichao called this “liberation through a return to the ancients” (yi fugu wei jiefang 以復古為解放). Liang 
Qichao, Qingdai xueshu gailun (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1994 [1921]), 13, quoted in Peng, Wan 
Qing de jingshi shixue, 5.
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transcend the perceived irrelevance of  earlier scholarship and fashion their scholarship as politically 
meaningful and useful. In no small way did many early Qing scholars blame frivolous and 
disengaged scholarship for the decay of  Ming society and for the subsequent conquest of  China by 
the Manchus. 
Although historians have traced the main threads of  the evidential learning movement in 
textual scholarship, the movement as pursued by Qing scholars was neither unified nor restricted to 
textual research. The empiricism of  the era went beyond extensive evaluation of  evidence in textual 
sources as the path to knowledge. Experiential methods of  learning, including personal observation 
and practice, also animated evidential studies. Several early Qing scholars, including Yan Yuan 顏元 
(1635-1704) and his student Li Gong  李塨 (1659-1733), were reputedly averse to overly bookish 
learning and advocated experiential learning and physical activity as the means to accrue useful 
knowledge about the world: “Knowledge should not be sought by introspection, nor from books, 
but from daily activities.”12 Yan had lost all faith in Song scholarship in 1668, when the death of  his 
foster grandmother prompted him to examine closely Song texts about mourning practices, 
especially the book of  Family Rituals (Jia li 家禮). He discovered discrepancies between this text and 
the original classics on which it was based, prompting him to disavow Song and Ming studies in 
preference for practical studies. For him, “practice” (xi 習) became the fundamental route to 
knowledge, and the year after his abrupt intellectual transformation, he changed the name of  his 
own studio to the “Studio of  Practice” (Xi zhai 習齋) to reflect his new intellectual orientation.13 
By the early nineteenth century, the city of  Changsha and its two academies, Yuelu and 
12 Cited in Liang, Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period, 22.
13 On Yan's biography, including his intellectual transformation, see ECCP, 913-915. The idea of  “practice” 
was extremely important for both Yan and his student Li Gong. After Yan's death, Li established the 
“Schoolhouse of  the Studio of  Practice” (Xi zhai xueshe 習齋學舍) in Boye, Zhili province, in honor of  his 
late teacher. See ECCP, 477.
36
Chengnan, had become important sites for the propagation of  diverse scholarly trends comprising 
evidential learning, including personal experience as a means to knowledge. Yuelu's headmaster, Luo 
Dian, devoted time to training his students in experiential learning and he organized field trips that 
pulled his students away from textual analysis, at least temporarily. According to Daniel McMahon, 
Luo guided students on outings into the hills behind their school, a space which served as a “hands-
on venue for the study of  flora and folk customs” and a place to debate “classics and contemporary 
affairs.”14 What motivated these outings was Liu's desire to train students in inductive logic, to use 
observation as the stepping stone to knowledge; the trips amounted to a “fusion of  empirical 
observation of  nature with a Yuelu faith in a cultivated mind’s capacity to grasp socially relevant 
truth.”15 Hallmarks of  Yuelu training in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
observation and experience were the keys to understanding both the natural and social worlds of 
one's surroundings. 
Learning about the world through observation and experience was an important 
characteristic of  Zuo's own intellectual development, especially in the 1830s and 1840s when he 
tried his hand at agriculture and conducted experiments with various cultivars on his farm, as I show 
in the next chapter. Yet Zuo's intellectual investigations of  the world began with books, and perhaps 
no text provided him such a broad introduction to statecraft and to the trends of  evidential learning 
as the 1827 publication of  the Statecraft Compilation of  the Dynasty (Huangchao jingshi wenbian 皇朝經世文
編). Zuo's interest in and close reading of  this text was no mere coincidence. Its two editors were 
both Yuelu Academy alumni. The man who spearheaded the compilation project, He Changling, 
became one of  Zuo's mentors, and the man who was its primary editor, Wei Yuan  魏源 (1794-1856), 
14 McMahon, “The Yuelu Academy and Hunan's Nineteenth-Century Turn Toward Statecraft,” 84.
15 Ibid., 85.
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was a native of  Hunan who later authored several important works on history and geography.16 The 
compilation extended to 120 volumes, which contained reprinted and newly printed essays by Qing 
scholars about a wide range of  topics dealing with statecraft, from taxes, revenues, and bureaucratic 
personnel to hydrology and agriculture, to military strategy and geography.17 One of  the most 
famous and influential publications of  the nineteenth century, the Statecraft Compilation was a 
bellwether of  the high tide of  interest in statecraft and a vehicle for exposing scholars like Zuo to a 
wide range of  evidential scholarship from the previous two centuries.   
The Politics of  Geography in Zuo Zongtang's World
Zuo's first significant exposure to geographical studies began in 1829, when he purchased 
several treatises and compilations dealing with historical geography. Despite the criticism he 
received, Zuo remained enthralled by the topographic and strategic knowledge contained in such 
works, and he spent entire days filling blank volumes with notes on information he found useful. 
This was particularly true of  one voluminous treatise, the Essentials of  Historical Geography (Dushi  
fangyu jiyao 讀史方輿紀要), written by early Qing scholar Gu Zuyu  顧祖禹 (1631-1692).18  Referring to 
Gu's treatise, Zuo claimed that he “pondered it with great concentration” and “delighted in its 
recording of  mountains and rivers, strategic and remote locations, and guidelines for attacking and 
16 Susan Mann Jones and Philip A. Kuhn, “Dynastic Decline and the Roots of  Rebellion,” in The Cambridge  
History of  China, vol. 10, pt. 1, Late Ch'ing 1800–1911, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), 149.
17 The compilation's 120 volumes were divided up into eight different primary topics: academics (xueshu 學術, 
6 vols.), systems of  governance (zhiti 治體, 8 vols.), personnel administration (lizheng 吏政, 11 vols.), revenue 
administration (huzheng 户政, 28 vols.), rites administration (lizheng 禮政, 16 vols.), military administration 
(bingzheng 兵政, 20 vols.), punishment administration (xingzheng 刑政, 5 vols.), and works administration 
(gongzheng 工政, 26 vols.). The latter six corresponded to the Six Ministries (liubu 六部), which were 
administrative organs of  the central government.
18 On Gu Zuyu's biography, see ECCP, 419-20. Zuo Xiaotong, Xiankao shilue, quoted in ZZN, 1:7a
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defending, which [Gu] knows like the back of  his hand.”19 Zuo also obtained copies of  an enormous 
work of  geography by a pioneer of  evidential learning, Gu Yanwu, entitled Advantages and Weaknesses  
of  Prefectures and Kingdoms in the Realm (Tianxia junguo libing shu 天下郡國利病書).20 
Zuo's interest in these treatises represented an important but little recognized shift in the 
way geographical knowledge came to serve the interests of  the Qing empire. As a young scholar and 
a hopeful future member of  the Qing bureaucracy, Zuo was preparing to serve the state. Yet the 
texts that he read in the 1830s were not written several centuries earlier for the benefit of  the Qing 
state. In fact, both Gu Zuyu and Gu Yanwu—as well as other early proponents and practitioners of 
evidential learning—were inspired to blaze new paths in scholarship in part because their own 
society had been conquered by the Manchus in the 1640s. They reacted to what they saw as the 
decrepitude of  late Ming intellectual and political life that had allowed Ming society to crumble and 
the Qing to become ascendant, a process that had been physically devastating for the cities and 
countrysides of  China proper.21 Scholars chose different ways of  dealing with the transition crisis in 
the mid-seventeenth century. Gu Yanwu, who was in his 30s during the Manchu invasion, refused to 
serve in the new Manchu-ruled Qing bureaucracy for the remainder of  his life—nearly forty years. 
He had organized armed resistance to their invasion in his hometown of  Kunshan, Jiangsu, in 1645. 
Thereafter he refused to serve as on official in the new dynasty despite suggestions from friends to 
sit for the examinations or join scholarly initiatives sponsored by the Qing government.22 Gu Zuyu, 
by contrast, seems to have served the Qing state insofar as he participated in the compilation of  a 
19
潛心玩索。喜其所載山川險要，戰守機宜，瞭如指掌。Zuo Xiaotong, Xiankao shilue, quoted in ZZN, 1:7a. 
20 On Gu Yanwu's biography, see ECCP, 421-25.
21 On the Manchu takeover of  China, see Frederic Wakeman, The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction 
of  Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1985); Lynn 
A. Struve, Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tigers' Jaws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
22 ECCP, 422. 
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new geographical gazetteer of  the empire, the Comprehensive Gazetteer of  the Great Qing (Da Qing yitong  
zhi 大清一統志), in 1689.23 But he, too, had tried to resist the Qing. He had fled southward in 1674 to 
join the forces of  Geng Jingzhong  耿精忠 (d. 1682) in Fujian province during the anti-Qing rebellion 
of  the Three Feudatories (San fan 三藩) until its defeat in 1676.24 
The political disposition of  these two scholars toward the Qing did not relegate them to the 
sidelines of  scholarship, as is evident from their work on massive geographies. To a large extent, 
their scholarship became the avenue for their political sentiments. Gu Zuyu's reason for writing the 
Essentials of  Historical Geography was connected directly to the downfall of  Ming society and to his 
desire to provide fellow scholars with the geographical knowledge to defend their society against 
intellectual and political decay. In the preface to his magnum opus, he obliquely referred to his 
disappointment about the lack of  knowledge among Ming scholars and officials and their 
helplessness in the face of  crisis to explain his desire to compile the work: 
I have done this book with strong hopes that the world will have foreknowledge of 
[its contents]. Those without foreknowledge who felt frustrated and did not know 
which course to take were in charge of  the affairs of  the world and handled the 
weighty [matters] of  the state. Once their hands were tied, they gave up [the state] to 
other people. It is for this reason that my deceased father wailed in fury and grief, 
and wrung his wrists until his death.25
凡吾所以為此書者，亦重望夫世之先知之也。不先知之，而以惘然無所適從者，任天下
之事，舉宗廟社稷之重，一旦束手而畀之他人，此先君子所為憤痛呼號，扼腕以至於死
23 ECCP, 420. 
24 ECCP, 420. 
25 Gu Zuyu, “Dushi fangyu jiyao xu”  讀史方輿紀要序 [Preface to Essentials of  Historical Geography], in HJWB, 
78:2a; Gu Zuyu, “Zong xu er”  總敍二 [Second general preface], in Dushi fangyu jiyao [Essentials of  historical 
geography], (1811; repr. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1955), 14.
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也。
Although Gu did not mention the Manchu conquest of  Ming society, his statements obliquely 
suggest that he viewed Ming scholars as fundamentally incapable of  effective action because they 
lacked the requisite knowledge. His father's dour presentiments about society before the collapse of 
the Ming were particularly influential in motivating Gu to pursue politically useful geographical 
research. He recorded that his father's last words convinced him to undertake such a project.26 The 
result was a compendium of  geographic information that Gu expanded from five to 130 volumes 
covering topography, history, and toponyms for hundreds of  different locations within the empire. 
Gu Yanwu's scholarly initiative was likewise motivated by the downfall of  the Ming. The 
introductions to his work contained references to the shortcomings of  officials of  the Ming more 
oblique than the other Gu's work. He wrote that, after failing the provincial examination in 1639, he 
“retreated [from the world] and studied. I perceived that the world had many anxieties, and I was 
ashamed that scholars had few skills.”27 It was for this reason that Gu began to research the twenty-
one dynastic histories, prefectural and district gazetteers, and collections of  scholars' essays and 
memorials. Over twenty years later, he wrote a preface to his Advantages and Weaknesses of  Prefectures  
and Kingdoms in the Realm, in which he focused on geography in relationship to three issues of 
26 Gu Zuyu, “Zong xu er”  總敍二 [Second general preface], in Dushi fangyu jiyao, 14. See also Gu Zuyu, “Zong 
xu yi” 總敍一[First general preface], Dushi fangyu jiyao, 8. The memory of  his father during the Manchu 
invasion also stood out in his mind when he introduced the project. He wrote of  his father: “When he 
reached the age of  forty, there came roving bandits and chaos. We fled into the mountains, and [my father] 
burnt his writing brush and buried his inkstone, and led his son Zuyu himself  to till the open wilds of  Mt. 
Yu [Yushan, near Changzhou]. Over the course of  time, he became increasingly destitute, indignant, and 
senseless. He acquired a strange illness and then died.” Gu Zuyu, “Zong xu yi” 總敍一[First general 
preface], Dushi fangyu jiyao, 8. 
27 Gu Yanwu, “Tianxia jun guo li bing shu xu”  天下郡國利病書序 [Preface to the  Advantages and Weaknesses of  
Prefectures and Kingdoms in the Realm], in Tan Qixiang 譚其驤, ed., Qingren wenji dili lei huibian 清人文集地理類匯編 
[Collected works of  people in the Qing dynasty, geography compilation], (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin 
chubanshe, 1986), 1:222.
41
statecraft: military strategy and defense, taxation, and water conservancy.28 At the same time, over 
several decades in the middle of  the seventeenth century, Gu compiled another work on geography 
that was less concerned with solving particular problems of  statecraft than with compiling 
information about the empire as a whole. This work, the Gazetteer of  Borderlands (Zhao yu zhi 肇域志), 
amounted to a “comprehensive gazetteer of  geography in the Ming dynasty.”29 
Given the political stance of  Gu Yanwu and Gu Zuyu vis-a-vis the Manchu takeover of 
China, it is perhaps not surprising that their works were not widely circulated in the empire, at least 
initially. Indeed, it seems that it was not until the early nineteenth century that their primary 
geographical works made it into widespread circulation. Gu Zuyu's Essentials of  Historical Geography 
was first published in a mere five volumes following the death of  his father in 1666. But the full 130-
volume edition was not published until 1811, when Long Wanyu  龍萬育 published the Essentials 
together with a version of  Gu Yanwu's Advantages and Weaknesses.30 Although the preface of  Gu 
Yanwu's geographical treatise dates to 1662, there is little evidence that his work was published on a 
wide scale before this printing in the early nineteenth century.
Zuo's interest in books about imperial and historical geography written by Gu Yanwu, Gu 
Zuyu, and other Qing scholars may thus have reflected a commonplace trend in the reproduction 
and consumption of  geographical treatises in the early nineteenth century. Zuo was not unaware of 
the politics involved in reappropriating the works of  opponents of  the dynasty for learning about 
effective statecraft, and particularly about matters pertaining to strategic uses of  geographical 
knowledge. Indeed, he was cautious to defend the authors he read from charges of  being 
28 Zhao Rong  趙榮 and Yang Zhengtai 楊正泰, Zhongguo dili xue shi [History of  Chinese geography], (Beijing: 
Shangwu yinshuguan, 1998), 25. 
29 Ibid., 25.
30 ECCP, 420, 424. Long Wanyu's reprinting (1811) was subsequently reprinted by Zhonghua shuju (1955). 
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“conspirators” (ceshi 策士). For example, in marginal notes to himself  following several of  Gu Zuyu's 
reprinted essays in his own copy of  the Statecraft Compilation of  the Dynasty, Zuo defended Gu's work 
from criticism by older scholar and fellow Hunan provincial Wei Yuan.31 According to Zuo, Wei had 
evaluated Gu's intentions based on the focus of  his writing about historical geography:
Mr. Wei Yuan said that [Gu's book] talked a lot about capturing and talked little 
about guarding; that it talked about attacking but did not talk about defending. Thus 
it was the talk of  attackers and conspirators. This discourse is terribly erroneous. In 
most cases, as for the forms and features of  mountains and rivers, the features will 
change over time. As for capturing, guarding, attacking, and defending, [these 
actions] are applicable regardless of  location.32  
魏氏源謂，其多言取而罕言守，言攻而不言防。迺搶攘策士之談。此論甚謬。大凡山川
形勢，隨時勢為轉迻。至於取守攻防則易地可通也。
Zuo shrewdly challenged Wei's assumption that Gu Zuyu's emphasis on offensive maneuvers at 
various geographical locations meant that he was a conspirator. Instead, he turned the question of 
Gu's political stance and his purported conspiratorial strategy into a question of  temporality. For 
Zuo, the passing of  time changed the “appearance” or “feature” (shi 勢) of  particular geographic 
locations even if  the topographical “form” or “body” (xing 形) of  the terrain did not change. In this 
way, Gu's talk of  military strategy was not a question of  attacking specific locations, for the specific 
characteristics of  those locations would change over time. Rather, Gu was describing how military 
strategy relied on geography in general terms. It seemed, therefore, that the young Hunan scholar 
31 See also Qian Jibo 錢基博, Jin bai nian Hunan xuefeng (han Jingxue tongzhi) 近百年湖南  學風 (含《經學通志》) 
[Academic trends in Hunan in the past 100 years (including the “Comprehensive gazetteer of  classical 
studies)], (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2004), 72.
32 ZZN, 1:7a.
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was trying to rationalize his own interest in Gu's work and to rehabilitate Gu Zuyu's geographical 
knowledge for his own interest in the Qing one and a half  centuries later. In other words, he 
considered Gu's work an important text for learning how to defend the empire against internal and 
external enemies, even though it was precisely Gu's lament over the ascendancy of  the Manchus that 
had prompted him to write the book in the first place. 
Zuo also justified his own deep interest in studying geography and strategy. Perhaps he felt 
that his political stance or his use of  geographical knowledge might be questioned. In 1839, as he 
continued his geographical studies, he wrote to He Xiling to admit his inability to determine 
everything about places that were strategic in the past. He made a case for the contingency of 
military tactics in relationship to specific locations. As he wrote, 
places are not always strategic, and strategic [places] are not always reliable. As for the 
[land] forms for attacking and defending, they cannot be predetermined. It is not 
merely that I do not want to have the reputation of  a conspirator.33
蓋以地無常險, 險無常恃, 攻守之形, 不可前定, 非僅不欲居策士之名已也。
The variability of  the strategic value of  specific landscapes and topographical features meant that 
military maneuvers would be very difficult to plan in advance. This inability to determine how land 
should be used for strategic purposes afforded Zuo the chance to make clear to his mentor that it 
was essentially a problem of  knowledge, not an issue of  trying to hide intentions that would be 
suspect in the eyes of  Qing officials. 
Zuo's Study of  Geography and Mapping
For Zuo, researching geography meant conceptualizing the geographic spaces of  the empire 
33 DG19/0/0 (1839), ZZQ, 10:11. 
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and learning how to use land and terrain in strategic ways. Drawing maps, perusing historical 
gazetteers, and reading works like Gu's grounded Zuo's spatial conception of  the empire in the 
practice of  defining places that belonged to the Qing and projecting them backward into history. 
Confronting questions about the contingent and changing nature of  geography, Zuo tried to 
articulate responses that pointed to the incomplete and sometimes inconclusive nature of 
information contained in books and maps. Nonetheless, books and maps provided important facts 
about history and strategy, and Zuo pursued his study of  geography using some of  the practices of 
evidential learning, which included employing different sources to corroborate information and 
never being fully satisfied with his knowledge of  the subject. It was a process of  sorting through 
information of  varying degrees of  verisimilitude to determine which could be trusted and which 
had to be abandoned. 
When Zuo read statecraft and geographical essays, he initiated a dialog between himself  and 
the texts. He not only took notes on Gu's work, he also marked up his personal copy of  Statecraft  
Compilation of  the Dynasty such that there were marks of  “cinnabar and orpiment almost 
everywhere” (dan huang dai bian 丹黄殆徧).34 In the margins of  his copy of  the text, he appraised the 
value and veracity of  Gu Zuyu's work using the language of  evidential learning:
As for Mr. Gu's writing, the textual research has rather many inaccuracies and 
omissions, and remarks also are occasionally deficient in consideration. Yet [his 
work] is familiar with the vestiges of  ancient and recent successes and failures and 
the features of  various places.35 
顧氏之書, 攷據頗多疏略, 議論亦間欠酌。然熟於古今成敗之迹、彼此之勢。
34 Zuo Xiaotong, Xiankao shilue, quoted in ZZN, 1:7a
35 ZZN, 1:7a.
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Zuo's study of  geography also grew up around his conversations with the brothers He Changling 
and He Xiling in the 1830s. Whereas the former played largely the role of  a book-lender and 
interlocutor, the latter served as a correspondent to whom Zuo wrote about his frustrations in 
learning about geography. From He Changling, Zuo borrowed a great many “official and unofficial 
illustrated histories” (guan si tu shi 官私圖史) because he lacked the money to purchase them himself. 
According to his recollection, each time he returned the books, his mentor would inquire what he 
had learned and they would work “together examining and appraising, studiously debating, without 
being tired of  it even a little bit.”36 To He Xiling, Zuo wrote seeking advice about how to improve 
his studies of  geography. He also communicated with other Hunan scholars about geographical 
research.37
Before Zuo sat for the metropolitan examination for the first time in 1833, he had begun 
research into geography through his connection with the He brothers. But it was really his successive 
failure in that examination—three times, in 1833, 1835, and 1838—that encouraged him to devote 
more of  his time to statecraft and subjects relevant to governance. After his first failure, he wrote to 
Xu Faji  徐法績 (1790-1837), who served as the Hunan provincial examiner (xiangshi zheng kao guan 鄉
試正考官), expressing his desire to devote more of  his energy to “timely matters” (shiwu 時務), 
especially famine relief  and the administration of  the salt trade, Yellow River maintenance work, and 
Grand Canal transport.38 There is little evidence to suggest that he studied or wrote much about 
36 ZZN, 1:7b-8a.
37 Zuo exchanged letters with Hunan scholar Zou Hanxun  鄒漢勛 (1805-1854) about his research of 
geography. Stephen R. Platt, Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 15. Zou's grandson, Zou Daijun  鄒代鈞 (1854-1908), who became an accomplished 
scholar of  geography, traveled out to see Zuo Zongtang in 1880 when Zuo was in Suzhou, Gansu, to 
request Zuo's support for the printing of  his grandfather's posthumous works, Zou Shuzi yishu 鄒叔子遺書 
[Posthumous writings of  Zou Shuzi], for which Zuo also wrote a preface. See ZZQ, 13:271; ZZQ, 
13:366-367; Qian, Jin bai nian Hunan xuefeng, 73; ECCP, 768.
38 ZZQ, 10:1-2; ZZN, 1:11a.
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these topics in the few following years. But after his second failure several years later, he spent more 
effort studying imperial geography and map-making. Right around the time of  his third and final 
failure in the metropolitan examinations, He Xiling attested to Zuo's rejection of  effete scholarship 
in preference for what he considered to be more timely and useful subjects. Referring to Zuo by his 
style name (zi 字), He wrote,
Jigao has recently abandoned ornamental phrases, and works on studies that are 
useful; he speaks of  the conditions of  the world, which he understands like the back 
of  his hand.39
季高近棄詞章, 為有用之學, 談天下形勢, 瞭如指掌。
As Zuo turned his attention away from exam learning in the 1830s, he paid greater attention to 
studies of  geography as a centerpiece of  his “practical learning.” Zuo undertook long-term research 
in geography in which his method of  acquiring knowledge entailed textual studies and map-making. 
Both functioned as measures of  corroborating evidence and weeding out incorrect information. Yet 
he also recognized the incompleteness of  knowledge about topography and historical change. 
Neither book learning nor mapping enabled the transmission of  knowledge about the world with 
complete fidelity. 
One problem Zuo faced was the rarity and unreliability of  historical geographies. “The 
ancient books [about geography] that have circulated have been very few,” he wrote in 1836. “As for 
Jia's map and Li's record, they have not typically been seen very much.” Zuo seems to have been 
referring to two scholars of  the Tang dynasty (618-907) and their works: Jia Dan  賈耽 (730-805) and 
the giant Map of  China and Foreign Regions (Huayi tu 華夷圖) which is typically attributed to him;40 and 
39 He Xiling 賀熙齡, Han xiang guan shi chao  寒香館詩鈔 [Poetry from the hall of  cool fragrance], (N.p, preface 
1848), 4:3b; see also ZZQ, 15:986. 
40 Benjamin A. Elman, “Ming-Qing Border Defense, the Inward Turn of  Chinese Cartography, and Qing 
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Li Jifu  李吉甫 (758-814) and his Illustrated Gazetteer of  Administrative Regions in the Yuanhe Reign (Yuanhe  
junxian tuzhi 元和郡縣圖志). Zuo also cited three Song dynasty scholars—Cai Shen  蔡沈 (1167-1230), 
Wang Yinglin  王應麟 (1223-1296), and Hu Sanxing  胡三省 (1230-1302)—whose work he seemed to 
trust. Beyond them, however, he found scholars' conclusions “far-fetched” (qianzao 牽鑿). On still 
other maps, certain positions were “contrary to reason” (guaichuan 乖舛) and so not worth 
examining.41 
Zuo found that textual sources and visual representations each had their flaws, which meant 
that information contained in these sources had to be corroborated by other sources. Using maps 
alone or solely consulting histories did not adequately yield a truthful version of  geographical 
knowledge. According to Zuo's way of  thinking about the history of  Chinese geography, 
Those in the past and present who discuss geography search for images in maps and 
search for principles in books. In short, this exhausts [what they do].42 
古今談地理者，索象於圖，索理於書，兩言盡之矣。
The greatest shortcoming of  this segregated model of  geographical research was its inability to 
attend to the historically contingent nature of  landscape, topography, and political geography. A 
wide range of  topographical and geo-political formations, including hills and valleys, waterways and 
borderlands, cities and patterns of  control, all changed with the passing of  time. Canals silted up, 
borders shifted, strongholds were abandoned. “In this case,” Zuo concluded, “maps are unable to 
record everything.”43 
Expansion in Central Asia in the Eighteenth Century,” 31; Elman, “Geographical Research in the Ming-
Ch'ing Period,” 3; Richard J. Smith, Chinese Maps (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), 26. 
41 ZZQ, 10:4.
42 ZZQ, 10:3. 
43  如此則圖不能盡紀也。ZZQ, 10:3. 
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If  maps did not have the capacity to record and transmit to viewers the historical 
contingency of  changes in land and political boundaries, Zuo also found reasons to be skeptical of 
the authority of  books to convey a full range of  information about imperial geography. Some 
geographical information simply could not be properly recorded in books. Orientations and the 
relationships between topographical features were particularly difficult to clarify in non-pictorial 
texts. This was especially so given the fact that, for Zuo, plotting mountains and rivers in 
relationship to one another in two dimensions formed the basis for conceptualizing geographical 
space as comprised of  specific distances and shapes:
The units of  length and breadth [of  the land] are manifest by mountains and rivers. 
Mountains and rivers as arteries and veins are produced by visual estimation. Thus, 
squareness and irregularities, crookedness or straightness, tallness or shortness, all 
therefore rely upon [these things].44
廣輪之度，山川所著也。山川脈絡，準望所生也。於是方邪、迂直、高下均於是乎憑之。
Yet textual descriptions of  mountains and rivers hardly created a clear sense of  geographical 
relationships. Zuo posed a hypothetical case. Suppose you were reading a book about geography, 
and the book described district a laying to the east of  district b. How would you determine whether 
a was directly east of b, or southeast or southwest?  Having determined it to be southeast, how 
44 ZZQ, 10:3-4. What I have translated as “visual estimation” (zhunwang 準望) was one of  six cartographic 
principles pioneered by early Chinese geographer Pei Xiu. Richard Smith has translated this as “regulated 
view,” which he defines as the “depiction of  the correct relationship between the different parts of  a given 
map.” See Richard J. Smith, Chinese Maps (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), 25-26. The notion 
of  mountains and rivers forming the skeleton of  geography, and of  the earth, was a concept that emerged 
in one of  the texts Zuo purchased some years earlier. Qi Shaonan  齊召南 (1706-1768), author of  a book 
about the empire's waterways entitled Summary of  Waterways (Shuidao tigang 水道提綱),  articulated the earth as 
a body with structure and form composed of  mountains and rivers. According to Qi's rendering, “the 
earth combines water and land into a body. It resides in the exact center of  heaven. It is also like the body 
of  a human, yet the mountains are its muscles and bones, and the waters are its arteries and veins.” Qi 
Shaonan 齊召南, “Shuidao tigang yuan xu”  水道提綱原序 [Original preface of  the Summary of  Waterways], 
Shuidao tigang (Wenjin ge, ca. 1781), yuanxu:1a. For Qi Shaonan's biography, see ECCP, 129-130.
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would you be able to choose an orientation that was even more precise, one whose lines of 
emplotment on the map would result in huge differences on the ground? And even if  you were able 
to determine the precise direction from b to a, how would you estimate the distance between them 
and between other features? Frustrated by the complexity of  conceptualizing geographical 
relationships from the written text, Zuo wrote to He Xiling:
With inconsistencies undetermined, how indeed is one to find a middle ground and 
reach the truth? In this case, books are unable to be thoroughly informative, and also 
cannot be completely trusted.45
歧出不定，果何從而折衷至是乎。如此則書亦不能盡告也，亦不能盡信也。
To overcome the problem of  reliability posed by using maps (tu 圖) and texts (shu 書) as 
individual sources of  geographical knowledge, Zuo proposed his method, which had two particular 
characteristics. First, Zuo stressed that he used sources against one another to corroborate evidence, 
to draw facts out of  a mish-mash of  sometimes contradictory information. This would be a process 
of  rectifying and standardizing information in order to reach a better understanding of  the 
geographical layout of  a region. He wrote of  determining the “reality of  a position” (fangwei zhi shi 
方位之實) by calculating distances between points and examining the countryside through which 
roads and waterways passed, and of  “interrogating” (shen 審) and “standardizing” (zhun 準) the 
indeterminacies, contradictions, and complexities of  the information about travel routes, toponyms, 
and topographies. Put in the simplest of  terms, it meant using two types of  writing to balance each 
other out: “employing gazetteers to rectify histories, and using histories to bring gazetteers into 





works to correct their errors. When not earning money as a teacher, he planned to spend his time on 
geography:
[I will] devote my mind to maps and histories, again unfurl the birds-eye maps, 
carefully sort out the gazetteers of  the five regions, make mountains and waterways 
distinctly clear as if  I had formerly visited them, and correct errors and excise 
mistakes, at least for one long day.47 
寓心圖史，重披飛鳥之圖，細繹五域之志，山川曆曆，恍若舊游，訂誤刊訛，聊以永日。
If  using sources to corroborate evidence was the first characteristic of  his geographical 
studies, the second was to fix geographical knowledge in time as well as in space. This meant relying 
upon sources to trace a geographical or topographical feature as far back into history as possible, 
through the string of  dynasties that composed history, in the two dimensional space of  a map. The 
map was his starting point, and the goal was to reach as far back into history as possible, to know 
the “formal resemblances” (xingsi 形似) of  geographical and topographical features in ancient and 
later times. Zuo began by creating a map based upon “a current, reliable atlas”48 and then he worked 
back through historical records for a given place. His method was to
determine that a given place in the present is a given place in past dynasties, and 
further trace it back all the way to the start of  classics and histories mentioning the 
place.49
辨今之某地，即先朝之某地，又溯而上之，以至經史言地之始。
Zuo noted that this method of  “tracing back” was comparable to a method for estimating celestial 
phenomena called “deducing paces” (tuibu 推步) used by calendarists, who could determine the 
47 Letter of  DG17/0/0, ZZQ, 10:8. 
48
目前可據之圖籍。ZZQ, 10:4. 
49 ZZQ, 10:4. 
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solstices by tracing and calculating seasonal phenomena and climate far back into history. For 
geographical studies, maps provided a spatial logic to historical changes, and once Zuo had 
produced an initial map layered with contemporary spaces of  provinces and prefectures, he would 
then trace them back into history, to their earliest known forms listed in the chapter about 
geography in the Classic of  History (Shujing 書經). In Zuo's words, this process took him “from Ming 
to Yuan, to Song, and all the way back to the nine states of  the Tribute of  Yu.”50 
Map-making itself  had a method, one that brought together the whole territory into a single 
glance of  the “birds-eye maps” (feiniao zhi tu 飛鳥之圖) and allowed the territory of  previous 
dynasties to appear to fall within the boundaries of  the existing empire. Zuo told of  first drawing a 
map of  the imperial territory (huangyu 皇舆) and then measuring out a grid of  squares whose sides 
represented 100 li 里.51 He would also use colors to differentiate five topographical forms52 and 
sketch out the boundaries of  administrative regions onto a map that eventually reached to roughly 
three meters squared.53 With the borders of  the country's territory marked on paper, Zuo worked 
through historical sources—his evidence (zheng 證)—in what must have been a tedious process of 
checking orientations, comparing sources, drawing something on the page and then revising the 
course of  the lines when some other piece of  information came up. This negotiation between visual 
representation and textual sources was, in his own words, like “chiseling the feet in order to fit their 
50
由明而元而宋，上至禹贡九州。ZZQ, 10:4. 
51 One li  里 is approximately equal to 500 meters or .3 of  a mile. 
52 Zuo referred to these as the wuwu 五物, but it is unclear exactly which forms these were. He may have been 
referencing the Rites of  Zhou (Zhouli 周禮), which claimed that five different topographical forms—
mountains and forests (shanlin 山林), rivers and marshes (chuanze 川澤), hills (qiuling 丘陵), embankments and 
flats (fenyan 坟衍), and lowland plains (yuanxi 原隰)—gave rise to distinct types of  products and people. See 
Hanyu da cidian, X.
53 Three meters, equivalent to about nine chi 尺. Letter of  DG16/0/0, ZZQ, 10:4. 
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sandals.”54 
 Researching geographies distant in both time and space may have been an isolating 
experience, but Zuo relied upon the support of  his wife, Zhou Yiduan  周詒端 (1812-1870), to 
complete his studies. Zuo and Zhou, who married in 1832, were in financial straits owing to Zuo's 
unsuccessful attempt at the imperial examinations when, in 1834, they rented one portion of  the 
Zhou family compound and moved there with their daughter.55 As he worked on geography, Zhou 
helped her husband with cartography, tracing out (yinghui 影繪) the drafts he had made.56 Years later, 
upon her death in 1870, he would record in her epitaph how she studied histories (shushi 書史) with a 
seriousness of  purpose, and how, in their conversations about history, she could often upbraid him 
by going to books on the shelves and showing him facts that he did not know.57  
Despite acknowledging the problem of  sources in studying imperial geography, Zuo seems 
to have paid special attention to several widely known maps to serve as the basis for his studies. As 
he mentioned in 1836, he always started with a trustworthy map. The imperial map published by 
Jiangnan scholar Li Zhaoluo  李兆洛 (1769-1841) in the 1830s may have been just such a map. Li's 
map, the Comprehensive Atlas of  the Dynasty (Huangchao yi tong yutu 皇朝一統輿圖), used the grid pattern 
that had long been standard among Chinese cartographers dating back to third-century cartographer 
Pei Xiu  裴秀 (224-271), whereby the sides of  each square in the grid represented a given distance, 
54
鑿趾以適其屨。ZZQ, 10:4. 
55 Their eldest daughter, Zuo Xiaoyu 左孝瑜, became an accomplished poet whose work was published as 
Xiao shi wu shi cao  小石屋詩草 [Poetic works from the small stone house]. Yu Yueheng 喻岳衡, Zuo Zongtang  
jiao zi shu: shenjiao yu yanchuan bingzhong de shilu 左宗棠教子書:  身教與言傳并重的實錄 [Zuo Zongtang's letters for 
instructing his sons: true records of  the equal importance of  teaching by example and by words], 
(Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2002), 129. 
56 Zuo Xiaotong, Xiankao shilue, quoted in ZZN, 1:13b.
57 ZZN, 1:13b; Zuo Zongtang, “Wang qi Zhou furen muzhiming,” ZZQ, 13:356.
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often 100 li 里.58 Although titled “comprehensive,” Li's collection of  cartographic representations 
were of  provinces within China proper and, aside from a map of  Shengjing  盛京 (later, Liaoning 
province), it did not include any territories of  the empire beyond China proper. The collection did 
contain one representation of  the Qing empire situated next to other countries on a circular map 
that also depicted Africa, Europe, and two other land masses—perhaps Australia and Antarctica.59 
Li's atlas, which was published together with a philological study of  toponyms, seems to have been 
popular enough among scholars that Zuo asked fellow scholar Hu Linyi  胡林翼 (1812-1861) to 
purchase a copy of  Li's atlas in Jiangnan on his behalf  in 1837.60
Even more influential for his studies of  geography were eighteenth-century maps of  the 
empire produced under the authority of  the Qing emperors with the help of  Jesuit cartographers. It 
was after moving in 1840 to the household of  another Hunan scholar, Tao Shu  陶澍 (1779-1839), 
and becoming the tutor of  Tao's son, Tao Guang 陶桄, that Zuo gained access to Tao's private 
library. Teaching there and previously at the Lujiang Academy (Lujiang shuyuan 淥江書院) in Liling 醴
陵, Hunan, had taken time away from his studies of  geography,61 but gaining unfettered access to the 
books in Tao's library gave him another chance to revise his earlier sketches of  geography based on 
imperial maps. He turned to two imperially commissioned maps from the eighteenth century, the 
Kangxi Atlas (Kangxi yutu 康熙輿圖), named for the reign period of  the Kangxi  康熙 emperor (r. 
58 Benjamin A. Elman, “Geographical Research in the Ming-Ch'ing Period,” Monumenta Serica 35 (1981-83): 
3.
59 Li's map seems to have been published for the first time in 1831 under the title “Huangchao ge sheng diyu 
zhizhang tu” 皇朝各省地輿指掌圖 [Handy illustrations of  geography for each province in the empire] 
contained within the published work Huangchao yudi lue  皇朝舆地畧 [Outline of  imperial geography], (Bianzhi 
shu shu, 1831). What appears to be the same set of  maps was reproduced later in the decade in Li 
Zhaoluo, ed., Lidai dili zhi yunbian jin shi  歷代地理志韻編今釋 [Current explanations of  compiled rhyming 
words from the historical gazetteers of  past dynasties], fanlie dated 1837 (Hefei, 1870). 
60 ZZQ, 10:8.
61 Letter of  DG17/4/6, ZZQ, 15:18; Letter of  DG17/0/0, ZZQ, 10:8. 
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1662-1722), and the revised version of  the atlas produced four decades later and named for the 
emperor, the Qianlong Palace Atlas (Qianlong neifu yutu 乾隆內府輿圖). These atlases charted the entire 
empire using the technology of  Jesuits to create a visual representation of  the Qing realm that 
substantiated imperial control over borderland territories vis-a-vis an expanding Russian empire.62 
The updated Qianlong version in the 1750s added the recently conquered Central Asian territory of 
Xinjiang to the map. Zuo apparently consulted these atlases in order to revise and correct the 
cartographic drawings that he had made, and in this way he seems to have treated these maps as 
impeccable sources against which to check the errors of  his own work.63 Zuo referred to the 
eighteenth-century atlases contained within the Grand Compendium of  Books Past and Present (Gujin  
tushu jicheng 古今圖書集成), an encyclopedic collection printed in the 1720s.64 But the versions printed 
there were less detailed and lacked the latitude and longitude lines of  the versions kept inside the 
imperial palace for use by the emperors.65 Zuo may have also consulted other copies of  the atlases 
that circulated among scholars outside of  Beijing. For instance, the Jiangnan scholar and 
mathematician Dong Youcheng  董祐誠 (1791-1823) copied the Kangxi and Qianlong atlases in a 
forty-eight panel collection of  maps printed by Li Zhaoluo in 1832 as the Comprehensive Atlas of  the  
Empire (Huangchao yi tong yudi quantu 皇朝一統輿地全圖). One panel of  the forty-eight depicted the 
entire empire, stretching from the island in the North Pacific Ocean later incorporated into Russian 
62 Elman, “Ming-Qing Border Defense,” 48-50; Peter C. Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: 
Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia,” The International History  
Review 20.2 (June 1998): 274-279; Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise, 77-78.
63 Zuo Xiaotong, Xiankao shilue, quoted in ZZN, 1:19a.
64 This claim is from Zuo Xiaotong, Xiankao shilue, in ZZN, 1:19a.
65 Perdue, “Boundaries, Maps, and Movement,” 279.
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territory as Sakhalin to distant territories in the western Himalayas.66 This type of  map enabled Zuo 
to correct what he and his wife had drawn and it presented him with a picture of  the empire as a 
whole, one that incorporated all of  the territories conquered by the Qing in the eighteenth century. 
In other words, it provided a Qing geographic vision to Zuo, whereas the pioneers of  evidential 
learning who wrote extensively about geography—Gu Yanwu and Gu Zuyu—had compiled their 
works of  geography based on their knowledge of  the Ming.
Geography, Local Knowledge, and Strategies for Using Land
Cartographic representations of  the Qing empire commissioned by the most illustrious 
emperors of  the eighteenth century allowed Zuo the chance to revise his own maps. But the most 
advanced and accurate maps of  the day, which the Kangxi and Qianlong atlases were purported to 
be, were unable to transmit to their viewers information about how to use specific landscapes in 
strategic ways. As many of  evidential learning's participants understood, first-hand experience 
beyond book-bound learning was also an important pathway to knowledge. How could experience 
deepen one's knowledge of  land and geography that had been built solely through reading texts and 
maps? How did one negotiate between experiential knowledge and information gained from books? 
Zuo never wrote extensively about this issue, but the preface to Gu Zuyu's massive work on 
geography, which Zuo so assiduously studied, entertained these questions. For Gu, researching 
geography and topography was inherently related to the acquisition of  military skill; one of  the 
foremost reasons for studying the lay of  the land was to understand how armies might attack or 
defend it. But neither maps nor texts could completely explain a particular region's strategic value, 
66 See Dong Fangli, Huang chao yi tong yudi quantu  皇朝一統輿地全圖 [Comprehensive atlas of  the empire], (Bian 
zhi shu shu, 1832), National Library of  Australia, MAP LMS 640, digital collections, 
http://nla.gov.au/nla.map-lms640.
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and Gu rationalized the accumulation of  geographical knowledge as a dialectic between textual 
sources and experiential know-how.67 
As the author of  the Essentials, Gu eagerly promoted the value of  his book. But he also 
emphasized that other sources of  knowledge and other ways of  thinking about geography were 
crucial to knowing land strategically. Questioned by a hypothetical  interlocutor about the usefulness 
of  his book, Gu touted his extensive research into textual sources and his own travels and occasional 
discussions with merchants, travelers, and military men. He was also adamant to explain that 
strategic geographical knowledge should be derived from one other type of  indispensable source, 
native guides (xiangdao 鄉導). These native guides—literally the “guides to the countryside”—served 
as conduits of  information about features of  terrains of  which they had extensive personal 
experience. As natives of  a given region, they could provide nuanced perspectives on using the land 
which outside strategists could hardly derive from textual sources. Such native guides were so 
important for gaining knowledge of  the land and its features that Gu described their function as 
akin to one's own visual and aural senses: 
If  you trust in my book yet do not have faith in native guides, it would be like 
covering your ears yet attempting to hear and closing your eyes yet attempting to see. 
You would surely make many mistakes.68 
67 Zuo appears to have had access to at least two versions of  the preface to Gu Zuyu's Essentials of  Historical  
Geography. The 1897 chronological biography of  Zuo's life notes that he purchased Gu's text around the 
18th year of  the Daoguang reign (1829). The most recently published version of  Gu's text at that time 
seems to have been a typescript edition (juzhenban 聚珍板), with a prefatory note by Long Wanyu 龍萬育 
dated 1811. Zuo also had access to the version of  Gu's preface that was in the original publication of  the 
Huangchao jingshi wenbian. This preface is an abbreviated and edited version of  the longer, original form in 
the 1811 version. I have therefore chosen to use the 1811 version for my reading of  Gu's ideas. See Gu 
Zuyu, Dushi fangyu jiyao [Essentials of  historical geography], (1811; repr. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1955). 
Compare Gu Zuyu, “Dushi fangyu jiyao xu” [Preface to the Essentials of  historical geography], in HJBW, 
78:1a-2a.
68 Gu Zuyu, “Zong xu er”  總敍二 [Second general preface], Dushi fangyu jiyao, 11. 
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使信余之書而不取信於鄉導，譬之掩耳而求聞，閉目而求見，所誤必多矣。
He assumed that the scholar who seeks knowledge about a place would be an outsider without 
experiential knowledge of  the land. The role of  the local guide was thus to provide enough first-
hand information to help the outsider gain his orientation in the land and be able to decide how to 
use the terrain most strategically. 
Experiential knowledge of  the land provided by native guides would enable the outsider to 
utilize an identifiable yet evasive characteristic of  land which Gu called the “benefits of  the 
land” (dili 地利). His articulation of  the strategic value of  learning about geography came directly 
from Sunzi's Art of  War (Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法), typically dated to the Spring and Autumn period 
(770-476 BCE). He copied a passage from Sunzi to describe the value of  native guides for 
controlling the “benefits of  the land”: 
Those who do not know the forms of  mountains and forests, treacherous and 
difficult [terrain], and impassable marshland will be unable to march with armies. 
Those who do not employ local guides will be unable to obtain the benefits of  the 
land.69 
不知山林、險阻、沮澤之形者，不能行軍。不用鄉導者，不能得地利。
As I describe in subsequent chapters, scholars like Zuo used the same terminology of  the “benefits 
of  the land” or “profits of  the land”—dili—to name the result of  productive agricultural uses of 
land. Yet for Gu and, indeed, for many other evidential scholars, the dili of  a place was something to 
be acquired even though it remained immanent in the landscape and was both a factor and product 
of  successful military strategy.70 An intimate knowledge of  the local environment would be 
69 Gu Zuyu, “Zong xu er,” Dushi fangyu jiyao, 11. For a slightly different translation, see Sunzi, The Art of  
War: Sun Zi's Military Methods, trans. Victor H. Mair (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 123.
70 It was also the term chosen as the heading for two volumes within the section on military administration 
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necessary to use the land in the most strategic way possible—to gain all of  its “benefits.” As local 
informants, native guides would provide information about the land to outsiders, who would then 
choose appropriate strategies with these “benefits” in mind. 
Despite the indispensable value of  information from native guides, Gu cautioned his readers 
that guides should never become the primary sources of  geographical or topographical knowledge 
for strategists. Strategists needed to sort through, to judge, and to balance information given to them 
by native guides—perhaps just as evidential scholars did with textual sources. Gu suggested that his 
readers acquire background information about geography before they employed native guides, and 
he was eager to promote his book as just the right starting place. He imagined that the Essentials 
would serve as the primer for adeptly utilizing information from local guides. And when it came 
down to the dialectic between the experiential knowledge of  the guides and the bookish knowledge 
of  the scholars, he deemed the latter ultimately more reliable. 
Gu wrote that strategists should rely upon information from native guides only when 
necessary and only for temporary periods of  time. Given this stipulation, Gu urged scholars to 
understand the principles, if  not the specific details, of  how to use topography most advantageously, 
and he admonished his readers to “use native guides temporarily” when a problem arose but to 
“know the benefits of  the land in the day-to-day.”71 Strategists ought not to try to assess the 
advantages of  the land merely on the spur of  the moment, when their main source of  information 
would be native guides. While this kind of  impromptu action was sometimes necessary, Gu 
acknowledged, the most sensible thing to do would be to think about how to strategize for the 
“benefits of  the land” at all times. This meant extensively researching textual and cartographic 
in the 1827 Statecraft Compilation of  the Dynasty; these volumes contained essays concerning the strategic 
value of  imperial lands. See juan 78-79 of  HJWB.
71
鄉導用之於臨時者也，地利知之於  平日者也。Gu, “Zong xu san,” 13. 
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sources about the geography of  a particular location before arriving there.
A further problem with native guides was their questionable reliability. According to Gu, 
they should be used only so long as they might be necessary for providing guidance. If  one relied 
upon them all of  the time without having foreknowledge of  the landscape, then one would open 
oneself  to the possibility of  being misled or duped by the enemy. He reiterated that geographical 
knowledge must be accrued on an “everyday” (pingri 平日) basis, which meant research. If  you do 
not do this “yet place your trust in a temporary native guide,” Gu asked, “how would you not be 
fooled by the enemy?”72
If  local guides were not working for the enemy, their geographical advice nonetheless might 
just be worthless. Despite repeating Sunzi's admonitions about the native guide being indispensable, 
Gu seemed to treat them as merely another source of  information to be balanced with and 
corroborated by others. Indeed, he assessed them skeptically and condescendingly as social inferiors 
who were not always worthy of  an outsider's trust. As he counseled his readers, 
broadly seek [information] from native guides, following what is trustworthy, and 
omitting what is dubious, in order to improve [your] use of  the benefits of  the land. 
Why futilely entrust [your] eyes and ears to a servant?73 
博求之於鄉導，從其可信，缺其可疑，以善吾地利之用，豈徒寄耳目於僕夫云爾哉。
This process of  weeding out useless information from what native guides provided would enable 
one to figure out exactly how best to use the land. In other words, the outsider-cum-strategist would 
ultimately decide upon how specific topographic features like mountains, forests, marshes, and 
passes would influence strategic plans. 
72
欲取信於  臨時之鄉導，安在不為敵所愚也。Gu, “Zong xu san,” 13. 
73 Gu, “Zong xu san,” 14. 
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Even in the best of  cases, then, native guides could only be one source of  knowledge, and 
the outsider—Gu's reader—was ultimately responsible for “making judgments in accordance with 
the locations of  the benefits of  the land.”74 For Gu, the epistemological superiority of  the outsider 
for knowing how to use the land was even more striking when one considered the changing nature 
of  the land's benefits. Although native guides might be necessary, Gu proposed that the “benefits of 
the land” were hard to determine because they changed constantly. He noted that military strategist 
Zhuge Liang  諸葛亮 (181-234) had gone out from Sichuan through the Pavilion of  Swords (Jian'ge 劍
閣), a strategic pass in northern Sichuan, to conquer Shaanxi and Gansu, whereas the less capable 
ruler Liu Shan  劉禪 (207-271) could not even defend the capital of  Sichuan when he held the 
Pavilion. Gu used this historical instance to suggest that, even if  one were knowledgeable about 
geography, the strategic value of  the land could change with one's skill. Knowing how to use 
landscape to one's advantage was in some measure intuitive, and it depended upon a mixture of 
geographical knowledge, experience, and wisdom. According to Gu, 
If  one knows to seek the benefits of  the land in lofty mountains and deep valleys, 
famous cities and the capital, yet does not know that the benefits of  the land are 
right between one's fingers and palm, then there is no reason to speak with [him] 
about the benefits of  the land!75
知求地利於祟山深谷、名城大都，而不知地利即在指掌之際，烏足與言地利哉。
Insofar as the strategic value of  land changed with time and with one's own knowledge and 
experience, measuring or explaining the benefits of  the land in a particular location would be 
difficult. Gu gave the example of  past Mongol military tactics: they were highly successful, 
74  因地利之所在而為權衡焉。Gu, “Zong xu san,” 13. 
75 Gu, “Zong xu er,” 12. 
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“independently led by their own minds,” and not found on any map nor recorded in detail in any 
gazetteer.76 Indeed, Gu described the “benefits of  the land” as “that which changes without end.”77 
The protean nature of  the potential value of  the landscape meant that a place's dili would be nearly 
impossible to objectify in visual representations or in words:
As for the profundity of  dili, maps cannot record it, and discussions cannot 
thoroughly [explain] it, for it changes with the numinous and indeterminate mind. 
It is what is said to be intuitable but inexpressible in words.78 
地利之微，圖不能載，論不能詳，而變化於神明不測之心。所謂可以意會，不可以言傳
 者乎。
It was impossible to predetermine completely a landscape's “benefits,” its advantageous use by the 
strategist, and it would be foolhardy to attempt to estimate the potential benefits of  the land by any 
typical measurements.79 Insofar as the “benefits” were in constant flux—just like other phenomena 
such as yin and yang and the seasons—aspiring strategists like Gu's readers needed to learn to intuit 
their potential existence, location, and fruition. Only when they had built their skills of  strategic 
intuition and had comprehended the changing nature of  the forces at work in a landscape would 
they be able, in Gu's estimation, to discuss the “earth” (fangyu 方輿).80
Even if  strategists could ascertain a land's benefits only fully through intuition, however, 
there were other aspects of  geographical knowledge that were unchanging and crucial for successful 
strategy. Gu recognized that even as dili changed, other phenomena stayed constant, including 
76
師心獨往。Gu, “Zong xu er,” 12. 
77
變化無窮者。Gu, “Zong xu er,” 12. 
78 Gu, “Zong xu er,” 12. 
79 Gu noted that if  one were to “estimate it zhu by zhu and compare it cun by cun, one would surely lose 
much.”  使銖銖而度之，寸寸而比之，所失必多矣。Gu, “Zong xu er,” 12. 
80 Gu, “Zong xu er,” 12. 
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opposite pairs (“squares and circles, odds and evens” 方圓奇偶), the organization of  military units 
(“squad, platoon, company, and battalion” 伍兩卒旅), and features of  the landscape (“inner and 
outer city walls, mountains, and rivers” 城郭山川). It was within these unchanging parameters that 
strategists were to determine how best to obtain the benefits of  the land. Human action would 
engage stable landforms within a larger system in flux. Strategists were to take the “unchanging 
body” (不變之體) of  the land to “enact constantly changing functions” (為至變之用), and to rely on 
the “fixed forms” ( 一定之形) of  the landscape to “enact unfixed guidelines” (為無定之準).81 
Providing strategic geographic knowledge was Gu's primary reason for compiling the 
Essentials of  Historical Geography and for explaining his rationale for determining the “benefits of  the 
land” based on a combination of  intuition, textual information, and experiential knowledge. But 
perhaps to attract an even wider audience, he also suggested that the geographical knowledge 
contained within his work would be applicable to all levels of  officialdom, from the emperor on 
down to local prefects. His research could enlighten officials who, on a day-to-day basis, managed 
lands and civilian livelihoods. It could give them insight into
the complexities of  the borderlands; the haunts of  evil in the mountains and 
marshes; the benefits of  agriculture, sericulture, waterways, and springs; and the 
patterns of  public sentiment and customs.82
疆域之槃錯，山澤之藪慝，與夫畊桑水泉之利，民情風俗之理。
In other words, geographical knowledge compiled primarily for strategic reasons could be relevant 
to everyday forms of  governance. Even if  military maneuvers remained the main application, and if 
determining how to make the most of  the benefits of  the land was primarily a strategic question, 
81 In talking about topographical forms and land as a fixed body, Gu was echoed by Qi Shaonan in the 
preface to his eighteenth-century work Summary of  Waterways. See note 44 above.
82 Gu, “Zong xu san,” 14.
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those skills would nonetheless be useful for other purposes, including commonplace activities like 
agrarian production. 
Map-Making in the Field
Decades after he read Gu Zuyu's work and began his research in geography, Zuo was serving 
the Qing government in his capacity as the governor-general of  Fujian and Zhejiang provinces, and 
he faced precisely the issue that Gu had raised. As a scholar in his home province, Zuo was 
accustomed to relying on written sources to learn about the world. By comparing various sources, he 
had attempted to sort through histories and gazetteers, keeping only verifiable evidence to draw 
maps of  the empire and its provinces. Yet when he left his home province, he was faced with the 
dialectic of  geographical learning: how should one reconcile personal experience with textual 
sources?
In 1864, he presented a seemingly stark response to the question posed by Gu Zuyu's 
geographical treatise, and in a sense, by the evidential learning movement as a whole. In a line copied 
from Tang geographer Jia Dan, Zuo asserted that personal experience within a landscape would be 
far more useful than other sources of  second-hand evidence: “In studies of  geography, it is better to 
see for oneself  than to hear a hundred times.”83 In a letter to the Zongli Yamen 總理衙門, the Qing 
government bureau established in 1861 to handle diplomatic and foreign affairs, Zuo expressed 
doubt about the ability of  older maps to accurately represent topographic formations. Old maps 
were problematic because they served as models for geographic diagrams recently submitted by 
officials in many places. Zuo complained that officials who submitted such maps had no 
“experiential knowledge” (tihui 體會) of  various geographic relationships and formations, including 
83
地理之學，百聞不如一見。Letter of  TZ3/0/0, ZZQ, 14:504-505. Zuo may have gotten this line from an 
essay in the Statecraft Compilation. See Zhu Yunjin 朱雲錦, “Ditu shuo”  地圖說 [On maps], in HJWB, 78:11b. 
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mileage, orientation, linearity, area, incline, and water depth. He further criticized them for marking 
mountains and waterways with dyestuff  merely for the sake of  “beauty” (meiguan 美觀) even though 
the “real forms of  the land do not at all match.”84 In Zuo's eyes, this made the new maps no 
different from “vulgar paintings of  landscape.”85 
Zuo did not reserve his scorn for new maps. He also directed gentler criticism toward some 
maps contained within geographical treatises that circulated widely in the nineteenth century. In 
particular, he named two works: Gu Zuyu's Essentials of  Historical Geography and the Small Insights into  
the “Tribute of  Yu” (Yugong zhuizhi 禹貢錐指), a work by Hu Wei  胡渭 (1633-1714). Zuo credited them 
with employing the grid method for drawing maps, with the sides of  each square representing 100 li 
里, but he also took them to task for not paying adequate attention to the details. For one thing, their 
books did not contain many maps, and Zuo chided them for allowing the names of  locations like 
ports, prefectures, and districts to “occupy and get rid of  the true land forms.”86 In other words, 
their maps did not depict topographical formations aside from delineating the boundaries between 
land and water. This left contemporary mapmakers without much clue about how to fill in the blank 
spaces. By contrast, Zuo praised the Kangxi and Qianlong atlases just as he had done several 
decades earlier. He regarded them as relatively accurate for their depictions of  landscape, 
orientations, and distances. Yet, lamented Zuo, they were not widely accessible because they had not 
been much circulated beyond the court, and were therefore of  less use in creating new maps of 
provinces and prefectures.
To rectify the problem of  new maps relying on old and untrustworthy sources, Zuo 





86  占去實在地形。ZZQ, 14:504. 
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were scaled to 50 li  里 per side. He then wanted to have them plot out distances and relationships 
between topographical formations using calculations of  roads and waterways based upon “normal 
paths in the terrain.”87 They were also to use a compass to determine precise orientations and 
thereby avoid drawing distorted cartographic representations, which could “make the land lose its 
real form [and thus render the map] hard to examine carefully.”88 After undertaking what seems to 
have amounted to a cursory land survey, officials were to send their maps up through the 
administrative hierarchy of  the province, a process in which general maps of  prefectures (fu 府) and 
circuits (dao 道) were to be drawn up. In addition, despite his mockery of  coloring maps for beauty, 
Zuo clearly had multi-colored maps in mind, and he spelled out which colors he wanted used for a 
variety of  topographical formations.89 Although he requested that only the names of  government 
offices, temples, villages, or ferry crossings be written on the maps, he suggested that the basic 
shapes of  the following places be drawn with explanations added underneath: wharves where 
commercial trawlers docked, garrisons of  government soldiers, and islands and reefs in the ocean. 
By adding these details, he hoped that novice cartographers from among the local government 
bureaus would produce maps “a little more refined and truthful” than copies of  older maps.90 
Zuo delegated the tasks of  collecting cartographic information to Qing officials in the 
prefectures and districts. But since these officials—the prefects, the magistrates, and others—had 
originally come from elsewhere, Zuo assumed that they were not familiar with local landscapes. As 
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地形平徑。ZZQ, 14:504. This seems to have been the system of  “road measurement” (daoli 道里) in which 
distances were determined using triangulation between given distance markers. Smith, Chinese Maps, 26. 
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令地失真形，難於  省覽。ZZQ, 14:505. 
89 Mountains (yellow with green shading), high peaks (black dots), streams and tributaries (blue 青), broad 
sections of  waterways (light blue), deep sections of  waterways (dark blue), ocean (yellow), tidewater 




he noted plainly, “Local officials cannot understand everything upon their arrival.”91 What Zuo 
seemed to need were native guides, similar to those whom Gu Zuyu had described in the preface to 
his book. Local officials literally needed to get down off  their horses and include locals in the 
process of  cartographic surveying:
[Local officials] must select gentry in each location, take along compasses, and go 
with them to survey. But they must [also] remove their horse and carriage 
accompaniment to avoid frightening people.92 
須擇各處紳士攜帶羅槃同往相度，但須屏去輿從，免駭聽聞。
Zuo recognized that sending out prefects and magistrates with local elites to survey the land was not 
a customary practice of  cartography, but he wanted them to be diligent about it, and, as the acting 
governor-general, he threatened that any careless cartographic work would be returned for 
correction and revision. As he had indicated before, what he was most interested in was accurate 
representations of  the landscape: “Give priority to the real topography. Do not aim for beauty.”93
Conclusion
Zuo's pursuit of  the “real topography” by dispatching local officials to act as cartographers 
in 1864 may have been an expedient way to bring the provinces of  Fujian and Zhejiang under his 
control as governor-general just as the Taiping Rebellion was coming to a violent close. Set against 
the background of  Zuo's earlier studies of  geography, it appears that his proposal about local map-
making turned upon misgivings about the information contained in the majority of  textual and 







corroborate the information of  another revealed contradictions and aporia in existing knowledge. 
And he found that these holes in the geographic knowledge of  the empire were not always easily 
resolved by close textual analysis or by painstaking cartographic practice at home.
Perhaps even larger questions loomed for Zuo and other scholars caught up in the diverse 
streams of  evidential learning in the Qing: would learning about geography and other practical 
matters through texts be adequate? What was the value of  personal experience? Gu Zuyu's citation 
of  Sunzi suggests that, even if  texts were key sources for learning about geography, local informants 
were also indispensable to using landscapes strategically. Their knowledge of  terrain could inform 
important decisions made by outsiders. And those decisions were based, at least in principle, on 
assessments of  the benefits of  the land, or dili. This seems to be precisely one of  the reasons why 
Zuo called upon prefects and magistrates in Zhejiang and Fujian to take local gentry out into the 
field when they surveyed the land. These village elites were to act as local informants for a mapping 
project whose goal was to surpass the quality and precision of  most previous maps. At least in 
principle, they were to contribute to new graphic sources of  knowledge about geography in the 
nineteenth century. And they may have also legitimized Qing surveying projects in their local 
communities by their presence. 
The question of  how Zuo viewed local and experiential knowledge as a source for 
understanding the advantages of  the land is apropos of  his reconstruction projects decades after 
beginning his studies of  geography. As a military general, he may have taken seriously Gu's (and 
Sunzi's) maxims about improving one's military strategy by learning about terrain from local people. 
But his knowledge of  geography and landscape may have also informed how he sought to obtain 
another kind of  dili, the material benefits of  agrarian production—the “profits of  the land.” Before 
beginning his service for the Qing state in the 1850s, he had ample opportunity to study profitable 
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agriculture through texts and through personal experience. As the next chapter will show, evidential 
learning also framed his studies of  agrarian production. Personal experience and even 
experimentation became the means to gain insight about technologies and techniques as they related 
to land and climate. Zuo's studies of  geography seemed to lay the groundwork for his assessment of 
how landscapes and their productive potential might be harnessed to provide for people's 
livelihoods. If  it is true that “Ch'ing [Qing] geographical studies were overly inclined to antiquarian 
research and so turned a living subject into a dead one,” as late Qing scholar Liang Qichao once 
claimed, it might be possible to say that Zuo Zongtang turned this dead subject back into a living 
one.94
94 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period, xxviii.
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Chapter 2
Learning about Agriculture: Treatises and Test Planting 
The environment of  the capital city in the spring of  1838 only exacerbated Zuo Zongtang's 
disappointment over learning about his third failure in the metropolitan examinations. When he 
reported the news to his wife, he indicated that he had had enough of  the city; he would “not again 
walk through the vanity fair and compete with a group of  juveniles for bitter pears by the 
roadside”—the alluring but ultimately corrupted fruits of  commerce that attracted crowds of  urban 
philistines.1 The crass hubbub of  Beijing may have made Zuo's mind wander back to the 
countryside of  Hunan, but he did not leave the capital without stopping by its bookstalls. Vowing 
never again to attempt the exams, the thirty-six-year-old purchased a large number of  agricultural 
treatises (nongshu 農書).2  These treatises broadened the dimensions of  his scholarly activities and 
focused much of  his mental energy on agriculture. Unlike his research in historical geography, 
however, delving into agriculture took him beyond the enclosed walls of  his study and out into the 
fields. Investigating agriculture meant juggling textual sources and actual practices. In the years to 
follow, Zuo moved between reading treatises replete with agronomic principles and technical 
information, and going outside to observe the natural conditions and partake in farming. In the 
spirit of  evidential learning, Zuo remarked to his wife that he planned to read the treatises and 
submit their contents to trials in the fields, to carry out “on-the-ground testing” (shidi kaoyan 實地考
驗).3 
1
不復再踏軟紅，與群兒爭道旁苦李矣. Letter of  DG18/0/0 (1838), ZZQ, 15:247-48. 
2 Letter of  DG18/0/0 (1838), ZZQ, 15:248; ZZN, 1:16a. 
3 Letter of  DG18/0/0 (1838), ZZQ, 15:248. 
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Zuo returned to Hunan that spring, and for roughly eight years until 1846, agriculture 
became one of  his primary intellectual interests. His research in agricultural treatises and his 
observations of  plants and production techniques in the fields exemplify how evidential learning as a 
set of  scholarly practices molded approaches to agriculture among scholars in the Qing period. On a 
basic level, agriculture was a “practical” subject like historical geography and a focal point for 
students of  the Qing statecraft movement.4 Zuo's seemingly paradoxical decision to engage with 
worldly affairs by retreating to the countryside mimicked the decision of  some of  evidential 
learning's forerunners, who retreated from society to escape the Manchu conquest and found 
themselves deeply engaged in intellectual pursuits. Even more significantly, agrarian scholarship in 
the Qing was also inflected with underlying concerns that characterized evidential research, like the 
positive valuation of  evidence and personal observation. Perhaps the clearest sign of  evidential 
learning's influence on agrarian studies was the desire among scholars like Zuo to “test out” (shixing 
試行) agricultural techniques from textual sources and obtain visual evidence of  the efficacy of 
techniques, cultivation patterns, and crops.
When Qing scholars passed judgment on the efficacy of  agrarian technology, they employed 
a wide range of  considerations. Sometimes they considered a technique or crop's capacity for 
production in adverse climatic or environmental conditions. More often, it came down to a 
quantifiable measure, particularly for grain crops, with the ratio of  harvest volume to land area being 
the most common measure.5 Yet qualitative evaluations were more fundamental to scholarly 
4 For example, see William Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century  
China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in  
Hunan, 1500-1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1987).
5 In the Qing period, at least, this was often expressed as the ratio of  shi  石 to mu 畝. A shi was a volume 
equivalent to roughly 103 liters in the Qing period. A mu was an area of  land equivalent to about .15 acres 
in the Qing period. See Li Bozhong, Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620-1850 (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1998), xviii. The harvest was also evaluated by the ratio of  grain harvested to seed sown, which was 
expressed as fen 分. See Francesca Bray, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 6, pt. 2, Agriculture (Cambridge: 
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discourses about agriculture. Scholars often talked about maximizing the wealth that could result 
from agrarian production by referring to the “profits of  the land” (dili 地利). This was the same term 
that Gu Zuyu had employed to describe the advantageousness of  a geographical position as 
considered by the military strategist. In the case of  agriculture, Qing scholars used the term to 
indicate “the productive potential of  the physical earth, intended for man's benefit.”6 As Peter 
Perdue has shown, late imperial officials aimed to guide farmers in “exhausting the earth” (jin dili 盡
地利), which entailed raising yields on standard crops and boosting the cultivation of  cash crops.7 
For Zuo, it was a combination of  techniques and cash crops that seemed to help him attain the 
profits of  the land when he lived in rural Hunan. In 1846, after eight years of  researching 
agriculture, he wrote that some old methods he had been using were “extremely efficacious,”8 and 
that he had chosen to plant mulberry, tea, bamboo, and other trees to “exhaust the profits of  the 
land” (jin dili 盡地利).9 
 Approaching questions about the efficacy of  agrarian techniques meant confronting the 
same issue that Gu Zuyu had faced in his discussion of  geographical dili. In the use of  the 
environment, how would one balance local knowledge with knowledge from textual sources? In 
1838, Zuo recognized that efficacy and profitability could not be disconnected from the conditions 
of  local environments. Climate, vegetation, the nature of  the soil, and local customs all shaped the 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 379-380. Another way scholars measured average production was by 
tallying the number of  individual grains per stalk. For example, Qi Junzao estimated the number of 
sections (ban 瓣) and grains (li 粒) on each tassel (sui 穗) to calculate average grain production per tassel for 
a variety of  different crops for the harvest in Shouyang 壽陽, Shanxi province, for the year 1834. Qi Junzao 
祁寯藻, Mashou nong yan  馬首農言 [Words on farming from Mashou], (1855), 7a-7b, in XXSK 976.
6 Helen Dunstan, “Official Thinking on Environmental Issues and the State's Environmental Roles in 
Eighteenth-Century China,” in Sediments of  Time: Environment and Society in Chinese History, ed. Mark Elvin 
and Liu Ts'ui-jung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 587.
7 Perdue, Exhausting the Earth, 12. 
8
甚有效驗. Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:54.
9 Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:54.
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parameters of  possible production, which could differ radically from one region of  the empire to 
the next. On the other hand, agricultural treatises formed an indispensable basis for agrarian 
knowledge. These texts purveyed techniques that could purportedly succeed in diverse landscapes 
and under divergent conditions, just as the texts themselves traveled large distances across the Qing 
empire. It was the attempts of  Qing scholars to “try out” cultivation techniques and crops for the 
edification of  themselves and area farmers, and then to write about their trials, that bridged the gap 
between these two sources of  knowledge. They transformed written information into agrarian 
practice and then transformed experience back into written, mobile knowledge. Indeed, Zuo's 
experimental cultivations, which allowed him to assay the efficacy of  agrarian techniques drawn 
from texts, had a larger purpose. He told his wife in 1838 that he would take the results of  his 
experiments and “compose them into a book in order to instruct [farmers] in agriculture and 
gardening.”10 Having been verified in the field, the techniques drawn from textual sources would 
flow back to the written page to be circulated more widely, to move beyond the bounds of  local 
environments. This is what Zuo had in mind as he returned to Hunan a failed exam candidate.
Spring, 1838
For Zuo, learning about agrarian production began as an academic question. It may have 
been the fourth policy question in the metropolitan examination of  1838 that really prompted his 
reconsideration of  agriculture as a topic worthy of  investigation and practice. To be sure, agriculture 
was not merely a collection of  productive technologies but also a normative system of  social 
relationships that had long been enshrined in the political philosophy of  imperial dynasties. 
Francesca Bray argues that “correct agriculture” became a fetish of  the rulers of  the Qing dynasty 
10
著為一書，以詔農圃. Letter of  DG18/0/0 (1838), ZZQ, 15:248. 
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for a variety of  reasons, including their “fears that the population had begun to outstrip natural 
resources,” and so they adamantly promoted frugality and productivity among peasants.11 We do 
not know the phrasing of  the examination question to which Zuo responded, but his writing 
indicates a commitment to the fetish of  agriculture as a system for producing wealth. In the opening 
of  his essay, he wrote:
Agriculture and sericulture are the tools that support life and the origin of  great 
profit in the world, whereas for the state they are an inexhaustible storehouse.12
農桑者天下托命之具，大利之原，而國家無盡之藏也。
Here, Zuo invoked the two productive activities at the core of  statecraft rhetoric. Agriculture and 
sericulture were not significant merely because grain and silk output were economically vital to the 
most highly productive agricultural zones of  the empire, like the lower Yangzi River delta region. 
Their pairing reflected an idealized, gendered division of  labor within the household economy in 
which men worked in fields while women stayed within the household to tend silkworms and reel 
silk.13 It was because of  the character of  agriculture and sericulture as productive activities tapping 
into the “origin of  great profit” that people and the state could create wealth almost autonomously: 
the “people will naturally profit” (min zi yi 民自益) without detracting from the wealth of  others, 
while the “state will naturally become rich” (guo zi fu 國自富) without impoverishing the people. In 
the most ideal sense, the forward-thinking architects of  a prosperous agrarian society would always 
11 Francesca Bray, Technology and Gender: Fabrics of  Power in Late Imperial China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 31-32.
12 DG18/0/0 (1838), ZZQ, 13:446.
13 According to Susan Mann, the reiteration of  this gendered division of  labor by officials and scholars in 
eighteenth-century Qing China served to promote four goals: to increase peasant household productivity; 
to increase a peasant family's disposable wealth in order to guard against financial troubles brought on by 
disasters; to mold family and female morality; and to shape household production schemes. Susan Mann, 
Precious Records: Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 148. 
See also Bray, Technology and Gender.
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be prepared for dearth and, as Zuo put it, “open up a source of  profit for all generations.”14
Notwithstanding these terse iterations of  standard Qing statecraft rhetoric, Zuo's essay was 
largely unconcerned with the political and moral philosophy of  agriculture. Instead, it focused on 
two different categories of  knowledge about the technical aspects of  agriculture: agricultural 
treatises on one hand, and observations of  local conditions on the other. This juxtaposition of 
sources of  information for those interested in “agricultural policy” (nongzheng 農政) subtly revealed 
Zuo's desire to sort through information about techniques to determine how to arrange agriculture 
in the most productive way possible. We might call this his agrarian strategy. While textual 
knowledge from the treatises provided a foundation, he proposed that the knowledge gleaned by 
observations of  landscape and communication with local people—agrarian versions of  Gu Zuyu's 
“local guides”—would be indispensable. 
Perhaps to convince exam readers of  his erudition in agricultural scholarship, Zuo briefly 
reviewed eleven texts dating back to the pre-imperial period in chronological order. He began this 
rough genealogy of  agrarian knowledge with several chapters of  larger works from before the Han 
era (206 BCE-220 CE) that he considered to be among the earliest sources of  agrarian knowledge. 
He cited a calendrical record of  celestial, phenological, and agricultural phenomena, the Minor 
Annuary of  the Xia (Xia xiao zheng 夏小正),15 as well as a chapter from the Book of  Poetry (Shijing 詩經) 
that described agriculture of  the Shaanxi region in verse, the Airs of  Bin (Bin feng 豳風).16 Perhaps 
14
開百世之利源. DG18/0/0, ZZQ, 13:446.
15 Bray notes that there is no consensus on the dating of  this work, but she estimates that it is “probably pre-
Han at the latest.” See Bray, Agriculture, 53. In his volume on agricultural treatises, Wang Yuhu suggests 
that this work originated prior to the Qin era (221-206 BCE). See Wang Yuhu 王毓瑚, Zhongguo nongxue 
shulu  中國農学書錄 [Record of  Chinese agricultural treatises], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), 2.
16 In the middle of  the eighteenth century, a scholar by the name of  Yang Cao  楊艸wrote a guidebook to 
Shaanxi agriculture and sericulture entitled Broad Meanings of  the Airs of  Bin [Bin feng guangyi 豳風廣義]. This 
book was based on his analysis of  the Airs of  Bin, which he used as evidence for his claim that Shaanxi 
was suited to sericulture in the present, just as it had been in the ancient past. Yang personally tested the 
techniques and tools for sericulture, and his findings were written into the work. Wang, Zhongguo nongxue  
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more than these early texts, what had been crucial for the emergence of  agriculture as a distinct field 
of  learning was the creation of  a separate school, the agronomists (nongjia 農家). Zuo attributed this 
invention to the work of  Han dynasty imperial librarian Liu Xiang  劉向 (79-8 BCE), who worked 
with his son to organize and categorize diverse fields of  learning from among ancient sources 
written on bamboo strips held in the imperial library.17 This differentiation laid the groundwork for a 
field of  scholarship with a distinct identity. Quite impressed with Liu's range of  knowledge, Zuo 
described him as a “student of  the classics yet [one who] knew the urgency of  agriculture,”18 which 
to Zuo's mind set him quite apart from most scholars in the Qing. 
Agrarian texts containing technical information about plants and methods of  cultivation 
were even more significant for his purposes as a potential promoter of  agrarian practice. He layered 
praise on the masterpiece of  scholar Jia Sixie  賈思勰 (6th century CE), Essential Techniques for the  
Peasantry (Qimin yaoshu 齊民要術), for its broad use of  sources and its insightful investigation (kaohe  
考核) of  information. He also thought highly of  Song scholar Chen Fu  陳旉 (b. 1076), whose 
Agricultural Treatise (Nongshu 農書) contained “much that is appropriate for current use,” and for this 
reason, Zuo considered him to be quite unlike “flowery scholars” (huashi 華士) whose impracticality 
and vacuity made them useless for tackling the affairs of  statecraft.19 
shulu, 221-222. 
17 This work was Qi lue  七略 [Seven epitomes], by Liu Xin  劉歆 (46 BCE-23 CE). Note that Zuo incorrectly 
identified the author of  Qi lue as Liu Xin's father, Liu Xiang. He also seems to have mistaken this text, for 
the “seven epitomes” contained no “agronomists” division. Serving as imperial librarians to one of  the 
Han emperors, the two collaborated on a different work, the Bie lu  别錄 [Differentiated records], which 
became a basis for the son's completion of  Qi lue after his father's death. The “agronomists” seems to 
have first appeared as one of  nine categories for essays collected in the section on bibliography (yiwenzhi 藝
文志) in the History of  the Han (Han shu 漢書), which also attributed these divisions to Liu Xiang.  On these 
two, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, Rewriting Early Chinese Texts (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 
2006), 2. On the Lius' project, see Mark Edward Lewis, Writing and Authority in Early China (Albany: State 
University of  New York Press, 1999), 325-332.
18
經生而知本務之急. ZZQ, 13:446. 
19
多切近時用. ZZQ, 13:446. 
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Despite their age, other old books had caught Zuo's attention for their technical 
information. One agrarian skill that he considered quite difficult to acquire was judging how specific 
soils were suited to the “nature of  things” (wuxing 物性), including plants. Three texts from the Yuan 
period (1206-1368) earned his praise in this regard: the Fundamentals of  Agriculture and Sericulture  
(Nongsang jiyao 農桑輯要) attributed to the Yuan dynasty's Agricultural Extension Bureau (si nong si 司
農司);20 Selected Essentials of  Agriculture, Sericulture, Clothing, and Food (Nongsang yishi cuoyao 農桑衣食撮要),
 compiled by Turkic scholar Lu Mingshan  魯明善 around the year 1314; and the most famous of  the 
three, the Agricultural Treatise (Nongshu 農書) of  Wang Zhen  王禎 (1290-1333), whose work Zuo 
selected for extra praise. There were several other texts which Zuo found quite useful, although the 
information they related had more to do with famine relief  than with the regular work of 
agricultural production. Zuo named two Ming scholars' works, the Extensive Record of  Wild Vegetables 
(Ye cai bo lu 野菜博錄) by Bao Shan  鮑山 (17th century) and the Materia Medica for Famine Relief  (Jiu 
huang ben cao 救荒本草) by Zhu Su  朱橚 (1361-1425).21 He was particularly impressed with Zhu Su's 
insights about natural disasters and the havoc they wreaked in the lives of  common people. 
Moreover, he praised Zhu Su for his ability to differentiate famine relief  materials according to their 
properties (xing 性), varieties (zhong 種), and flavors (wei 味), and sort through confusions over the 
names, appearances, and substances of  different materials. 
At the end of  the list, Zuo reserved space for a relatively more recent text that served him 
quite frequently in the late 1830s and 1840s as a source of  information about cultivation techniques. 
This text was the Complete Treatise on Agricultural Administration (Nongzheng quanshu 農政全書) by late 
Ming polymath Xu Guangqi  徐光啟 (1562-1633). Perhaps unlike other scholars in Zuo's genealogy 
20 Bray, Agriculture, 628.
21 Zuo identified the author as “Su, Prince of  Zhou in the Ming” 明周王橚. ZZQ, 13:446.
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of  agronomists, Xu's orientation as a late imperial statecraft scholar placed him in line with Zuo's 
interest in practical studies, and, as we will see, Xu contributed to the precedent of  testing 
agricultural techniques and new crops in soil as a means to promote them among farmers.22 Zuo 
revered Xu's text for its painstaking research and its comprehensive coverage of  many topics 
including tools, strains (pin 品) of  plants, times for planting, and “methods for adapting to the 
land” (rentu zhi fa 任土之法).23 The exam essay of  1838 would not be the only time that Zuo referred 
to Xu's treatise.
This list of  agronomic texts substantiated Zuo's broad background in agrarian scholarship 
and may have demonstrated his potential competency in agricultural governance as a future official 
regardless of  location or local environmental conditions. Yet there was some information that treatises 
could not yield. Indeed, as Zuo recognized, some characteristics of  location and the natural 
environment were “difficult to speak about” (nan yan zhe 難言者) and therefore difficult to record in 
any text or even communicate to another person. These characteristics had to be experienced, 
absorbed, and pondered. This created an obvious line of  division between officials and local people: 
Those who govern a locale are not the people accustomed to its soil. [As for] the 
fertility of  the soil, the timing of  the seasons, the location of  water sources, the 
suitability of  plants to soils, and the expedience of  tools, they surely do not equal the 
people of  the land who have pondered them for a long time and who know them 
with meticulousness.24  
官斯土者，非習斯土之人也，其地之肥磽，候之遲早，水泉之何出，土物之何宜，器具
22 On Xu Guangqi as a statecraft scholar, see Catherine Jami, Peter Engelfriet, and Gregory Blue, eds., 
Statecraft and Intellectual Renewal in Late Ming China: The Cross-Cultural Synthesis of  Xu Guangqi (1562-1633) 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001).
23 ZZQ, 13:446. 
24 ZZQ, 13:446. 
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之何便，必不及其地之民慮之早而知之審也。
In other words, governing officials from beyond the geographical boundaries of  a specific locale 
would have knowledge inferior to people who had long lived there. For Zuo, the inability to talk 
about some aspects of  agriculture was based upon the assumption that the person talking would be 
an outsider with little knowledge of  local conditions.  
The contradiction between knowledge and authority rises to the surface in Zuo's essay, for 
the people who have little knowledge of  local land have the power to promote certain forms of 
production, while local subjects who know a great deal about the land have little power to determine 
agrarian policy. This contradiction was partially a function of  the so-called “law of  avoidance,” a 
bureaucratic regulation that prohibited magistrates and other high-ranking provincial officials from 
serving in their home provinces or within 500 li 里 of  their homes.25 In principle, this type of 
regulation precluded conflicts of  interest between government affairs and hometown or family 
interests or loyalties, reduced opportunities for corruption, and forestalled provincialism among 
officials. The result was that magistrates and other outside officials were typically unfamiliar with 
many aspects of  the local communities in which they served. As Zuo made clear in his essay, it was 
not only the social characteristics of  local communities that outsider officials were prone not to 
understand. They were also outsiders when it came to agriculture, environment, and geography, 
regardless of  how much textual research they had done. If  they had few clues about the 
geographical arrangements of  waterways or the types of  plants that flourished in local soils, what 
good could they be in promoting agriculture? Could they merely turn to the information in their 
books and blindly suggest that peasants follow that information? 
Zuo's solution to the quandary of  official ignorance about local agrarian and environmental 
25 T'ung-tsu Ch'u, Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 
21-22, 320n28. 
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conditions pointed to the value of  observation and inquiry. Personal presence was extremely 
important for finding out exactly which productive practices, organisms, and irrigation schemes were 
likely to be most successful in a specific locale. Zuo urged officials to become familiar with local 
conditions and to figure out what methods of  production worked best on local lands. He asserted 
that officials should
accord with their seasons, traverse their wilderness, pass through their countryside, 
inquire about what is profitable, and find out what is suitable.26
以其時，行其野，曆其鄉，詢其利，訪其宜。
He suspected that observation and inquiry would overcome the inadequacy of  textual sources and 
enable outsider officials to guide local people to seek profit in agriculture. 
For Zuo, profit (li 利) was the premiere variable in the equation of  local knowledge and 
production, and as officials sought what was most profitable, it would lead them to accord with 
customary practices. These were not mere questions of  technical practice, for they determined the 
appearance of  the landscape and the culinary patterns of  the people. In principle, there were two 
categories of  profit that officials needed to consider: what kind of  profit the land ordinarily yielded 
and what people found most profitable. These were to be the guideposts for official action, which 
would be shaped according to local practice rather than official plans for transformation:
Accord with the profits of  the land and profit from them. [One] need not force the 
northwest to all be paddy fields or the southeast to all be a sea of  dry land.  
因地之利而利之，不必強西北皆水田，東南皆陸海。
As Zuo cautioned would-be officials against forcing the land to support agrarian regimes to which it 
was not suited, he also warned them not to force people to change their habits. Such coercion would 
26 ZZQ, 13:447.
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be most apparent in the changing patterns of  basic comestibles that had come to epitomize different 
geographical regions of  the empire:
Accord with what is profitable for the people and make profit from it. [One] need 
not force the people of  the southeast to eat wheat or the people of  the northwest to 
eat rice. 
因民之利而利之，不必強東南民食麥，西北民食稻。
In this reckoning, the primary factors shaping what people found profitable were the various 
organisms they chose to cultivate. For instance, Zuo recognized that jujubes (zao 棗) and chestnuts 
(li 栗) could be profitable in specific regions, and he cautioned against tearing those trees out to 
replace them with mulberry, despite sericulture's prominent position in the political philosophy of 
Chinese agrarian society. Likewise, cotton (mian 棉) and ramie (zhu 苧) should not automatically be 
abandoned for silk production. 
Agrarian scholars had long employed geographical shorthand to refer to the divergent 
customs and production methods of  different regions of  their empires. Late Yuan scholar Wang 
Zhen, for example, had made a “systematic and conscientious effort to contrast northern and 
southern agricultural technology.”27 Some five centuries later, Zuo pointed out that some land-use 
patterns were efficacious only within specific environments, and he used the geographical categories 
of  northwest (xibei 西北) and southeast (dongnan 東南) to differentiate and essentialize land use and 
agrarian production. What determined these categories were not only the preferences and customs 
of  local people but also the nature of  soils and climates.28 Agriculture-promoting officials needed to 
27 Bray, Agriculture, 61; see also William Y. Chen, An Annotated Bibliography of  Chinese Agriculture (San 
Francisco: Chinese Materials Center Publications, 1993), 14-15.
28 Zuo may have used the northwest-southeast division rather than the north-south division because of  the 
significance and size of  the northwest regions in the nineteenth century, some eighty years after the 
Qianlong emperor's conquest of  Xinjiang and at a time when historical and geographical scholarship 
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recognize these essential divisions and shape their agrarian schemes to accord with local conditions.
By noting positive correspondences between land use on one hand and climate, landforms, 
and custom on the other hand, Zuo seemed to acknowledge the geographical limitations of  agrarian 
technology. This is why he suggested that officials would need to understand the land before 
implementing agrarian projects. In his geographic dichotomy, the “northwest” represented zones of 
aridity and dry-land farming, while the “southeast” represented lands where water was abundant and 
paddy fields were common. Zuo offered hypothetical scenarios that relied upon the juxtaposition of 
the essentialist categories of  northwest and southeast, arid and aqueous. If  an official were 
attempting to work for water conservancy (shuili 水利, lit. “profits of  water”) in the northwest, where 
there was a paucity of  water, he might be inclined to reproduce highly productive hydrological 
infrastructure from the southeast, with irrigation channels, polders, embankments, and sluice gates. 
But he would discover that the quality of  the soil would frustrate his plans. In the northwest, the 
“earth is loose” (tu song 土鬆) and thus prone to floating away (fu浮) and causing obstructions (yong  
壅). It would crumble easily when used to create embankments and sluices for irrigation, and would 
cause channels and polders to silt up.29 Officials in the northwest would thus be foolhardy to simply 
import plans for waterworks from the southeast. 
Zuo contrasted this example with a second hypothetical situation: working with southeastern 
people to avoid “water disasters” (shuihai 水害). Officials may have thought to transform the land by 
making it as dry as possible through actions like draining the ravines, dredging the waterways and 
marshes, reinforcing embankments, or pulling out aquatic grasses. Yet each of  these would harm the 
interests of  the people: they would lead to unemployment (shiye 失業), injure people's financial 
about the northwest circulated widely.
29  土浮沙壅，故善淤也。ZZQ, 13:447.
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interests (shang mincai 傷民財), or even deprive the people of  profit (duo min li 奪民利).30 In short, 
officials would harm the livelihoods of  southeastern people if  they enacted hydrological plans 
without consulting them or finding out beforehand which types of  waterworks were most useful and 
successful. It is important to note the divergent reasons why Zuo assumed irrigation schemes could 
not simply be replicated across vast geographic zones. In the case of  the northwest, it was largely a 
question of  soil quality—an environmental constraint—whereas in the case of  the southeast, he was 
primarily concerned about the social interests of  the people. Nonetheless, what tied these two cases 
together was the issue of  how to ascertain which irrigation scheme to promote. When officials 
determined how to proceed, there seemed to be little place for agricultural texts in making such 
decisions.  
Farming & Studying 
And yet, for officials and scholars who circulated throughout the empire, learning about 
agriculture was often mediated by textual sources. Zuo had clearly studied agrarian texts prior to 
1838 and had worked out a basic genealogy of  agrarian knowledge leading back to ancient times. He 
had also had the chance to read the three chapters about “agricultural policy” (nongzheng 農政) and 
many other essays related to agrarian production in the Statecraft Compilation of  1827. If  texts 
predominated in studies of  agriculture, however, the fields served as alternative spaces for learning, 
ones that provided opportunities to observe soil, weather, cropping patterns, and the outcomes of 
production techniques. In the late 1830s and 1840s, Zuo sometimes opted for these alternative 
spaces, and so he moved between his studio and the fields as he investigated agriculture.  
Scholarship and agriculture had long been recognized as an honorable combination of 
30 ZZQ, 13:447.
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pursuits for rural scholars who, for a variety of  reasons, were not engaged in bureaucratic service. 
This combination, known as “farming & studying” (gengdu 耕讀, lit., “plowing and reading”), was 
common in the Ming and Qing eras, and had been practiced as early as the Northern Song 
(960-1127). In its quintessential form, it entailed elite families purchasing land and managing it as a 
profitable enterprise to provide financial guarantees for a family's aspiring scholars.31 While agrarian 
production by tenant farmers—often some of  whom were related to the landowners—would 
provide a stable income, the boys and young men of  the landowning family would pursue studies in 
an attempt to achieve a position in the bureaucracy via the imperial examinations. Farming & 
studying was thus a method of  social reproduction for rural scholastic elites whereby a family 
pursued two complementary avenues toward wealth and social status. Zuo recognized that farming 
& studying had been the main occupation of  his own ancestors,32 and it was the desire to maintain 
his family's social status that influenced his decision to purchase a tract of  land in northern Hunan 
in the 1840s. 
The significance of  farming & studying may very well have transcended its role as a method 
of  social reproduction for elite families in late imperial times. For while many elite families relied 
upon it for this purpose, there was at least a small proportion who were genuinely interested in 
combining scholarship and fieldwork to increase their knowledge of  agriculture as a set of 
productive techniques and technologies. To be sure, many scholars preparing for the exams threw 
themselves into their studies without paying attention to the technical scholarship about agriculture. 
But judging from Zuo's experience, there were others who treated the fields, as much as the library, 
31 Hilary J. Beattie, Land and Lineage in China: A Study of  T'ung-ch'eng County, Anhwei, in the Ming and Ch'ing  
Dynasties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
32 Zuo Zongtang, “Qian Nanyuan xiansheng wencun xu” [Preface to Mister Qian Nanyuan's collection of 
writings], GX7/1/0 (1881), ZZQ, 13:266; ZZN, 1:1b. 
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as spaces for investigation. 
It may have seemed that Zuo was retreating from matters relevant to contemporary politics, 
that a farmstead in rural Hunan was an escape from his own failure, from the world around him, and 
from the reports he had heard of  British violence along the coasts. In the several years after going to 
Anhua  安化 in the spring of  1840 to begin serving as the private teacher to the son of  Tao Shu, he 
thought about finding a place away from the world where he could farm the land. In 1841, Zuo 
wrote to He Xiling about his deepening depression over contemporary affairs and the potential 
respite to be found in the countryside.
Current events are gradually becoming worse. At night, I sit and think to myself, with 
a hundred sentiments all jumbled together, and to the extremes of  idiocy. I then 
consider choosing a distant, secluded place where no human traces have reached, 
buying ten or so mu [of  land], and personally cultivating [crops] within [that place].33
時事浸以不佳。夜坐獨思，百感交集，愚痴之極。遂思擇一幽窅夐絕、人跡不到之處，
買田十數畝，躬耕其中。
The current events of  which he spoke were the violent episodes of  the Opium War with the British. 
The war resulted in a shocking defeat for the Qing and in the empire's accession one year later, in 
1842, to the Treaty of  Nanjing, which gave the British legal footholds in five seaports. These were 
ports where Zuo already knew they and other foreigners would be “pursuing the profits of  trade.”34 
The crimes of  the British in Jiangnan certainly exacerbated Zuo's despair over the situation, and 
made him think even more strongly of  a solution akin to how Gu Zuyu's father had chosen to avoid 
the catastrophes of  the Manchu invasion of  China in the mid-seventeenth century: by finding a 
33 Letter of  DG21/0/0 (1841), ZZQ, 10:30. 
34
求貿易之利. Letter of  DG21/0/0 (1841), ZZQ, 10:29. 
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remote place with arable land to weather the cataclysm. In 1842, Zuo remarked in even stronger 
words that 
since I cannot plunge into the sea to perish, the only thing to do is to purchase a 
mountain and go into hiding.35
吾既不能蹈海而亡，則惟有買山而隱耳。
In the same year, he admitted to He Xiling that he had long harbored such a plan to live in seclusion, 
to survive by “purchasing a mountain” (mai shan 買山),36 which meant finding a piece of  land 
fortified by its strategic location in hills or mountains that could be a self-sufficient refuge from the 
chaos outside.
Despite the air of  crisis in the early 1840s, Zuo's search for a countryside manor was a much 
more mundane process of  locating a parcel of  land that he could purchase and then renting out its 
farmland to ensure the long-term prosperity of  the Zuo clan. Finding such a place necessitated his 
close attention to the shape and quality of  the terrain. He made sure to analyze the fineness (jia 佳) 
of  the hills and the linearity (zhi 直) of  the farmlands.37 As early as the winter of  1840, Zuo had 
received word about just such a remote but arable hideout between Changsha and his native place, 
Xiangyin 湘陰, called Qingshan 青山, where the land “is crisscrossed by a group of  peaks and the 
mountain valleys are deep.”38 He also heard about other options, including a place called Biyunfeng 
碧雲峰, which had highly fertile farmland but which was very difficult to access and where people of 
the Ming had gone several centuries earlier to “hide from the world” (bi shi 避世).39 In the end, 
35 Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 15:252.
36 Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 10:34. See also letter of  DG24/0/0 (1844), ZZQ, 10:46, for Zuo's 
allusion to a Ming poet's work about escaping to the mountains. 
37 Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 10:35.
38
群峰錯互，山谷深邃. Letter of  DG21/0/0 (1841), ZZQ, 10:27.
39 Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 10:35.
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however, he decided to use the savings from his work as a teacher in Anhua to purchase 70 mu  畝 of 
land at a spot called Liujiachong 柳家冲, in the eastern countryside of  Xiangyin.40 In 1844, he moved 
his family to this homestead, which he labeled Liuzhuang  柳莊 (lit. “Willow Manor”).41
If  the move to Liuzhuang represented a retreat from the world, its agriculture would hardly 
be disconnected from the thriving market in cash crops and other rural products that connected 
countrysides to cities. The way Zuo envisioned using the farmland tethered it to the possibilities for 
commodity trade that flowed through commercial centers like Changsha. This was a city, Zuo had 
commented in 1842, in which he could not reside for a long time. It bustled with the same kind of 
profane activity and hubbub that he had reviled in Beijing, and its commerce evinced the “mutual 
exchange between countryside and city” (xiangcheng hu yi 鄉城互易) that earlier Qing scholar Zhang 
Ying  張英 (1638-1708) had spoken about.42 But, as Hilary Beattie has shown, the long-term growth 
of  commercialization is precisely what made farming & studying a viable and enticing option for 
elite families.43 Zuo did not remark upon which goods linked the countryside and city together, but 
the way he imagined his own future farm suggests that he, too, was thinking of  turning a profit from 
these connections. In 1841, he imagined the products of  Qingshan to include those which could 
cover basic subsistence needs as well as those that could fetch cash as commodities:
Farmland can be made into plots, timber can be used for cooking, potatoes and yams 
can ensure the year's [sustenance], the yard can grow mulberry trees, the hillsides can 
40 Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 15:252.
41 Letter of  DG24/0/0 (1844), ZZQ, 15:41.
42 Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 10:34. Zhang Ying was a steadfast advocate for purchasing land as a 
guarantee for a family's elite status. Parts of  his well-known essay about agriculture, “Heng chan suo yan” 
 恆產瑣言 [Remarks on real estate], appeared in the Statecraft Compilation. See HJWB, 36:15a-17a. For a 
translation of  the text, see Beattie, Land and Lineage in China.
43 Beattie, Land and Lineage in China, 12, 36. 
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grow bamboo, and sheep can be herded.44
田可區，材可爨，薯蕷可保歲，園可桑，山可竹，羊可牧。
Zuo knew well about rural commodity networks in Hunan. His experience in Anhua had taught him 
that important cash crops included the palm tree (zong 棕), tung (or paulownia) tree (tong 桐), plum 
tree (mei 梅), bamboo (zhu 竹), and above all, tea (cha 茶). It was not only the cultivation of  cash 
crops but the possibility of  moving them along the thoroughfares that was key to the relationship 
between cities and countrysides. In cases where roads were obstructed, neither Shanxi salt merchants 
(Shanxi yinshang 山西引商) nor itinerant laborers (dai gu zhi ren 待雇之人)—labor was an another 
significant commodity that flowed along the roadways—could circulate. Because commerce would 
be obstructed, families who owned land would not be able to “make business transactions in order 
to live.”45 
Zuo's was one of  these families, and despite his insistence on retreating from the world, his 
farmland enabled him to partake in lucrative commodity markets. What did this mean for his search 
for “profits” from the land? Zuo's decision about what to grow on his farm and what techniques to 
use for cultivation came out of  his readings about agriculture, his understanding of  what the land 
could grow, and his ideas for what could be marketed profitably through the commercial networks in 
the Hunan countryside. Tea leaves in particular had shown him the profits to be made from the 
land. Anhua, where Zuo taught, had long been known for its tea output, and by the eighteenth 
century, Anhua tea was being exchanged locally with merchants from many different parts of  the 
empire.46 Zuo tried growing tea in Liujiachong, and he was delighted to report on two different 
occasions that the income from his tea yard just about equaled Qing taxes (Qing guo ke 清国課) for 
44 Letter of  DG21/0/0 (1841), ZZQ, 10:27. 
45
交易以為生. Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 10:35.
46 Perdue, Exhausting the Earth, 100. 
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the year. Given the return on tea leaves, he was eager to increase their output and also bring the 
“profits of  mulberry and bamboo to fruition.”47 The profits of  the tea garden were
sufficient to know the necessity of  exhausting the profits of  the land,
and so the necessity of  repairing the human affairs [of  the world].48 
足知地利之不可不盡，而人事之不可不修。
The financial return on one single crop gave him hope that more profits could be drawn from the 
land, which would in turn be an avenue toward enriching farmers and rectifying the current 
problems that society faced. 
Articulating Farming as a Scholar's Practice
Zuo's interest in agricultural studies in the middle of  the nineteenth century demonstrated 
his passion for scholarship that could not find its ultimate outlet in governmental affairs. Agriculture 
filled that gap, but not without Zuo feeling the need to defend his choice to fellow scholars. His 
justification for paying attention to agriculture was that it had long been an interest of  true scholars, 
even if  many of  Zuo's contemporaries looked condescendingly upon agrarian knowledge. In fact, 
his invocation of  the names of  several scholars of  ancient times to substantiate his own position 
seemed to put him at odds with the authors of  classic texts. In letters to acquaintances in 1840 and 
1846, Zuo mentioned one student of  Confucius, Fan Chi 樊遲, who had gone to his teacher asking 
about agriculture.49 Confucius had rebuffed his student, not only by claiming that experienced 
agrarians (laonong 老農) and experienced gardeners (laopu 老圃) would serve Fan Chi's inquiry better 
than he would. Behind Fan Chi's back, Confucius also criticized him as a “petty man” (xiaoren 小人) 
47
桑竹之利成. Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:58.
48 Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:54.
49 Letter of  20/4/27 (1840), ZZQ, 15:33; Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:55. 
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for paying attention to agriculture when ritual (li 禮), righteousness (yi 義), and trust (xin 信) were the 
primary instruments for governing the people.50 Zuo also alluded to Chen Xiang 陳相, who was 
reproved by Mencius for his interest in agriculture as a primary trope of  politics.51 While he 
recognized that there were principles of  governance higher than agriculture, “this is certainly not to 
say,” Zuo asserted, “that scholars should not personally do agriculture.”52 
Zuo also alluded to other historical figures who had highlighted the importance of  agrarian 
learning and rural lifestyles. He chose allusions that spoke to the political significance of  agriculture 
as a system for “governing life” (zhisheng 治生) and to ones that affirmed his decision to be 
personally involved in crop cultivation. Perhaps the two were hard to separate; Zuo claimed that 
“among the ancients, there were none who did not farm and study.”53 Among these figures was the 
Jin-era poet Tao Yuanming  陶淵明 (365-427), whose lines of  verse, written while he lived at his 
countryside farm, seemed to reflect precisely the lifestyle that Zuo now found for himself. Zuo 
quoted these two lines:
When I've already plowed and already sowed, I return to read my books.54
既耕亦已种，時還讀我書
50 See Confucius 13.4, in Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, ed., Lunyu yizhu 論語譯注 [The annotated Analects], (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 2009), 133.
51 Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 10:55. For the case see Mencius 5.4, in Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, ed., Mengzi  
yizhu 孟子譯注 [The annotated Mencius], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 123.
52
并非謂士人不當工稼. Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:55.
53
古人無不耕且讀者. Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:54.
54 This verse comes from Tao's series of  poems “Du Shanhaijing” 讀山海  經 [Reading the Classic of  Mountains  
and Seas]. For a citation, see Tao Qian 陶潛, Tao Yuanming ji   陶淵明集 [Collection of  Tao Yuanming], ed. Sun 
Fuqing  孫福清 (Guangzhou: Han mo yuan, 1879), 4:15a. See Xiaofei Tian, Tao Yuanming  ＆Manuscript  
Culture: The Record of  a Dusty Table (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 2005), 150. 
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Four limbs are truly exhausted, so that extraordinary perils shall not afflict.55
四體誠乃疲，庶無異患干
By alluding to Tao Yuanming, Zuo was not merely asserting the propriety of  focusing his efforts on 
agriculture, but also imbuing agriculture, rural life, and work in the fields with the aesthetic sense of 
emotional and physical fulfillment. “What joy is there in draping over one's shoulders the moonlight 
and carrying a hoe!” he proclaimed in 1846.56 
But just as the allusions to Tao's poetry legitimated his investments of  time in agriculture, 
they were also meant to redeem agriculture for scholarship. What Zuo most disliked about 
contemporary scholars was their rootlessness and their inability to grasp practical affairs. It was in 
his assessments of  scholars' relationship to agriculture and to farmland that Zuo really seems to 
have expressed the spirit of  late imperial statecraft. Zuo complained that whereas the ancients had 
taken agriculture seriously, scholars of  later generations (houru 后儒) had turned their backs on 
agronomic research, and he heaped a pile of  aspersions on them:  
The research and practice of  scholars of  later generations is not clear; they become 
broadly and profoundly [knowledgeable] in books of  all sorts, but they are ignorant 
of  the five grains [i.e. agriculture]. How is it possible that they run about in this 
unsettled society yet are indolent and useless when it comes to agriculture? They 
55 This verse comes from Tao's series of  poems “Huan jiu ju”  還舊居 [Returning to my old residence]. For a 
citation, see Tao Qian 陶潛, Tao Yuanming ji   陶淵明集 [Collection of  Tao Yuanming], ed. Sun Fuqing 孫福清 
(Guangzhou: Han mo yuan, 1879), 3:8b. See Tian, Tao Yuanming  ＆Manuscript Culture, 113.
56
何若帶月荷鋤之為樂乎. Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:55.
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have the name “scholars,” but they really are equal to vagabonds.57
 后儒講貫不明，遂至博極群書，不知五穀。寧奔走於風塵，而怠荒於稼穡。名為學者，
實等游民。
Given that scholars got caught up in the profane affairs of  contemporary life and let the pace of 
their lives be set by them, their writings were also disappointing. Zuo considered much of  what 
scholars produced to be vapid nonsense. Multiple times in the early 1840s, he shared a keen 
disappointment not only with scholarship in general, but also with the published works about 
agriculture.58 In 1844 and 1845, he claimed that he had done extensive reading in new books, but 
that out of  innumerable volumes, there were only a few that he could really appreciate.59 Most 
authors wrote primarily to make a name for themselves, while their efforts contributed little to 
studies that would help society:
Among people of  the recent era who write books, most choose to do something that 
is easy to complete and has a good title. There are extremely few practical studies.60
近人著書，多簡擇易成而名美者為之，實學絕少。
Studies of  agriculture were sidelined as scholars wrote books in pursuit of  reputations for 
themselves, which meant that relatively few books from past or present took up the topic of 
57 Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:55. The word houru   後儒 means “scholars of  later generations,” but 
it can refer in particular to several Song pioneers of  the “study of  principles” (lixue 理學) known as Neo-
Confucianism, which was especially prominent in the Song and Ming dynasties. These pioneers were Zhu 
Xi 朱熹, Cheng Hao 程顥, and Cheng Yi 程頤. Zuo seems to have been using a much broader definition of 
houru in this passage, to include scholars beyond these three. Nonetheless, given Zuo's inclinations toward 
statecraft and evidential learning, it may have been a subtle attack on pre-kaozheng modes of  learning as 
well. See Luo Zhufeng, ed., Hanyu da cidian  漢語大詞典 [The grand dicitonary of  Chinese], (Shanghai: 
Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2007), 1853.
58 For an example of  his criticism of  scholarship, see Letter of  DG22/0/0 (1842), ZZQ, 15:252.
59 See letter of  DG24/0/0 (1844), ZZQ, 15:42; Letter of  DG25/0/0 (1845), ZZQ, 10:49.
60 Letter of  DG25/0/0 (1845), ZZQ, 10:49. In another reiteration of  this point, Zuo noted that “there are 
really no practical studies able to support later generations” 絕無實學可餉後人. See letter of  DG24/0/0 
(1844), ZZQ, 15:42.
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agriculture. In Zuo's eyes, scholars had little regard for what he called the “most important affair for 
human life.”61 
In the barrage of  criticism, Zuo did not spare farmers. They, too, seemed to be caught up in 
the excitement for advancement, in the urge to profit, to the detriment of  society.
[I] believe the maladies of  today's agrarians and today's scholars are exactly equal. 
Both are myopic out of  their desire for quick [results]. Having misled themselves, 
they mislead others. Their bearing on the world is not insignificant.62 
以為今之農者與今之學者，弊正相等，皆以欲速見小。自誤而以誤人，其關系天下不小
也。
In this simple diagnosis, both scholars and farmers had a vision problem. Insofar as they approached 
their tasks with this debility, they were bound to cause problems for society as a whole. It was the 
myopia (jianxiao 見小) of  both groups that Zuo seemed to take to heart as he invested his time and 
efforts in practicing agriculture and writing about it. Visualizing the success of  agricultural 
techniques became part of  the solution. 
Experimenting with Methods and Plants
Notwithstanding his claims about hiding away from the world, Zuo's purchase of  land and 
his choice of  cash crops connected him directly to the market for land and its products. Yet 
understanding the nexus between countrysides and urban markets, and how to profit from that 
connection, was an important but not adequate step in determining how to make the land (and the 
people farming the land) yield the most profitable crops and harvests possible. Merely choosing to 
61
人生第一要務. See letter of  DG24/0/0 (1844), ZZQ, 15:42; Letter of  DG25/0/0 (1845), ZZQ, 10:49.
62 Letter of  DG25/0/0 (1845), ZZQ, 10:51; cf. letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:54. 
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grow tea in the Xiangyin countryside seemed to produce enticing returns, but for Zuo, agricultural 
practice also meant trying things out and experimenting with crops and techniques, a process in 
which reading and cultivating were complementary activities.
After 1838, Zuo's reading of  agrarian texts often entailed a counterpart in practice, an 
impetus to test out (shi 試) various methods and verify (yan 驗) their efficacy, which meant going out 
to the fields and dealing firsthand with plants and soils. Decades later, when he was in the empire's 
northwest, Zuo would recall how he practiced agriculture in Hunan. After citing his family's humble 
origins, he noted:
I carried on farming & studying (gengdu), and in my youth, engaged myself  with the 
farmland. By my nature, I enjoyed studying and probing into all the various books 
about northern agriculture and southern agriculture. I personally verified [their 
contents] and assimilated [what they had to say].63 
耕讀相承，少小從事隴畝，於北農、南農諸書，性喜研求，躬驗而有得。
What connected his reading and agrarian practice was a spirit of  investigation into agricultural 
knowledge. Zuo expressed the impulse to translate knowledge from texts into practices in the fields 
as wanting to “try out” or “put into effect on a trial basis” (shixing 試行) various methods and objects 
pertaining to agriculture, including techniques for arranging a pattern of  cultivation on a plot of 
land. 
From the start, Zuo recognized that his readings in agriculture, his experiments, and his 
writing of  texts would come to fruition in their capacity to promote the best practices of  production 
among farmers, even while his own family profited from the production of  cash crops.64 Consider 
63 Memorial of  GX3/3/29 (1877), ZZQ, 6:637; ZZN, 1:16a.
64 Letter of  DG18/0/0 (1838), ZZQ, 15:248; Letter of  DG21/0/0 (1841), ZZQ, 10:28.
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his practice of  sericulture. There was nothing original in his decision to have his family grow 
mulberry trees and reel silk in the several years after 1838. According to Luo Ruhuai 羅汝懷 
(1804-1880), a fellow scholar who lived in the same town as his wife's family, it was during Zuo's 
studies of  geography that he committed some effort to growing mulberry trees and producing silk.65 
Zuo had acquired roughly one thousand “young mulberry trees” (zhi sang 稚桑) for this purpose.66 
Yet his desire to try sericulture arose from ambitions that were larger than merely becoming 
proficient in cultivation at home. His goal was to propagate technical knowledge about sericulture 
and draw interest to its techniques among other farmers. In the spring of  1840, he claimed to be 
spending a lot of  effort researching the methods for raising silkworms. Learning about sericulture 
was “not only for a single person or a single family to seek material sustenance.”67 Researching 
mulberry trees and silkworms could yield wider benefits, assuming that he had the ability to 
demonstrate sericulture's feasibility to other farmers. This is where “trying out” became important. 
As Zuo noted for sericulture,
In the future, [when] I try out proper methods, those who spring to action upon 
hearing the news will naturally be many.68 
將來試行得法，聞風興起者自多。
65 See Luo Ruhuai 羅汝懷, Lu yi caotang shiji  綠漪草堂詩集 [Collected poetry from the thatched cottage of  green 
ripples], 20 vols. (Changsha, 1883), 12:10a. This work is cited in ZZN, 1:17b.
66 In a poem, he paired the imagery of  young mulberry trees supporting silkworms for the first time with the 
image of  his seven-year-old daughter first learning Chinese characters. Zuo Zongtang, “Er shi jiu sui zi ti 
xiao xiang ba shou,” ZZQ, 13:458. This is cited in ZZN, 1:17b. After moving his household to 
Liujiachong several years later, he apparently continued to guide his family in the venture of  sericulture, as 
he was planning to collect mulberry seeds (sangshenzi 桑葚子) in late spring of  1846, likely from Anhua, to 
send to Liujiachong to be planted by the farmers there. He had previously sent several cuttings of  the 
“jade butterfly plum” (yudiemei 玉蝶梅)—a special variety of  plum blossom—for cultivation at home. Letter 
of  DG26/2/29 (1846), ZZQ, 15:48. 
67
此不獨為一身一家圖溫飽也. Letter of  DG20/4/27, ZZQ, 15:33. 
68 Letter of  DG20/4/27, ZZQ, 15.33. 
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It is worth noting several points about the utility of  this type of  “test run.” Since the goal was to 
demonstrate the success of  sericulture and attract interest among farmers, it was clear that Zuo 
needed to show them “proper methods” (de fa 得法), which were assumed to be the most productive 
ones. How had he come to know which ones were the best methods? Although he rarely mentioned 
it in his letters to family members and fellow scholars, his research in agricultural texts and his 
experimental runs of  sericulture were the basis for deciding upon the proper methods. In 1840, he 
wrote to a brother of  his wife. 
Now [in late May] is precisely when mulberry tree saplings can be transplanted. I 
have exhaustively looked over and read in detail [Xu Guangqi's] Complete Treatise on  
Agricultural Administration,69 searching for planting methods in it. I do not begrudge 
small expenditures for [the purpose of] enjoining [farmers].70  
 桑秧樹此時正可移栽。萬望細看農政書，求其種法。勿惜小費，為囑。
Accruing technical information about farming and then putting it on display for farmers through 
trial runs: this is how he hoped to spread information about productive practices to enrich the 
community. Enabling whole villages, rather than merely his family, to achieve material sustenance 
would be “our great meritorious and virtuous deed.”71 
69 Note that in Zuo's text, he uses the title “Nongzheng shu”  農政書 rather than the standard title 
“Nongzheng quanshu”  農政全書 to refer to Xu Guangqi's early seventeenth-century agricultural treatise. 
For another usage like this, see Wang Xinjing, “Qutian putian shuo” [An explanation of  qutian and 
horticulture fields], HJWB, 36:12a-13a. Despite their disagreement about whether there are various 
versions of  Xu Guangqi's text, Hu Daojing and Wu Dedao agree that the shorter title refers to the 
standard text. See Hu Daojing 胡道靜, “Guanyu Nongzheng quanshu de 'bieben'” 關於《農政全書 “》的 別 ” 本 [On 
'another edition' of  the Nongzheng quanshu], Zhongguo nongshi中國農  史 [Agricultural History of  China] 
(1983.01): 96; and Wu Deduo 吳德鐸, “Guanyu Yangyu yueling yu Nongzheng quanshu de ‘bieben'" 關於《養余月
“ ” 令》與《農政全書》的 別本 [On 'other editions’ of  the Yangyu yueling and the Nongzheng quanshu], Zhongguo 
nongshi  中國農史 [Agricultural History of  China] (1983.03): 55.
70 Letter of  DG20/4/27 (1840), ZZQ, 15:33. 
71
我輩一大功德. Letter of  DG20/4/27 (1840), ZZQ, 15:33. 
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Promoting agricultural techniques was a commonplace goal of  imperial officials in the Qing, 
as it had been for officials in previous dynasties stretching back to the beginning of  the imperial era. 
Indeed, the mythical origin of  Chinese farming in the works of  Shennong 神農, legendary god of 
agriculture, was always related to the propagation of  agrarian skills among the populace. Yet it is less 
clear to what extent non-officials spent time promoting agriculture. Despite having considered the 
purchase of  a position as district magistrate (zhixian 知縣) and even having contributed some money 
for the post,72 Zuo never held a position related to government service until 1852. The time he 
spent working on agriculture, in his study as well as in the fields, was of  a scholar with time to 
research and tinker. It was this extra-bureaucratic approach that perhaps allowed Zuo to dig more 
deeply into agrarian learning and focus more intently on the potential benefits of  agricultural 
promotion than many other Qing scholars of  the nineteenth century. 
Zuo's interest in trying out techniques from texts seems to have begun not long after his 
return from Beijing in 1838, and it was exemplified by his concern to research and put into practice 
a particular method of  cultivation. This was the qutian  區田 (“plot fields,” “area fields,” or “pit 
cultivation”) method of  dividing up farmland into a patchwork of  small square plots. Measuring 
roughly a quarter square meter in size and one-third meter deep according to one early Qing 
account,73 the small plots would alternate with uncultivated plots in a modified checkerboard pattern 
and were designed to concentrate water, fertilizer, seed, and labor power (see Figure 2). In 1841, Zuo 
wrote to his mentor He Xiling expressing his intention to resign from his teaching job, move back to 
where his family was, and rent over 10 mu  畝 of  farmland, where he would
personally cultivate it, test out the ancient method of  qutian, and promote it to my 
72 Letter of  DG25/1/19 (1845), ZZQ, 15:53; Zuo Zongtang weikan shudu, 2.
73 Sun Zhaikui 孫宅揆, Jiao jia shu  教稼書 [Book for instruction in agriculture], in Qu zhong wu zhong 區種五種 




As we will see, no less important to his experience with qutian were his readings in the numerous 
texts about the method that had appeared in the Qing era, as well as his own writings about qutian.
Why did late imperial scholars like Zuo investigate farming's “ancient methods”? Peter 
Perdue has argued that interest in qutian in the Qing period signified not only “the enduring appeal 
of  classical precedent,” but also “a transformation of  radical Confucianism” in which agrarian 
scholars were activists who held faith “in the possibility of  implementing models from the classic 
texts in their own time.”75 By all accounts, qutian did have classical precedent. The earliest writings of 
qutian are commonly ascribed to Han dynasty scholar Fan Shengzhi氾勝之,76 who recorded the 
method's archaic origins as a measure to ensure agrarian production even in years of  drought.77 The 
scholars who investigated agriculture may have dealt with old texts, but they did so in the same way 
other evidential scholars approached non-agrarian topics like history, philology, or geography. They 
foregrounded the search for evidence and dug deeply into ancient texts precisely in order to search 
for the roots of  knowledge. If  Qing-era research in agriculture was not separate from trends in 
evidential learning, then Qing interest in qutian was not merely a continuation of  Confucian scholars' 
age-old desires to use classical precedents to bolster social welfare. It was, rather, an indication of 
intellectual innovation in the very period in which they were studying.
74 Letter of  DG21/0/0 (1841), ZZQ, 10:29. 
75 Perdue, Exhausting the Earth, 13, 15. Perdue employs Thomas Metzger's schema of  two poles—“radical” 
and “moderate”—to talk about Confucian thought in the late imperial period. See Thomas Metzger, 
Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977).  
76 Perdue, Exhausting the Earth, 13; Wang Yuhu, Zhongguo nongxue shulu, 13. 
77 Fan Shengzhi ascribed the invention of  qutian to Governor Yi 伊尹, who served the first king of  the Shang 
dynasty (16-11 c. BCE) and who was purported to have taught farmers how to fertilize fields. See “Fan 
Shengzhi yi shu”  氾勝之遺書 [Posthumous work of  Fan Shengzhi], in Qu zhong wu zhong, 1:1a.
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Research about qutian was hardly separate from other considerations of  how to search for 
profit from the land. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, not long after Gu Zuyu 
compiled the Essentials of  Historical Geography, scholars were researching and writing about qutian. 
One prominent example is Lu Shiyi  陸世儀 (1611-1672),78 whose essay “On qutian” (“Lun qutian” 論
區田) discussed the origin of  his interest in the method, other agrarian scholars' citations about 
qutian, and his exchanges with farmers about the use of  techniques in the fields.79 It is worth 
dwelling on the contents of  Lu's essay, for Zuo Zongtang knew Lu's work and may have gleaned 
many insights from it. Lu's initial interest in agriculture seems to have paralleled Gu Zuyu's interest 
in geography insofar as it sprung from disasters arising in the wake of  the Manchu takeover of  the 
heartlands of  the Ming dynasty. Lu identified 1644 and 1645 as a stark turning point in the lives of 
the people and community he knew; after these dates, “instruction” (jiaoshou 教授) and the “way of 
cultivating life” (yangsheng zhi dao 養生之道) had greatly deteriorated. But it was also the turning point 
around which Lu recognized the value of  agriculture as a subject of  study. He realized that, in times 
of  calamity as he was then facing, scholars of  the past went into seclusion and farmed the land. He, 
however, admitted his physical weakness as a denizen of  the city who was unaccustomed to 
agricultural affairs and “unable to personally handle farm tools.”80 Nonetheless, he made a point to 
78 ECCP, 548-49.
79 Lu's essay appeared originally in his Sibian lu  思辨錄 [Record of  intellectual inquiry], which was published 
after 1661. A shorter, edited version appeared in the 1827 Statecraft Compilation (HJWB, 36:13a-15a). An 
edited version of  Lu Shiyi's longer work, the Sibian lu jiyao  思辨錄輯要 [Edited essentials of  the record of 
intellectual inquiry] was made by Zhang Boxing  張伯行 (1652-1725) and printed in his Zheng yi tang quan shu 
  正誼堂全書 [Complete works of  the hall of  true meaning] early in the eighteenth century. Zhang's vast 
compilation was reprinted by Zuo Zongtang in 1866 at the “Academy of  True Meaning” (Zheng yi shuyuan 
正誼書院) in Fuzhou, Fujian. See ECCP, 549, 52; Zhengyi tang quanshu zongmu  正誼堂全書總目 [General catalog 
for the Complete works of  the hall of  true meaning], (Fuzhou: Zhengyi shuyuan, 1869), 15b.
80
不能親執耒耜. Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao  陸桴亭思辨錄輯要 [Lu Shiyi's edited essentials of  the record of 
intellectual inquiry], in Zheng yi tang quan shu   正誼堂全書 [Complete works of  the hall of  true meaning], 
(Fushou: Zhengyi shu yuan, 1866), 11:1a.
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research agriculture by relying upon information from Jiang Shishao 江士韶, a friend who had had 
experience in the paddy fields he owned in the western outskirts of  their Jiangnan hometown, 
Taicang 太倉. Lu, too, owned land, and even though he had never farmed, he decided in the 
straitened circumstances to contribute the costs of  production (gongben 工本) for the purchase of 
plow oxen and tools and go through the fields to supervise cultivation. His decision appears to have 
been a move to boost production by raising the level of  technology of  his tenants, but there were 
other motives. Apropos of  agrarian research, he said that his presence in paddy fields indicated how 
he
desired, in some small way, to engage in [the peasants'] affairs, in order to have some 
experience with the study of  farming and water control.81
稍欲涉獵其事，以驗農田水利之學也。
His involvement in the agriculture of  his tenants in Jiangnan—rather than hiding away to undertake 
agricultural production like Zuo did in the 1840s—afforded Lu Shiyi the opportunity to examine 
techniques of  production. 
It was during this phase of  observation that Lu had the idea for trials of  qutian. He was 
surprised to learn through his readings in history that such a “wonderful method” (miao fa 妙法) was 
neither taught to nor circulated among farmers. According to his knowledge, the bureaucracy of  the 
Yuan dynasty had tried to promote the qutian method and had even dispatched special supervisors to 
oversee its propagation. Yet farmers had not responded positively to these efforts, which left Lu 
wondering why.82 Despite the lackluster results of  past attempts to promote the method, Lu 
81 Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong  區種十種 [Ten titles on plot cultivation], ed. Wang Yuhu 王毓瑚 
(Beijing: Caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1955), 23; Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, in Zheng yi tang quan shu, 
11:1a-1b.
82 He surmised that either farmers considered the Yuan promoters to be inhuman (feiren 非人) or the 
methods to be impractical. 
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committed himself  to the task of  spreading qutian among peasants. Speaking of  the method, he 
wrote:
I previously wanted to personally test it out, yet I had no free time. This year, since I 
have personally attended to farm affairs, I will discuss this method everywhere with 
experienced farmers, and furthermore speak of  it with Chen Hu, and have him test 
out these things, so that he can find out the truth of  the matter.83
予嘗欲親試之而未暇。今歲既親田事，將以此法徧商之老農，且以語陳子言夏，亦令試
其事，庶可得其實也。
He relied upon several groups of  people to facilitate the spread of  qutian. Communicating with the 
experienced farmers may have allowed him to hear their perspectives on local conditions and 
customs, but it also gave him the opportunity to initiate a discussion of  production methods. And 
he used his connections with a fellow scholar of  Taicang, Chen Hu  陳瑚 (1613-1675), with whom he 
shared an interest in statecraft.84 As we will see, Lu asked Chen to put the method into practice and 
see if  it really could produce abundant harvests as earlier scholars had suggested. The importance of 
testing out the method, at least in principle, was paramount as he moved to convince others of  its 
efficacy. 
Lu's consideration of  qutian as an agricultural technique raised concerns about the interplay 
of  humans, land, and climate in a way that echoed older considerations of  land use as a function of 
strategic geographical thinking. Lu himself  had conducted research in strategic matters and had 
written a text about military strategy based upon diagrams of  military positions purportedly created 
83 Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 24; Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, 11:2a. 
84 On Chen Hu, see Yan Wenyu 嚴文郁, ed., Qing ru zhuan lue  清儒傳略 [Biographical sketches of  Qing 
scholars], (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1990), 210.
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by Han dynasty general Zhuge Liang.85 When speaking about qutian, he employed a hierarchy of 
three variables which had originally appeared in the Mencius in a passage about military strategy, but 
which he applied to the realm of  quotidian production:86 
The timing of  heaven, the profits of  the land, and the accordance of  people: it is not 
only in the use of  soldiers that things are like this. All matters have them. In the case 
of  farming, their relation is especially important.87 
天時、地利、人和，不特用兵為然。凡事皆有之，即農田一事，關係尤重。
Although these variables had relevance to classical conceptions of  governance, Lu defined them in a 
secular way that made them stand for factors of  production in agriculture. He described each in 
turn:
The presence or paucity of  water defines the timing of  heaven. The fertility or 
barrenness [of  the soil] defines the profits of  the land. Dredging [waterways] and 
reclaiming [land] for cultivation defines the accordance of  people.88
水旱，天時也。肥瘠，地利也。修治墾闢，人和也。
Although these three variables retained their allusions to the Mencius, the way Lu described them in 
the context of  agriculture suggests that they might be better rendered as “climate and weather,” “soil 
fertility,” and “labor.” 
Just as important for understanding Lu's notion of  agriculture was the relationship between 
85 The text's title is Ba zhen fa ming  八陣發明 [Elaborations upon eight arrays] (1633). See ECCP, 548.
86 For Mencius, these were the “timing of  Heaven” (tianshi 天時), the “advantages of  the land” (dili 地利), and 
the “unity of  the people” (renhe 人和). See Mencius 4.1, in Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, ed., Mengzi yizhu 孟子譯注 
[The annotated Mencius], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 86. James Legge translated these into somewhat 
unwieldy phrases as the “opportunities of  time vouchsafed by Heaven,” “advantages of  situation afforded 
by the Earth,” and “the union arising from the accord of  Men.” See James Legge, trans., The Works of  
Mencius (New York: Dover Publications, 1970 [1895]), 208.
87 Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, 11:1b; Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 23. 
88 Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, 11:1b; Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 23. 
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the three factors, and here Lu preserved the hierarchical order of  their relations from the Mencius. 
Labor (renhe 人和) was the most important (zhong 重) variable to making agriculture function 
properly, followed by soil fertility (dili 地利) and climate (tianshi 天時). Lu explained this hierarchy by 
raising several hypothetical scenarios. People could come to expect regular weather patterns, but 
when unforeseen weather arrived, poor soil would be harmed whereas fertile farmland would be 
fine. For Lu, this demonstrated that soil quality trumped climate and weather in the hierarchy of 
important factors of  production. Yet Lu recognized that labor was the key factor, much more 
important than soil fertility. For if  irrigation channels had not been built, or if  planting was not done 
on time, then even good farmland would be unusable. Conversely, if  the weather was favorable and 
the land of  high quality, what distinguished the results would be the degree of  hard work.89 Indeed, 
despite recognizing that climate was the most essential (yao 要) factor of  production, Lu asserted that 
labor ultimately determined the size of  the harvest:
If  the proper climate and soil fertility already obtain, and one is also able to 
supplement them with labor, then what one harvests would be even more different 
from [the harvests of] others. This is the reason one must place great value in human 
labor.90 
使既得天時，既得地利，而又能濟之以人和，則所獲更與他人不同。所以必貴於人和也。
Lu thus presented labor as the defining factor of  production in agriculture to preface his discussion 
89
勞逸頓殊故也. Lu quoted an aphorism to suggest that labor, too, was a factor of  production with varying 
quality: “purchase farmland and purchase tenants” 買田買佃. Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 
23. 
90 Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, 11:2a; Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 23-24. For a fuller 
translation of  the longer passage, see Li Bozhong, “Changes in Climate, Land, and Human Effort: The 
Production of  Wet-Field Rice in Jiangnan during the Ming and Qing Dynasties,” in Sediments of  Time:  
Environment and Society in Chinese History, ed. Mark Elvin and Liu Ts'ui-jung (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 448-449.
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of  qutian and its potential advantages to farmers. 
Perhaps ironically, Lu and other scholars acknowledged that labor was also the main sticking 
point forestalling the widespread adoption of  qutian. Simply put, qutian was labor-intensive, which 
peasants already knew or quickly found out when they attempted to employ qutian methods. One of 
the reasons that qutian was never widely adopted was that farmers complained of  the great amount 
of  labor it entailed. If  they accorded with the technical specifications in the farming manuals, they 
had to divide their fields into small plots, calculated at 2650 plots for each mu.91 Lu had apparently 
canvassed farmers to understand why they did not use qutian on their farms, and he found that it was 
a combination of  lack of  knowledge, the laboriousness of  the method, and the particular irrigation 
patterns of  Jiangnan fields.92 
On the other hand, because labor was the single most important factor of  production for 
agriculture in general and qutian in particular, humans could overcome the problems associated with 
land quality, climate, and weather, at least in principle. Labor would minimize the divergent qualities 
of  the environment, making the qutian method capable of  spreading almost anywhere there was 
labor. For one thing, Lu recognized that the method could be used to cultivate a wide variety of 
crops, including barley (damai 大麥), yams (shanyao 山藥), taro (naizi 艿子), as well as soybeans and 
adzuki beans (da xiao dou 大小豆).93 Perhaps more significant for the potential geographical scope in 
which qutian could spread, scholars had recorded that the method could be employed on nearly any 
type of  land.
Qutian does not require good farmland. Hillsides, high land and steep slopes near 
91 Sun Zhaikui 孫宅揆, “Qutian shuo”  區田说 [An explanation of  qutian], in HJWB, 36:11b.
92 Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, 11:10a; Perdue, Exhausting the Earth, 13-14.
93 Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 24.
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towns, and even the inside slopes of  city ramparts can all be used for qutian.94 
區田非必須良田也。諸山陵近邑高危傾阪及邱城上皆可為區田。
To be sure, fertilizer was crucial insofar as it amplified the efficacy of  human labor. The “qi of 
manure” (fenqi 糞氣) enabled infertile fields to be made into highly productive plots. Indeed, the 
method seems to have been based on the notion that human labor—and manure as an extension of 
that labor—could generally transform land to make it suitable for production. Jia Sixie's sixth-
century text noted that “qu [plot] cultivation does not prioritize land management; it just uses barren 
land.”95 In other words, labor created the possibility for the extension of  cultivation to new places, 
and it used the particular techniques of  qutian to make this feasible.
When scholars put qutian into practice, however, the results did not always demonstrate the 
method's purported potential. At very end of  his discussion of  qutian, Lu Shiyi noted that when his 
friend Chen Hu had heard from him about the method, Chen dug seven plots in the empty soil next 
to his house and calculated that if  each plot yielded one dou  斗 (roughly 10 liters) of  grain, its output 
would be commensurate with what the land could produce under normal circumstances. Yet the 
experiment with qutian did not yield the desired results because, as Lu Shiyi mentioned, the 
“methods were not completely and thoroughly satisfactory.”96 The test run faced a slew of 
problems: the bottoms of  the plots were not flat; when planted, the seeds were not pressed firmly 
into the soil; when the sprouts appeared, they clumped together in the middle of  the plot; and the 
sprouts were not weeded apart (yunxi 耘稀). In addition, four plots had been ruined by “evil outsider 
manure” (e'ke fen 惡客糞), while in the remaining three, the grain plants lacked sufficient water and 
94 Jia Sixie, Qimin yaoshu, quoted in Song Baochun Ð宋葆湻 , “Fan Shengzhi yishu”  氾勝之遺屬 [Posthumous 
writings of  Fan Shengzhi] (1819), in Qu zhong wu zhong, 1a. Part of  this translation is taken from the 
translation in Bray, Agriculture, 127. 
95
蓋區種不先治地，即荒地為之也. Jia Sixie, quoted in Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 25.
96
法不俱盡善. Lu Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, 11:14b; Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 35.
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did not ripen fully like “regular grain” (changhe 常禾).97
Despite the disappointing outcome of  this trial, Qing scholars in later periods were excited 
by the possibility that demonstrations of  qutian could convince farmers to adopt it in their fields. In 
the nineteenth century, just as Zuo Zongtang was studying agriculture and conducting trials of 
production methods, there seems to have been a surge of  interest in the method. The editors of  the 
1827 Statecraft Compilation chose an abridged version of  Lu Shiyi's essay on qutian, along with two 
other early Qing scholars' essays, for inclusion in a volume about agriculture.98 The main editor, He 
Changling, also wrote a slim volume entitled Cultivation Methods of  Qutian (Qutian zhong fa 區田種法) 
when he served as the governor of  Guizhou province in the late 1830s and early 1840s.99 In fact, no 
fewer than seven new treatises about qutian appeared over the course of  the nineteenth century, 
including several that were reprinted in a collection entitled Five Titles on Plot Cultivation (Qu zhong wu 
zhong 區種五種), produced by Zhao Mengling 趙夢齡, who began compiling the work at the turn of 
the nineteenth century and who wrote a preface for the text in 1842; it was not published until 
1878.100 Although the information contained in these treatises was typically rehashed from earlier 
sources, their composition indicated a renewed interest in a technical solution for agriculture.  
Nineteenth-century interest in qutian was also reflected in the continued attempts to prove 
the method's effectiveness in boosting crop yields, and Zuo Zongtang was quite aware of  these 
97 Lu mentioned, however, that the stalk and leaves of  the plants were more lush than regular grain stalks. Lu 
Shiyi, Lu Futing sibian lu jiyao, 11:14b; Lu Shiyi, “Lun qutian,” in Qu zhong shi zhong, 35.
98 Sun Zhaikui 孫宅揆, “Qutian shuo”  區田说 [An explanation of  qutian], in HJWB, 36:11b-12a; Wang Xinjing 
王心敬, “Qutian putian shuo”  區田圃田说 [An explanation of  qutian and horticulture fields], in HJWB, 
36:12a-13a; Lu Shiyi 陸世儀, “Lun qutian”  論區田 [On qutian], in HJWB, 36:13a-15a.
99 This volume seems to be no longer extant, although a preface to the work still exists. See Tang Jian 唐鑑, 
“Qutian zhong fa xu”  區田種法序 [Preface to Cultivation Methods of  Qutian], in Tang Queshen gong ji 唐確慎公集 
[Collection of  Duke Tang Jian], (1875), 2:32a-33a.
100 Zhao Mengling, ed., Qu zhong wu zhong  區種五種 [Five titles on plot cultivation], (Lianhuachi, 1878 [preface 
1842]).
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attempts. In 1840, for instance, he requested that He Xiling send him a text about qutian written by 
Jiangnan scholar Pan Zengyi  潘曾沂 (1792-1853),101 a native of  Suzhou who promoted the technique 
among farmers on the outskirts of  the city. Beginning in 1828, Pan reported upon his attempts to 
“test out” (shixing 試行) qutian methods around the city in order to convince peasants of  their 
efficacy. He grumbled that farmers in his area had a problem of  vision, a diagnosis that seems likely 
to have influenced Zuo's complaints about the myopia of  farmers and scholars several years later. 
Pan found that farmers were ravaging their farmland by extracting too much from the soil:
The farmers of  Wu [county] are constrained by nearsightedness and are greedy to 
harvest small profits. They double-plant with winter wheat, and thereupon lay waste 
to springtime cultivation. They are either hoeing or piling up [the soil], always being 
careless. The more they cultivate, the more wasteland there is.102 
吳農狃于咫見，貪獲小利，兼種宿麥，因廢春耕，或耘或耔，動輒鹵莽，多種多荒。
Like Lu Shiyi, Pan recognized the increasing deficiency of  agrarian production—and the constant 
paucity of  the harvest despite neither flood nor drought—as a sign that the proper combination of 
the three primary factors of  production had become disrupted.103
Not unlike other activist officials, Pan deemed the solution to be educating the farmers in 
new technology in order to boost output and “open up a source of  profit” (kai li zhi yuan 開利之原). 
For this purpose, he used his own money to establish the Fengyu Community Fields  豐豫義田 to 
support impoverished farmers. He also attempted to introduce farmers to qutian methods and to 
101 Zuo referred to the text as the Book of  Qutian (Qutian shu 區田書). See letter of  DG20/0/0 (1840), ZZQ, 
10:19.
102 Pan Zengyi, “Fengyu zhuang ben shu”  豐豫莊本書 [Basic writings of  Fengyu Manor], in Qu zhong wu zhong, 
5:1a.
103 Pan's terms were slightly different from those used by Lu Shiyi. For climate and weather, he used tiandao 天
 道 rather than tianshi 天時, and for human labor, he used renli  人力 rather than renhe 人和. For soil fertility, he 
used the same term, dili 地利. Pan Zengyi, “Fengyu zhuang ben shu,” in Qu zhong wu zhong, 5:1a. 
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entice them to imitate his demonstrations. In 1828, outside one of  Suzhou's city gates, Loumen 婁門,
 he cultivated rice stalks (daohe 稻禾) using the qutian method. He claimed that this demonstration 
resulted in a large harvest, and it was this demonstration and the abundant harvest that “village 
farmers near and far all witnessed.” If  we are to believe Pan, farmers thereupon began to adopt the 
method and even began vying for government awards for high productivity.104 The following year, 
outside another city gate, Fengmen葑門, Pan reported that he emulated qutian methods to “test it 
again, and again verify its efficacy” (zai shi zai yan 再試再驗), and he gauged its success by the fact 
that it “really had a harvest that increased by multiples relative to normal fields.”105 
In fact, the harvest was the only outcome of  qutian cultivation that Pan seemed to care about 
demonstrating to farmers. Even with a plentiful harvest, however, they sometimes remained 
skeptical. In October 1829, he remarked that peasants held their doubts despite seeing the 
demonstration with their own eyes:
Nowadays, even though the farmers of  each village have had the experience of 
seeing the effectiveness of  the methods of  plot cultivation that this manor has 
tested, in the end they do not thoroughly know its details, and thus seem to be half 
skeptical and half  trusting.106
現在各鄉農于本莊所試區種之法，雖經覩有成效，究未深悉其詳，故猶疑信參半。
Suzhou's peasants appeared unwilling to adopt qutian because they had no desire to abandon their 
cultivation of  secondary winter crops (chunhua 春花), and they also remained skeptical of  the inputs 
and labor required for the method. But Pan was insistent that “there really is profit” (shi you liyi 實有
104
遠近村農皆所目擊. Pan Zengyi, “Fengyu zhuang ben shu,” in Qu zhong wu zhong, 5:1b.
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實較常田倍多收穫. Pan Zengyi, “Fengyu zhuang ben shu,” in Qu zhong wu zhong, 5:3a.
106 Pan Zengyi, “Fengyu zhuang ben shu,” in Qu zhong wu zhong, 5:3a.
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利益) in it, and in order to help farmers see this, he proposed a set of  “handy guidelines” (jianbian  
guitiao 簡便條規), which the Suzhou prefect, surnamed Wang, approved for publication and 
circulation among area farmers.107 Using the final harvest as a benchmark for success, Pan urged 
farmers themselves to try out the method and compare the “small plot” fields to their normal fields, 
which would serve as a kind of  control: 
Suppose that those who work ten mu of  farmland plant half  in qutian and half  by 
transplanting as usual, and then double plant with secondary winter crops. In the 
coming year, when the rice grains are taken to the threshing ground, compare the 
two [harvests] with each other; the profitable [one] and lackluster [one] will naturally 
appear. If  the grains of  qutian are several times more than the normal fields, then 
[farmers] can thereafter all change their farming.108
如業田十畝者，半種區田，半仍照常插蒔，兼種春花。來年稻穀登場，兩相比較，盈絀
自見。如果區田之穀倍於常田，則此後即可一律改種。
Judging by Pan's writings, it appears that at least four tenant farmers were ambitious enough about 
the method to win official recognition for their efforts.109 In fact, it was not only village farmers but 
a number of  degree-holders and other social elites who had either successfully tried the method or 
were willing to do so.110 
As a technology of  agrarian production, qutian would also have the effect of  overcoming the 
limitations of  local landscapes. Pan's goal was not only to spread the knowledge of  qutian to the 
107 For the stipulations, see Pan Zengyi in Qu zhong shi zhong, 115-123.
108 Pan Zengyi, “Fengyu zhuang ben shu,” in Qu zhong wu zhong, 5:6a. For a similar passage, see Pan Zengyi, 
“Fengyu zhuang ben shu,” in Qu zhong wu zhong, 5:3b-4a.
109 Pan Zengyi in Qu zhong shi zhong, 128.
110 Pan Zengyi in Qu zhong shi zhong, 129.
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villages surrounding Suzhou, but also to make qutian do what other methods apparently could not: 
separate farmers and their agrarian fortunes ever slightly more from the vicissitudes of  the land and 
the weather. Pan reiterated that qutian had no particular need for fertile soil, and that when farmers 
adopted the method, “infertile land will change into fertile soil.”111 And insofar as the 
transformation of  the land was possible in this way, some of  the region's farmland that ran 
alongside hills and typically succumbed to excessive aridity could be made highly productive.112 
Enthusiastic about the method just like other nineteenth-century scholars, Zuo reiterated the 
principles of  qutian in his own writing. Sometime after his return to Hunan in 1838 and, perhaps, 
after extensive readings in agricultural scholarship, Zuo wrote a tract entitled Illustrated Explanations  
for Expanding Qutian (Guang qutian tushuo 廣區田圖說).113 Although the full text is no longer extant, the 
preface to his work remains. In light of  the proliferation of  texts about qutian in the nineteenth 
century, Zuo's was merely another voice in the chorus of  statecraft scholars singing the praises of  a 
technology purported to multiply the size of  the harvest by improving production techniques. He 
asserted that the method would help farmers avoid hurting their grain plants, which resulted from 
excessive transplanting; help them minimize water usage; help plants avoid insect pests; yield full and 
plump grains; ensure that the land's fertility was not exhausted by overuse; and improve yields 
roughly tenfold. 
On the other hand, qutian was not merely a technical solution to problems associated with 
agrarian production. Insofar as he imagined that qutian would transform how a family employed its 
111
瘠土化為腴壤. Pan Zengyi in Qu zhong shi zhong, 132.
112 Pan Zengyi, “Fengyu zhuang ben shu,” in Qu zhong wu zhong, 5:6a, 5:4a.
113 Zuo Zongtang's chronological biography records his writing of  this treatise in 1838, just after his failure in 
the examinations, but there is no evidence that it was precisely in this year that he wrote the texts. See 
ZZN, 1:16a. Note that the name of  the extant preface for this work is “Guang qutian zhi tushuo” 廣區田制
 圖說 [Illustrated explanations for expanding the qutian system]. See ZZQ, 13:244.
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labor, it would also serve a social function. Where Lu Shiyi and Pan Zengyi had asserted the prime 
significance of  labor (renhe  人和 or renli 人力) in making qutian successful, Zuo pointed to the way in 
which qutian enabled the full use of  labor within a farming family. Since qutian was a labor-intensive 
method of  production, it would allow for and require more than able-bodied adult males to work 
the land, and so it would initiate a certain congruence between labor and land. When qutian was put 
into practice, claimed Zuo, “there are no excess people and no useless labor.”114 This labor 
arrangement translated into a beneficial financial equation: with more people working the land, the 
need for and costs of  secondary inputs like farm animals and fodder would decrease while output 
would increase, thus boosting the incomes of  tenant farmers. 
Given the proper technical and social conditions for qutian, Zuo argued that it would be able 
to spread across the empire. As past proponents of  the method had argued, it could overcome the 
problems of  weather, and Zuo noted that it would be able to support a family even in times of 
famine because it would have a transformative effect on land: it would be able to “change dearth 
into abundance, and transform barrenness into fertility.”115 So long as there was adequate labor 
power, it would face few barriers to its expansion across the land, for it was not circumscribed by 
social status. Zuo imagined that rich and poor families alike could adopt qutian to support 
themselves. This would be expressed geographically, as families, towns, and the “whole empire” 
(tianxia 天下) would become fertile ground for this method.116 
Zuo's optimism about qutian was that of  an agrarian promoter, one whose task was to make 
114
人無冗而力無虚. “Guang qutian zhi tushuo xu”  廣區田制圖說序 [Preface to Illustrated explanations for 
expanding the qutian system], ZZQ, 13:246.
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易乏為饒，反瘠為沃. ZZQ, 13:247.
116 Zuo noted that “scholars who read books and cultivate their minds, families that have been rich for 
generations and practice farming, people who do other things for a living, and those who are without 
work and bored can all manage [qutian] themselves and turn their work [toward it], exhausting their labor 
to eat.”  讀書養素之士，世富習耕之家，未作趁食之民，游手無俚之子，皆能自營轉雇，稱力而食. See ZZQ, 13.247.
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sure that farmers knew about the best methods available. “When I talk about the profits of  qutian,” 
he had once claimed, “my farmers consider it anew.”117 Like other scholars, he recognized the 
potential points of  frustration: the people were “surprised” by the divergence between the size of 
the harvest and the amount of  land cultivated, and “fearful” of  the complexity of  the technique. But 
perhaps the most frustrating obstacle was people's mentality, which was indisposed to change. 
“People have no sense of  past and present,” Zuo lamented. “They carry on as before and are 
content with the usual.”118 He smarted at their complacency, but he recognized that this was partially 
a function of  their inability to see qutian in practice. Despite its several-thousand-year history, people 
were still unable to “more fully see its efficacy“ (duo du qi yan 多睹其驗).119 This was the reason for 
the pamphlets, the simplified lists of  guidelines, and the demonstrations of  the method in gardens 
where people could see it at work. Farmers needed to be convinced with evidence. 
Zuo also needed his own evidence. He wanted to know that qutian could work, at least in the 
soils of  his hilly, secluded homestead in northern Hunan. His farm became the testing ground for 
various agrarian techniques and crops, and his agrarian research—shuttling between reading and 
practice—became part of  his self-image as a rural scholar. Although he held the teaching post at 
Anhua for several years after purchasing the homestead, he nonetheless paid attention to farming 
practices there. In 1844, he wrote:
Every time I return from Anhua, I oversee and work on cultivation, taking what I 
research on an everyday basis and testing it out. I spend my days going through the 






120 Letter of  DG24/0/0 (1844), ZZQ, 15:41.
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每由安化歸即督工耕作，以平日所講求者試行之。日游隴畝，自號湘上農人。
Despite Zuo's enthusiastic inclination to conduct these trial runs of  various agricultural techniques, 
he had learned how important labor was to getting things right. He may have had his own fields in 
the countryside near Xiangyin, but the majority of  the land was rented out to tenant farmers or 
farmed by hired laborers. He had put some in charge of  implementing specific cultivation methods, 
but he found that some of  his tenants were unable to reproduce what he had done.121
Since agricultural scholarship seemed to strike Zuo as the most significant aspect of 
“practical studies” in the early and mid-1840s, it is perhaps not surprising that he set about 
composing his own treatise on the subject. Entitled the Agricultural Treatise from the Pucun Pavilion 
(Pucun ge nongshu 樸存閣農書), the text contained between ten and twenty chapters on various aspects 
of  agrarian production.122 Although this book is no longer extant,123 it seems to have been a 
culminating product of  Zuo's studies of  agriculture when he was still in Hunan. Zuo haughtily 
called it a “book that the world cannot lack,”124 and its composition capped seven or eight years of 
interest, research, and testing. He hoped that it would serve a function that he had first imagined 
years earlier in Beijing, “to instruct [farmers] in agriculture and gardening.”125
121 Zuo wrote, “On the land I myself  cultivate, I generally implement that which is expedient for today's [use] 
from the ancient farming methods, and [people] have heard that it's quite good. I regret that the kind I 
carefully hired still cannot fully conform to their wishes.” 宗棠自耕之田，略以古農法之便于今者行之，聞甚良。惜
細雇輩尚未盡如其意. Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 10:58.
122 For mention of  this text, see ZZN, 1:22b; Letter of  DG26/0/0 (1846), ZZQ, 15:55; Letter of  DG25/0/0 
(1845), ZZQ, 10:49-50. The title of  the text borrows one of  Zuo Zongtang's sytle names, Pucun 樸存. If 
pucun is read literally, an alternate translation of  the title would be Agricultural Treatise from the Paviliion of  
Simple Existence. 
123 Zuo's chronological biographer remarked in 1897 that the draft version of  the text remained at the 
homestead of  Zuo, but it was only a partial version. ZZN, 1:22b.  
124
人世不可少之書. Letter of  DG25/0/0 (1845), ZZQ, 10:50.
125
以詔農圃. Letter of  DG25/0/0 (1845), ZZQ, 10:49-50.
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Conclusion
To the extent that Zuo attempted to tie together bookish and experiential knowledge 
through field testing of  methods like qutian during his investigations of  agriculture, his efforts 
exemplified the activist spirit of  Qing scholars who became interested in agriculture. Influenced by 
evidential learning, scholars placed a high value on visual evidence. Moreover, this evidence was 
meant to have a persuasive effect. When Pan Zengyi orchestrated trials of  qutian methods near 
Suzhou, he wanted to demonstrate their efficacy to onlookers to convince them to replicate the 
pattern of  production in their own fields. 
This type of  visual evidence to persuade farmers was by no means exclusive to Qing 
agriculture. As Nick Cullather has argued, technology is “a type of  rhetoric, an argument in the form 
of  an object,” and during the Cold War, the sight of  scientifically bred high-yield rice from the 
United States growing tall in the paddy fields of  Vietnam and the Philippines became a politically 
charged claim to the superiority of  modern biotechnology.126 Even if  the rhetoric of  Qing scholars 
about agricultural technologies was somewhat more reserved, those scholars were no less reliant on 
the process of  rendering the success of  technology in visual form for the consumption of  peasants. 
In comparison to Pan Zengyi's trials of  qutian, Zuo's agrarian experiments almost surely attracted 
fewer observers, given the remote location of  his farm. Had it been published and circulated, his 
agricultural treatise may have garnered a wider audience. Yet, even for him, evidence in practice 
remained the baseline for judging the efficacy of  crops and agrarian techniques as means toward 
gaining the “profits of  the land.”
In principle, successful trials posited the applicability and efficacy of  agrarian technology in 
the local environment and convinced area farmers that adopting it on their own land would produce 
126 Nick Cullather, “Miracles of  Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of  Technology,” 
Diplomatic History 28.2 (April 2004): 229.  
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the same results. But evidence could also be used to legitimize claims about the efficacy of 
techniques in spite of  local conditions like topography, rainfall, soil fertility, climate, or established 
cropping patterns. As Francesca Bray has argued, late imperial agronomists strove “to produce 
mobile forms of  authoritative natural knowledge that could be applied anywhere in the empire.” It 
was these codified, mobile forms of  technical knowledge—not wholly unlike modern science—that 
were supposed to diminish the importance of  local conditions and be persuasive in doing so.127 Qing 
scholars claimed that qutian could profitably serve agrarian production in almost any landscape and 
for any crop, so long as there was human labor and fertilizer to support it. To be sure, the practice 
of  qutian did not always yield the proper results, but the claims nonetheless stood: despite 
vicissitudes of  seasons, weather, topography, soil quality, and crop variety, qutian could greatly boost 
yields.
This engagement with agricultural technology and arguments for persuading farmers to 
harness the “profits of  the land” in specific ways amounted to an agrarian strategy. Although Zuo 
had recognized the importance of  talking to local farmers—not unlike how Gu Zuyu had proposed 
talking to local guides when formulating military strategy—the source of  agrarian knowledge for 
him really came down to the texts he read. As I show in the next chapter, Zuo enthusiastically 
deployed technical knowledge about crop cultivation and agriculture to train local people how best 
to obtain the “profits of  the land” when he began serving in the northwest as a military general two 
decades after researching agriculture in Hunan. Whereas his Hunan homestead had been a site for 
his extensive examinations of  agriculture, Shaanxi and Gansu provinces in the 1860s and 1870s 
became field sites for promoting production strategies that served the interests of  finding “profits” 
while overcoming the environmental particularities of  those regions. 
127 Francesca Bray, “Science, technique, knowledge: passages between matter and knowledge in imperial 
Chinese agriculture,” The British Journal for the History of  Science 41.3 (September 2008): 343.
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Chapter 3
“Evil Grasses” and the Profits of  Cotton in Postwar Gansu
Ripe bolls of  cotton appeared in roadside fields in the towns of  Shandan, Fuyi, and Dongle 
right when Zuo Zongtang passed through northwestern Gansu province with his army in August 
1873.1 Seeing flourishing fields awaiting harvest must have been a relief  for the sixty-one-year-old 
Zuo, for the sights and sounds of  Gansu after years of  warfare had been discouraging, even 
unnerving. In devastated hamlets where he saw and heard victims of  starvation, he was eagerly 
attentive to any harbingers of  agricultural renewal. Cotton bolls maturing in the late summer sun 
seemed to be visual evidence of  an initial recovery, and Zuo recorded the sight in a missive to 
Beijing the following year. 
Yet ripe cotton signified more than the tenuous success of  agrarian reconstruction in one 
small corner of  the empire following the Muslim uprisings and their suppression by Zuo's army. 
Cotton's appearance in the landscape also affirmed Zuo's way of  harnessing the “profit” (li 利) that 
he and other scholar-officials believed to be inherent to the process of  agriculture—of  uniting 
human labor with land and plants in productive activity. Like other statecraft scholars, Zuo did not 
conceive of  this profit as an always-existing cache of  wealth beyond the realm of  human society. As 
William Rowe has explained, Qing scholar-officials maintained a “quasi-religious respect for the 
glorious bounty provided by Heaven-and-earth,” but they believed that “this bounty is only fully 
realized through the process of  human exploitation.”2 Although ripe bolls of  cotton were fruits of 
1 TZ13/0/0 (1874), ZZQ, 11:444. Zuo passed through these towns on his way to a new military base camp 
in Suzhou 肅州, Gansu.
2 Rowe, Saving the World, 217. For another assessment of  extracting nature's bounty via agriculture in late 
imperial China, see Perdue, Exhausting the Earth. 
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the labor of  local farmers, they were also the end result of  the larger process of  harvesting the 
bounty already coming to fruition in the natural world. As this chapter demonstrates, obtaining 
“profit” was hardly a straightforward process in the late Qing era, particularly in the liminal spaces 
between warfare and peace and in the borderland regions of  the empire. In the process of 
attempting to harness these profits, the aging general assessed the climate and natural conditions of 
Gansu, sought to demonstrate the feasibility of  specific crops through trial cultivation, 
communicated with local elites and farmers directly and via printed booklets, and supervised the 
countryside with military patrols.
Zuo had chosen cotton as one of  the primary organic mechanisms by which Gansu's 
civilians could readily access the so-called “profits of  nature.” But it was not a foregone conclusion 
that they, too, would choose cotton. In his efforts to help farmers obtain profit, Zuo assumed that 
they operated according to a specific set of  principles by which they were motivated to pursue what 
they deemed most profitable. In late Qing Gansu, as in many other parts of  the empire, farmers 
often elected to grow opium poppies which could bring high returns on the domestic opium market. 
Ripe cotton in the fields was thus also living evidence of  a strategic moral victory for Zuo inasmuch 
as it competed with, and may very well have replaced, what officials called the “evil grasses” (e'hui 惡
卉, yaohui 妖卉), the opium poppy. If  cotton, one of  the “good seedlings” (jiamiao 嘉苗),3 signified 
the righteous pursuit of  prosperity aligned with Zuo's goals, by the late Qing opium poppies had 
become a visual marker of  the moral decadence of  society, of  domestic opium consumption and 
addiction, of  the unabashed profit motive, of  the loss of  the empire's wealth, and of  foreign 
imperialism. In the postwar battle against opium poppy and for cotton, agriculture became a highly 
3 TZ13/3/22 (1874), ZZQ, 6:28. 
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politicized field of  contestation framed by Qing officials like Zuo in terms of  profit and sheathed in 
a polarized discourse of  good and evil. 
Land and Climate in Late Qing Gansu
Nowadays it may be hard to imagine northwest China being a region ecologically unsuited to 
large-scale cotton production, given the massive output of  raw cotton from the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region, currently the largest provincial-level producer in the country.4 But 140 years 
ago, there seemed to be no consensus about whether the plant could be highly productive in 
northwest soils and whether it should be promoted among farmers in Gansu and Shaanxi. Some 
officials were skeptical that cotton could thrive in these regions. In early 1871, when Zuo was 
stationed in the eastern Gansu city of  Pingliang, he noted how “people say this place is not suitable 
for cotton.”5 Naysayers apparently thought that neither the province's soil nor weather was 
propitious for cotton production. Some claimed that the “qualities of  the soil” (tuxing 土性) would 
not nourish important cash crops like cotton and mulberry, while others complained that the 
weather turned cold relatively early compared to other parts of  China.6 To many observers, in other 
words, the northwest provinces did not appear to be fertile ground for cotton. 
Zuo was hard-pressed to refute claims that the climate of  Gansu adversely affected 
agriculture. In his experience, compared with his home province and others that he had visited, it 
4 Björn Alperman, China's Cotton Industry: Economic Transformation and State Capacity (New York: Routledge, 
2010), 170; David Bachman, “Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? Contradictions and Ironies of  Chinese 
Governance in China's Northwest,” in Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: 
University of  Washington Press, 2004), 170. Bachman perceptively notes the connection between cotton 
production and Han migration into the region: “the amount of  cotton acreage seems to be growing in 
tandem with the increasing Han population in northern Xinjiang.” Ibid., 172. 
5 TZ10/2/4 (1871), Zuo Zongtang weikan shudu [Unpublished letters of  Zuo Zongtang], (Changsha: Yuelu 
shushe, 1989), 99-100. 
6 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:528.
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did have a shorter summer. In missives to other officials or reports to Beijing, Zuo remarked upon 
Gansu's cold air, its lofty mountains, its early winter—earlier even than that of  neighboring Shaanxi 
province. In the spring of  1871, he had heard that Shaanxi's “fields of  wheat have a lustrous sheen 
and grain flowers varnish the whole countryside.” Yet west of  Jingyuan in Gansu, where the altitude 
increased and the temperature dropped, “the tender buds still have not fully developed, snow and 
rain frequently soak [them], and the splendors of  spring are still held back.”7 Zuo lamented that he 
could not foresee the results of  the year's harvest. Given the overwhelming influence of  the seasons 
on Gansu's agricultural productivity, he could not avoid admitting that the province's “land leans 
toward the northwest, temperate weather is scarce, and cultivation is certainly inferior to the 
southeast.”8 
Despite these doubts about climate, weather, and productivity, Zuo did not accept that 
Gansu's natural conditions were much different from those of  Shaanxi. Perhaps Shaanxi's 
springtime had arrived earlier in 1871, but this did not mean Shaanxi and Gansu were ecologically 
distinct. Turning to sericulture, he noted how the Airs of  Bin (Bin feng 豳風), a collection of  verse 
contained within the ancient Book of  Songs (Shijing 詩經), contained evidence of  women raising 
silkworms in the Jing River valley running through the adjacent prefectures of  Binzhou in Shaanxi 
and Jingzhou in Gansu. Moreover, sericulture of  the Jing River valley was currently experiencing a 
revival. Making a clear case for the connection between geographical proximity and ecological 
resemblance, Zuo suggested that the lands of  Gansu could indeed grow mulberry trees in 
abundance because they were adjacent and similar to Shaanxi. “The soil of  Gansu province is linked 
together with [Shaanxi],” Zuo remarked. “Within some hundreds of  li 里, how would the 
7 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 11:231. 
8 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:529. 
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environment (tiandi 天地) be any different?”9 
Nor did Zuo surrender to claims that Gansu's environment was fundamentally unsuitable for 
cotton. The region had its climatic idiosyncrasies, he admitted, but it still had four seasons and 
“winter and summer naturally coming one after another” just like elsewhere in the empire. More 
importantly, the “land fosters myriad creatures (wanwu 萬物) and flora already grow in great 
abundance,” Zuo asserted, “so it is certainly untenable that everywhere is unsuitable” for growing 
crops like cotton.10 Nor was it inconsequential that cotton shrubs and mulberry trees had “no need 
for fertile land.” Zuo told his subordinates in Gansu that cotton would not reduce the production of 
cereals or other food crops because it could flourish on hillsides or blossom in the desert.11
Trial Cultivation as Persuasion
Even though doubts about Gansu's fecundity lingered in Zuo's mind,12 he remained 
committed to the idea of  cotton. As he promoted agriculture in war-torn communities in the 
northwest, he articulated a systematic process which subordinates were to employ as they attempted 
to convince farmers to grow cotton and other cultivars. In a communiqué to district officials 
throughout Shaanxi and Gansu in 1871, Zuo summed up the process in these terms:    
If  those who are in charge first carefully investigate what is suitable for the land, and 
even more assiduously search for methods of  cultivation and appropriate varieties of 
9 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:529.
10 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:529. 
11 Zuo also recommended cotton and mulberry because they required relatively small initial expenditures of 
capital. TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:528. 
12 In 1874, he repeated his observations of  the region's abridged summertime and abundant cold and, with 
deflated optimism, complained that Gansu's “products (wuchan 物產) are exceedingly scarce.” See 
TZ13/3/22 (1874), ZZQ, 6:27.
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seedlings; [if  they] call together the elders of  the villages and clearly declare that 
these things are profitable, notifying them explicitly and in earnest so that all of  them 
know, and then supervise their trial cultivations (shizhong 試種), after one or two years 
there will be a small amount of  profit and the common people will promptly pursue 
it like a flock of  ducks.13    
如為上者先詳察夫土地之宜，更勤求夫種植之法與夫秧種之宜，召鄉中父老明告其利，
剴切曉示，俾咸知之，然後督其試種，一二年後稍有利益，小民即趨之若騖矣。
As Zuo's statement indicates, attempting to herd farmers toward his vision for agriculture was a 
complicated process involving observation and investigation of  natural conditions, plants, and 
cultivation methods; meetings with civilians to educate and convince them about the pecuniary 
rewards of  following the vision; and experimental cultivation to test specific plants and methods. 
This process was neither quick nor easy, and Zuo realized that persuading farmers to follow along 
could take a matter of  years.  
Why was trial cultivation necessary? Trial cultivation held open the prospect of 
demonstrating to a skeptical audience the feasibility of  adopting specific crops and production 
methods. To make cotton a viable alternative to opium poppy, Zuo had to legitimize its cultivation 
and give the idea of  cotton wide purchase among local farmers. Zuo himself  knew from reports that 
cotton could be grown in Gansu. But any lingering skepticism among farmers about its ability to 
grow, its methods of  propagation, or its profitability had to be resolved, and this is where trial 
cultivation became important.14 In this sense, the trials undertaken by subordinates and local elites 
13 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:528.
14 Zuo did not mention specific varieties of  cotton, but plant variety may have been another variable in the 
experiments carried out under his purview.
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and carried out under Zuo Zongtang's purview were largely designed to convince Gansu's farmers 
to grow cotton and other crops, to demonstrate the viability of  specific cultivars as tools to obtain 
profit from the land, and to model the best methods of  production. To be sure, trial cultivation may 
have also led to innovations in agriculture, from the tools and techniques to the plants themselves. 
But by and large, they targeted the skepticism of  local people and purveyed specific plants and 
cultivation methods as agrarian technologies which could overcome the vicissitudes and irregularities 
of  local environmental conditions and yield enticing harvests. 
As he attempted to persuade Gansu farmers of  cotton's viability, Zuo asserted that trial 
cultivation and crop experimentation in Chinese agriculture had legendary origins. In a March 1871 
letter to Gansu's judicial commissioner (anchashi 按察使), Shen Yingkui 沈應奎, Zuo reasoned that 
“in the affairs of  the world (tianxia 天下), what isn't revealed through testing (shichu 試出)? Prince 
Millet and Shennong were both like this.”15 Zuo's statement to Shen is rich with meaning, for he 
substantiated the universal and nearly timeless character of  testing (shi 試) as an agrarian practice 
right when trial cultivations (shizhong 試種) were supposedly showing how cotton could overcome 
particularities of  location and season and could be grown in almost any place. By claiming that the 
legendary progenitors of  Chinese agriculture used testing, Zuo connected the practice to the birth 
of  agriculture itself. But even if  he claimed that test cultivation had originated in Shennong's 
attempts to spread agriculture to ancestors of  the Chinese, testing was bound neither to any one 
location in the empire nor to any historical period. Zuo's statement suggests he believed that trial 
cultivation could be useful in any agrarian geography without restrictions in space or time. Not 
15 TZ10/2/4 (1871), Zuo Zongtang weikan shudu, 99. Prince Millet (Houji 後稷) was the name of  the revered 
agricultural ancestor of  the Zhou, and Shennong  神農 (sometimes translated as the “Divine Farmer”) was 
the mythical emperor who taught agriculture to the Chinese. See Bray, Agriculture, 1, 36a.
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coincidentally, this is precisely the message about cotton that Zuo hoped to disseminate among 
Gansu's farmers: that it could be profitable nearly anywhere in spite of  local conditions.16
Notwithstanding Zuo's claims about mythical precedents for agrarian testing, the idea of 
planting crops for experimental purposes dated back at least to the late Ming dynasty, when Xu 
Guangqi reportedly experimented with the sweet potato, which had come to China from the New 
World. Recognizing this new tuber's potential value to the empire's food supply because of  its ability 
to withstand poor weather, thrive in infertile soils, and resist insects, Xu anticipated spreading its 
cultivation among farmers, save for the fact that they were skeptical of  its ability to flourish in 
diverse climates. As Francesca Bray and Georges Métailié argue, Xu experimented with sweet 
potatoes and turnips “to prove that plants could adapt to almost any conditions provided the right 
cultivation techniques were found.”17 Although climate and land quality may have been noteworthy 
variables, Xu saw them merely as obstacles to be overcome in the process of  finding the best 
cultivation methods. Xu carried out experimentation expressly for the purpose of  identifying those 
methods and demonstrating to the unconvinced that they would make the tuber viable in almost any 
landscape. Sweet potato experiments were therefore also useful as a means to persuade farmers that 
crops could thrive in conditions that they presumed to be inhospitable. This seems to have been 
precisely what Zuo Zongtang was thinking about when he recorded trials with cotton, rice, and 
16 Cotton and cultivation methods as described here seem to meet Francesca Bray's definition of 
“technological artefacts,” which “extend or multiply human capabilities” and “flatten out the irregularities 
of  the world around us” (326). Test cultivation, by contrast, seems to be the mechanism that enables the 
claims about these technologies to “travel through time and space, and to subsume heterogeneity”—
precisely what “a scientific fact or theory” must do in order to be persuasive (324). See Francesca Bray, 
“Science, technique, knowledge: passages between matter and knowledge in imperial Chinese agriculture,” 
The British Journal for the History of  Science 41.3 (September 2008): 319-344.
17 Francesca Bray and Georges Métailié, “Who was the Author of  the Nongzheng Quanshu?” in Statecraft and 
Intellectual Renewal in Late Ming China: The Cross-Cultural Synthesis of  Xu Guangqi (1562-1633), ed. Catherine 
Jami, Peter Engelfriet, and Gregory Blue (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 342. 
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other cultivars in Gansu.
Zuo was not the first Qing official to adopt cotton as a strategic replacement for opium 
poppy and to grow the shrubby fiber plant in test plots to entice farmers away from the vilified 
flower. He Changling had promoted cotton as an alternative to poppy cultivation when he served as 
governor of  Guizhou province during the Opium War.18 He facilitated trial cultivations of  mulberry 
seeds and saplings imported from Sichuan,19 and he hoped to show through trials that cotton, too, 
would be a suitable crop for Guizhou's poor farmers. After having dispatched subordinates to 
purchase over 26,000 jin  觔 of  cotton seeds in Hubei and Henan provinces, he sent local magistrates 
out to the villages to instruct the people in methods of  propagation and to entice or compel them to 
switch from opium poppy to cotton.20 Near the walls of  the provincial capital at Guiyang, He hired 
civilians to plant what may have amounted to a demonstration garden—several mu  畝 of  land sown 
with cotton on which future cotton farmers would be trained. He faced what Zuo would confront 
thirty years later in Gansu: skepticism about cotton's suitability on the land. But in late 1840, based 
on several years of  trials, He assailed this pessimism with full force. Since his Guizhou cotton had 
matured and blossomed just like cotton plants in Hubei and Henan, he asserted, “we can do away 
with the longstanding saying that 'the soil is not suitable'” (tudi bu yi zhi shuo 土地不宜之說).21
Trial Cultivation in Gansu
 In late 1871, Zuo issued a directive to all local government bodies throughout Shaanxi and 
18 David Bello, Opium and the Limits of  Empire: Drug Prohibitions in the Chinese Interior, 1729-1850 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 279. 
19 He mentioned test planting (shizhong 試種) mulberry in two memorials written in 1840. He Changling, 
Nai'an zouyi [Memorials of  He Changling] (1882), 6:1b, 24b.
20 DG20/1/19 (1840), He, Nai'an zouyi, 6:1b.
21 DG20/10/22 (1840), He, Nai'an zouyi, 6:25a.
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Gansu to experimentally grow rice, mulberry, and cotton.22 If  he chose the latter as a productive and 
strategic opponent of  the “evil grasses,” the other two he promoted to improve and boost yields of 
foodstuffs and fiber materials. Having traveled through much of  the eastern part of  Gansu, Zuo 
recognized the various cultivars which local farmers propagated: barley and wheat (daxiaomai 大小麥),
 yellow and white millet (huangbaimi 黄白粟), broom corn millet (mizi 糜子), oil sesame (youma 油麻), 
and maize (baogu 包谷). But he lamented their “short tassels of  grain, single shoots, and small 
granules.” These withered appearances signified that resulting harvests hardly enriched, and only 
sometimes met the needs of, the people who labored to produce them.23 He also complained of 
Gansu's paucity of  textile crops, a situation that subjected many civilians to high prices for cloth 
imported from other provinces.24
One of  Zuo's initial suggestions was to augment Gansu production with the cultivation of 
“southern rice” (nanfang daogu 南方稻谷).25 Not a cultivar of  local origin, rice from the south would 
purportedly multiply yields and profits. But the initial trial, which was carried out by military officers 
under his orders, did not meet his expectations. In 1870, “late rice” (wan dao 晚稻)—chosen to 
overcome the obstacles of  a late spring—had raised and then dashed his hopes for success because, 
even though it sprouted fully and abundantly, the harvest eventually amounted to little. His 
experience with late rice prompted Zuo to suspect that Gansu really was inhospitable to this 
imported variety, and he was ready to relinquish the idea of  southern rice in northern landscapes. 
But the following year, the acting magistrate of  Pingliang prefecture, Wang Qichun 王啟春, offered 
22 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:527.
23 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:528. Zuo calculated the average harvest at about 100 jin 觔 for each mu 畝. In 
the Qing period, one jin equaled roughly .6 kilograms or 1.3 pounds, and one mu equaled roughly .15 of  an 
acre. Li, Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, xvi-xvii. 
24 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:528. 
25 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:528. 
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tangible evidence of  success. He sent Zuo a sample of  harvested and refined rice obtained from a 
trial cultivation he had overseen. Since the harvest was roughly four times larger per mu 畝 than usual 
for cereal grains in the region, Zuo felt vindicated. He prognosticated that eastern Gansu could 
indeed support southern rice cultigens, provided they were quick-ripening varieties with access to 
ample irrigation water.26 
As important as cotton was to Zuo's plans for Gansu, he seems never to have overseen any 
of  its trial cultivations. He instead relied on reports sent in from other regions of  Gansu to assess 
cotton's viability in the province. By late 1871, he had received word from Shen Yingkui that cotton 
flourished outside the provincial capital, Lanzhou. It reportedly grew well even further to the 
northwest, along Gansu's periphery. An elite man in Zhenfan, Lan Peiqing 藍佩青, had propagated 
cotton in a successful trial in which the plants turned out “extremely fine,” helping to convince Zuo 
of  the efficacy of  promoting cotton more broadly.27 But only two years later, he complained that 
many local officials had responded to his enthusiasm about cotton, mulberry, and other cultivars 
with the “excuse that local conditions are not suitable” (yi fengtu bu yi wei ci 以風土不宜為辭).28 Such 
widespread pessimism may have caused Zuo to questions how to utilize Gansu's climate in a 
strategic way, and he allowed for the possibility that some land would be better suited to grains than 
to cotton.29 But the contents of  his missives to Beijing suggest that he remained committed to the 
prospect of  finding the right combination of  weather, soils, and cultivation methods. “On warm, 
fertile land facing the sun,” Zuo maintained, “if  [people] undertake propagation with the right 
26 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:528. The trial cultivation of  rice in Pingliang under the leadership of  Wang 
Qichun reportedly had a per-mu yield of  400 jin. 
27 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:529. 
28 TZ12/0/0 (1873), ZZQ, 11:379.  
29 TZ13/3/2 (1874), ZZQ, 6:29.
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methods, the profits to be reaped have to be many.”30
Rooting out Opium
Even before Zuo promoted cotton, he had issued strict prohibitions against poppy 
cultivation to expurgate local opium production and ameliorate the empire's addiction to the drug.31 
In 1869, he wrote an edict outlining an anti-opium policy. A short document composed entirely of 
rhyming four-character lines (sizi yunwen 四字韵文) to make it easier for literate civilians to read and 
commit to memory,32 the edict traced the opium problem back to outside influences and castigated 
the “wicked plan of  foreigners” which “harm our Chinese customs” (hai wo hua su 害我華俗). Yet the 
opium problem had reached new proportions as farmers across the empire became wise to the 
financial profits of  growing poppies. Despite poverty, moral delinquency, and depravity arising in the 
wake of  opium and addiction, farmers unceasingly pursued the poppy's “wicked profits” (jian li 奸利)
 and the “precious gold” (jianjin 兼金) yielded by piercing the bulbs of  the yellow and white flowers 
and extracting the viscous liquid inside them.33 Zuo despaired that “our Chinese people” (wo hua min 
我華民) would willingly partake in the cultivation of  a plant that spread immoral behavior. But 
poppy flowers were even more galling because they apparently would not grow on shabby land; they 
required fertile land to flourish. The edict thus recognized that the “evil grasses” (e'hui 惡卉) grew at 
30 TZ13/0/0 (1874), ZZQ, 11:444. In the previous year, he had used a similar phrase—“on land facing the 
sun, [we] have to try to cultivate”—to describe the necessity of  cultivating plants like cotton. See 
TZ12/0/0 (1873), ZZQ, 11:379. 
31 For an assessment of  the opium problem in the Qing empire, see Bello, Opium and the Limits of  Empire; 
and several of  the essays in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds., Opium Regimes: China,  
Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952 (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 2000). 
32 For later references to the edict, see ZZQ, 7:142; ZZQ, 12:367; ZZQ, 12:531.
33 Nearly a decade later, Zuo called opium a “handful of  precious gold” (yi wo jianjin 一握兼金). See GX4/7/4 
(1878), ZZQ, 7:146.
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the expense of  the “good grains” (jiagu 嘉谷). Intended for widespread distribution to post houses 
and village schools, the edict emphasized that all farmers were prohibited from growing opium 
poppy and all local elites were responsible for helping to exterminate the plant.34 
Enforcing the prohibition was a completely separate matter from issuing the edict. 
Uprooting opium poppy demanded diligent surveillance in the countryside, a task fulfilled by 
battalions of  Zuo's army that had been stationed throughout the province after rebellion had been 
quelled. Their participation in enforcement alongside civilians suggests that some aspects of 
agricultural promotion were militarized in the 1870s. For example, in the winter months of  early 
1877, Zuo reissued orders for surveillance after having received imperial approval for poppy 
prohibition. He commanded “each defense battalion to split up on different roads to investigate and 
uproot” the forbidden flowers.35 Some of  Gansu's top civilian leaders—provincial treasurer (fansi 藩
司) Chongbao  崇保 and judicial commissioner Shi Nianzu —史念祖 also dispatched subordinates to 
“go everywhere in the countryside” (zhouli xiangcun周歷鄉村) to search for signs of  the illicit 
poppies, but they often called upon military forces to undertake surveillance and enforcement. Zuo 
thus described the process:
Local officials under my charge direct the defense forces in the prefectures and 
districts to go into the countryside with light cavalry from time to time to search for 
[opium poppy], ordinarily several times per month. Upon encountering a whole 
section of  farmland, [they ensure that farmers] uniformly turn the plow and irrigate 
[the land] with water. In cases where [opium poppies] grow mingled among beans 
and wheat, [they] hoe them up and pull them out, so that no [poppy] shoots remain. 
34 For the prohibition, see TZ8/0/0 (1869), ZZQ, 14:587. 
35 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:143.
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Therefore, land already planted in opium poppy is completely cleansed of  flowering 
shoots, returned to growing beans, wheat, and millet, and is suddenly transformed 




This straightforward description of  military detachments uneventfully clearing opium poppy 
from the countryside elided an irony of  the army's presence, one that Zuo himself  recognized: 
extensive poppy cultivation partially resulted from military interventions and reclamation policies. 
After almost a decade of  strict prohibition, farmers still grew poppies in remote locations or amidst 
grain crops to avoid detection, especially in northern Gansu's Ningxia prefecture.37 Ningxia was 
purported to have wonderful growing conditions, with “highly fertile” (shangyu 上腴) soil irrigated by 
river water, and perhaps for this reason its production of  poppies surpassed that of  other areas in 
the province.38 But natural conditions were not fully responsible for the boom in opium cultivation 
in the 1870s. According to Zuo, new settlers were. He explained that during the phase of  civil 
unrest, the region's Muslims (Hui 回) had largely avoided the drug and its floral source, given their 
“customary taboo against smoking opium, which had long been far outside religious discipline.”39 
But if  poppy cultivation had been a relatively minor practice during warfare, it did not remain so. 
When Ningxia was recaptured and “all the rebels were eliminated, recruits for land reclamation 
36 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:143.
37 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:143.
38 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:147.
39 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:143. 
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gradually became more numerous, and the clandestine propagation of  opium poppy turned out to 
be several times greater than in the past.”40 As new non-Muslim settlers from beyond the region's 
borders reclaimed land, they expanded opium production by several-fold. Likely oblivious to any 
taboos, these farmers may have considered little more than the profitability of  growing opium 
poppies. So even as military personnel and “light cavalry” participated in the surveillance of  the 
countryside, it had been, in part, their presence and the new land policies that caused the explosion 
in opium cultivation. 
Another reason for poppies flourishing in Ningxia was that some officials blithely neglected 
countryside surveillance or even colluded with growers to evade punishment. Zuo mandated that 
special attention be paid to the six districts of  Ningxia after he cited at least six officials in 1878—
prefectural magistrate (zhifu 知府) Li Zongbin  李宗宾 and a handful of  district magistrates—for not 
thoroughly investigating or punishing agrarian scofflaws. In other cases, he criticized local officials 
for being dilatory and having “the intention of  merely muddling along” (deguo qieguo zhi xin 得過且過
之心), or for abstaining from enforcement out of  fear that doing so would endanger their ability to 
collect land taxes from farmers.41 Some may even have demurred because they worried about 
“depriving the people of  their source of  profit” (duo minjian liyuan 奪民間利源).42 Still others, he 
complained, practiced extortion or collected bribes in return for covering up illegal poppy 
cultivation.43 
Opium farmers' resistance to enforcement also thwarted Zuo's anti-poppy policy. They 
40 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:143. 
41 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:147.
42 GX4/0/0 (1878), ZZQ, 12:367. 
43 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:146. On Zuo's punishment of  derelict officials, also see the memorial of 
TZ13/5/6 (1874), ZZQ, 6:45. 
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sometimes used the cover and camouflage of  other food crops to shield their valuable poppies from 
destruction. Typically a method of  intensive horticulture used to increase land productivity or reduce 
pests and plant diseases, inter-cropping became a technique of  Gansu poppy farmers for avoiding 
detection. In other cases, farmers eschewed passive resistance and resorted to violence to ward off 
inspectors. They confronted agents of  the state and “often gathered in groups to hinder 
inspections” when minor officials approached their fields with shovels to weed out their flowering 
cash crops.44 In neighboring Shaanxi, some deputized enforcers of  the ban who surveyed the fields 
encountered the resistance of  “conniving women” (zongrong funu 縱容婦女) who relented and pulled 
out their poppies only after being reprimanded.45
Zuo Zongtang's opium prohibition policy called for a range of  punishments for lawbreakers. 
In 1871, he claimed that any farmer who defiantly or surreptitiously grew opium poppies would 
have his land expropriated by the state and returned to the rightful landlord only when the farmer 
had committed himself  to cultivating cotton, mulberry, rice, or other cereal grains.46 Seven years 
later, in the aftermath of  the drought and famine that devastated Shanxi and Henan provinces, Zuo 
and the Shaanxi governor, Tan Zhonglin  譚鍾麟 (1822-1905), jointly reported to Beijing an even 
stricter policy for punishing farmers who surreptitiously grew poppies at a time when grain was 
particularly scarce. Offenders were to have their land expropriated and they were to be given the 
cangue (jiahao 枷號), a wooden yoke worn around the neck as punishment, so that they could serve 
as examples to other farmers.47 Yet given the paucity of  labor power in Gansu and Shaanxi following 
the warfare of  the late 1860s and the policy emphasis on resettlement, expropriating the land of 
44 TZ13/5/6 (1874), ZZQ, 6:45. 
45 Tan Zhonglin, Tan Wenqin gong zougao [Memorials of  Tan Zhonglin] (1911), 6:3a.
46 TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 14:529.
47 Tan, Tan Wenqin gong zougao, 6:3b.
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criminal poppy cultivators does not seem to have been a standard punishment. In fact, destroying a 
farmer's valuable illicit crop was the primary objective of  enforcement and the main penalty, and in 
certain cases in Shaanxi, guilty farmers carried out their own punishments by uprooting poppies and 
replanting other crops in the presence of  officials.48
Harnessing the Profit Motive in Gansu
Visual evidence of  cotton along the road in the late summer of  1873 was just the kind of 
encouraging sign that Zuo could report to Beijing, but it was not the only sign of  hope for an anti-
opium policy. According to Zuo's recounting of  his westward journey, “every time my vehicle 
stopped, the elders gathered together and looked on.” These impromptu meetings provided him the 
chance to transmit orders to local leaders in regions recently pacified. Face-to-face interaction also 
allowed him to consult with them directly about local patterns of  agricultural production. If  the 
sight of  ripening cotton assuaged his worries about postwar dearth, he was also reassured that the 
elders seemed to know about cotton what he wanted them to know: “all are aware that the profits (li  
利) of  cotton are on par with opium poppy, and sometimes surpass it.”49 
At the heart of  the matter was a conception of  how Qing farmers operated. Zuo and other 
governors perceived that civilian agrarian subjects were motivated almost entirely by notions of 
profit rather than by propriety. Viewed in this manner, farmers elected to cultivate opium poppies 
because they brought larger financial returns than other crops. Over nine years after promulgating 
the rhyming edict against opium, Zuo and one of  his officers, Liu Dian  劉典 (1820-1879), jointly 
lamented how “ignorant people lack knowledge and lust after large profits (zhongli 重利), and 
48 Tan, Tan Wenqin gong zougao, 6:3a.
49 TZ13/0/0 (1874), ZZQ, 11:444. 
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thereupon take fertile soil suitable for grains and plant it with opium poppy.”50 Precisely this was 
occurring in Ningxia in the late 1870s: “people on fertile land are constrained by evil customs, widely 
cultivating opium poppy and seeing it as source of  profit (liyuan 利源).”51 Zuo accepted their pursuit 
of  profit as a matter of  course. He instead castigated their choice of  the poppy as the technology by 
which to reap the nutrients of  the soil and the commodity with which to pursue profits available 
through market exchange. 
So Zuo turned to profit as a primary means to entice farmers away from poppy production. 
He acknowledged that “if  when ignorant people greedily grow opium poppy they are greedy only 
for its profits (li 利), then [we] shall use profits (li 利) to mobilize them.”52 Caring little about what 
opium meant to a polity called “China” of  which they perhaps had little or no consciousness, 
farmers would instead respond to officials' cajoling leadership about what would be profitable. As 
Zuo had earlier reported to the Qing court, he had surveyed various locations in Gansu and 
determined that “all which are fertile and warm areas facing the sun and able to grow opium poppies 
are not unsuited to growing cotton.”53 This rough ecological correspondence between growing 
conditions for opium poppies and cotton made the latter crop a perfect substitute. And so he 
devised a straightforward formula for making Gansu poppy-free: “If  one wants to prohibit poppy 
cultivation, one must first think of  a [crop] variety that can surpass its profits (li 利), and then people 
will become aware of  [the fact that] opium is not so profitable. Thereafter, avarice can gradually fill 
in.”54 The linchpin of  his plan was thus harnessing farmers' seemingly inherent desire for profit and 
50 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:142.
51 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:143.
52 GX4/7/4 (1878), ZZQ, 7:143.
53 TZ13/3/22 (1874), ZZQ, 6:27. 
54 TZ13/0/0 (1874), ZZQ, 11:445.
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turning what had been the race for “wicked profits” into the pursuit of  morally and legally 
acceptable pecuniary reward. If  farmers were strategically enticed and shown the profits of  cotton, 
he imagined, they would automatically forgo opium poppies without officials having to resort to 
“harsh methods” (junfa 峻法). This seems to have been what the elders of  those northwestern Gansu 
towns had evinced as Zuo passed through in the late summer of  1873. 
Circulating the Methods of  Cotton Production
How did Gansu's farmers learn to grow cotton? Trial cultivations demonstrated that cotton 
and other crops could be planted in the soils of  Gansu. But it is unlikely that the techniques of 
propagation used in those trials circulated far beyond the local city or town in which they took place. 
And despite meeting elders on the roadside in 1873, Zuo did not always have the luxury of  direct 
contact with townspeople and local officials. Instead, Zuo utilized printed texts and government-
sponsored technical bureaus to disseminate information about cotton cultivation and weaving with 
the goal of  encouraging and enabling farmers to increase their output. 
  By the 1870s, Zuo had long been aware of  the value of  consulting texts about agriculture, 
sericulture, and specific production techniques like the qutian method.55 Nineteenth-century China 
abounded in republished versions of  agricultural treatises, and Zuo had read a great many of  them 
by the time he traveled to the northwest in the late 1860s. Publications about cultivating cotton were 
less commonplace than texts about mulberry propagation, perhaps because cotton, unlike silk, had 
not reached the status of  a product for imperial consumption. But like He Changling, whose 
subordinates helped promote cotton by printing and distributing the eighteenth-century Manual of  
55 For Zuo's references to qutian in the 1870s, see TZ12/0/0 (1873), ZZQ, 11:379; TZ10/0/0 (1871), ZZQ, 
14:291; and TZ11/0/0 (1872), ZZQ, 14:298.
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Cotton (Mumian pu 木棉譜) in Guizhou in 1837,56 Zuo opted to propagandize cotton by circulating 
texts. Printed at the government bureau in Xi'an in 1874, the Ten Essentials of  Growing Cotton (Zhong  
mian shi yao 種棉十要) and The Book of  Cotton (Mian shu 棉書) were to be disseminated among local 
officials and elders throughout the northwest.57 The former text, a terse ten-point guide to 
cultivating cotton, is no longer extant. The latter text, however, still exists and its contents reveal the 
mundane and straightforward mechanics of  growing cotton that were apparently sufficient to make 
the plant grow in diverse environments. 
Originally published in southeast coastal Fujian province eight years earlier, The Book of  
Cotton showcased cotton varieties and production techniques from regions where the textile industry 
was relatively well-developed in the nineteenth century, particularly the lower Yangzi delta region. 
The book was printed by the office of  the Fujian provincial treasurer (fanshu 藩署) in late 1866, just 
before Zuo Zongtang departed Fuzhou to take up his new post as the governor-general of  Shaanxi 
and Gansu. This suggests that Zuo had already had some experience—or at least some previous 
enthusiasm for—promoting cotton based on methods drawn from other parts of  the empire. Yet 
the text made no reference to cotton cultivation in Fujian's climate or landscape even though cotton 
had been a profitable crop in the province in earlier centuries.58 The text played the same role in 
Gansu, namely as a means to disseminate information about production techniques without 
reference to local conditions.  
A short booklet, The Book of  Cotton explained methods for fifteen aspects of  production. 
56 DG20/1/19 (1840), He, Nai'an zouyi, 6:1a.
57 TZ13/3/22 (1874), ZZQ, 6:28; ZZN, 7:1a; Qin, Zuo wenxiang gong zai xibei, 243-44.
58 After the seventeenth century, Fujian cotton production gradually diminished in competition with other 
cash crops like sugarcane and tea leaves. See Zhao Gang and Chen Zhongyi, Zhongguo mian ye shi [History 
of  the cotton industry in China], (Taibei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1977), 49. 
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Unlike other agricultural texts, which often contained prefaces situating them within the 
longstanding tradition of  Chinese agricultural treatises, this text had no preface or any other 
explanations about its origins. Instead, it was a straightforward technical manual of  methods for 
production. The first page jumped into the subject, cataloging the most prominent varieties of 
cotton seeds, including some of  notable geographic origin. “River cotton” (jianghua 江花), for 
instance, came from Hubei, whereas “northern cotton” (beihua 北花), “soft and fine,” came from 
Beijing and Shandong. Also worthy of  mention was the “Zhejiang cotton” (Zhehua 浙花), a product 
of  the northern Zhejiang town Yuyao and a common variety across lower Jiangnan (wuxia 吴下).59 
The Book of  Cotton also described techniques for planting, seedling division, weeding and irrigation, 
harvesting, drying, ginning, bowing, carding, thread spinning, warping, starching, textile weaving, 
and oil pressing. 
Throughout its description of  these techniques, the text assumed that people in any place 
might be able to adopt them for profitable cotton production. Despite being too brief  and singularly 
focused on cotton to be considered a typical agricultural treatise, The Book of  Cotton nonetheless 
fulfilled part of  the function of  official treatises “to produce comprehensive, mobile knowledge that 
could successfully be transferred through the medium of  print, across vast spaces of  the empire, 
and translated into local action.”60 And although the majority of  the instructions were provided 
without much reference to geographical context, the text did contain geographic-specific 
information that put the spotlight on rich areas of  China proper or foremost cotton-producing 
regions—a rhetorical technique that emphasized the knowledge gap between regions with the best 
59 Mian shu (Fujian fanshu, 1866), 1a.
60 Bray, “Science, technique, knowledge: passages between matter and knowledge in imperial Chinese 
agriculture,” 334.
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practices and those which were not as advanced and thereby enabled the text to serve as “an early 
form of  technology transfer” between such regions.61 If  the book's listing of  cotton seed varieties 
hinted that no commercially valuable cotton cultigens had been developed in the northwest by the 
nineteenth century, the text even more clearly stated the technological dominance of  one region in 
matters of  processing cotton: “for weaving tools, Songjiang prefecture is the best in the world 
(tianxia 天下).”62 Other regions would therefore look toward the east, to Songjiang and the greater 
Jiangnan region, including places like Yuyao, as having reached the technological pinnacle of  cotton 
production. By its reference to these places and its omission of  others, the handbook articulated the 
technological dominance of  eastern regions of  the empire that excelled at cotton production and 
served as the model for other regions attempting to imitate their success.  
Reprinted editions of  The Book of  Cotton seem to have circulated widely in the late 
nineteenth-century northwest, perhaps stoking the desires of  local officials to promote cotton as a 
convenient and acceptable replacement for opium poppy and to imitate advanced techniques from 
other regions. To the east of  Xi'an, the cotton manual reached Shaanxi province's Dali district, 
where the compiler of  the local gazetteer, Zhou Mingqi 周銘旂, wrote in 1879 of  its positive 
influence on the local cotton industry.
In the several years since the noble minister Zuo issued The Book of  Cotton, those 
within the area who grow cotton have gradually become more numerous, especially 
so in the [district's] southwestern countryside, [where] soil near sand yields to what 
cotton likes. Those who weave cloth and [use it for] clothing all depend thereupon.63
61 Ibid., 335.
62 Mian shu, 12a.




Significantly, like peanut plants which had colonized “pastures of  sand” (shayuan 沙苑) in Dali and 
whose methods of  cultivation had been transferred from Henan province's riverine lands, cotton 
was not a “special product” (zhuanchan 專產) of  the local area but a newcomer that could thrive with 
techniques from afar.
Zuo's cotton publications also reached several thousand kilometers to the northwest into 
Xinjiang, where local officials in the oasis of  Turpan reportedly received 200 copies of  the Ten 
Essentials of  Growing Cotton for distribution to area gentry and farmers so that they could emulate its 
production methods.64 But Turpan's cotton production may not have needed any guidance from 
publications like this one. In 1879, Zuo reported that “what is produced in Turpan is better than 
[cotton in] China proper,” and that oasis cotton had long been transported via Hami and sold to the 
inner provinces of  the empire. Turpan cotton was also reportedly cheaper than anything in China—
three-fourths the price of  local Gansu cotton and less than half  the price of  Sichuan and Shaanxi 
cotton. This was the case even after several years of  official cotton promotion in these areas. 
Lamenting how this price disparity made the transport and sales of  Gansu cotton within China 
proper “none too profitable” (wu shen li 無甚利), Zuo realized that a future of  “outsiders” (wairen 外
人) controlling cotton sales would be nearly unavoidable.65 
Despite this pessimism over the potential fate of  Gansu cotton production, some local 
officials dedicated themselves not only to boosting the output of  cotton on land once growing 
opium but also to teaching civilians how to process raw cotton into cloth. Two magistrates in 
64 GX4/3/25 (1878), XJDQ 15-21-113.
65 GX5/0/0 (1879), ZZQ, 12:464.
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northern Gansu, Yang Danian  楊大年 of  Ningzhou and Huang Shaoxin  黄紹新 of  Zhengning, were 
particularly active proponents of  Zuo's anti-opium, pro-cotton schemes, and they went farther than 
other officials to “establish bureaus to instruct [people in] weaving”66 and institutionalize cotton in 
the province. They established sites to grow the seeds, distribute the plants, and train local people 
how to weave its fibers into marketable cloth, an endeavor that may have further raised the 
profitability of  cotton. According to Zuo's letter to Beijing in May 1874, these two officials
bought cotton seeds from afar, propagated them into seedlings, and distributed them 
among the people, responding to the current situation with the arts of  cultivation. 
[They] also sought spinning wheels and weaving tools for purchase, and hired civilian 
women to train [people] in weaving, [endeavors which] have already been effective.
遠購棉種，栽蒔成秧，分布民間，因時樹藝，又購覓紡車織具，顧倩民婦教習紡織，已
有成效。
Zuo proposed to Beijing that their successes in “growing cotton and teaching weaving” deserved 
imperial recognition and commendation, for which he recommended them.67 
The efforts of  Yang and Huang are particularly notable inasmuch as they demonstrate how 
cotton promotion in Gansu may have drawn from an imperial model of  textile manufacturing 
centered within government-operated workshops. Until the very late nineteenth century, cotton 
manufacturing in China took place almost solely within households,68 and Gansu cottons were likely 
being woven by hand looms within single households in the 1870s. In contrast to this commonplace 
textile fiber, silk had long been produced in imperial factories for consumption at court or in 
66 TZ13/3/22 (1874), ZZQ, 6:27.
67 TZ13/3/22 (1874), ZZQ, 6:27.
68 Kang Chao, The Development of  Cotton Textile Production in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University East 
Asian Research Center, 1977), 29. 
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commercial workshops to satisfy elite private consumption, imbuing it with a special status that 
cotton never acquired.69 So when Yang and Huang established cotton training workshops and when 
they sought to make cotton textiles the focus of  government bureaus, they may have borrowed 
loosely from a precedent of  imperial textile manufacture. Whether influenced by cotton manuals or 
notions of  bureaucratization, cotton promotion in Gansu drew its techniques from beyond the 
borders of  the province. Like test cultivation, government-sponsored bureaus functioned to make 
cotton a viable industry despite seemingly unfavorable local conditions.      
Profits and Morality in Gansu
Creating landscapes free of  poppies and full of  cotton was a task that required constant 
intervention. Officials used surveillance and punishment in an attempt to rid their districts of  opium 
production. Zuo's plan for northwest agriculture also relied upon educative and communicative 
methods: he and his subordinates talked with village elders, carried out trial plantings to demonstrate 
the feasibility and profitability of  crops they wanted to promote, circulated cotton manuals, and 
established government textile bureaus. Zuo and other officials aimed to convince farmers to see the 
possibility for profits as they did—in the form of  fields of  cotton and ripe bolls on the bush—and 
then enable them to utilize highly productive methods of  cultivation and processing.
69 This is not to suggest, however, that earlier imperial policies neglected cotton propagation, or that the 
imperial household never had any use for cotton. Yuan and Ming emperors promoted cotton production 
via various measures. The first Yuan emperor established the official position of  Supervisor of  Cotton 
(mumian tijusi 木棉提舉司) in five southern provinces. Shortly thereafter, cotton requisitioning was 
transformed into an official cotton levy, a taxation policy continuing at least until the mid-Ming. The Ming 
obtained cotton for use in the imperial house, for supplying military clothing, and for the horse trade with 
neighboring polities. See Zhao and Chen, Zhongguo mian ye shi, 43-46. Although cotton had lost some 
bureaucratic support by the Qing, the Qianlong emperor gave official recognition to cotton production by 
personally inscribing his poetic comments on the cotton pictorial Illustrations of  Cotton (Mian hua tu 棉花圖) 
by Fang Guancheng. Fang's work is contained in Fan Chuyu, ed., Zhongguo kexue jishu dianji tonghui, Nong  
xue juan 4 (Zhengzhou: Henan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1994).
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To a significant extent, however, Zuo developed plans for cotton promotion as a way to 
intervene in agriculture without challenging the basic principles by which Gansu's farmers chose 
what to plant, harvest, and sell to the market. Despite his claims about foreign malfeasance being the 
root cause of  China's opium conundrum, he knew that for farmers of  opium poppy, the question 
was one of  financial gain rather than propriety or identity, and Zuo largely accepted their pursuit of 
profit. Given this fact, he tried to harness the profit motive to guide farmers toward cotton and 
convince them that it could be at least as financially rewarding as opium poppy. 
In this quest, choosing cotton was not purely a matter of  recognizing cotton's price on local 
or regional markets. Commodity values surely played a large role, but the idea of  obtaining profit 
was more complex than exchange in the marketplace. When making claims about the profitability of 
cotton, Zuo also paid attention to Gansu's environmental conditions—its soils, weather, and 
seasons. When he assessed these conditions, he found them suited to cotton cultivation, and reports 
about successful trial propagation of  cotton seemed to verify his judgments. Obtaining profit from 
cotton was, from his perspective, the end result of  a more complex process of  matching plants to 
suitable landscapes, demonstrating their potential, and educating farmers about propagation. 
Reaping profits through cotton cultivation was also a moral activity, at least in the eyes of 
Zuo and other officials, because doing so meant shunning opium poppy, a flower vilified in the 
1870s. Consider a poem about anti-poppy patrols in the countryside. Four or five years after Zuo 
circulated the cotton manuals, a local magistrate in northern Gansu wrote a verse entitled 
“Prohibiting Opium Poppy” (Cha jin yingsu 查禁罌粟): 
Patrolling the countryside near and far,
Treading the rivers east and west,
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Toxic grass roots have been completely eliminated,  
And opium flowers are not seen.
Wielding hoes in the early morning brume,
Finishing with the soil in the evening sun,
Evil breeds no longer remain,
Still teach [them to cultivate] our cops—exactly the same.70 
  循来鄉远近 /    踏偏水西東 /    毒草根除盡 /  煙花過眼空
  挥锄朝霭外 /    繫壤夕陽中 /    無復留非種 /  還教我稼同
Zhu Meixie 朱美夑, who served as the district magistrate in Haicheng  海城 from 1878 to 1880,71 
indicates in this verse that opium prohibition was not merely a policy of  restricting farmers from 
growing a specific plant. It was a more comprehensive, transformative program to rid the land of 
unacceptable vegetation—the “evil breeds” (feizhong 非種)—and introduce vegetation that was 
acceptable, what Zhu called “our crops” (wo jia 我稼). If  carried out successfully, it would have 
changed the appearance of  the landscape: fields full of  bolls of  cotton, perhaps, or parcels of 
wheat, rather than expanses of  bulbous, multi-colored flowers. And it would also have meant that 
farmers, whether willingly or begrudgingly, altered their agricultural habits and their practices of 
cultivation to more faithfully reproduce normative patterns of  farming, at least according to officials 
like Zhu.
Efforts to exterminate the so-called “evil grasses” from Gansu's countryside echoed wartime 
attempts to defeat and root out enemies of  the imperial state, particularly the so-called “bandit 
Muslims” (fei Hui 匪回) against whom Zuo's army fought in the 1860s and 1870s. Perhaps like his 
70 Yang Jingeng, ed., Haicheng xian zhi [Gazetteer of  Haicheng district] (1908), 10:9b.
71 Haicheng xian zhi, 8:2b.
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military campaigns, Zuo's agricultural operations were strategic maneuvers to make the province safe 
for the Qing and accord with his agrarian vision for it, a vision tempered by stark divisions between 
right and wrong. To intervene in Gansu agriculture, he chose the morally palatable cotton and a 
select few other crops as cultivars because he believed they were profitable for farmers and could 
take to Gansu's climate and landscape. Seeing fields of  cotton in 1873 was thus a victory on many 
potential levels: a moral victory of  good over evil, a victory of  agricultural techniques over local 
conditions, a victory of  official knowledge over peasant ignorance, and a victory of  “our crops” 
over “evil breeds.” However unsure and incomplete these victories may have been toward the end of 
the 1870s, visions of  cotton offered hope that, on the agricultural front, Gansu might replicate the 
productivity of  other parts of  the empire. 
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Chapter 4
“Spreading the Profits of  Zhejiang”: Sericulture in Xinjiang
Commoners obdurately stick to the “soil of  mulberry trees” in the Tribute of  Yu. 
Explaining sericulture, they say that when planting mulberries, one must select land 
with suitable soil quality to obtain the greatest profit. They always act as if  marginal 
areas have limitations. They are not aware that any household with five mu can plant 
mulberry trees and any family with a woman can raise silkworms. In this world, any 
place with soil is one where mulberry trees can be grown and silkworms can be 
raised. 
—Shen Bingcheng, Summary of  Sericulture (1871)1
世人泥禹貢桑土。既蠶之說，謂種桑之地必擇土性所宜，以致天下大利。輒為方偶所限。
不知五畝之宅可樹桑，匹婦之家可飼蠶。天下有土之地皆可種桑之地，皆可養蠶之地也。
The intense summer heat in Turpan may have already begun to stifle the oasis city and its 
arid farming villages when, on a day in late May 1889, an anxious imperial functionary sent a missive 
to Urumqi pleading for direction. Having arrived at the post almost three years earlier, the man had 
gained some experience supervising the city's military clothing bureau and its sericulture bureau. He 
was evidently troubled that these two Qing government bureaus ran increasingly large fiscal deficits 
as the years passed. But what truly exasperated him were the previous day's events at the sericulture 
1 Tribute of  Yu (Yu gong 禹貢), a chapter within the Classic of  History (Shujing 書經), records the geographical 
particularities of  regions in ancient China. One mu  畝 equals one-sixth of  an acre. Shen Bingcheng, 
Cansang jiyao [Summary of  Sericulture], (Chang Zhen tong hai dao shu, 1871), preface:1a. 
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bureau, where dozens of  Turkestani youth (chantong 纏童) labored to manufacture thread and silk 
cloth from cocoons purchased in the villages around Turpan and beyond. He solicitously recounted 
how, even though these young Turkestanis had never before expressed any dissent, “suddenly 
yesterday, each sericulture foreman extorted money for daily expenses (yancaiyin 鹽菜銀) [from us].” 
He attributed their effrontery—their demands for greater remunerations—to their malfeasance: 
foremen like this shirked corvée duties and hired themselves out for sericulture work several months 
at a time, yet knew nothing of  the proper schedule for salary payments. As the imperial functionary 
lamented to superiors in the provincial capital, the young Turkestani workers had already begun to 
harbor “minds of  dissent” (yixin 異心) owing to the incitement of  these foremen. With mounting 
debts and obstreperous laborers, the future of  Qing-sponsored sericulture in Turpan was in doubt.2 
The potential fate of  the Turpan bureau as it appeared to this official in 1889 stood sharply 
at odds with the optimistic proclamations of  Shen Bingcheng   沈秉成 (1823-1895) about marginal 
territories being fertile land for sericulture. Following the social dislocation and ecological 
destruction of  the Taiping Rebellion, Shen and an expanding group of  activist governors promoted 
mulberry cultivation and silk production as one of  the foremost economic panaceas of  the times. 
Shen's vision of  sericulture seemed to champion household production wherever the family lived or 
migrated in the post-conflict era, regardless of  environment or custom. As long as the household 
had enough land and labor, local conditions were to make no difference.
 In practice, however, late nineteenth-century promotions of  sericulture relied upon a highly 
specialized and commercialized template of  production from a very specific location within the 
empire. Shen and others looked to northern Zhejiang province, and particularly to Huzhou 
2 GX15/5/1 (1889), XJDQ 15-30-1009.
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prefecture, to furnish everything from a prosperous model of  political economy, to the expertise of 
silk craftsmen, right down to the mulberry and silkworm organisms. Huzhou became the top choice 
among these officials for hiring experts and purchasing the primary means of  production—trees 
and insects—to be brought back to the districts they governed. The vogue for Huzhou sericulture 
forged expansive networks of  commerce between this center of  silk production and its peripheral 
territories.
Campaigns to promote sericulture also more tightly ensnared Qing localities and subjects in a 
complex system of  social relations that included European merchants, Chinese officials, Huzhou 
experts, and local apprentices and farmers. The young Turkestani men in the Turpan sericulture 
bureau did not merely produce silk. They labored within the ambit of  imperialisms, European and 
Qing. They may have attempted to strengthen their own positions within the system in May 1889 
when they confronted officials over pay. But they were also subject to the visions of  Qing officials 
who intended them to be willing recipients of  Chinese sericulture expertise, workers capable of 
feeding silk demand on the world market, and residents of  a territory more firmly incorporated into 
the empire and attached to China proper. 
Humans were not the only organisms shaping the system of  social relations in the late Qing 
era. The mulberry tree and the silkworm also played crucial roles inasmuch as they acted as the 
primary means of  production for the industry. When Zuo Zongtang scrambled to expand agrarian 
production in Xinjiang beginning in the late 1870s, he followed Shen Bingcheng's initiative to hire 
experts and purchase huge numbers of  mulberry trees and silkworm eggs in Huzhou. As bulk 
commodities, these organism embodied sets of  knowledge distinct from their counterparts 
elsewhere in the empire. Human techniques of  selection, cultivation, and modification had altered 
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and reshaped the mulberries and silkworms over centuries of  practice. Transplanted into new 
environs, they retained their accumulated histories of  human modification and their social 
characteristics as “biological artifacts” and products of  Huzhou expertise.3 They were, in other 
words, subtle colonizers in new lands alongside the people who brought them—the same ones who 
had opened the Turpan sericulture bureau and had fancifully imagined a thriving Xinjiang silk 
industry. 
The Huzhou Model and the World Market
The Huzhou model emerged out of  crisis on the southern banks of  the lower Yangzi River 
sometime in the 1860s. Like other places in China's agricultural heartland, this region's environment 
had been devastated by the Taiping catastrophe. A British naval captain who was charting his way up 
the Yangzi in 1861 put ashore at the city of  Zhenjiang, where he discovered beyond its crumbling 
walls “nothing but a treeless country” where destroyed countryside hamlets “had the appearance of 
a number of  Irish villages after the famine.” Perched on a hillock, the captain peered across the 
landscape and inside the walls, finding only a “heap of  débris” where houses had once stood. Amidst 
the destruction, he could hardly mask his excitement that the countryside was “rapidly regaining a 
state of  nature” where pheasants, quail, rooks, jackdaws, and ducks flocked in unimaginable 
abundance. Yet the enticing possibility of  shooting these fowl or other flourishing fauna did not 
leave him oblivious to the “distinctive mark” of  the Taiping landscape stretching from Zhenjiang to 
Wuhu, several hundred kilometers upriver: the startling “entire absence of  trees.”4
3 This term comes from Edmund Russell, “Introduction: The Garden in the Machine: Toward an 
Evolutionary History of  Technology,” in Industrializing Organisms: Introducing Evolutionary History, ed. Susan 
R. Schrepfer and Philip Scranton (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1. 
4 Thomas W. Blakiston, Five Months on the Yang-tsze; with a Narrative of  the Exploration of  its Upper Waters, and  
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Eight years later, a forty-six-year-old native of  the district of  Gui'an in Huzhou moved to the 
southern banks of  the Yangzi near Zhenjiang. Perhaps new vegetation had grown green and had 
covered some of  the landscape's wartime scars, but in late 1869, the man, Shen Bingcheng, toured 
each village, surveyed the land, and discovered the country to be primarily “vast, empty soil” 
(kuangtu 曠土).5 A middling Qing official, Shen had received imperial orders to organize local military 
preparations, but the poverty and emptiness of  the countryside gripped him. Across the barren land 
where thorny brambles extended almost limitlessly, fields remained unclaimed years after the 
Taipings had disappeared. What Shen found most dissatisfying about these scenes was the vacant 
land lying fallow with “untapped profits” (yuli 餘利).6 
Shen admitted no surprise that the downward spiral of  warfare, destruction, desertion, and 
desolation led to unending wasteland. But the most basic issue was not social conflict that had left 
the districts of  Zhenjiang heavily depopulated.7 Rather, Shen decried farmers' lack of  knowledge 
about how best to use the soil. He faulted the customs of  the people (minfeng 民風) for not fully 
understanding the techniques of  agriculture and sericulture,8 leaving them ignorant of  how to raise 
mulberry trees and silkworms and unable to derive their livelihoods in a skillful way from the 
“natural profits of  Heaven and Earth” (tiandi ziran zhi li 天地自然之利). Yet Shen imagined how easy 
it could be. He claimed to have once seen an eight-member family who pulled themselves out of 
poverty by raising ten wicker baskets of  silkworms and reeling the silk, producing an income 
Notices of  the Present Rebellions in China (London: John Murray, 1862), 7-9, 55. 
5 Shen, Cansang jiyao, preface:1b. 
6 Shen, Cansang jiyao, guitiao:1a. 
7 In the district of  Dantu, the population dropped from around 330,000 to little over 100,000 between 1859 
and 1867. Dantu xian zhi [Gazetteer of  Dantu County] (1879), 12:18b.
8 Shen, Cansang jiyao, guitiao:1a.
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equivalent to crop production on 100 mu of  land.9 Apocryphal though Shen's claim may have been, 
it confirmed to him the value of  sericulture in reconstruction. 
 Eager to create wealth and put peasants and soil to work, Shen planned to train local 
farmers in the entire process of  sericulture. The Huzhou native reportedly consulted with local 
elders, gathered monetary contributions, and dispatched subordinates to his home prefecture to 
purchase over 200,000 mulberry saplings and hire workers skilled in their cultivation.10 Within the 
city, where there had been sericulture bureaus (cansang ju 蠶桑局) before the warfare, Shen proposed 
experimenting with mulberry tree cultivation.11 He also requested that the project's chief  supervisor, 
Wu Liufu 吴六符, draft regulations for establishing city and countryside mulberry and sericulture 
bureaus at which farmers could register to receive mulberry saplings. Shen also purchased silkworm 
eggs and invited “silkworm masters” (canshi 蠶師) to travel the region promoting silk production and 
spreading their knowledge. In Zhenjiang's southern outskirts, in the district of  Dantu, Shen set up a 
mulberry tree bureau (kesang ju 課桑局) where specialists instructed farmers how to tend Huzhou 
trees, utilize their leaves for raising silkworms, and reel cocoons into silk thread.12 What Shen 
brought to the lower Yangzi city was, in other words, a developed set of  productive practices along 
with their corresponding organisms, the highly productive mulberry trees and silkworms of 
Huzhou.
Shen's pioneering attempts at Huzhou sericulture in Zhenjiang may have remained little 
more than regional reconstruction policy had he not recorded them in his Summary of  Sericulture 
9 Shen, Cansang jiyao, guitiao:1b.
10 Shen, Cansang jiyao, guitiao:1b.
11 Shen, Cansang jiyao, guitiao:1b.
12 Shen, Cansang jiyao, preface:1b; Dantu xian zhi (1879), 17:19a. For a reference to this, see Li Wenzhi, ed., 
Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi ziliao [Materials on modern Chinese agricultural history], (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 
1957), 1:883.
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(Cansang jiyao 蠶桑輯要), a short text published several years later in the summer of  1871. In the 
preface, Shen recounted how it was Wu Liufu who had suggested compiling various production 
procedures pertaining to mulberry trees and silkworms.13 Shen answered the suggestion by 
explicating in detail a wide range of  techniques, from grafting branches and feeding silkworms to 
operating silk looms. In fact, he devoted the vast majority of  the text to these instructions for 
sericulture. Although Shen was surely knowledgeable about many techniques, he admitted to having 
“widely collected the sayings of  various masters” in order to explain all of  them.14 
Yet Shen's work may also have served less utilitarian purposes. For one thing, the book was a 
textual encomium of  his great-great grandfather, Shen Bingzhen  沈炳震 (1679-1738), who had 
penned a set of  lyrical ruminations on twenty sericulture activities in the early eighteenth century. 
The living Shen appended his ancestor's work, entitled Ballads of  Sericulture (Cansang yuefu 蠶桑樂府), 
to his own work.15 Perhaps far more significant than recognizing his debt to family heritage, 
however, was that Shen's text boasted of  his project's successes and propagandized Huzhou 
sericulture. Whether in soil “high and flat or low and moist,” Shen proudly and imaginatively 
reported, his mulberries had “flourished into forest” and, after more than a year, eighty to ninety 
percent remained alive.16 Indeed, it was perhaps owing to his strong enthusiasm for the Huzhou 
mulberry tree as a robust cultivar suited to almost any landscape that Shen devoted all of  his nine 
initial instructions to its cultivation. In an enticingly straightforward calculation of  financial success 
aimed at sericulture's future acolytes, Shen proposed: “If  today one grows an additional portion of 
13 Shen, Cansang jiyao, preface:1b.
14 Shen, Cansang jiyao, preface:1b.
15 For citations of  the elder Shen's work, see ECCP, 645; Huzhou shi zhi [Gazetteer of  Huzhou City] (Beijing: 
Kunlun chubanshe, 1999), 616; Shen, Cansang jiyao, preface:1b. 
16 Shen, Cansang jiyao, preface:1b.
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mulberry trees, another year he will obtain an additional portion of  profit.”17 Such forthright 
optimism urged readers in any location to adopt the techniques and the organisms explained within 
the text.
Like nineteenth-century sericulture production in the lower Yangzi delta, Shen's Huzhou 
model assumed the existence of  a world market for silk textiles. Despite his idealization of  the 
family unit of  production and his claim that promoting sericulture enabled local people to clothe 
themselves, he was not envisioning production for self-sufficiency. Shen wanted to unleash the 
“private ambitions” (si yuan 私願) of  individual producers who would clamor to supply the market in 
silks, which reached from local cities to imperial ports around the world. Back in his home region, he 
had “personally seen the silks produced every year” and had “met on the road those who come from 
all over to purchase them.”18 Inasmuch as Shen knew that foreign trade could boost prospects for 
the success of  Huzhou sericulture, his plans coincided with the basic thrust of  post-Taiping 
economic reconstruction in the lower Yangzi delta.19
Xinjiang Sericulture and the Possibilities of  the World Market
A decade after Shen Bingcheng first adopted the Huzhou model in Jiangsu province, Zuo 
Zongtang picked up on the idea of  deploying Huzhou trees, silkworms, and experts thousands of 
kilometers west, clear across the empire. In 1878, Zuo's army had just recaptured the last of  the 
17 The sericutlure enthusiast reported that after “cultivating mulberry trees for three years, [one may] pick 
leaves for a lifetime.” Shen estimated that each mu of  land could support forty to fifty trees, which in turn 
could produce leaves sufficient for silk production of  eight to nine jin 觔. One jin equals half  a kilogram. 
See Shen, Cansang jiyao, guitiao:2a.
18 Shen, Cansang jiyao, preface:1a.
19 Lillian Li, China's Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern World, 1842-1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Council on East Asian Studies, 1981), 134.
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southern cities of  Xinjiang from the remnants of  Muslim resistance.20 Searching for a way to 
invigorate reconstruction and curtail the influence of  Russian traders and diplomats, he chose to 
emphasize silk production in major cities across the territory. Although he articulated his vision for 
Xinjiang sericulture in a lengthy April 1880 memorial to Beijing that outlined many other strategies 
of  reconstruction, projects like repairing waterworks and rebuilding public infrastructure did not 
offer the same profitable possibilities as mulberry cultivation and silkworm raising sponsored by the 
state. Unlike other measures, silk production would be aimed at filling the demands of  the 
international markets. 
According to Zuo, Xinjiang sericulture could be poised to supply markets both east and 
west, but the primary customers would be Kazakhs and Russians. The general acknowledged how 
Western countries (taixi 泰西) increasingly consumed Chinese silks from bustling seaports like 
Shanghai, but he vented frustrations that overland trade routes for manufactures were slow and 
costly and would likely hinder sales of  Xinjiang silks in the east. Yet in Xinjiang itself, market 
demand for silk had gone locally unfulfilled. Zuo noted how the nomadic states (xingguo 行國) of  the 
northwest had increasingly consumed silks and woolens in the recent era even though they had long 
used felts or animal hides for their clothes, quilts, and tents. To obtain these textiles, they conducted 
business with merchants from the “central lands” (zhongtu 中土) far to the east in China proper and 
bypassed Xinjiang products altogether, even though they still had to deal with the pitfalls of 
overland travel.21 
20 On the thirteen-year period of  Muslim rule in Xinjiang after the defenestration of  Qing authority, see 
Hodong Kim, Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2004); James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of  Xinjiang (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 116-130. 
21 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:520.
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Xinjiang's current silk output also left Russians and other border merchants unsatisfied and 
unchecked, at least according to Zuo's estimate.22 Clearly very anxious about Russian intervention in 
the territory, the general lamented the fact that Russian merchants regularly journeyed far inside the 
precarious Qing borders to purchase merchandise that could potentially be produced much more 
closely in the cities of  Xinjiang. This vexed him all the more because Russian authorities had been 
pressing for consulates in several northwestern cities and they still remained in control of  the Ili 
Valley as of  1880, a point of  contention in Russian-Qing relations.23 He admitted that some 
merchants purchased silk in Xinjiang, but they continually proposed traveling to Sichuan because 
quantities of  silk along the northwestern border were insufficient to meet the demand.24 
Zuo suspected that, by promoting sericulture, he could simultaneously reach strategic and 
economic goals. If  Xinjiang produced cocoons in abundance and manufactured enough silk, then 
nomads, Russians, and other merchants would not have to travel far within Qing borders to conduct 
trade with the Chinese provinces. “All the various nomadic states of  the northwest” could acquire 
their silks right in Xinjiang, obviating the need to “pass through Gansu to Sichuan to buy new 
silk.”25 This scenario would be mutually satisfying: “the other parties would obtain their profits, 
while I, for my part, could apply techniques for their control.” In other words, deepening Xinjiang's 
connection to the international market would facilitate rather than hinder Chinese control of  the 
region. Silk profits from trans-border commerce also translated into customs duties, so creating a 
22 Prior to Zuo Zongtang's sericulture intervention in Xinjiang, at least some of  the region's silk 
manufactures were exported to Russia. See A.N. Kuropatkin, Kashgaria, Eastern or Chinese Turkistan:  
Historical and Geographical Sketch of  the Country; Its Military Strength, Industries and Trade, trans. Walter E. 
Gowan (London: W. Thacker & Co., 1882), 85-88 passim. 
23 See Immanuel Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of  Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1871-1881 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1965). 
24 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521.
25 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521.
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thriving silk industry would increase the funds available to Zuo's military government and relieve the 
urgency of  its finances.26
Yet deepening Xinjiang's connection to international commerce could not be accomplished 
without thoroughly improving Xinjiang sericulture. The general acknowledged that Xinjiang already 
had mulberry trees and some silk production. In fact, the existing stock of  mulberry trees appeared 
to be huge. As he reported to Beijing in 1880, “because the land of  Xinjiang's southern region is 
basically suited to mulberry,” he had ordered subordinates to survey and calculate the total number 
of  mulberry trees in their areas. Their responses indicated that people in northern and southern 
Xinjiang cultivated more than 800,000 trees in total.27 Despite the arid climate and irrigated lands of 
the oases being fertile ground for mulberry trees, however, Zuo judged other factors of  production 
inadequate for a thriving industry. 
Mulberry trees may have dotted the landscape in many locations, but often there was no 
evidence of  silkworms, a mismatch of  natural resources that astonished Zuo. As he wrote to 
Gansu's provincial treasurer Yang Changjun  楊昌濬 (1827-1897) in the spring of  1880, “the Western 
frontier has none of  the profits of  silkworms, yet the mulberry trees produced are numerous and 
fine.” This mismatch grated against his sense of  agricultural norms. Mulberry trees without 
silkworms meant foregoing the potential profits of  the land and wasting its resources. What was 
natural for him was to simultaneously harness the productivity of  both organisms: “This is nothing 
more than if  one has mulberries, it is certainly fitting to have silkworms.”28
Perhaps even more frustrating for him, local people seemed inept in matters of  sericulture 
26 GX 6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521.
27 GX5/12/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:468. He increased the estimated number of  mulberry trees by 6,000 several 
months later. See GX 6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521.
28 GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:618. 
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even where silkworms did exist. He particularly criticized Xinjiang's laborers and their lack of  skills. 
He complained that the “Turkestani Muslims (chanhui 纏回) do not know the methods for grafting 
mulberries or raising silkworms.” Even if  they managed to raise silkworms for their cocoons or 
weave silk, the products of  their labor were more or less worthless. He claimed that the silk they 
produced came out “stiff, its color muddled,” hardly the qualities that would enable integration into 
international markets.29 
The ineptitude of  Xinjiang's Muslims in matters of  sericulture indicated to Zuo a 
horrendous discrepancy between labor and resources. He fretted that, lacking sufficient expertise, 
the Turkestanis were incapable of  putting mulberry trees and silkworms to the most profitable uses. 
Where mulberries thrived, “locals (turen 土人) just gather mulberry fruits as replacement for grain or 
refer to the mulberry as medicinal material, so the profits of  silk are not widespread.” Earlier he had 
reported the same problem: if  people used the trees at all, they often merely collected the fruits to 
feed themselves.30 Utilizing parts of  the tree as medicine was no more helpful for feeding silkworms. 
Zuo thus equated this usage with a monumental waste of  nature's bounty: “Heaven gives rise to 
such fine profits, and people just abandon them—a pity indeed!”31 Since Xinjiang's Muslims did not 
use mulberry trees in the ways that accorded with Zuo's knowledge of  sericulture, he ridiculed them 
for squandering their resources.
The benchmark by which Zuo appraised existing silk production in Xinjiang was none other 
29 GX5/12/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:468.  
30 A later Xinjiang governor, Wei Guangtao  魏光燾 (1837-1915), repeated the same charge: “local people who 
produced mulberry trees took the mulberry fruits as a substitute for grain.” See Wei Guangtao, Kanding  
Xinjiang ji [Record of  the suppression and pacification of  Xinjiang] (1899), 8:15b. After being exiled to 
Xinjiang, Lin Zexu noted in 1846 the same thing about southern Xinjiang Muslims: they ate mulberries 
(along with melons) to stave off  hunger. See Lin Zexu quanji [Collected works of  Lin Zexu], (Fuzhou: 
Haixia wenyi chubanshe, 2002), DG26/2/10 (1846), 3:511. 
31 GX5/12/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:468.  
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than Huzhou. In his assessment, Zuo had quickly concluded that low-grade silk was “far inferior 
compared to the central lands (zhongtu 中土).”32 Zuo implied that, by comparison, northern Zhejiang 
people had done exceedingly well in utilizing the resources of  the natural world and in turning them 
into profitable manufactures. As he noted several months after his initial appraisal of  Xinjiang, “as 
for silk from the central lands (zhongtu 中土), its profits reach everywhere, and the products of 
Hu[zhou] in particular rank first in the central lands (zhongtu 中土).”33 Huzhou sericulture—its 
products, its laborers, its technology—was thus the standard against which Zuo judged Xinjiang's 
Muslims and the silks they manufactured.
Spreading Zhejiang into Xinjiang
As the general in charge of  Xinjiang military affairs, Zuo Zongtang adopted the Huzhou 
model for sericulture in order to cultivate more highly productive laborers, mulberry trees, and 
silkworms in the borderland. Under the arrangements made by Zuo's staff, sericulture specialists 
hired in Huzhou brought their expertise, their trees, and their insects across the empire to be 
reproduced throughout Xinjiang. In this wholesale copying of  Huzhou's technology, Zuo intended 
to train local people and organisms and erase their perceived inferiorities relative to Huzhou. Or, as 
the general phrased it, he intended “to spread the profits of  Zhejiang into Xinjiang.”34 
Spreading Huzhou practices required expert knowledge. By early 1880, Zuo had enlisted Zhu 
Yingtao 祝應焘, a former district magistrate from Hubei province,35 and Hu Guangyong 胡光墉 
32 GX5/12/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:468.  
33 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:520.  
34 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521. 
35 According to Zuo's memorial, Zhu Yingtao was a former district magistrate of  Chongyang county, Hubei 
province, who had been relieved of  his position over the purported mishandling of  a case involving a 
dispute about trees. Despite the black mark on this man's official record, Zuo deemed him a good 
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(1823-1885), Zuo's longtime “purchasing agent” in Shanghai, to locate and hire skilled sericulture 
craftsmen in northern Zhejiang and make arrangements for their journey to the oases of  Xinjiang. 
Since the mid-1860s, Zuo had relied upon Hu, a native of  Hangzhou, to make arrangements for 
shipments of  military supplies and large cash remittances.36 Zuo chose Zhu largely because he was a 
Huzhou insider, a Zhejiang native, and “very familiar with all matters concerning sericulture.”37 Zuo 
ordered these two men to recruit sixty sericulture experts from Huzhou who were knowledgeable in 
all aspect of  the silk production process, from the propagation of  mulberry tree stock and the 
grafting of  mulberry branches to the reeling of  silk thread and the use of  looms. Zuo also charged 
Hu and Zhu with purchasing mulberry tree saplings and silkworm eggs in Huzhou and finding a 
means to transport them three to four thousand kilometers westward. Zhu was responsible for 
chaperoning the experts and their tools on the journey to Xinjiang.38 By January 1880, Zhu and these 
craftsmen had reached Lanzhou, and as soon as they arrived in Suzhou, Gansu, they were to be 
dispatched beyond the western end of  the Great Wall.  
Human resources being spent on Xinjiang's development, these experts would serve as 
Xinjiang's direct link to Huzhou knowledge. According to Zuo, they would teach Xinjiang's Muslims 
how to do everything from propagating and grafting trees to bathing and boiling silkworm cocoons, 
reeling their silk, and weaving the thread into cloth.39 They had been hired, in other words, to train 
Turkestanis in Huzhou practices and to raise the productivity of  local sericulture. Initially, they 
would be deployed in sericulture bureaus established in the oasis cities along the main transportation 
candidate for sericulture envoy in both Zhejiang and Xinjiang. 
36 C. John Stanley, Late Ch'ing Finance: Hu Kuang-yung as an Innovator (Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research 
Center, Harvard University, 1961), 1-18. 
37 GX5/12/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:468.
38 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521. 
39 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521. 
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routes between Anxi (in northwestern Gansu province) and Aqsu (located in western-central 
Xinjiang), including Dunhuang, Hami, Turpan, and Kucha. Soon thereafter, Zuo hoped to promote 
silk production in the “four western cities,” namely Khotan, Yakan, Yengisar, and Kashgar.40 Only 
after establishing bureaus for sericulture training in these ten sites did Zuo expect to expand the 
program to cities north of  the Tianshan mountain range, into northern Xinjiang.
Although oases south of  the Tianshan grew mulberry trees in great multitude, Zuo deemed 
the trees inferior to those in Huzhou and in need of  modification. Many were “wild mulberry trees” 
(shengsang 生桑) and less advantageous than domesticated varieties for raising silkworms because of 
their relative paucity of  leaves. Another report suggested that Xinjiang's farmland contained trees 
with “large trunks and emaciated leaves”—nearly worthless to sericulture since many of  the 
silkworms that ate their leaves “turned stiff  and died.”41 But Zuo was confident that such trees could 
be modified to suit new production initiatives. Zuo optimistically envisioned that “as soon as they 
are altered by grafting (yijie 移接), then [their leaves] can raise silkworms.”42 Because new branches 
could be grafted onto older trunks, Huzhou sericulture would flourish more quickly in southern 
Xinjiang, where tens of  thousands of  trees already grew, rather than in locations where mulberry 
trees would have to be started from seedling. 
In the same bureaucratic missives, Zuo remarked upon modifying mulberries and training 
Turkestanis. Both were subject to his future vision of  Xinjiang sericulture and, finding deficiencies in 
both, the general imagined the positive transformation of  trees and people. With trees grafted and 
“Turkestanis (chanmin 纏民) diligently becoming familiar with [sericulture] work,” he foresaw the 
40 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521. For reference to the “four western cities,” see GX3/11/5 (1877), ZZQ, 
6:776. 
41 Xinjiang tuzhi (Dongfang xuehui, 1923), 28:5b; Li Wenru, Xinjiang dili zhiwu kao (MS, n.d.), cansang:1b.
42 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521. 
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possibility of  improving the industry, increasing its output, and connecting its products to the 
international market along the Qing border.43 
Zuo issued a follow-up report to Beijing in January 1881 describing the early successes of 
the “trial run of  sericulture bureaus and business” over the previous year.44 About the time Zuo 
arrived in Hami in mid-1880, Zhu Yingtao sent him samples of  silk recently produced in the 
bureaus of  Hami, Turpan, Kucha, and Aqsu. After personal inspection, Zuo judged the cloth “white 
and resilient, no different from the central lands (zhongtu 中土).”45 He also had reason to be 
increasingly optimistic about Xinjiang's mulberry stock. In a comment at odds with his own 
assessment the previous year, some Huzhou craftsmen claimed that “in comparison with Zhejiang, 
the leaves produced by mulberries of  this land are large, juicy, and thick, truly suitable for 
silkworms.”46 The experts of  purportedly the best sericulture practices in the empire had put 
Xinjiang's mulberry trees at least on par with those of  Zhejiang. 
But shortcomings related to local production still hindered the industry. Even if  Xinjiang 
mulberry leaves could adequately nourish silkworms, the experts from afar regretted that “when we 
arrived, the season had already passed, so there's not much silkworm raising.” The silkworms in 
Xinjiang were also lackluster. Zuo reported that if  Zhu Yingtao were to purchase “local cocoons” 
(tujian 土繭) from Turpan, Kucha, or Aqsu, they would be flimsy and yellow, such that the “silk 
thread obtained would not reach one-half  of  [what can be done with] Zhejiang mulberry trees.” In 
fact, Zhu had inspected numerous bolts of  various types of  silk and had found them to be inferior 
43 GX6/4/17 (1880), ZZQ, 7:521. 
44 GX6/12/2 (1881), ZZQ, 7:630.
45 GX6/12/2 (1881), ZZQ, 7:631.
46 GX6/12/2 (1881), ZZQ, 7:631.
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to Zhejiang's products.47 
Faced with these disappointing outcomes, Zuo Zongtang reiterated the importance of  inputs 
and expertise from Huzhou. He proposed that if  the recently established sericulture bureaus relied 
even more upon Zhejiang mulberry trees (Zhesang 浙桑) for local production, “material [inputs] can 
basically be saved.” He also remained optimistic that Xinjiang workers could reel threads and weave 
marketable silk on par with the manufactures of  Huzhou if  they followed the techniques of  the 
experts and pressed more Zhejiang silkworms into productive service. In other words, he remained 
wedded to the goals of  transforming Xinjiang sericulture in the image of  the Huzhou industry, 
causing the “profits (li 利) of  Zhejiang to move into the northwest,” and finding ways to “manage 
foreigners” (yu yi 馭夷) and control the border.48
Huzhou Organisms and the Circulation of  Knowledge
At the heart of  the Huzhou model was the mulberry tree and the techniques for its 
cultivation. As Shen Bingcheng and other late nineteenth-century sericulture promoters believed, to 
produce silk of  the finest quality, one had to start with the highest quality inputs. According to Shen, 
differences in land were not overly concerning; mulberries could flourish any place with soil and 
people to tend them. Silkworm varieties mattered, too, but the means of  differentiation and 
alteration were not as highly developed as those for the mulberry tree. Shen and others thus gave 
their primary attention to the tree and particularly to the leaves it produced. As farmers had long 
recognized, although silkworms ate leaves from many types of  trees, the quality of  the silk fibers 
47 GX6/12/2 (1881), ZZQ, 7:631.
48 GX6/12/2 (1881), ZZQ, 7:631.
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they produced varied widely.49 Even among mulberry trees, large variations in leaf  size, texture, and 
moisture content determined the abundance and quality of  fibers spun by the silkworms. So when 
Shen Bingcheng dispatched people to purchase hundreds of  thousands of  mulberry trees from his 
hometown in 1869 even though Danxi, a district of  Zhenjiang, had always had “wild mulberry 
trees” (yesang 野桑) and cudranias (zhe 柘) and even had a small stock of  mulberry trees from 
Huzhou,50 he was likely thinking primarily of  the leaves to be produced by the new transplants.
For Xinjiang, Zuo also chose the engineered mulberry trees that Huzhou's farmers had 
developed. The “Huzhou mulberry trees” (Husang 湖桑) that Zhu Yingtao and Hu Guangyong 
purchased in the region south of  Lake Tai were products of  centuries of  selection as well as 
amalgamated specimens containing parts from different varieties of  mulberry trees. As early as the 
Northern Song (960-1127), people in Huzhou had begun to improve the leaves of  the mulberry tree 
by combining the branches and trunks of  different trees through grafting, gradually creating trees 
that became known to the local population as distinctly “Huzhou mulberry trees,” a name in 
existence by the Ming (1368-1644).51 Later, Huzhou cultivators adopted methods for pruning 
branches and creating trees with short trunks; Shen's ideal mulberry, for example, was fully mature at 
1.6 to 1.9 meters tall (see Figure 3).52 Such modifications gradually made mulberry tree leaves larger, 
more numerous, more nutrient rich, and easier to harvest. They also reduced the amount of  fruit 
produced by the tree, thus leaving even more nutrients for the leaves. These changes enabled 
49 Li, China's Silk Trade, 11. 
50 Danxi xian zhi (1879), 17:19a, quoted in Li Wenzhi, ed., Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi ziliao [Materials on modern 
Chinese agricultural history], (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1957), 1:426. 
51 Huzhou shi zhi, 617-18. Another source suggests that the practice of  grafting mulberry trees became 
widespread during the Yuan era (1276-1368). See Dieter Kuhn, Science and Civilisation in China, v. 5, pt. 9, 
Textile Technology: Spinning and Reeling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 289.
52 Pruning was to keep the tree at this height, between five and six chi 尺. One chi equaled approximately one-
third of  a meter in the Qing period. Shen, Cansang jiyao, zashuo:12a.
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producers to feed higher quality leaves to more silkworms, which increased the output of  silk fibers 
considered to be of  high quality.53 
Categorizing trees was a key step in the process of  producing mulberry leaves. In 1880, when 
Zuo had just initiated the project to transform Xinjiang sericulture, Huzhou native Wang Yuezhen 
 汪曰楨 (1813-1881) reprinted a detailed summary of  techniques for raising mulberry trees and 
silkworms and transforming their labors into silk cloth. In his explanations, he emphasized the 
significance of  getting the right types of  trees for production. Wang described two categories of 
mulberry trees, domesticated mulberries (jiasang 家桑) and wild mulberries (yesang 野桑). The former, 
he claimed, had “round, thick, and juicy” leaves and few large fruits, and had also long been known 
as Shandong mulberries (Lusang 魯桑). The undomesticated trees, also called thorny mulberries 
(jingsang 荆桑) and mountain mulberries (shansang 山桑), were almost the opposite: they bore 
numerous small fruits and “frail, pointy” leaves. Aside from the poor quality of  their leaves, 
undomesticated trees produced too many fruits, at least according to the households who raised 
them.54 In contrast to Xinjiang's mulberry trees, which local people used specifically for fruit, the 
best trees in Huzhou bore little or no fruit. 
After differentiation, grafting was a particularly important method for engineering resilient 
trees with thick, abundant leaves. As sericulture manuals of  the nineteenth century attest, different 
parts of  the domesticated and wild trees could be combined to create the ideal tree for leaf 
production and longevity. While domesticated varieties had the richest and most productive leaves 
and branches, its roots and trunk were known to be flimsy and to lack resiliency. The trunks of  the 
undomesticated varieties, by contrast, were commonly said to be sturdy. To harness the useful 
53 For a short explanation of  historical changes in Huzhou mulberry cultivation, see Huzhou shi zhi, 617-621.
54 Wang Yuezhen, Hu can shu [On Huzhou sericulture], (1880), 1:12b.
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qualities of  both types of  trees, authors suggested grafting the leaf-rich branches of  the 
domesticated varieties onto the strong roots and trunks of  the undomesticated varieties.55 In this 
way, Huzhou people seem to have engineered mulberry trees to suit their production goals.
Distinct silkworm varieties had also emerged through a gradual process of  selection and 
simplification. By the late Ming era, silkworm eggs of  superior quality, known as lotus seed eggs 
(lianxin zhong 蓮心種), had been bred in Huzhou's Nanxun township. This variety purportedly 
produced fine, white, strong silk fibers. By the mid-Qing era, many refined varieties had been 
developed in the region, and specific strains were often associated with their towns of  origin. During 
the Qing period, the lotus seed variety remained the most common, and producers throughout 
Huzhou prefecture and in cities in Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces utilized it. Another variety, the 
torreya cocoon egg (fei jian zhong 榧繭種), was also widely cultivated because the silkworms ate fewer 
leaves, developed quickly, and had large, white cocoons that were easy to unravel.56 
Despite the development of  these new silkworm varieties, modifying silkworms through 
selection seems to have been less significant to Qing sericulture than transforming mulberry trees 
into highly productive organisms. When describing Huzhou, Wang Yuezhen admitted that local 
people were ignorant of  everything beyond the most commonly raised silkworm varieties. His 
comment suggests that the silkworm egg trade had become highly commercialized, with the result 
that homegrown knowledge of  silkworm varieties was uncommon and was becoming increasingly 
marginalized. People who cultivated silkworms likely chose the best varieties available to them, but 
their main way to improve the process of  silkworms spinning silk was by managing their life cycle, 
55 Ye Shizhuo, “Bian sang zhonglei” [Differentiating mulberry varieties], in Zeng ke sangcan xuzhi [Reprint of 
the Essentials of  Sericulture], (1872), 17a. 
56 Huzhou shi zhi, 624-625.
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which involved regulating the mulberry leaves they ate. Unlike mulberry trees, which the people of 
Huzhou had been reshaping for hundreds of  years by selecting, grafting, and pruning them, Huzhou 
silkworms did not undergo substantial modification until the twentieth century, when early 
unsuccessful attempts to create pure strains were followed by the importation of  Japanese silkworm 
varieties in the 1920s.57
Human modulation of  the immediate environment was far more significant for raising 
silkworm productivity and enabling them to thrive in new locations. Judging by Wang's admonitions 
to aspiring sericulturalists, Huzhou silkworms were extremely fickle creatures highly susceptible to 
changes in temperature, humidity, mulberry leaf  quality and quantity, and other variables. Wang 
cautioned his readers to vigilantly monitor the creatures to forestall the onset of  disease and to 
reduce the chances that they would come into contact with cold air, which could diminish their 
output. Indeed, only constant supervision of  their living conditions and small interventions in their 
micro-environments would enable them to become highly productive. Raised in climate-controlled 
sheds, they were far more removed from the vicissitudes of  weather and season than mulberry trees, 
but then also depended more heavily on people for their productivity. “All these affairs,” the Huzhou 
scholar instructed, “succeed with labor and fail with leisure.”58
Perhaps because silkworm productivity depended so much on human labor, Wang exuded 
confidence that people could profitably introduce Huzhou sericulture to other regions.59 And just as 
57 Huzhou shi zhi, 625.
58 Wang, Hu can shu, 1:5b.
59 In fact, Wang had spearheaded the compilation of  the sericulture section of  the 1872 edition of  the 
Huzhou fu zhi [Huzhou prefectural gazetteer], but to increase the exposure of  outsiders to this knowledge 
and make it easier for those interested to access Wang's compendium of  sericulture facts without having 
to purchase the whole gazetteer, the scholar republished that specific section as a separate work, Hu can 
shu [On Huzhou sericulture].
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the silkworm could be more productive through human supervision, so too could the mulberry tree 
produce a better harvest of  leaves with proper soil management. Quoting from another Huzhou 
source, Wang reiterated that if  one “manages the soil correctly and is able to accord with the nature 
of  the mulberry, thus will grow leaves luxuriant, large, and thick.”60 Like Shen Bingcheng, Wang 
envisioned readers adopting his advice to recreate Huzhou-style silk production in hinterlands and 
marginal territories.
Yet Wang also cast a shadow of  doubt upon any attempt to follow Huzhou's methods too 
closely. Concerned that some readers might rigidly deploy the Huzhou model and completely 
disregard the diversity of  landscape and custom, Wang wrote: “The natural conditions (fengtu 風土) 
in all directions have different things that are suited to them, so one cannot be completely restricted 
to Huzhou's existing methods. This, then, means adapting the means to do what is most profitable 
(biantong jinli 變通盡利), which I leave as a task for others.”61 This unabashed Huzhou promoter thus 
left open the possibility that officials in other locations would neither exactly nor completely 
replicate all aspects of  sericulture from his home region as they endeavored to tap into the profits of 
the land.
Initial Outcomes of  the “Zhejiang to Xinjiang” Plan
 Late in 1880, with Zuo Zongtang about to leave the northwest for Beijing, Hunan native 
and military general Liu Jintang  劉錦棠 (1844-1894) became the next imperial commissioner of 
Xinjiang military affairs and inherited the project to transform Xinjiang's sericulture. Picking up 
where Zuo left off, Liu ordered Zhu Yingtao to the “four western cities” to establish bureaus to 
60 Wang, Hu can shu, 1:11a-b.
61 Wang, Hu can shu, preface:1b.
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train locals in the technologies of  silk production. He also requested Hu Guangyong to arrange 
another bulk shipment of  mulberry saplings and silkworm eggs from Zhejiang. From his 
predecessor's perspective, these orders indicated that Liu was enacting measures “to do what is most 
profitable” (jinli 盡利).62  
Yet transporting hundreds of  thousands of  fragile mulberry saplings clear across the empire 
was no easy task. In 1881, Zuo enthusiastically endorsed Liu Jintang's reconstruction initiatives, 
which gave the border territory the “prospect of  rapid development,” but the quality of  Huzhou 
saplings in the latest shipment was not satisfactory.63 Perhaps the circuitous route had stalled their 
journey: instead of  being shipped overland via Hubei province as they had in the first shipment, 
these mulberries first sailed to Tianjin and then traced the long, overland route westward.64 By the 
beginning of  January 1881, many of  the young trees remained east of  Jiayuguan and had no chance 
to reach their intended destinations in the oasis cities. This problem had arisen despite Hu 
Guangyong's claims that the quality of  the trees was better than the previous shipment. An anxious 
Zuo was displeased with Hu's performance and frustrated by reports of  saplings' “furrowed bark 
and shriveled flesh” particularly because the Aqsu sericulture bureau awaited the shipment. That 
bureau's original request for trees had been small, but after some official recognition of  the city's 
progress in silk production, the bureau wanted more. Zuo claimed that those in the imperial 
household (gongfu 宫府) had been “surprised by the unexpected,” namely the high quality of  samples 
produced in the bureau the previous year. Eager to boost the recognition of  Xinjiang silks, Zuo 
wanted the work of  the Aqsu bureau to be supported, not hindered by problems with basic inputs.65 
62 GX6/12/2 (1881), ZZQ, 7:631.
63 GX7/0/0 (1881), ZZQ, 12:693.
64 Cansang zhiwu jiyao (Henan cansang zhiwuju, 1881), 28a.
65 GX7/0/0 (1881), ZZQ, 12:693.
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The Perception of  Success and Henan Sericulture
Despite the ambivalent initial outcome of  government-sponsored sericulture in Xinjiang, the 
allure of  the Huzhou model and its perceived successes in the far northwest enticed officials 
elsewhere to start their own projects. Perhaps because Zuo Zongtang had won imperial accolades 
for reconquering Xinjiang, some of  his counterparts simply expected that reconstruction projects 
initiated under his leadership would be successful. “If  Grand Secretary Zuo Zongtang previously did 
this in Gansu's territory and has already had remarkable success,“ Henan provincial governor Tu 
Zongying  涂宗瀛 (1812-1894) presumptuously reasoned in March 1881, “then Henan can also 
similarly promote it.”66 
For Henan's project, Governor Tu did not solely rely upon Zuo's reputation or an inkling of 
what was unfolding in Xinjiang. Shen Bingcheng himself  may have played a role in Henan, given 
that he was serving as the province's judicial commissioner (niesi 臬司) just as Tu and his other 
subordinates were arranging to establish mulberry promotion bureaus. Although the governor may 
not have closely consulted Shen, Tu was certainly aware that he had “brought with him his self-
published Summary of  Sericulture,” which the governor judged to be “fine and detailed.”67     
The province that Tu governed urgently needed a panacea in the aftermath of  famine that 
had killed millions three years earlier and had left the outskirts of  Henan's capital city, Zhengzhou, 
almost completely without trees—perhaps as lower Yangzi riparian landscapes had appeared two 
66 GX7/3/2 (1881), LFZZ 03-7068-103; Cansang zhiwu jiyao, 14b; Wang Shumin and Wang Yanxi, ed., Huang 
Qing Dao Xian Tong Guang zouyi [Memorials from the imperial Qing reigns of  Daoguang, Xianfeng, 
Tongzhi, and Guangxu], (Shanghai jiujingzhai, 1902), 38:5a.
67 GX7/3/2 (1881), LFZZ 03-7068-103; Wang and Wang, ed., Huang Qing Dao Xian Tong Guang zouyi, 38:5a.
167
decades earlier.68 Despite the destruction, Tu imagined that the “fertile and thick soils” of  his 
province would be able to foster the growth of  almost anything, including Huzhou mulberry trees 
and domesticated silkworms, which he deemed far superior to Henan's lackluster “local mulberries” 
(tusang 土桑) and “wild pupae” (yeyong 野蛹). The southern city of  Nanyang produced some silks and 
damasks, but they were not of  sufficient quality to circulate throughout the province.69 With the 
governor's permission, Wei Lunxian  魏綸先 raised financial contributions from local elites for the 
purchase of  120 mu  畝 to set up a provincial sericulture bureau, a site with test fields and 
workshops.70 Wei then dispatched officials on the several-month-long journey to northern Zhejiang 
for the acquisition of  start-up materials: some 230,000 mulberry saplings, over 360 sheets of 
silkworm eggs, twenty-four Huzhou craftsmen with expertise in trees and looms, and all sorts of 
sericulture tools. Perhaps for comparative purposes, Wei also arranged to purchase 30,000 local 
mulberry trees as well as some oaks—chestnut oak (xiang 橡), daimyo oak (hu 槲), and oriental white 
oak (qinggang 青棡)—whose leaves could feed wild silkworms.71 While the head bureau near the 
provincial capital “experimentally cultivated [mulberry trees] as a means to promote” sericulture, 
district bureaus were to supply saplings to farmers outside the capital.72 
Henan's sericulture bureaus also acted as places for purveying specialist knowledge to 
apprentices. In hiring several dozen skilled artisans from Zhejiang—not necessarily an easy task, 
since Xinjiang had already “hired off  many workers” and some of  those who remained were 
68 Cansang jiyao hebian (1880), preface:1a. On the famine of  1877-78, see Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley, Tears  
from Iron: Cultural Responses to Famine in Nineteenth-Century China (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
2008). 
69 GX7/3/2 (1881), LFZZ 03-7068-103; Wang and Wang, eds., Huang Qing Dao Xian Tong Guang zouyi, 38:5a.
70 Cansang zhiwu jiyao, 4a. 
71 Cansang jiyao hebian, 1a. 
72 GX7/3/2 (1881), LFZZ 03-7068-103; Wang and Wang, eds., Huang Qing Dao Xian Tong Guang zouyi, 38:5a.
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unwilling to leave73—Governor Tu intended to use these silk craftsmen to operate a textile hall 
(jifang 機房) where bright, young recruits and people of  other districts could study silk-weaving.74 Just 
as eager as Zuo Zongtang to aim for high-quality silks to satisfy markets, Tu optimistically believed 
in the feasibility of  using the Huzhou model in his own province: “there will be no difficulty in 
bringing the profits of  Zhejiang's Huzhou to Henan.”75
Harvesting Leaves and Cocoons in Xinjiang
Xinjiang witnessed an expansion of  government-sponsored sericulture activity in the 1880s. 
New divisions of  labor emerged as Qing officials hired workers for the sericulture bureaus and 
arranged for the production of  raw materials outside the bureaus. Within the bureaus, Zhejiang 
experts guided Turkestani laborers in manufacturing silk. In the countryside, officials under Liu 
Jintang's leadership attempted to harness village production of  mulberry leaves and silkworm 
cocoons to supply the bureaus, the loci of  activity in the push to increase production.76
To arrange for the harvesting of  mulberry leaves, Liu proposed that lower-level officials 
“hire workers from among the people to pick them.” But he also realized how the government-
sponsored extraction of  mulberry leaves could spark resentment and resistance, given that local 
people had their own systems of  production. Liu also worried that hiring workers to harvest leaves 
73 Cansang zhiwu jiyao, 63a. 
74 The Henan sericulture bureau in Zhengzhou later became one of  the late nineteenth-century schools to 
train young Chinese men in industrial production. In 1898, prominent Qing official and Hebei-Henan 
governor general Zhang Zhidong issued a proclamation dedicated to setting up an industrial arts bureau 
(gongyi ju 工藝局) on the site, and within the repaired buildings, of  the former sericulture bureau. See Zhang 
Zhidong, proclamation, GX24/0/0 (1898), item 61, box 10, Gerow D. Brill Papers, Cornell University 
Library. 
75 Cansang jiyao hebian, 3b.
76 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
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could disrupt local habits and uses of  the mulberry tree. His fears arose especially when he thought 
of  southern Xinjiang. “The Turkestanis (chanmin 纏民) of  Khotan,” Liu surmised, “have always been 
able to feed silkworms with mulberry leaves. They are particularly unwilling to hear of  others taking 
[the leaves].”77 In other words, the Khotanese had been practicing sericulture far too long to allow 
government-hired workers to intercede in their production processes. Hoping to avoid this dilemma, 
Liu ordered officials to follow previous stipulations for the “reduced feedings” (shao wei 少餵) of 
silkworms, supposedly in order to prevent excessive leaf  harvesting. Yet a steady supply of  leaves 
remained crucial for the bureaus, so Liu turned to cash incentives to entice mulberry cultivators to 
harvest leaves. For the Turpan sericulture bureau, purchasing agents were to travel to southern 
Xinjiang, obtain leaves in bulk quantities, and send the leaves northward.78
Like other steps in the sericulture process, harvesting mulberry leaves required specific 
techniques. Drawing on his knowledge of  these techniques, Liu explained how the person in charge 
of  leaf  collection (zhicai 知採) ought to pack leaves into baskets and ship them to the sericulture 
bureaus via pack animal. He was mainly concerned that improper handling of  the leaves would 
ultimately hurt the silkworms, so he prohibited workers from stuffing leaves into their hats or shirts 
during the initial collection, and he cautioned against letting the leaves sit for too long after harvest 
for fear that they would wilt and spoil. Although Liu's instructions pertained to mulberry leaf 
harvests in Xinjiang, they were almost surely based on his understanding of  Huzhou practices. He 
suggested that his subordinates consult the “established methods” (chengfa 成法) of  sericulture within 
77 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
78 Local people were to be paid the price of  five wen 文 of  Xinjiang copper cash (hongqian 紅錢) for each ten 
jin 觔of  leaves, with the price rising according to this scale. Liu imagined large quantities of  leaves, since 
his first calculation was 50 wen for 100 jin of  leaves. GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
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Shen Bingcheng's handbook, the Summary of  Sericulture.79 Shen's work thus became reading for minor 
officials on the margins of  the empire and likely framed their knowledge of  the techniques of 
sericulture as well as their conceptions of  the geographic possibilities for production.
Liu devised a preliminary scheme for harvesting leaves from local people who otherwise had 
no relation to the Qing state project. But he also issued guidelines to prepare for the time when 
mulberry leaf  production would bypass the local population more or less entirely. He ordered the 
reconstruction bureaus (shanhou ju 善後局) to select “many mu ” 畝 of  government land suitable for 
mulberry trees in close proximity to the sericulture bureaus (cansang ju 蠶桑局) and carpet them with 
transplanted mulberry trees. To his mind, this was the best way to avoid needing to obtain large 
quantities of  mulberry leaves in the villages and therefore “prevent the disturbance and fatigue” of 
locals.80 
Aside from relying on officials in the military government, Liu also had the idea to employ 
local Turkestani officials, the begs 伯克, to promote sericulture. Begs were to be carefully selected and 
dispatched to the villages to supervise mulberry tree planting. But Liu was also wary of  using them 
too much. Worried that money to purchase leaves from local people might be embezzled, he warned 
against giving the money to begs, translators (tongshi 通事), mullahs (maola 毛拉), or other minor 
attendants (lie yiren 劣役人), whom he expected would transfer the money to themselves.81 In other 
words, although the plan for sericulture drew Muslim officials into the division of  sericulture labor, 
they remained suspect and were not fully incorporated into the Qing state project.82 
79 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
80 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
81 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
82 For analysis of  the role played by begs in earlier periods, see Laura Newby, “The Begs of  Xinjiang: Between 
Two Worlds,” Bulletin of  the School of  Oriental and African Studies 61.2 (June 1998): 278-297; and James A. 
Millward and Laura J. Newby, “The Qing and Islam on the Western Frontier,” in Empire at the Margins:  
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Obtaining supplies from Zhejiang also required some problem-solving. Although eager to 
start planting trees adjacent to sericulture bureaus, Liu dishearteningly reported how mulberry 
saplings acquired in Zhejiang were “still en route” and thus unavailable for immediate planting. The 
commander figured that if  he ordered them to continue with the journey out west, they would have 
little chance of  survival. So in consultation with other officials, he decided that the current year's 
saplings ought to be withheld from further travel and allocated for planting along the “rear route” 
eastward from Xinjiang by which he and the army had come west. Then, in the future, some could 
still be transplanted to Xinjiang for the benefit of  the region's sericulture.83 
Creating a local source of  silkworms was also Liu's concern. Recognizing that any sheets of 
silkworms (canlian 蠶連) obtained in Zhejiang had to undergo an extended journey, he suggested that 
people in Xinjiang should retain many more live silkworms and that officials would need to teach 
people how to gather the eggs. Then, in the following year, there would be no need to “acquire from 
afar” the sheets of  silkworms purchased from the provinces of  China. Liu's simplistic scheme for 
making Xinjiang self-sufficient in silkworm eggs, much like the plan for mulberry trees and their 
leaves, required training local people. Despite the seeming localization of  these basic practices, 
however, the original inputs were almost all brought from afar, and his intention remained 
replicating the Huzhou model.84 
What happened to Liu's orders at the local level? Some district officials appear to have 
implemented orders for sericulture production involving both mulberry tree cultivation and 
silkworm raising. In mid-July 1881, an official in the Turpan region, surnamed Yang, reported on a 
Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. 
Sutton (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 2006), 117-123.
83 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
84 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
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directive to the Turpan government office requesting statistical information about the number of 
mulberry saplings transplanted into each village. Yang provided no record of  the volume of 
mulberry trees, but he did suggest that he would check the numbers in several villages under his 
purview.85 While Yang supervised mulberry plantings, other Turpan officials managed silk cocoon 
production. In mid-1882, sericulture bureau official Huang Xianyi  黄憲儀 compiled a report listing 
purchases of  cocoons from Han and Turkestani residents in over twenty villages throughout the 
Turpan area. Huang recorded 138 households involved in the production of  about 315 kilograms of 
three varieties of  cocoons.86 The local bureau paid in “Hunan-measured” (xiangping 湘平) coinage 
according to set prices for each kind of  cocoon. In a separate report sent to Liu Jintang, Xinjiang 
military affairs assistant Zhang Yao  張曜 (1832-1891), and Xinjiang sericulture chief  Zhu Yingtao, 
Huang tabulated how much white and yellow silk had been reeled in six regional branch locations of 
Turpan's sericulture bureau.87 
These reports suggest that the newly established sericulture bureaus were government-
sponsored commercial ventures that relied upon a division of  labor between local villages and the 
bureaus. Huang's memo indicated how the Turpan bureau purchased cocoons from the villages for 
reeling at the bureau. Other reports described the government's purchasing leaves directly from 
mulberry producers, suggesting that the bureaus also raised silkworms. Yet Liu Jintang's orders 
foreshadowed a future in which government workers could sidestep Turkestani communities and 
85 GX7/6/20 (1881), XJDQ 15-29-345.
86 GX8/5/0 (1882), XJDQ 15-29-422. According to the report, the total harvest was about 630 jin of 
cocoons. There were over 400 jin of  gannan (white) and ganbei (yellow) cocoons and nearly 200 jin of 
tonggong (yellow) cocoons. 
87 GX8/6/0 (1882), XJDQ 15-29-383. The six locations were Putaogou, Tuokesun, Ya'erhu, Erbao, Lukeqin, 
and Pizhan. In total, the area had reeled just over 2900 liang of  silk for the year—out of  which about 80 
liang were submitted as silk samples—from a combined total of  nearly 2000 jin (1000 kilograms) of 
cocoons. One liang equals one-twentieth of  a kilogram.
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more directly control a key resource, mulberry leaves. In other words, local communities were first 
incorporated into the process as producers of  raw materials to supply government-run workshops. 
Later, if  Liu succeeded in bringing his plan to fruition, Turkestani producers of  mulberry leaves 
would become disengaged from—or at least have reduced involvement with—Qing production.
Controlling the supply of  silkworms continued to plague the sericulture venture. Perhaps 
since shipments from Zhejiang had been unreliable, Liu Jintang issued regulations in 1884 for 
purchasing silkworm egg sheets from southern Xinjiang. Liu ordered prices for sheets of  southern 
eggs (nanzhong 南種) to be determined by their quality, which he divided into three ranks. The Turpan 
sericulture bureau seems to have been involved in procuring silkworms from the south according to 
Liu's regulations.88 Private merchants also partook in the southern silkworm trade. One merchant 
purchased silkworm cocoons in the south on behalf  of  Turpan officials according to a three-tiered 
pricing system and shipped them back north.89
Laboring in Sericulture Bureaus
Xinjiang's sericulture bureaus were sites of  silk production. They also served as places where 
Zhejiang craftsmen trained Turkestani apprentices and laborers. Most comments about this 
arrangement, with Turkestanis studying under the tutelage of  their Han teachers, blindly praised the 
success of  the students in the first few years of  the program. Liu, for instance, reported many 
benefits coming from the efforts to educate the Muslims, who could now “support themselves by 
their own craft” (zi shi qi yi 自食其藝).90 In fact, owing to the perceived successes of  the bureaus, in 
88 GX10/4/9 (1884), XJDQ 15-30-624.
89 GX12/1/29 (1886), XJDQ 15-30-738. 
90 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3297.
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late 1882 Liu issued updated regulations for their operation. Based on Zhu Yingtao's claims that 
Xinjiang “silk weaving now has a foundation” and his own sense that Turkestanis had already begun 
to acquire skills for raising silkworms and reeling silk, Liu approved proposals to restructure the 
bureaus, discharge personnel, and grant leaves of  absence. Three or four Zhejiang craftsmen would 
be retained at each site and assigned to work with local governments to direct instruction in 
sericulture. Labor schedules would be partially based on the natural cycles of  the silkworms and 
partly on the requirements of  Qing reconstruction bureaus, which would be in charge of  production 
and education. In this rearrangement, Liu exhorted officials to closely monitor the training of 
sericulture laborers, not least of  all because operating looms was very difficult.91 
Reorganizing the sericulture bureaus meant dismissals and adjustments to the seasonal labor 
schedule. One Turpan official acknowledged receiving orders to dissolve a branch bureau around 
Turpan and to remove one manager (sishi 司事), three craftsmen from Zhejiang (Zhe jiang 浙匠), one 
mullah, and two cooks (huofu 火夫), whose stipends were all set to expire. This left a sizable group of 
workers: three Zhejiang craftsmen, three Turkestani craftsmen (chanjiang 纏匠), ten adult Turkestani 
apprentices (changnian chantu 長年纏徒), one interpreter, one cook, and two bodyguards (qinbing 親兵). 
These twenty were temporarily sent to the sericulture bureau at Putaogou, near Turpan, for the 
winter and allocated money for oil and charcoal, rice, wheat flour, and cooking firewood. A manager, 
surnamed Guo, had been consulted about the inventory of  tools, all of  which were stored and 
turned over to Turkestanis for oversight. Once the silkworms became active again the following year, 
additional managers were to be dispatched to direct the sericulture training.92 
91 GX8/9/29 (1882), XJDQ 15-29-448. 
92 GX0/0/0 (?), XJDQ 15-34-3525. See GX8/11/29 (1883), XJDQ 15-29-448, for a very similar draft 
version of  this document.
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Bureaucratic reorganization also entailed approving and supervising the return of  some 
Zhejiang craftsmen to their native places. In April 1883, Zhu Yingtao outlined basic stipulations for 
sending experts back home. According to the recruitment guidelines used by Hu Guangyong several 
years earlier, each craftsman would be given a daily food allowance on the return journey—the 
allowance totaled five months if  the point of  origin was somewhere in southern Xinjiang—and 
every two craftsmen were to be allocated one cart.93 These Huzhou specialists would be given their 
allowances by local reconstruction bureaus, which now controlled the sericulture bureaus.94 By early 
1883, some were already on their way back home. According to a prefectural supervisor in Turpan, 
surnamed Liu, three craftsmen previously employed in the local bureau had been allowed to return 
to Zhejiang.95 Over a year later, an official in Qarashahr reported that two Zhejiang sericulture 
experts working in Khotan had been dismissed from service and were being sent back along the 
circuitous route around the Tarim Basin with food money, two horses, and orders for the allocation 
of  a cart.96
The return of  these experts to Zhejiang did not necessarily indicate the lasting success of 
government-sponsored sericulture in Xinjiang. Inadequate finances and poor relations between 
Turkestanis and Han Chinese plagued the project and may have caused its early demise. In 1883, for 
instance, Turkestani laborers complained of  being owed wages for their work in the bureaus. Three 
workers in the Turpan bureau, Barat (Ch Ba-la-ti), Semati (Ch Se-ma-ti), and Osman (Ch A-si-man), 
93 The daily allowance for food was set at 1.6 qian 錢, totaling 24 liang  兩 for a five-month passage.
94 GX9/3/10 (1883), XJDQ 15-29-510.
95 Yang Changlin, 39 sui 歲 from Qiantang near Hangzhou; Rui Jichang, 30 sui from Huzhou; and Guo 
Baoqing, 25 sui from Renhe near Hangzhou were allocated two carts and daily food stipends for their 
journey from Turpan, about which other officials along the route were to be notified. GX9/1/21 (1883), 
XJDQ 15-4-471.
96 GX10/4/13 (1884), XJDQ 15-30-614.
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requested permission in March of  that year to travel to Aqsu to collect 64 liang—over two and a half 
times what Zhejiang craftsmen each received in food money for the journey home—owed to them 
for labor over the two previous years.97 
During the 1880s, the financial troubles of  the project continued to mount. The nameless 
Turpan functionary whose distress was caused by sudden Turkestani demands for more pay in May 
1889 acknowledged previous complaints that the subsidies lost to sericulture in the “eight southern 
cities” had been considerable. In light of  these losses, orders had been issued to make sericulture the 
responsibility of  local officials, precisely as Zhu Yingtao had suggested and Liu Jintang had 
approved. But this had not relieved the burden of  funding salaries and food stipends, and it surely 
did not resolve tensions between Turkestani workers and their Chinese managers. After the 
confrontation with the sericulture foremen on that day in late spring 1889, the functionary realized 
that the days of  Muslim youth studying and laboring docilely in the sericulture bureaus were over.98 
 To solve financial deficits and quell labor unrest, the Turpan functionary opted for the 
rather drastic solution of  shutting down the sericulture project. He could find no way around the 
insolence of  the workers: “if  they're not ruining the looms and textiles, then they're wolfishly 
bringing calamity upon the cocoons and silk, so we will still worry about public money.”99 But the 
government could close the bureaus and save money. And so this was his solution: “stop the looms 
and do not weave; gather the cocoons and put them on sale.” He suggested making up the principal 
investments through the sale of  materials and tools at a discount.100  
97 GX9/2/1 (1883), XJDQ 15-29-460.
98 GX15/5/1 (1889), XJDQ 15-30-1009.
99 GX15/5/1 (1889), XJDQ 15-30-1009.
100 GX15/5/1 (1889), XJDQ 15-30-1009.
177
The Huzhou Model in the Borderlands
What Qing officials like Zuo Zongtang imagined as a straightforward process of 
implementing Huzhou sericulture turned out to be a costly and often frustrating venture. Although 
Xinjiang's provincial leaders may not have adopted the Turpan functionary's pessimistic outlook or 
his suggestion to shut down silk production in 1889, they now perceived some of  the social 
antagonisms engendered by implementing a model from afar. But even if  they had long been 
disabused of  any “exhilaration of  mastery” that their predecessors felt in conquering and managing 
the frontier region,101 they did not allow frustrations to impede their visions for constructing 
Xinjiang province, a designation the borderland territory acquired in 1884. In this case, the project 
for Huzhou sericulture was not merely a quotidian bureaucratic measure of  economic 
reconstruction. Rather, it was a means of  reshaping geopolitical space, of  harnessing and controlling 
the international market in order to more firmly substantiate the Qing claim to Xinjiang. Perhaps for 
this reason, the sericulture project seems to have lasted at least until the final years of  the empire, 
when in 1907, Zhao Guihua 趙貴華, a Zhejiang native from Shaoxing (roughly 100 kilometers 
southeast of  Huzhou), toured southern Xinjiang oases, inspected local sericulture, and issued 
suggestions for improving production in hopes of  strengthening the industry.102
In an era when northwestern Qing borderlands were being more tightly incorporated into 
the state, the deployment of  the Huzhou model initiated potential resemblances between center and 
periphery. No longer were Xinjiang's mulberry trees to be unique, stocky specimens of  oasis 
vegetation. They were to become “organic machines” whose natural form was more thoroughly, 
101 Peter C. Perdue, “Sustainable Development on China's Frontiers,” in Natures Past: The Environment and 
Human History, ed. Paolo Squatriti (Ann Arbor: The University of  Michigan Press, 2007), 187. 
102 Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:6a-7a; Li, Xinjiang dili zhiwu kao, cansang:2a-4a.
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though not completely, reshaped by human needs and whose primary function was to produce 
leaves for silkworms.103 Silkworms from Huzhou, too, were to spin silk threads indistinguishable 
from their counterparts any other place in the empire. The circulation of  the Huzhou model also 
reshaped local practices. It did not quite require the “dogmatic uniformity” evident in the “Learn 
from Dazhai” campaign nearly a century later in the 1960s, when peasants throughout China were 
urged to emulate the farmers of  Dazhai village in their fervent revolutionary commitment to 
reclaiming land, terracing hillsides, and expanding grain production at breakneck speed, all regardless 
of  local ecological conditions or agricultural practices.104 Yet when Shen Bingcheng and his 
counterparts promoted Huzhou sericulture, their conscious attempts at replication may have come 
at the expense of  local systems of  production. The sericulture project meant training people to use 
lands, trees, and insects in proper ways. From Zuo's perspective, Turkestanis needed guidance 
because they did not know the best methods for using organisms like the mulberry tree. In this 
sense, the deployment of  Zhejiang craftsmen to educate imperial subjects in the skills of  Huzhou 
sericulture constituted part of  the process by which Zuo, Liu, and other late nineteenth-century 
Chinese leaders hoped to render the frontier and its people more amenable to imperial power and 
more able to produce profit from lands, plants, and animals of  the types they envisioned.
103 On the notion of  the “organic machine,” see Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of  the  
Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
104 Judith Shapiro, Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 98.
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Chapter 5
Horticulture and the Politics of  Connecting
In the sweltering heat of  early August 1880, three travelers from Shanghai arrived at an 
earth-constructed military barracks on the outskirts of  Hami, an oasis town in eastern Xinjiang. A 
German by the name of  Focke (Fu-ke 福克), an Austrian named Mandel (Man-de 滿德), and their 
Jiangsu province interpreter, surnamed Xi 席, had reached the final destination of  their half-year 
journey across the Qing empire. The barracks served as the new headquarters for Zuo Zongtang, 
who had moved there several months earlier from his previous outpost at Suzhou 肅州, in 
northwestern Gansu. Upon arrival, the trio paid a visit to Zuo, who invited them to stay and whose 
hospitality deeply impressed them. After sharing their insights about travel and responding to the 
old general's questions about affairs in Shanghai, the German inquired about Zuo's ability to live so 
frugally, work diligently, and bear the hardships of  living in the desert, especially as he was on the 
verge of  becoming a septuagenarian. Focke's travelogue, which was reprinted in an abridged version 
in the Shanghai newspaper Shenbao  申報 in early January 1881, went into some detail about the 
general's daily routine.1 What really seemed to impress Focke was not Zuo's rigid schedule or his 
routine of  rising at dawn and sleeping at midnight but rather his frequent attention to a patch of 
land beside the barracks: his vegetable garden. Each day after rising, Zuo “went to the vegetable 
garden to look out over it for quite a while,” and in the evening at five or six o'clock, he went “again 
1 Fu-ke 福克, “Xi xing suo lu”  西行瑣錄 [Trivial records of  westward travel], in Wang Xiqi 王錫祺, ed., Xiao fang  
hu zhai yu di cong chao 小方壺齋輿地叢鈔  [Collected transcriptions regarding territory from Small Square Kettle 
Studio], (Shanghai: Zhu yi tang, 1877-1897), case 6, 4:303a. See also Fu-ke, “Xi xing suo lu,” reprinted in 
ZZYS, 259. For the news report on which it is based, see Fu-ke, “Xi xing suo lu,” Shenbao 申報, 2766-2768 
(9-11 January 1881), 3-4. 
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to the vegetable garden to oversee the watering.”2 While he certainly spent more time conducting 
military business, Zuo's daily supervision of  twenty mu —畝 roughly three acres—which grew “all 
kinds of  melons and vegetables” hardly seems a trifling matter, at least because the harvest provided 
sustenance for Zuo. He reportedly ate six bowls of  vegetables for breakfast each morning.3
Seeing an aging general attempting to make a garden bloom almost literally in the desert may 
have been little more than a curiosity for Focke and his fellow travelers. Yet Zuo's attention to the 
garden was not mere show for his visitors or for the Shanghai readers of  the Shenbao who may have 
marveled at Focke's report. A fortnight before his visitors arrived, Zuo had written a letter to his 
youngest son, Xiaotong 孝同, who planned to journey to Hami the following month. After 
complaining about the oppressive summertime heat in Hami and Turpan and about his own 
ailments, Zuo requested that his progeny send him vegetable seeds. He asked that his son engage 
one of  his brothers to “quickly purchase red and white radish seeds (hong bai luobo zi 紅白蘿蔔子) as 
well as wild goose-egg seeds (tian'e dan zhongzi 天鵝蛋種子) and send them here, in order to distribute 
them to each military detachment; the more the better.” Zuo had a utilitarian justification for 
ordering seeds: he wanted to allocate them to his soldiers, who could plant them to supply food for 
themselves. Yet Zuo's calculations were also based on his assessments of  the land and his suspicion 
that flora from elsewhere could flourish in Hami's soils. As he pointed out to his son in the letter, 
the land appeared to be very fertile: “In this place, the terrain conditions (dimai 地脈) are extremely 
rich and planting vegetables would be most marvelous.”4 And Zuo seemed to have a third 
justification for requesting seeds: his own epicurean predilections, a desire for familiar flavors. At the 
2  往菜園眺望半晌 [. . .]  督看澆灌。 Fu-ke, “Xi xing suo lu,” in Wang, Xiao fang hu zhai, 6:4:303a-b.
3
諸色瓜菜俱全。Fu-ke, “Xi xing suo lu,” in Wang, Xiao fang hu zhai, 6:4:303b.
4 Letter to son Xiaotong 孝同, GX6/6/14 (1880), ZZQ, 13:232. The “wild goose-egg” is another type of 
Chinese radish, having a “green root with green flesh.” See Shiu-ying Hu, Food Plants of  China (Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005), 419.
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edge of  the desert and suffering the oppressive heat, the general found the land offered some hope 
for reproducing seeds from China proper. 
Zuo Zongtang's practices of  cultivating edible vegetation in gardens and his plans to bring 
vegetable seeds to Hami open up a window onto the aesthetics and politics of  horticulture along 
Qing frontiers in the late nineteenth century. One of  the corollaries to late nineteenth-century 
military and imperial control over Xinjiang and northwestern Gansu was the reproduction of 
specific forms of  biological life and cultural practice. From China proper, sojourners and migrants 
to the frontier brought their knowledge of  horticulture as well as their plants and their seeds. What 
they did with familiar cultivars in landscapes far from their original homes helped, even if  in minor 
ways, to create lines of  resemblance between the frontier and China proper and add to the symbolic 
construction of  political control in the northwest.
It was through the reproduction of  seeds, gardens, and landscapes that Zuo and others 
attempted to overcome the geographical and environmental differences between one region of  the 
empire and another. As they sought to cultivate vegetables in the northwest, migrants may also have 
harbored visions of  abundant landscapes that grew out of  their idealized notions of  horticulture as 
an economic and cultural practice—even along the edges of  the desert. In his assessment of  the 
horticultural dreams of  Californians to transform barren land into garden landscapes in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ian Tyrrell has written of  “cultural landscapes” as the 
“product of  popular dreams” that symbolize the “aspirations of  social groups and classes.”5 In their 
desire to replicate vegetables in what were sometimes adverse conditions, Zuo Zongtang and settlers 
from China proper constructed cultural landscapes that set baselines for visions of  Gansu and 
Xinjiang as lands awaiting the flourishing of  horticulture and the expansion of  agriculture. It turned 
5 Ian R. Tyrrell, True Gardens of  the Gods: Californian-Australian Environmental Reform, 1860-1930 (Berkeley: 
University of  California Press, 1999), 2.
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out to be more difficult than Zuo may have originally imagined to construct gardens, grow 
vegetables, and be satisfied with the abundance of  horticulture in arid terrains in the northwestern 
outposts where he resided as a military sojourner. Nonetheless, a vision of  northwest landscapes as 
sites for the reproduction of  life from China proper underscored the attempts to render parcels of 
land into vegetable gardens. This vision harbored the hopes and dreams not of  people already on 
the land, but of  sojourners and settlers from China proper.  
The Aesthetics of  Garden Reproduction
What Zuo established on the outskirts of  Hami and in several other locations in the 
northwest were gardens where he oversaw the cultivation of  vegetables. He and his visitors often 
called these spaces yuan 園, a term which I have chosen to translate as “garden.” Yet the terminology 
of  the garden should not flatten the complexity of  such spaces as sites for the creation of  tangible 
and symbolic resources, for a yuan may also denote a park or a yard whose utility is not wholly, or 
not even primarily, in its production of  edible vegetation. Indeed, gardens in late imperial China 
often had multiple overlapping functions, as Craig Clunas has shown, and the notion that there was 
a clear dichotomy between the aesthetic and economic functions of  garden spaces is a modern 
fabrication.6 It may seem that the sheer size of  the vegetable garden in Hami limited the aesthetic 
value of  the space. With three acres committed to growing vegetables, Zuo was surely invested in 
the tangible outcomes of  productive horticulture in Hami as well as in the two other locations where 
he established gardens in the 1870s, Lanzhou and Suzhou 肅州. While there is no evidence that these 
gardens were linked to commercial networks or supplied fresh produce to local markets, they did 
have a clear material utility insofar as the vegetables they produced provided sustenance to Zuo and 
6 Craig Clunas, Fruitful Sites: Garden Culture in Ming Dynasty China (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 22. 
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his troops. Yet the garden spaces that Zuo constructed also had an aesthetic value, one that was 
inseparable from the material practices of  vegetable cultivation—observing plots of  vegetables, 
walking between the rows of  greens, maybe even getting one's hands dirty in the soil, and 
consuming the fruits of  the garden. 
Zuo's gardens were spaces for the kind of  activity that allowed him to reproduce a vision of 
himself  as a rural farmer who enjoyed the sights and tastes of  familiar vegetables. Craig Clunas has 
written of  late imperial gardens in Jiangnan as lavish sites of  consumption and leisure designed to 
entice visitors and reproduce the owner's elite social distinction. These gardens did not completely 
shun productive uses of  the land, however, and one characteristic of  gardens in Suzhou  蘇州 was 
their focus on the “mimesis of  productive resources,” the replication of  fruitful landscapes like 
vegetable plots, fish ponds, and orchards within the enclosed walls of  the garden.7 The gardens of 
Lanzhou, Suzhou 肅州, and Hami were also sites of  mimesis, but ones in which the process of 
mimesis was enacted in distant geographical space, from the southeast to the northwest, from 
Hunan to Gansu and beyond. It was in these gardens that Zuo planted familiar seeds of  the 
vegetables that he had eaten earlier in life while he still lived in Hunan. The plots of  vegetables 
became replicas for his own fields in Hunan even as they produced foodstuffs for his troops on the 
frontier. And the act of  cultivating vegetables in these gardens re-created the aesthetics of 
productive rural husbandry on which Zuo based his identity as a countryside scholar. In this sense, 
the gardens that he established were sites not to reproduce his elite status vis-a-vis a select group of 
elite counterparts but to reproduce an aesthetic sense of  home and create a feeling of  connection 
when he was so far away. 
It was the products of  his work—the vegetables themselves—that may have allowed him to 
7 Clunas, Fruitful Sites, 22. 
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emulate what he referred to several times as the “distinct flavors of  my native place” (guxiang fengwei  
故鄉風味). His hankering after tastes from home by no means made Zuo unique among officials of 
the Qing and earlier dynasties who sojourned far from their native places. Merchants and officials 
who lived in large, late imperial cities like Beijing and Shanghai found ways to consume their home 
cuisines, including through the patronage of  restaurants serving up the dishes and flavors of  their 
native places.8 These sojourners partook in what Mark Swislocki has called “culinary nostalgia,” 
which he defines as “the recollection or purposive evocation of  another time and place through 
food.”9 Culinary nostalgia aptly describes how Zuo approached not cooked meals but their raw 
vegetable ingredients from his northwest gardens. In their cultivation, harvest, and consumption, 
these vegetables were the locus of  Zuo's desire to reproduce tastes from home and evoke the sense 
that he was in Hunan rather than on the frontier. Insofar as there was an aesthetic value to the 
gardens established by Zuo, it was in the enjoyment of  their very productivity: places that could re-
create a feeling of  home and replicate a local cuisine half-an-empire away. 
Zuo established the first of  three northwest gardens in the city of  Lanzhou some eight years 
before his garden experiment in Hami. In August 1872, Zuo moved his headquarters to the capital 
city of  Gansu, which was also the site of  the government office compound (jieshu 節署) for the 
former governors-general of  Shaanxi and Gansu provinces. Among the various locations within the 
compound, perhaps none elicited so much joy in Zuo as the anterior garden (jieyuan 節園), which I 
will call the Office Garden. Zuo noted that the space had once served less productive purposes: it 
8 Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937 
(Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1995), 22. Although native place cuisines may have been 
important to sojourners, they were not always replicated by the institutions set up to support those 
sojourners away from home. Richard Belsky argues that native place lodges in Qing Beijing did not 
automatically serve cuisines associated with their native places. See his Localities at the Center: Native Place,  
Space, and Power in Late Imperial Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 110-112.
9 Mark Swislocki, Culinary Nostalgia: Regional Food Culture and the Urban Experience in Shanghai (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2009), 1. 
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used to be the site of  plots of  flowers (huapu 花圃) for the governors-general to stroll about and 
enjoy the scenery. Zuo apparently dispensed with the flowers but kept a landscape of  pavilions, 
rocks, and trees, and added waterways and vegetable plots. After he moved to Lanzhou, Zuo seems 
to have taken little time to fix up the Office Garden. By the spring of  1873, he had begun to work 
the soil and, as he later reported to another official, he had transformed what had once been a 
garden of  flowers into vegetable plots (caiqi 菜畦).10 
The Office Garden came to have multiple functions under Zuo's leadership. When Pei Jingfu 
 裴景福 (1854-1924) traveled through Lanzhou on his way out to Xinjiang in late 1905, he stopped by 
the garden behind the former governor's compound and discovered a couplet over the entrance gate 
that he ascribed to Zuo Zongtang. The inscription read: “Close the gate and plant vegetables. Open 
the pavilions and engage guests.”11 If  growing edible plants was largely a private affair, the garden 
also served public functions. Insofar as it belonged to the governor-general's compound, Zuo's 
Office Garden may have been more connected to networks of  Qing officials and bureaucrats than 
to merchants and other non-governing elite, but this did not preclude the use of  the garden for elite 
gatherings. He recognized that the garden was a site of  official banquets, where important visitors 
were brought in and hosted. He himself  invited guests to come and take a look at the renovations he 
had made to the compound on the occasion of  a Mid-Autumn banquet in 1872, not much more 
than a month after he moved into the compound. His renovations included fixing up older temples 
to serve new functions.12 He also built pavilions around the gardens, and at his banquet attended by 
10 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX4/0/0 (1878), ZZQ, 12:428. For the early date of  this transformation, see 
ZZQ, 15:289. 
11
閉門種菜，開閣延賓。Pei Jingfu 裴景福, Hehai kunlun lu  河海崑崙錄 [Record of  the Journey to the Kunlun 
Mountains] (N.p, 1914), 2:41b; ZZYS, 120; ZZQ, 15:294. Xie Xiaozhong also saw this on his journey 
through Lanzhou in January 1917. See Xie Xiaozhong 謝曉鐘, Xinjiang you ji 新疆游記 [Record of  Travels to 
Xinjiang], (Shanghai: Taipingyang zazhi she, 1922), 43. 
12 He established two temples where offerings could be made to spirits of  the past inhabitants of  the 
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over 100 guests, he composed the “Poem of  the Pavilion of  Limpidity” (Chengqing ge shi 澄清閣詩).13 
The name of  the pavilion alluded to the most significant renovation in the garden: the 
creation of  a waterworks to provide a steady source of  clean water to the residents of  Lanzhou. 
Here was a public function of  the garden that foregrounded Zuo's continuing commitment to the 
Qing state project of  resettling society and rebuilding infrastructure in the late nineteenth century. 
The government compound in Lanzhou was situated beside the Yellow River, and Zuo harnessed 
the river for this new waterworks. A waterwheel scooped water out of  the river and into a series of 
three interconnected pools in the garden. Designed by “people who change the work [of 
nature]” (huagong ren 化工人) and built by thousands of  soldiers from Zuo's army,14 these pools 
channeled the water through a course of  twists and turns that enabled muddy water to drop its 
sediment along the way. In other words, the waterways transformed yellow, turbid river water into 
limpid water suitable for cooking, drinking, and watering plants.15 The endpoint of  the garden's 
waterworks was the Pool of  Imbibing Tranquility (Yinhe chi 飲和池), a spot where residents came 
with all manner of  jars and vessels for drawing out and carrying away water.16 The waterworks, then, 
was one of  the main public features of  the Office Garden and a point of  pride for Zuo. He touted 
compound, including Prince of  Su of  the Ming 明肅王, his family members, and their servants. These were 
the Temple of  Loyalty and Righteousness (Zhongyi ci 忠義祠) to honor virtuous men and the Temple for 
Martyred Women (Liefei miao 烈妃庙). Letter to sons, TZ11/11/22 (1872), ZZQ, 13:178. Also see “Gansu 
jieshu yuan chi ji”  甘肅節署園池記 [Record of  the Garden and Pond at the Gansu Governor-General's 
Compound], TZ11/0/0 (1872), in Zuo Zongtang, Dun bi yu shen  盾鼻餘瀋 [Writing left behind from the 
shield's handle] (N.p., 1881), 28b-29b; also reprinted in ZZQ, 13:371.
13 TZ11/0/0 (1872), ZZQ, 13:463-64; Letter to sons, TZ11/11/22 (1872), ZZQ, 13:178.
14 TZ11/0/0 (1872), ZZQ, 13:463; “Yinhe chi ji”  飲和池記 [Record of  the Pool of  Imbibing Tranquility], 
ZZQ, 13:370.
15 See “Yinhe chi ji”  飲和池記 [Record of  the Pool of  Imbibing Tranquility], ZZQ, 13:370.
16 Another rendition of  this name would be Pool of  Unrestrained Comfort. See “Yinhe chi ji” 飲和池記 
[Record of  the Pool of  Imbibing Tranquility], ZZQ, 13:370; also contained in Zuo, Dun bi yu shen, 
27b-28b; TZ11/0/0 (1872), ZZQ, 13:463. For another mention of  the record, see Letter to sons, 
TZ11/11/23 (1872), ZZQ, 13:179.
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that such a water-supply project in Gansu was unprecedented,17 and it is one of  the reasons he 
claimed that the garden was a “place to be proud of  myself  on the western journey.”18
Zuo's vision for the garden was influenced not only by the impetus to advance the Qing 
state project by refurbishing buildings, showing off  a renovated government office compound, and 
constructing waterworks to serve the populace. Memories of  landscapes and the aesthetics of 
garden produce also trained Zuo's mind on attempting to re-create the feeling of  being at home. 
Ripples in the water of  ponds and waterways reminded him of  his home environment; they were 
“just like waves on the Xiang,” the river running northward through Hunan and right past his native 
place, Xiangyin 湘陰.19 Yet it was more than poetic imagination that enabled Zuo to conjure 
resemblances. In Lanzhou, gardening as an activity of  reproducing plants from seed was meaningful 
largely because it allowed him to reproduce the trappings of  his home environment. Consider the 
couplet he wrote for the Raft Pavilion (Cha ting 槎亭), a structure within the garden. Perhaps as he 
peered out over the Yellow River, he saw rafts going back and forth, vessels connecting one place to 
another. And looking over to his garden, plots of  vegetables reminded him of  his own connections, 
and transported him back in space and time, from Lanzhou to Hunan.
In the eighth month, rafts traverse the water from Heaven [i.e. the Yellow River].
In plots linked together, vegetables bring forth the life of  the old garden.20
八月槎橫天上水，連畦菜長故園春。 
17 Letter to Wu Minshu 吳敏樹, TZ12/0/0 (1873), ZZQ, 11:403.
18  西行得意之所。 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX4/0/0 (1878), ZZQ, 12:428. 
19
如湘波然。 “Yinhe chi ji”  飲和池記 [Record of  the Pool of  Imbibing Tranquility], ZZQ, 13:370.
20 “Cha ting lian”  槎亭聯 [Couplet for the Raft Pavilion], TZ11/0/0 (1872), in Zuo, Dun bi yu shen, 62b; 
recorded in ZZQ, 13:474. The rafts were out on the river, but some of  the buildings in the garden that 
were made out of  bundled grasses and situated amidst the hillocks had made him think of  the material 
used to build rafts. Chen Dingxi 陳鼎熙, Xu yuan cang gao  栩園藏稿 [Draft stored in the Lively Garden], (N.d.), 
j. 5, quoted in ZZYS, 107-108. 
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Gardening was about connecting to another place. In the spring of  1873, Zuo wrote an inscription 
entitled “A Connection” (Yi xi 一繫) in which he celebrated the ability to reconnect with his native 
place. This was premised on the possibility that gardening allowed him to create a vision of  himself 
as a rural farmer who found fulfillment in the productive use of  land rather than a haggard, lonely, 
old military general close to the frontier. Indeed, Zuo seemed to shun his identity as a military 
general by writing that he had been “accidentally put in charge of  military affairs” (miu ren jun shi 謬
任軍事). But now that he found time to retreat from strategic planning, he could focus his energy on 
the matters of  the garden. Calling himself  the “Farmer on the Xiang River” (Xiang shang nongren 湘上
農人), an appellation he had first used nearly thirty years prior, Zuo wrote:
With frontier affairs roughly settled and my request for sick leave not yet finished, I 
have opened up plots in the Office Garden to plant vegetables, and I obtain to a 
considerable degree the distinct flavors of  my native place.21 
邊事略定，以病乞休未得，於節園開畦種菜，頗得故鄉風味。
Like rafts on the river, gardening carried him to other places and points in time. “I think back to 
plowing the fields myself,” Zuo wrote. “[It was] as if  I were in heaven.”22 The practice of  growing 
edible plants gave Zuo a feeling of  connection to Hunan and its flavors of  life that few other things 
in Gansu could in the 1870s. Years later, when his lengthy sojourn in the northwest was over, he 
wrote of  his delight at using the vegetables of  the garden to evoke a sense of  his old home:
When vegetables in the Office Garden are grown, they can be air-dried and taken as 
rations so that one may remember the distinct flavors of  the native place, which is, 
21 “Yi xi”  一繫 [A Connection], TZ12/0/0 (1873), ZZQ, 15:289.
22  回首躬耕，如在天上也。 “Yi xi”  一繫 [A Connection], TZ12/0/0 (1873), ZZQ, 15:289.
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for its part, extremely fortunate.23
節園蔬長，能晾干見餉，俾識故鄉風味，亦至幸耳。
Replicating a sense of  home and its familiar tastes through gardening was a fully material 
affair requiring tangible inputs. At the heart of  the process of  replication were seeds. I have yet to 
find evidence describing what kinds of  vegetables Zuo planted in the Lanzhou garden or where he 
acquired the seeds for them.24 Perhaps they came in packages from Hunan, side by side with the 
flavors of  home. In 1878, some six years after Zuo first cultivated the vegetable garden in Lanzhou, 
he was inquiring about a shipment of  food and seeds from his sons back in Hunan. He apparently 
had requested three wooden boxes containing pickled water chestnuts (yanji 腌薺) and vegetable 
seeds (caizhong 菜種). Worried that the vegetable seeds might be hurt by winter temperatures, Zuo 
asked his associate Yang Changjun, who was acting as a middleman, to send along the chestnuts but 
withhold the seeds from further shipment until warmer temperatures prevailed.25 By the time he 
requested and received the shipment of  foods from home, Zuo had already long moved his 
headquarters to Suzhou, where he was much closer to military operations taking place in Xinjiang. 
When the boxes arrived to him there at the end of  January 1879, he was quite pleased with their 
contents. He was particularly delighted with the salted ginger (yanjiang 鹽姜), and turned out to be 
dissatisfied only with the shrimp and brined gourd (xialugua 蝦滷瓜), which he determined was not 
23 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX7/0/0 (1881), ZZQ, 12:694.
24 There are descriptions of  what continued to be grown in the same garden decades after Zuo's departure 
from the northwest. Pei Jingfu noted on his visit to Lanzhou in 1905 that the vegetable plots in the garden 
that he saw in that year were all ones that were developed by Zuo. Pei, Hehai kunlun lu, 2:41b. Several 
decades after that, Mu Shouqi  慕壽祺wrote that the garden was still producing vegetables, including 
Chinese onions and scallions (xiejiu 薤韭), melons and gourds (guahu 瓜壺), radishes (luofu 萝菔), potatoes 
and yams (shuyu 薯蕷), and winter mallow (donghancai 冬寒菜). See Mu Shouqi 慕壽祺, Gan Ning Qing shilüe 甘
 寧青史略 [Historical outline of  Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai], (N.d.), j. 24, quoted in ZZYS, 209.
25 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX4/0/0 (1878), ZZQ 12:422; Letter to sons, GX4/12/19 (1879), ZZQ, 
13:208.
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homemade (jiazhi 家制).26 Zuo made no mention of  other contents, but if  his sons had responded to 
his request, those boxes also held vegetable seeds which he could plant in future gardens. 
In Suzhou from April 1876 until his journey out to Hami in the summer of  1880, Zuo 
continued the practice of  cultivating vegetables and reproducing garden landscapes. In that frontier 
post close to Jiayuguan, the western terminus of  the Great Wall, he opened up a vegetable garden of 
several tens of  mu  畝 and conscripted some lower-level soldiers (caiguan 材官) into service as 
farmworkers to tend the plots of  vegetables and to do farm-related chores, including processing 
manure for use on the fields.27 Zuo wrote several times to Yang Changjun suggesting that he travel 
out to Suzhou in the spring of  1879 once the new season had arrived, ice had begun to melt, the 
garden in Lanzhou had begun to come to life, and green grasses had begun to appear along the 
roads out west.28 Along the frontier, they could go together to the springs at Jiuquan  酒泉 (lit. “Wine 
Springs”) to drink and eat to their contentment. The food would include Zuo's “self-grown garden 
vegetables” (zizhong yuan shu 自種園蔬).29 
The views at Jiuquan may have been stunning, though the appearance of  the landscape was 
of  recent vintage. Just as he had done in the garden of  the governor-general's compound in 
Lanzhou, Zuo reformulated the land to serve the aesthetic and productive purposes of  his presence 
and the anticipated presence of  future sojourners from China proper. As he wrote to Shaanxi 
governor Tan Zhonglin in 1879, he had spent money and effort in order to add “fine scenery” 
(shenggai 勝概) to the place where he now resided. The centerpiece of  the newly landscaped vista was 
26 Letter to sons, GX5/1/8 (1879), ZZQ, 13:210. 
27 Shi Buhua 施補華, Ze ya tang wenji  澤雅堂文集 [Collected writings from Zeya Hall], (1893), j. 1, quoted in 
ZZYS, 65.    
28 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX4/0/0 (1878), ZZQ, 12:428.
29 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX4/0/0 (1878), ZZQ, 12:422.
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a lake roughly a kilometer around30 which was filled by local springs.
Recently, I have also dredged Jiuquan to form a lake. I planted flowering trees on the 
surrounding embankments, erected a pavilion at the center of  the lake, and 
constructed a small boat as an aid to sightseeing. In the middle of  the lake I have 
made an island and have kept three islets. I have purchased over 10,000 fish fry, and I 
swim in their midst. Waterfowl on the sandy island come without calling. Dust on the 
frontier extends for 10,000 li, and by completing this, I have created a new pattern 




In a more poetic rendering of  his construction of  the lake, Zuo noted how it reminded him of 
Dongting Lake back in Hunan.32 Despite being surrounded by desert, he was enchanted with the 
great expanse of  water that he had crafted with spring water using the labor of  his soldiers. The 
aesthetic pleasures of  boating on the lake, swimming in its waters, or walking along the shoreline did 
not, however, cause him to forget or dismiss the productive utility of  the land. Unused land around 
the lake could become sites for farming and horticulture. As he wrote in 1879, “I still need to 
reclaim the open spaces beside the lake for fields and gardens, to provide an occupation for 
scholars.”33 Zuo seems to have intended that the land adjacent to the lake be opened to settlement 
and cultivation.
30 “隄周三里廓。 Qiuri fan zhou quan hu zuo”  秋日泛舟泉湖作 [Composed on the occasion of  boating on the 
springs lake on an autumn day], GX5/0/0 (1879), in Zuo, Dun bi yu shen, 33b; reproduced in ZZQ, 13:464.
31 Letter to Tan Zhonglin 譚鐘麟, GX5/0/0 (1879), ZZQ, 12:488.
32  渺渺洞庭波，宛連湘與鄂。Zuo, Dun bi yu shen, 33b; ZZQ, 13:464.
33
尚須墾湖旁隙地為田圃，以業學者。Letter to Tan Zhonglin 譚鐘麟, GX5/0/0 (1879), ZZQ, 12:488.
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One of  the ironies of  Zuo's move to Suzhou and Hami was that it made him nostalgic for 
his time in Lanzhou. From April 1876 until late 1880—when Zuo left Hami and passed back 
through Suzhou and Lanzhou on his way to Beijing—he lived at a great distance from his native 
place and the Lanzhou garden. On several occasions, Zuo's nostalgia for gardening and food was 
transferred from his native place garden in Hunan to its Lanzhou mimesis. It was the harsh 
conditions of  far northwestern winters and summers that made him yearn for the purportedly more 
moderate climate of  Gansu's capital. In the midst of  a dust storm that blotted out the sun and 
prevented him from resting for days on end, Zuo wrote in 1879, “I suppose the new vegetables of 
the Office Garden are already exuberantly green and ready for eating.”34 But he could no longer 
enjoy the taste of  the vegetables nor take pleasure in the visual aesthetics of  the garden: “I regret 
that I long ago moved to and am holed up in Jiuquan, and I won't again share in the pleasure of 
these ponds and halls.”35 Northward from Jiuquan, wrote Zuo to one of  his sons in August 1880, 
“there is desert as far as the eye can see, and travel by cart is rather hard.” And all the way out at 
Hami, the summer heat and winter chill were both more intense than in China proper.36 “The 
frontier has a bitter winter,” Zuo wrote again the next month, “and in Hami the cold and heat are 
completely different from inside the pass [i.e Jiayuguan].” These assessments did not hold for 
Lanzhou, however: “In the Office Garden, the autumn scenery is delightful and the flavor of  the 
vegetables is quite fine.”37 Unexpected shifts in the weather caused him the most consternation and 
sparked a sense of  nostalgia for Lanzhou. Earlier that spring in Suzhou, the vegetables he sowed had 
been damaged by an unforeseen cold snap.
34
節園新蔬度已青青入口。Letter to Yang Changjun, GX5/0/0 (1879), ZZQ, 12:474.
35
惜老我移封酒泉，不復共此池堂樂意也。Letter to Yang Changjun, GX5/0/0 (1879), ZZQ, 12:474.
36
砂磧彌望，車行頗苦。Letter to Xiaotong 孝同, GX6/6/23 (1880), ZZQ, 13:232.
37
節園秋景宜人，蔬味正佳。Letter to Xiaotong 孝同, GX6/7/20 (1880), ZZQ, 13:234.
193
At the Beginning of  Spring, it was warm and pleasant, and the garden vegetables 
were only just emerging from the ground. The leaves of  the trees harbored green 
that was about to be emitted. But then there was a night of  frigid wind, the whole 
day there was snow to a depth of  roughly two cun [about three centimeters], and the 
eaves dripped and froze. To look forward with pleasure to [the time when the 
vegetables are] flourishing green and ready to eat is now all but impossible. Moving 
to and being holed up here thus does not compare with the satisfaction of  resigning 
and returning to my native place.38
春日和淑宜人，園蔬甫有出土者，樹葉含青欲吐。乃一夜寒風，竟日雪厚兩寸許，簷滴
且冰。欲盼青青入口不可得矣。移封於此，故不如歸臥故園之得也。
This was the disappointment that Zuo found living on the frontier. The means that he had to 
reproduce the tastes of  home—the vegetables and seeds—did not always come to fruition, could 
not always be relied upon in the environments of  the northwest. With a climate perhaps more 
amenable to vegetables, Lanzhou thus became a temporary stand-in for Hunan and the point at 
which Zuo focused his desires for the flavors of  his native place.  
Climate and weather did not seem to undermine Zuo's optimism about the transformation 
of  frontier lands into gardens, however disappointed he may have been about the outcome of  his 
seedlings in the spring of  1880. Central to his vision for horticulture was the notion that he could 
make barren land bloom green, even out in the midst of  the desert. Consider what he wrote toward 
the end of  his service to the Qing in the northwest, in early June of  1880, when he was headed out 
to Hami to take up residence there for five months. As he passed by Anxi, a city out beyond the 
Great Wall, he puzzled over the conditions of  the desert and its ability to become productive land.
38 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:595.
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The gobi lacks water and grasses, so it is impossible to estimate the land in order to 
settle people; this is true. Yet as I lean on the crossbar [of  the carriage] to observe it, 
there are also things I cannot fathom. The mix of  sand and stones harbors water 
vapor. Although there are no fountainheads springing forth, the moisture of  rain and 
dew is sufficient to cover grains. This is one thing.39
戈壁乏水草，不能度地以居民，固也。然憑軾觀之，亦有不得於心者，沙石間雜中含潤
氣，雖無涌現之源泉，雨露之滋潤，其足蔭嘉穀，一也。
This apparent anomaly caused Zuo to consider the possibility that the gobi in the upper northwest of 
Gansu might be able to yield grains. His observations near Anxi reminded him that at a location 
north of  Lanzhou called Qinwangchuan 秦王川, the land had been turned into productive 
agricultural soil even though people had claimed that grains would not grow there. That location 
could serve as a model for what Zuo envisioned in Anxi. “I suspect,” Zuo wrote of  the deserts east 
and west of  Anxi, “that they can imitate the methods of  Qinwangchuan, using them to cultivate 
grains.”40 
Zuo's visions for the transformation of  the desert around Anxi brought to light his own 
predilections for a landscape that was thoroughly cultivated. Noticing any signs that the land might 
be able to produce crops, Zuo made clear his suspicions that the land could be made to grow not 
only grain crops, but also fruits and vegetables. 
Wild grasses grow all over large and small mounds of  sand, and in their midst, reeds 
grow in motley clumps. Since [the land] already produces grass, it must be suitable 
for grain. How would it only be suited to animal herding and not convenient for 
39 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:610. 
40 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:610. 
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plowing and reclamation? As for sandbanks, although the gobi lacks trees, elms and 
willows appear at all places near water, so I suspect that land with underground 
moisture can all be cultivated. How would it be suited only to elms and willows and 
not suited to fruits and vegetables? All of  these are things that have been going back 




He recognized the immediacy of  providing funding for animal herding as the mainstay of  the local 
economy around Anxi, and he planned to raise contributions to purchase breeding sheep (zhong yang  
種羊) for distribution to soldiers and civilians in order to obtain the “profits of  animal herding” 
(chumu zhi li 畜牧之利).42 But that was only a temporary measure to spur production. “I plan to first 
use animal herding to guide the people,” Zuo wrote after his assessments of  the landscape, “yet 
order them to gradually plan for cultivation and harvest.”43 Within his visions for agriculture around 
Anxi, grain cultivation surely claimed the key position. Yet his mention of  fruits and vegetables 
suggests that horticulture, too, framed his visions for the landscape, visions that he seemed to share 
with sojourners and migrants to Xinjiang in the same decades. 
Patterns of  Propagation in Xinjiang
Garden-making in Lanzhou, Suzhou, and Hami arose from Zuo's personal aesthetics of 
production, landscape, and taste, but postwar horticulture in the northwest expanded well beyond 
41 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:610-611.
42 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:610. 
43  擬先以畜牧導民，而令其漸謀耕獲。 Letter to Yang Changjun, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:611.
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the rows of  vegetables where he resided. Settlers from China proper, including the soldiers in Zuo 
Zongtang's armies, brought their interests in horticulture, their techniques, and their desires to 
overcome the environmental limitations on growing vegetables. They also brought their plants with 
them. Xiao Xiong  蕭雄 (?-1893), a native of  Hunan who joined the camps of  several top military 
commanders and lived along the frontier for over ten years in the 1870s and 1880s, noted in a 
collection of  verse and prose about Xinjiang that much of  the contemporary garden cultivation in 
the borderland territory was the result of  Han people settling there and bringing along their 
vegetables seeds. 
Among Han people who have migrated and settled [in Xinjiang], those who grow 
vegetables are quite many. When the Hunan army went beyond the [Jiayu] Pass, they 
brought with them all kinds of  vegetable seeds and planted them everywhere, and so 
[people now] possess garden vegetables.44  
漢民徙居者，種菜較多。及楚軍出關，帶各項菜子，隨地廣種，而園蔬將備矣。
Xiao's assertion that the cultivation of  new vegetables in Xinjiang followed from the arrival of 
soldiers and postwar settlers from China proper was echoed by later accounts. Sun Anfu  愻盦甫 (?-?), 
who wrote chapters about agriculture, sericulture, forestry, herding, industry, commerce, and mining 
for the 1912 publication Illustrated Gazetteer of  Xinjiang (Xinjiang tuzhi 新疆圖志), recorded how “after 
the start of  warfare, Hunanese who went on the military expedition bound together and carried 
along sprouts and roots [of  plants], and transplanted them into this land.”45
44 Xiao Xiong 蕭雄, Xijiang zashu shi  西疆雜述詩 [Assorted narrated poems about the western borderland], 
(N.p., preface 1892), 3:43a.
45
軍興以後，湘人之從征者，捆載芽荄，移植玆土。Yuan Dahua 袁大化 et al., Xinjiang tuzhi  新疆圖志 [Illustrated 
gazetteer of  Xinjiang], (Tianjin: Dongfang xuehui, 1923 [1911]), 28:4a; Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, 
Xijiang bei sheng  西疆備乘 [Full history of  the western borderland], (N.p., 1914), 2:6; Zhong Guangsheng and 
Sun Anfu, Xinjiang zhigao   新疆志稿 [Draft of  the gazetteer of  Xinjiang], (N.p., 1930), 2:21a. For Sun Anfu's 
authorship of  these chapters, see his postface in Xinjiang zhigao, 1a-1b.
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The movement of  plants and people went hand and hand in the late nineteenth century, as it 
had been in earlier periods. Officials earlier in the century made connections between the settlement 
of  sojourners from China proper and the arrival of  new patterns of  livelihood, including 
horticulture. Bi-chang  璧昌 (?-?), a Mongol who served in high-ranking posts in Xinjiang, wrote 
about newcomers who came to Xinjiang in a short tract about border defense. According to his 
brief  historical summary of  the situation based on observations in the 1830s, after the territory of 
Xinjiang had been conquered by the Manchus in the mid-eighteenth century, new patterns of 
economic growth enabled local Muslims to get rich, but items of  trade from China proper were 
quite scarce—things like gold and silver ingots (yuanbao 元寶), tea leaves (chaye 茶葉), Chinese 
rhubarb (daihuang 大黄), silks (chouduan 綢緞), porcelains (ciqi 磁器), sugar (tang 糖), and needles (zhen 
針)—items that he considered to be in demand among Turkic Muslims (yihui 夷回).46 When 
merchants from all parts of  China proper came to trade these goods in Xinjiang, they established 
patterns of  life that replicated how they had lived in their home provinces. As Bi-chang recorded, 
merchants who were long-term sojourners settled down and “erected houses, set up markets, grew 
vegetables, and raised pigs, so there began to be the distinct flavors of  China proper.”47 It was not 
just merchants who brought their flora as a means to recreate patterns of  life. Officials and convicts 
who had been exiled to Xinjiang in the eighteenth century also had desires to eat of  their home 
cuisines48 and grow what they had grown before. A century before the arrival of  Zuo Zongtang's 
army in Xinjiang, exiles from China proper in northern Xinjiang were transplanting floral specimens 
46 Bi-chang 璧昌, Shoubian jiyao  守邊輯要 [Edited essentials for guarding the borderland], (N.p., preface 1839), 
5a.
47
蓋房立市，種菜養豬，始有內地風味。Bi-chang, Shoubian jiyao, 5a.
48 L. J. Newby, “The Chinese Literary Conquest of  Xinjiang,” Modern China 25.4 (1999), 466-467; Joanna 
Waley-Cohen, Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758-1820 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991), 153, 180.
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like peonies, peach trees, and flowering poppies into the regions around Urumqi and Ili.49 
But migrants to Xinjiang in the late nineteenth century were also interested in vegetable 
horticulture for economic gain, and they were not all Hunanese nor associated with Zuo's army. Sun 
Anfu pointed to three groups of  migrants (kemin 客民) who were prominent in Xinjiang's 
horticulture after the reconquest and the establishment of  Xinjiang Province in 1884. He listed them 
in order of  how adeptly they made a living from agrarian production. At the top of  the list were 
migrants from Tianjin, followed by settlers from Hunan and Hubei, and finally settlers from Shaanxi 
and Gansu. Each group also seemed to have a particular economic niche within agriculture. Whereas 
Hunan people grew rice, Hubei people generally cultivated cotton, and people from Shaanxi and 
Gansu grew opium, the migrants from Tianjin were the ones who largely focused on vegetables. Sun 
claimed they were skilled at vegetable cultivation and had opened many garden plots (yuanpu 園圃) in 
the region around the provincial capital at Urumqi. If  it was the Hunan army that had brought some 
vegetables into Xinjiang during the reconquest, Tianjin people soon followed in the cultivation of 
products of  the garden, and Sun wrote that they stuck together in their gardening, cooperating and 
working side-by-side.50  
For Zuo, the impetus to grow vegetables had been aesthetic and practical: to recreate the 
flavors of  home and transform the landscape into something pleasing while producing food for 
consumption. For the migrants to Xinjiang, growing vegetables was more often cast in the language 
of  market and economy, even if  horticulture retained its aesthetic value as a practice of  one's native 
place. As Sun made clear, there was great money to be made in vegetables in Xinjiang.51 From an 
49 Waley-Cohen, Exile in Mid-Qing China, 152. 
50 Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, Xijiang beicheng, 2:6; Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a; Li Wenru 
李文如, Xinjiang dili zhiwu kao  新疆地理植物考 [An examination of  geography and vegetation in Xinjiang], 
(M.s., n.d.), 2:9b.
51 The Chinese notion that horticulture was an especially profitable venture dates back at least to the sixth 
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economic perspective, vegetables were “indispensable for livelihood”52 and Sun claimed that the 
“profits of  gardening are ten times as plentiful as for agriculture.”53 This was in large part because 
they afforded the opportunity to partake in profitable market exchange. And it was the chance to 
make quick money through the market that attracted many migrants out to Xinjiang. Moreover, 
because the exchange rate between copper money (qian 錢) and silver taels (yin liang 銀兩) was 
running at 400 to 1, market exchange in Xinjiang turned out to be extremely lucrative: the 
“abundance of  profit is ten times that of  China proper.”54 One group of  items that turned 
opportunity into wealth was garden vegetables. At the provincial capital, the “varieties of  vegetables 
are especially numerous,” and people gathered from all around to purchase them and other 
commodities.55 
People from Tianjin seem to have dominated vegetable production and marketing around 
Urumqi in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Their vegetable patches were reputed to 
be trim and orderly, and they employed special techniques for cultivation, which may have allowed 
them to surpass other migrant groups in vegetable sales and production. These techniques enabled 
them to circumvent problems presented by springtime cold of  the kind that made Zuo's vegetables 
perish in Suzhou and hindered spring horticulture near Xinjiang's capital. People from Tianjin used 
the method for “hothouse flowers” (tanghua 唐花), a measure by which they heated vegetable 
seedlings in order to speed up or control the rate of  their growth in cold climates. Various 
techniques to warm vegetable seedlings as a means to promote growth in the winter and spring had 
century, when Jia Sixie  賈思勰mentioned this prospect in his work Qimin yaoshu  齊民要朮 [Essential arts for 
aiding the people]. See Francesca Bray, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 6, pt. 2, Agriculture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 541.  
52
蔬菜為生事所必需。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4b.
53
園圃之利，富於農十倍。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a.
54  其利之豐什倍於內地。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a.
55
蔬菜品彙特繁。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a.
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been increasingly described in textual sources since the middle of  the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), 
though they had existed as early as the Han dynasty.56 According to the method as described in the 
Illustrated Gazetteer of  Xinjiang, in the winter months people dug pits into the ground where they 
planted seeds and warmed them by small fires. The plantings would be closely protected by reeds 
and covered with reed-woven screens to keep out wind and snow. After the arrival of  the spring 
thaw, seedlings would be transplanted into vegetable patches. “Thus, the early spring vegetables all 
go on the market in season” in Urumqi, wrote Sun, a Zhejiang native who was perhaps accustomed 
to the timing of  the seasons far back east.57 In other words, the hothouse method enabled Tianjin 
people to get around the deep cold that set into northern Xinjiang in the winters and allowed them 
to reproduce the vegetables, on schedule, that they may have brought with them.58  
The Politics of  Seed Dissemination
The spread of  new vegetables and crop production methods into the northwest in the late 
nineteenth century was promoted through official policy. As he passed through Lanzhou in late 
1905, Pei Jingfu surmised that “all of  the small vegetables on the southern side of  Gansu province 
were brought and planted by Zuo Zongtang, who taught people to cultivate them.”59 Although Pei's 
claim is hard to verify, there are several indications that Zuo's passion for vegetables was not just a 
56 Liang Jiamian 梁家勉, ed., Zhongguo nongye kexue jishu shigao  中國農業科學技朮史稿 [Draft history of  Chinese 
agricultural science and technology], (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe, 1989), 534.
57
故春初之菜，無不應時入市。Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, Xijiang beicheng, 2:7; Yuan Dahua et al., 
Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a. 
58 Earlier instances of  importing Chinese plants into Xinjiang also necessitated special measures to insulate 
them from the chilly temperatures of  winter. Xiao Xiong noted that, aside from the rose (meigui 玫瑰) 
which was indigenous to Xinjiang, flower varieties could not withstand cold without special measures. He 
gave the example of  the Muslim King  回王 (perhaps of  Hami or Turpan), who in times past had brought 
flowers back from a residence in the imperial capital (jingdi 京邸) and had to grow them in a hothouse 
(wenshi 溫室) to keep them alive. Xiao Xiong, Xijiang zashu shi, 3:43b.
59
甘省所有南邊小菜，均文襄公攜種來，教人栽植。Pei Jingfu, Hehai kunlun lu, 2:10b; reprinted in ZZYS, 119. 
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matter of  personal taste. Nor was it merely individual sojourning merchants or postwar settlers who 
attempted to reproduce vegetables in accordance with their tastes or in their attempts to make 
money. Growing vegetables became a matter of  policy as Zuo oversaw the distribution of  vegetable 
seeds and the dissemination of  cultivation techniques to farmers in many locations in Gansu and out 
into Xinjiang. 
The year before his arrival in Hami in 1880, Zuo and local officials exchanged missives 
regarding plans to allocate vegetable seeds to residents of  Turpan. The few details that we have 
about this plan reveal the close nexus between knowledge about growing seeds and the seeds 
themselves. For it was not only the vegetable seeds that were to be transported to Turpan, but also 
the knowledge about how to properly cultivate them. In 1879, the vice prefect (tongzhi 同知) of 
Turpan, Kui Fu  奎紱 (?-?), composed a memo affirming his participation in a plan to distribute 
pamphlets about “southern methods for growing vegetables.”60 Kui recounted how those southern 
methods had been carved and printed as a short publication (pian 篇), of  which 1000 copies were 
made and delivered to local officials in the corridor stretching more than a thousand kilometers 
from Ganliang—present-day Liangzhou, nearly three hundred kilometers northwest of  Lanzhou—
all the way westward to Hami. The officials, in turn, were to summon agricultural supervisors from 
the cities and countrysides and order them to publicize and explicate the methods to local people. 
Recognizing how “exhausting the profits of  the land and enriching the people” was precisely what 
local officials should be doing, Kui suggested that each military bureau and local government unit 
west of  Jiayuguan ought to reprint the leaflets for easy distribution among gentry, peasants, and 
soldiers so that they could all gain the knowledge of  vegetable cultivation. Not much more than a 
week later, Kui confirmed his resolve to print an extra two hundred copies of  the leaflet about the 
60
南方種蔬之法。GX5/2/30 (1879), XJDQ 15-4-181.
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“established methods” (chengfa 成法) for vegetable cultivation. As soon as they were ready, he 
claimed, he would distribute them to local Turkic Muslims (chan hui 纏回) so that they would act in 
accordance with the new measures.61 
But soon, Kui was reporting an acute problem which threatened the feasibility of  the whole 
venture. Whereas the farmers could obtain the knowledge about how to plant southern vegetables 
that had been promoted and circulated via pamphlet and word of  mouth, it appears that they did 
not have the biological specimens to implement the new cultivation techniques: they did not have 
the vegetable seeds. “In previous years,” he wrote, Turpan “has certainly not had the seeds of  the 
Chinese cabbage (huangyabai 黄芽白), winter mallow (dongxian 冬莧), red amaranth (hongxian 紅莧), 
water spinach (wengcai 蕹菜), asparagus lettuce (wosun 萵笋), and mustard greens (paicai 排菜).”62 To 
bring the new cultivation methods to fruition, Kui suggested that an order be made to distribute 
seeds to Han and Turkic Muslim residents of  the oasis for supplementary cultivation; his request 
was for “all kinds of  vegetable seeds” (ge yang caizi 各樣菜籽).63 Eastward in Suzhou, Zuo Zongtang 
found this plan worthy of  approval, and he recognized the need to spread seed stock from China 
proper to Turpan. In a June 1879 missive, the general acknowledged the formal request for “all 
kinds of  vegetable seeds” (ge se shucai zizhong 各色蔬菜籽種) from Turpan. He apparently had 
accepted Kui's request, because by that time, he stated that seeds of  the Chinese cabbage, winter 
amaranth, and water spinach had already been sent to the local government in Turpan for 
allocation.64 Kui responded with a short message of  acknowledgment, saying the seeds would be 
61 GX5/3/8 (1879), XJDQ 15-4-181.
62 For references to these vegetables, see Hu, Food Plants of  China, 413, 542, 381, 636, 740. 
63 GX5/3/15 (1879), XJDQ 15-4-181.
64 GX5/4/27 (1879), XJDQ 15-4-181.
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distributed immediately to Turkic Muslims for planting.65 
None of  the subsequent messages between Kui and Zuo clarified the success or failure of 
their plan to bring new vegetable seeds to Turpan and train farmers to cultivate them. And given the 
historic linkages between Turpan and China proper through trade and diplomacy, there may be 
reason to question Kui's claim about the people of  the Turpan oasis never having had those varieties 
of  vegetable seeds.66 Nonetheless, this example is significant insofar as it demonstrates what new 
visions for horticulture and vegetation entailed in the late nineteenth-century northwest. It seems to 
indicate that “southern” techniques for vegetable cultivation were highly regarded among Zuo and 
other officials, and their importation into the northwest was matched by a need to bring along their 
biological counterparts, vegetable seeds. If  the techniques had been devised over the long term to 
support the growth of  specific varieties of  vegetables, then perhaps the techniques could not 
succeed without the proper seeds. And so the desire to raise the productivity of  the land and people 
in Turpan and to make a style of  horticulture from China proper prosper on the edges of  the desert 
may have required new plants. In turn, vegetables of  the varieties that Kui and Zuo imported into 
Xinjiang may have introduced novel culinary forms or daily practices to the people of  the oasis. 
According to Xiao Xiong's postwar collection of  poetry and prose about Xinjiang, “not many 
Muslims eat vegetables, so the business of  gardening is neglected and there are also few varieties of 
vegetables.”67 This set them in distinct contrast to the migrating Han who were coming to Xinjiang 
to find new land for agriculture and new opportunities to make money through vegetable 
cultivation. If  Xiao's claim holds true, then Kui's distribution of  vegetable seeds and the knowledge 
of  techniques to grow them may well have been an attempt to transform the habits of  the residents 
65 GX5/5/16 (1879), XJDQ 15-4-181.
66 I have been unable to confirm or deny Kui's claim based on present research. 
67
回人不多食菜，故圃事疏而菜類亦少。Xiao Xiong, Xijiang zashu shi, 3:42b.
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of  Turpan while at the same time trying to make inhospitable climates and soils yield abundant 
harvests.
Xiao Xiong perceived that vegetable gardening was a less common form of  horticulture in 
Xinjiang. The oases were abundant in the fruits of  gardens and orchards, and he cataloged melons, 
raisins, peaches, pears, pomegranates, apricots, and cherries among Xinjiang's produce.68 Yet even if 
fruit horticulture was far more common than vegetable cultivation, Xiao still recognized a number 
of  commonplace vegetables, perhaps in the local markets.69 Although it is difficult to determine 
from his process of  translation alone to what degree Xinjiang and China proper shared specific 
varieties of  vegetables in the nineteenth century, Xiao certainly thought they did. He listed both 
Chinese names and the Chinese transliterations of  Turki names for several vegetable varieties, 
including turnips (Ch manjing 蔓菁, Tu chamghur 產木古爾), carrots (Ch huluopu 胡蘿蒲, Tu zerdek 栽爾
達克), and coriander (Ch yansui 芫荽, Tu yumgac sut 引麻蘇). For the last of  these, Xiao Xiong noted 
that the “Chinese variety” (Zhongguo zhi zhong 中國之種) was known as husui  胡荽 and had been 
brought to China from the region that was now known as Xinjiang by Zhang Qian 張騫, a Han 
dynasty military general who had undertaken campaigns in the northwest. There were others, 
however, that Xiao seemed to think were unique to Xinjiang or to the greater northwest, including 
Shaanxi and Gansu—places where Zuo Zongtang's army had operated. Among these varieties were 
68 Xiao, Xijiang zashu shi, 3:39b-42b.
69 The space and activity of  the market afforded sojourners the opportunity to appraise the region's local 
produce and compare the array of  commodities with what they knew of  other regions in the empire. In 
1882, a Manchu by the name of  Shakedulinzhabu  沙克都林扎布 (1842-1897), who was serving as the 
commandant (lingdui dachen 領隊大臣) of  Barkol  巴里坤 in northern Xinjiang, was dispatched to survey the 
border between the Qing state's territory in southern Xinjiang and imperial Russian territory. In his diary 
of  the trip in the middle of  September of  that year, he recorded his short visit to Aksu, an oasis city lying 
on the edge of  the Tarim Basin some 450 kilometers northeast of  Kashgar. Shakedulinzhabu tersely noted 
what he saw in the markets of  Aksu: “the fruits, vegetables, fish, and meat on the market are largely 
similar to [those of] China proper.”  市上蔬菓魚肉大似內地。 Shakedulinzhabu 沙克都林扎布, Nanjiang kan jie riji  
tushuo  南疆勘界日記圖說 [Illustrated diary of  surveying the border in southern Xinjiang], (M.s, preface 1884), 
261.
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a kind of  onion (Tu piyaz 丕牙斯)70 as well as what I believe was kholrabi (Tu chaylan 切蓮). 
According to Xiao, kholrabi was not to be found in “southern China” (nan zhong 南中) but existed in 
Shaanxi and Gansu.71 
Evidence from southern Xinjiang several decades after Xiao's sojourn suggests that, despite 
the existence of  a few varieties unique to Xinjiang, local people recognized many vegetables 
commonly cultivated by Turkic residents as having a definite geographic origin—China. In the first 
decade of  the twentieth century, a mullah in Kashgar by the name of  Abdu Vali Akhon compiled a 
short description of  local vegetables and their cultivation at the behest of  a Swedish missionary.72 
According to the mullah, “The seeds for the vegetables have [always] been taken from China. Rather 
few [seeds of] vegetables have been made available from other cities.”73 In this list of  twenty-one 
vegetable varieties from China, he included several varieties that were among those that Zuo had 
sent to Turpan in the form of  seeds some thirty years earlier. Just as significant as the recognition of 
origin was the pattern of  naming vegetables, which in many cases seemed to follow from Chinese 
names. Turkic speakers adopted the names for a number of  Chinese vegetables, including cabbage 
(Tu baysay, Ch baicai) and asparagus lettuce (Tu usung, Ch wosun).74 In other words, at the frontiers of 
the Qing empire in its last years, the vegetable varieties that had been brought from China proper at 
70 The late eighteenth-century Xiyu tuzhi  西域圖志 [Illustrated gazetteer of  the western regions] lists this as the 
wild onion (Ch yecong 野葱, Tu piyaz 辟雅資). See Xiyu tuzhi jiaozhu  西域圖志校注 [Edited and annotated 
gazetteer of  the western regions], (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2002 [1762; 1893]), 552. 
71 For his description of  these vegetables, see Xiao Xiong, Xijiang zashu shi, 3:42b-43a. As an aid to 
determining Turkic names for vegetables, I have used Gunnar Jarring, Agriculture and Horticulture in Central  
Asia in the Early Years of  the Twentieth Century with an Excursus on Fishing: Eastern Turki Texts with Transcription,  
Translation, Notes and Glossary (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1998), 53-57. For the 
kholrabi, Xiao noted another Turkic name that he transliterated as pielan 撇蘭, but I have been unable to 
find a corresponding Turkic name for this. Jarring, Agriculture and Horticulture, 55n29.
72 Abdu Vali Akhon, “Otyashlarning beyani” [A description of  vegetables] (ca. 1905), reprinted and 
translated in Jarring, Agriculture and Horticulture in Central Asia, 53-57.
73 Ibid., 53.
74 Ibid., 54n20, 55n23.
206
some point in the past had retained their identities as imports from China with non-Turkic names.75 
Understanding Relations through the Transfer of  Seeds and People
This initial evidence of  the movement of  seeds and vegetable varieties from China proper to 
Xinjiang is reason to question the geographical scope and social importance of  “germplasm 
transfer” within and beyond the Qing empire in the nineteenth century. Jack Kloppenburg has 
employed this term to describe the movement of  plant genetic stock in the form of  seeds from one 
part of  the world to another. In the early modern period, “plant germplasm was appropriated and 
shifted across the continents and archipelagos of  what is now the Third World as the European 
powers sought commercial hegemony.”76 The spread of  vegetable seeds and other horticultural 
plants from the center of  the Qing empire to the northwestern periphery in the late nineteenth-
century as I have described does not exhibit the same patterns of  unequal exchange based in the 
expansion of  commercial networks and capitalism. This was not capitalist asymmetry of  the kind 
described by Kloppenburg, even if  germplasm transfer in the early modern world system had a huge 
and lasting impact upon the movement of  people from China proper to the imperial peripheries.77 
75 Swedish scholar Gunnar Jarring, who conducted extensive research on Turkic languages, expressed his 
surprise that a large proportion of  vegetable names were derived from Chinese: “The names of  the 
different kinds of  vegetables are strikingly often of  Chinese origin. My conclusion is that these vegetables 
do not belong to the original diet of  the Turk population of  this Central Asian area. But further research 
in the field is necessary.” Jarring, Agriculture and Horticulture in Central Asia, 8. 
76 Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of  Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000, 2nd ed. 
(Madison: The University of  Wisconsin Press, 2004), 154. For Kloppenburg, germplasm transfer 
reproduced the asymmetries of  global relationships within the world system, and these asymmetries were 
manifest in quantitative and qualitative ways. Not only did metropoles appropriate much more germplasm 
from peripheries than it transferred to them. Germplasm also had a different social character that 
correlated with the direction of  transfer. Seeds and plants have been appropriated as free goods from the 
peripheries, whereas the products of  biotechnology in the metropole have flowed back to the peripheries 
as commodities. Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 15. 
77 The irony of  Kashgar mullah Abdu Vali Akhon's inclusion of  the tomato among the list of  vegetables 
from China is that the tomato was an import to China from the New World. Although the tomato does 
not seem to have had the ecological and economic importance of  maize, potatoes, or peanuts—all New 
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The most developed core regions of  China proper seem to have gained nothing in varieties of  flora 
or valuable germplasm from Xinjiang in the nineteenth century that they could put into the service 
of  further economic development or the accumulation of  wealth. 
Nonetheless, there was an asymmetry in the nineteenth-century relationship between China 
proper and the frontier regions that becomes visible by focusing on the movement of  plants and 
seeds to places like Xinjiang. At least for the nineteenth century, the evidence suggests that the 
geography of  germplasm transfer in the Qing empire was quite different from the geographical 
trajectories of  transfer within the networks of  European colonialism whereby seeds and plant 
specimens often traveled from colonial peripheries to capitalist cores or between colonies under the 
control of  a single European power. In the Qing, the transfer seems to have been largely 
unidirectional, with valuable genetic material in the form of  seeds moving to the margins rather than 
to the center of  the empire. In some ways, this outward movement of  plant material coincided with 
the long-term spread of  highly productive domesticated varieties to new lands. This trend applied to 
the vegetables of  China, and historians have begun to trace the geographical expansion of  plant 
cultivation in the late imperial period.78 Yet the nineteenth century may have been unique in the 
volume of  human movement to the frontiers which resulted, as a matter of  course and of  official 
policy, in the transfer of  plant stock to these regions. The organic materials for food production 
accompanied the increasing stream of  migrants out to Xinjiang and other borderlands. In fact, the 
World cultivars which enabled Han migrants to expand cultivation to inhospitable soils and terrains within 
China proper and on its peripheries—the arrival of  the tomato and these more valuable cultivars in China 
was an unintended manifestation of  germplasm transfer derivative of  European colonization in the 
Americas. On New World food crops, see, for example, Ping-ti Ho, “The Introduction of  American Food 
Plants into China,” American Anthropologist 57.2, pt. 1 (April 1955), 191-201.  
78 Sub-varieties of  common cultivars like the Chinese cabbage multiplied and expanded geographically in the 
late imperial period. Bai Hewen  白鶴文 et al., Zhongguo jindai nongye keji shigao  中國近代農業科技史稿 [Draft 
history of  Chinese agricultural technology in recent times], (Beijing: Zhongguo nongye keji chubanshe, 
1995), 160.
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germplasm transfer facilitated by Zuo's military intervention and carried out by merchants, soldiers, 
and civilian agrarians reflected the basic necessities of  early modern explorers and colonizers 
worldwide. They took staples and other plants with them to peripheral regions in support of  their 
own subsistence.79 
What guided high officials like Zuo just as much as it guided civilian settlers as they migrated 
out to the frontiers was the desire for the reproduction of  subsistence cast in the flavors of  home. 
For some migrants, like the vegetable farmers from Tianjin, the will to specialize in horticulture grew 
out of  the desire for easy money-making in the markets of  northern Xinjiang, and so they did not 
aim merely to ensure their own biological subsistence and reproduction. Yet as far as the evidence 
will allow, I would like to argue that bringing vegetable seeds from one's native place and cultivating 
them in distant lands was never simply a question of  economics or subsistence. Migrants came 
bearing their desires to re-create home life, and horticulture was one of  the methods for doing so, 
because familiar tastes and landscapes reminiscent of  home provided some sense of  stability despite 
being in a foreign land. It was in the material practice of  gardening that Zuo found this sense of 
stability. The gardens that he created in Gansu and Xinjiang promised to provide the aesthetic 
pleasure of  treading across cultivated land, the daily practice of  acting like a farmer, and the regular 
enjoyment of  vegetables that fed his nostalgia for home.  
The growing resemblance between the practices and products of  horticulture in China 
proper and Xinjiang became an important trope in the years when Zuo Zongtang was not merely 
bringing new plants and seeds but also leading soldiers and refugees to the frontier. A stream of 
settlers followed in the wake of  his army's reconquest of  Xinjiang, and insofar as they brought 
79 Kloppenburg writes of  European movement around the globe: “As more voyages of  exploration were 
undertaken and as colonization proceeded, germplasm transfers of  staple food crops were made as a 
matter of  course, principally by sailors and settlers interested in subsistence production. [. . .] Old World 
vegetables went west.” Kloppenburg, First the Seed, 155.
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plants and practices with them, they added to the resemblance. To be sure, there were countervailing 
forces that sometimes impeded the replication of  Chinese horticulture in peripheral territories. As 
Zuo and others discovered, the climate of  Xinjiang was not always hospitable for growing hinterland 
vegetables, and attempts at horticulture may have floundered upon extremes in weather or other 
environmental conditions that set the frontier apart from China proper. There was another obstacle 
as well. Writing about Xinjiang agriculture at the end of  the Qing dynasty, Sun Anfu complained of 
migrants traveling out to the borderland only long enough to accrue sizable wealth through 
commerce before they returned to their native places. Because they had “no plan to cultivate fields 
and gardens and raise sons and grandsons,” too many sojourners added little to the agricultural and 
horticultural soils of  Xinjiang or to the region's Han population.80 Despite these obstacles, there 
remained a vision of  horticultural abundance in the northwest in the late nineteenth century. 
Bringing seeds and a deep commitment to cultivated landscapes, Zuo hoped to overcome the 
environmental conditions that made him feel so distant from Hunan. The push to spread vegetables 
to oasis cities like Turpan was corollary to the process of  resettling refugees from China proper after 
warfare in the 1860s and 1870s. Insofar as the varieties of  seeds, the cultivation practices, and the 
aesthetics of  garden production were all imported from China proper, it was also an endeavor to 
render distant lands into familiar landscapes.
80
無殖田園長子孫之計。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4b. 
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Chapter 6
Populating the Land: Regulations for Resettlement across the Empire
Taiping marauders returned to the northern Zhejiang town of  Wukang sometime in early 
1864. They forced themselves through front doors with knives bared, raided storage trunks, grains, 
and household utensils, and then occupied homes for days on end. When at last they departed, they 
left fields and gardens barren. Survivors had nothing to eat but “grass, roots, and tree bark.” Of 
those lucky enough to escape, some “entrusted their lives to tiny brooks and river branches” and bid 
their time amongst the dense thickets of  reeds by the water's edge, scooping out fish and shrimp and 
picking wild rice shoots (gu 菰) and water poppies (xing 荇). Others fled into the piedmont, taking 
refuge in bamboo forests and along mountain cliffs. But most did not survive—Wukang was 
startlingly depopulated. One observer estimated that out of  around 200,000 original inhabitants, 
only several tens of  thousands remained in the town.1  
Precipitous depopulation was a defining characteristic of  Zhejiang society following the 
Taiping disaster. Perhaps close to a half  of  the province's original thirty million people died or fled 
in the chaos.2 In one northwestern district, Anji, the population fell from over 130,000 to fewer than 
7000 within a matter of  four years, between 1860 and 1864.3 The military agents of  pacification and 
reconstruction were deeply aware of  depopulation even before they had suppressed the last 
remnants of  the Taipings in 1864. When Zuo Zongtang entered the beleaguered province from the 
1 This story is related in Qin Xiangye, Ping Zhe ji lue [Brief  account of  the pacification of  Zhejiang], 
(Zhejiang shuju, 1873), 13:9a-b.
2 Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 55. On the issue of  nineteenth-century Taiping-era 
depopulation, see Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population of  China, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, MA; Harvard 
University Press, 1959), 236-48. 
3 Anji xian zhi [Gazetteer of  Anji county], (N.p., 1874), 4-hukou:4a-b. 
211
southwest with his forces in early 1862, he discovered barren fields with survivors barely clinging to 
life. His initial reports indicated widespread death and desertion in the countryside, where farmland 
had quickly fallen out of  use. This caused him great concern as the new governor of  Zhejiang 
because he bore the responsibility for reviving agricultural production, providing food and clothing 
to survivors, and generating tax revenue for state treasuries stretched far beyond their means. 
Without labor in the countryside, the task of  rebuilding would be all but impossible. 
 For late Qing governors charged with reconstruction, the quintessential characteristic of  a 
devastated rural landscape was its paucity of  people. The most startling landscapes were those 
without labor power to undertake farming. In the wake of  rebellion, provincial policies to reconnect 
land with labor multiplied throughout the empire in the late nineteenth century. Governors from 
Zhejiang all the way to Xinjiang adopted stipulations to solicit settlers for land reclamation (zhaoken 
招墾), among the first priorities in the wave of  reconstruction efforts from the 1860s to the 1880s. 
Despite the great diversity of  environments and landscapes within the empire, officials eager to 
promote production rarely tailored their regulations to specific regions. Instead, they assumed that 
the homogeneous mechanism of  production—agriculture—would be employed in nearly the same 
manner everywhere. Likewise, although they usually raised the issue of  water control and purported 
to repair waterworks, water control per se hardly differentiated one region from another. The details 
of  place were all but effaced as these officials drafted and circulated regulations in the sprint to 
resettle the land. 
In contrast to the de facto regulatory homogenization of  agricultural landscapes, late Qing 
governors keenly categorized land's counterpart, human laborers. Eager to control the social ecology 
of  agricultural production, officials almost always circumscribed specific groups of  people whom 
they deemed worthy of  additional government supervision based on their geographic origins or 
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their economic identities. Sometimes this meant outright exclusion from the process of 
reconstruction and social reincorporation, as was the case for some Shaanxi Muslims in the 1860s.4 
In other cases, provincial policies initiated the strategic yet cautious inclusion of  diverse populations 
into the process of  land resettlement. Despite the appearance of  equanimity created by 
commonplace regulatory claims about accepting both local people (tuzhu 土著) and migrants (kemin 
客民) for resettlement, governors carefully discriminated between undesirable settlers and other 
groups they deemed unproblematic. As these agents of  the Qing state strategized for the revival of 
postbellum agriculture, what mattered most was not the land itself  but the people who would 
cultivate it. 
Zhejiang's Initial Reconstruction under Zuo Zongtang
Appointed Zhejiang's new governor after the last one had died at the hands of  the Taipings 
in Hangzhou, Zuo Zongtang was horrified by the disruption of  agricultural production when he 
arrived with his army in early 1862. That summer, he reported how the Taipings had occupied the 
province's most fertile areas and how, in the preceding year, its military leaders Li Shixian 李世  賢 and 
Li Xiucheng  李秀成 had ravaged hinterland countrysides “right when farming people were separating 
seedlings [for planting] and reaping rice, so that old grains were plundered and new grains were not 
harvested.” He was estranged by the extent of  the ruins, by the enormity of  the land without tillers, 
and by peasants who had escaped death but were now starving. The Taiping disruption to Zhejiang 
agriculture had resulted in deserted fields and sparse harvests. The few remaining people Zuo 
encountered as his army marched into the province from the southwest, through the prefecture of 
Quzhou, were “starving and tired in the extreme,” and “none had color in his face, even to the point 
4 For example, see Liu Rong's “Regulations for Land Management” (1865), in HJWX, 39:64a-72a.
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where some just withered and died.” He inspected destroyed buildings strewn with reeking “putrid 
flesh and skeletons,” leaving “diseased vapors” to waft through the air. As survivors struggled for 
life, the fields grew no grains.5
Even as his army made progress expelling Taiping forces from major cities the following 
year, the countryside languished. As he victoriously reported the recapture of  Shaoxing in March 
1863, Zuo appended a dire missive: in Zhejiang, “people and materials have faded away, the fields 
are wastelands, and as far as one can see there are white bones and yellow cogongrass (huang mao 黃
茅).” Almost all of  the farming tools had been destroyed. Unable to purchase seeds of  staple grains 
and beans, survivors scavenged the fields for scraps of  edible vegetation: “they go along, hunched 
over in barren farm plots and abandoned vegetable gardens, picking wild vegetables for food.” 
When they could search no more for lack of  light, “they snuggle up and lay their heads under 
cracking and crumbling walls, using pieces of  earth to sleep.” Perhaps most appalling to the 
governor, starvation victims had lost the will to live and looked with complete indifference upon 
“their own flesh and blood dying at their sides.”6 
Zuo responded to these scenes of  deprivation with commonplace famine-relief  measures. 
His army doled out gruel to survivors from grain stocks confiscated from captured rebels or from 
their own provisions. But seeing as how Zuo's army consistently faced grain shortages, he deemed 
this only a stopgap solution, the mere “application of  small drops of  water” to a conflagration.7 To 
replenish the stocks, he procured grain from northeastern Jiangxi province and had it shipped by 
boats, carts, and human porters across the mountains of  southwestern Zhejiang.8 Yet this precious 
grain did not satisfy the needs of  his army and famine survivors. By the spring of  1863, the 
5 TZ1/6/16 (1862), ZZQ, 1:74-75.  
6 TZ2/2/4 (1863), ZZQ, 1:178.
7 Ibid., 1:178.
8 TZ1/6/16 (1862), ZZQ, 1:75.  
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governor was fretting about how distant the fall harvest seemed, and he harbored little hope that the 
destitute would survive the summer.9  
More than soup kitchens would be necessary to make Zhejiang thrive, so Zuo devised a 
concise set of  twelve guidelines for reconstruction within his first year in the province. In the winter 
of  1862-63, he purportedly distributed to subordinates “Twelve Articles of  Remediation” to instruct 
local officials how to initiate and manage reconstruction efforts.10 Each district of  each prefecture 
was to establish a “united welfare bureau” (tongshan ju 同善局) headed by local gentry who could also 
set up branch bureaus in countryside villages at their discretion.11 Although there were pre-Taiping 
precedents for such bureaus in the existence of  government-run charities, the number of  welfare 
institutions greatly increased in the era of  reconstruction.12 The wide range of  functions of  the new 
bureaus also surpassed the more narrowly defined responsibilities of  previous agencies. The twelve 
articles stipulated that the bureaus undertake charitable activities, reorganize and regulate local 
finances and solicit donations, and enforce prohibitions against four activities deemed harmful to 
public order.13 The united welfare bureaus were to be funded by raising new lijin 釐金 taxes on salt 
9 There were also indications that relief  in the form of  gruel was insufficient. The new military general of 
Hangzhou, Yi-le-dong-a 伊勒東阿, despaired at the “look of  starvation” on the faces of  the people even 
after local officials had begun to distribute free porridge. Yi-le-dong-a was struck by the depth of 
depravity of  the scenes in Zhejiang when he entered the province sometime before the summer of  1863. 
He noted how the population had greatly shrunk, fields had gone to waste, and many houses had been 
lost to immolation. On top of  this, the weather had not proved cooperative in ameliorating the plight of 
the survivors. He reported in August 1863 that the rains had been delayed in coming, leaving the fields dry 
and hurting grain crops. See TZ2/6/26 (1863), GZZ 04-01-22-0061-050.
10 TZ2/2/4 (1863), ZZQ, 1:178; Qin, Ping Zhe ji lue, 13:3a.
11 Qin, Ping Zhe ji lue, 13:3a; Li Yingjue, Zhe zhong fa fei ji lue [Brief  account of  the hairy bandits in Zhejiang], 
(N.p., n.d.), 84.
12 Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China, 94. 
13 The twelve articles are as follows: “Take in and provide support for children”; “Take in and provide 
support for women”; “Provide aid for widowing, orphaned, and crippled beggars”; “Bury bodies”; 
“Increase lijin taxes on salt and tea”; “Raise lijin taxes on boating households”; “Urge donations from the 
private rents [collected by] ancestral temples”; “Urge donations from the gentry”; “Prohibit abductions 
and kidnapping”; “Prohibit disturbances and swindling”; “Prohibit bullying and insulting”; “Prohibit the 
slaughter of  plough oxen.” Qin, Ping Zhe ji lue, 13:3a-5b.
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and tea at production grounds, trading ports, and checkpoint bureaus.14
Despite the clear concern of  the articles for charitable, financial, and security matters, the 
newly established bureaus also paid attention to rebuilding agriculture. The final article, for example, 
strictly forbade the slaughter of  plough oxen, an integral input for productive farmwork. According 
to Zuo, in early 1863 the number of  living draft animals in Zhejiang was a tiny fraction—“not one 
in a hundred”—of  the original number in the province.15 This paucity of  “oxen power” meant that 
reclaiming all of  the abandoned and unused farmland would be far more difficult than before, and 
Zuo's prohibition was intended to stem any further loss of  these valuable, living agricultural tools.16 
The bureaus also aimed to revive handicraft production, a significant component of  the rural 
household economy in nineteenth-century Jiangnan. The second article of  Zuo's regulations 
outlined plans for using female labor to produce textiles in a kind of  work-as-charity arrangement. 
Despite the mandate to “take in and provide for women” (shou yang funu 收養婦女), the details of  the 
article indicate how bureaus took advantage of  the crisis to tap into women's knowledge and labor. 
Women first registered at the bureaus with a long list of  personal details, including their ages, place 
of  origin, residence, and the names of  parents-in-law, husband, parents, uncles, brothers, and all 
other relatives, living or deceased. Then the bureaus were to distribute raw cotton and hemp and 
exhort the women to spin the materials into thread and weave it into cloth. Once the weaving 
process was complete, women were to return to the bureaus to sell the finished cloth. This kind of 
putting-out system engaged surviving women in productive activity and also helped the bureaus “to 
satisfy expenditures.”17 Although the women's work was not agricultural fieldwork, it was no doubt 
intended as a counterpart to farming. 
14 Qin, Ping Zhe ji lue, 13:4a. 
15 TZ2/2/4 (1863), ZZQ, 1:178.
16 Qin, Ping Zhe ji lue, 13:5b.
17 Qin, Ping Zhe ji lue, 13:3b.
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The united welfare bureaus may have provided relief  for local survivors in the short term, 
but the governor knew that their work alone was not sufficient to rebuild agricultural production in 
the long term. Much land had fallen out of  cultivation as landlords and peasants fled or died in the 
violence, and only a fraction of  the original population remained. The primary task for agriculture 
was therefore to recruit more labor to settle on Zhejiang's abandoned cropland. As of  March 1863, 
the governor planned to purchase seeds and plough oxen and entice the “farming people of 
neighboring provinces to come to Zhejiang to cultivate land, in hopes that the future might have the 
expectation of  population growth.”18 Despite his resolve to promote the province's reconstruction, 
Zuo stayed in Zhejiang only until late 1864, when he was ordered to defeat rebel movements in 
Fujian and Guangdong provinces. 
Differentiating Settlers: Ma Xinyi's Zhejiang 
Plans for recruiting farm settlers to Zhejiang's fields awaited Zuo's successor, Ma Xinyi 馬新
貽, an experienced military general from the army of  Zeng Guofan 曾國藩. Not more than a month 
after taking up his post as the new governor in January 1865, Ma articulated six objectives for 
provincial reconstruction, two of  which directly pertained to agricultural production: water control 
and land reclamation.19 
Like his predecessor, Ma understood the urgency of  repairing embankments along the 
coastline to protect littoral communities and provide irrigation for crops. Dikes along the north side 
of  Hangzhou Bay and the Qingtang River—in places like Renhe, Haining, and Haiyan—had fallen 
into various states of  disrepair. Several years earlier, Zuo had reported how “salty water poured into 
18 TZ2/2/4, ZZQ, 1:178.
19 Ma Xinyou, Ma Duanmin gong nianpu [Chronological biography of  Ma Xinyi], (N.p., n.d.), 26a; TZ4/1/15 
(1865), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi [Memorials of  Ma Xinyi], (N.p., 1894), 1:3a-6b.
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farmlands, mulberry trees withered and rice turned into weedy grasses, and farmers next to the seas 
lost their occupations” because stone embankments and reinforced earthen dikes had eroded.20 Ma 
acknowledged the initiative of  some local gentry to repair embankments, but he envisioned much 
grander plans: replacing the bunches of  sticks or bundles of  tree twigs, grain stalks, and stones that 
formed some embankments with costly stonework. Beyond these urgent issues, the provincial 
capital also faced water problems. West Lake was clogged with turnip mustard (fengfei 葑菲), making 
dredging difficult, but Ma firmly resolved to clear the grasses from the lake and other waterways to 
prevent sedimentation and thus enable farmland irrigation.21 
Despite the significance of  water control, Ma identified repopulating Zhejiang's farmlands as 
the foremost task for the reconstruction of  agriculture. He deemed the human resources of  the land 
fundamentally inadequate to fully extract the resources of  the soil. Depopulation in the previous 
decade had ruined the province's agriculture: “In Zhejiang, farmland hitherto has been mostly 
fertile, and Western Zhejiang the best. Since warfare, the greater part has become wasteland (huangtu 
荒土). Seeking a reason for this, [I find] the main cause is that people were forced to leave and nine 
out of  ten houses are empty.”22 To initiate reclamation of  wasteland and make Zhejiang fertile again, 
Ma instructed subordinates to recruit refugees and migrants. The governor initially showed almost 
no preference for who would settle and cultivate abandoned land. He may even have been frustrated 
that, nearly six months after Zhejiang had been completely retaken by imperial forces, more local 
people had not returned. Calling into question the basic intentions (benxin 本心) of  the common 
people who “have a native place yet do not return and have fields yet do not farm,” Ma instructed 
each district to recruit farmers—anyone “willing to cultivate”—regardless of  whether they were 
20 TZ3/4/13 (1864), ZZQ, 1:423.
21 TZ4/1/15 (1865), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 1:5a-b.
22 TZ4/1/15 (1865), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 1:6a.
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refugees of  local origin or peasants from other provinces.23 Just as Zuo Zongtang had planned, local 
officials were to provide seeds and tools to the recruits, who would repay these capital inputs only 
after the following year's autumn harvest. 
Ma's summary of  reclamation plans lent a veneer of  universality to his reconstruction tactics. 
Any farmer should be allowed to cultivate any piece of  vacant and unclaimed land, no matter the 
agricultural knowledge he had, his geographical origin, or the local ecological conditions. Yet Ma 
also recognized local differences would likely shape how plans were carried out. He made local 
officials responsible for “taking appropriate action according to local conditions” (yin di zhi yi 因地制
宜) on the issues of  recruitment tactics and tax assessments after reclamation.24 Ma also articulated 
vast discrepancies in mores and popular sentiments of  the people in each of  Zhejiang's eleven 
prefectures. Given these localisms, the governor suggested that petty officials should be chosen 
“according to the locality” (yin di 因地), a way to ensure their rapport with local inhabitants. This was 
especially important for prefectures where he assumed some people to be morally delinquent. The 
people of  Ningbo and Shaoxing prefectures, for example, may have been extravagant or frugal, but 
they all had a knack for “clever swindling,” an aspect of  their character likely to be handled adroitly 
only by officials who governed flexibly and were “shrewd and able to endure problems.” By 
contrast, the “savage” people of  Taizhou prefecture along the eastern littoral required “determined 
and powerful” leaders who could “restrain their ferocity and obstinacy and calm them into being 
good.”25 
23 TZ4/1/15 (1865), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 1:6a.
24 TZ4/1/15 (1865), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 1:6b.
25 TZ4/1/15 (1865), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 1:5b. Ma reported that land in the three prefectures of  Jinhua, 
Quzhou, and Yanzhou was barren, yet the people's feelings were “all simple, gentle, and obedient.” Their 
primary activities after destruction had become mere “rest and procreation.” Yet Ma prognosticated that if 
“merciful, propitious, and kindly” local officials were employed and “went above and beyond their 
offices,” life would gradually return to normal. Ma also called the people of  Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and 
Huzhou “luxuriously extravagant” and the people of  Chuzhou and Wenzhou “peaceful and quiet.”
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When he detailed formal policies for soliciting settlers and facilitating reclamation in the 
“Regulations for Reclamation in Zhejiang” several years later, Ma intimated that local officials ought 
not to differentiate between settlers, only between different pieces of  land.26 Ma cloaked this aspect 
of  the regulations in imperial ideology by claiming that the “imperial court makes divisions between 
land but does not distinguish between people” (you fen tu wu fen min 有分土無分民). In other words, in 
the process of  surveying land and reappropriating it into the system of  government extraction, 
officials ought to pay attention only to boundaries in fields and waterways. No distinction would be 
made among the potential settlers, a clear contradiction of  Ma's desire to categorize Zhejiang people 
when he first arrived in the province. Regardless of  if  they were local (bendi 本地) or from another 
region (waichu 外處), they would be allowed to take up new claims on abandoned land as long as they 
cultivated it. The regulations mandated that settlers register their previous activities, the position and 
location of  their new fields, the number of  mu 畝, and the grain output. If  several people vied for 
one parcel of  land, the first person to arrive would have priority.27 
Despite this air of  universality, however, Ma's categorizations of  Zhejiang people crept into 
settlement regulations. Anxious about dangerous and uncouth southeasterners, Ma maintained a 
tepid attitude toward any farmers who came from Wenzhou and Taizhou prefectures. Previously, Ma 
had warned about needing to restrain them. Now, he only very warily incorporated them into 
Zhejiang's reconstruction process. The regulations thus cautioned his subordinates: “For the fierce 
people of  Wenzhou and Taizhou, one need not recruit them to come, [but if] there are those who 
have come willingly, one need not command them to leave.”28 If  Ma stopped short of  outright 
26 TZ5/8/22 (1866), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 3:49a-57b; TZ5/9/20 (1866), LFZZ 03-9552-17. The memorial 
containing the regulations dates to late September 1866, but the regulations contain passages indicating 
decisions made in 1864.
27 TZ5/8/22 (1866), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 3:53b-54a.
28 TZ5/8/22 (1866), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 3:53b.
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prohibition, he nonetheless differentiated Wenzhou and Taizhou people from the rest of  the 
potential settlers, who would be given legal access to cultivate Zhejiang's abandoned lands. 
Although Ma never clarified why he targeted people from those two southeastern 
prefectures, it seems likely that he reproduced the late imperial precedent of  official animosity 
toward so-called “shack people” (pengmin 棚民), a derogatory moniker for seasonal or permanent 
migrants who cultivated land and labored in the Yangzi highlands and who were known for their 
flimsy hillside abodes.29 Qing officials came to associate the shack people with social instability and 
ecological degradation in upland regions, and blamed them for problems like deforestation, soil 
exhaustion, and erosion.30 Although these upland setters had arrived from various locations in 
southeastern China during the Qing era, post-Taiping Zhejiang officials apparently associated them 
with the prefectures of  Wenzhou and Taizhou.31 In these prefectures, Ma reported, the mountainous 
terrain had little arable land, so residents migrated and sought new opportunities to cultivate land 
elsewhere, despite the fact that their native regions were relatively unharmed by the rebellion. But as 
Ma recognized, residents of  the countryside in places like Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou refused 
to conduct business with any such people because “their temperament is fierce by nature” (xingqing  
su han 性情素悍), and landowners apparently expected them to cause trouble at the first sign of 
29 On the shack people, see Stephen Averill, “The Shed People and the Opening of  the Yangzi Highlands,” 
Modern China 9.1 (January 1983):84-126; Anne Osborne, “The Local Politics of  Land Reclamation in the 
Lower Yangzi Highlands,” Late Imperial China 15.1 (June 1994):1-46; Anne Osborne, “Highlands and 
Lowlands: Economic and Ecological Interactions in the Lower Yangzi Region under the Qing,” in 
Sediments of  Time: Environment and Society in Chinese History, ed. Mark Elvin and Liu Ts'ui-jung (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 218; Shiba Yoshinobu, “Environment Versus Water Control: The Case 
of  the Southern Hangzhou Bay Area from the Mid-Tang through the Qing,” in Sediments of  Time:  
Environment and Society in Chinese History, ed. Mark Elvin and Liu Ts'ui-jung (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 163-164. 
30 For example, see XF1/5/1 (1851), LFZZ 03-4489-23.
31 One post-Taiping gazetteer describes “shack people” as “people of  Wenzhou and Taizhou who cultivate 
the mountains. Their dwellings are all grass huts. Thus, they are called shack people.” See Anji xian zhi 
(1874), 4-hukou:4b. For other references to shack people being from Wenzhou, see Anne Osborne, “The 
Local Politics of  Land Reclamation in the Lower Yangzi Highlands,” 4, 7n10, 14.
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tension in the relationship.32 Ma thus realized the potential difficulties of  harnessing the labor power 
of  Taizhou and Wenzhou people to revive agriculture in the northern and western prefectures—
Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Jinhua, Quzhou, and Yanzhou—where large expanses of  farmland had 
grown into weeds. 
Yet these discriminatory sentiments created a conundrum for local officials and landowners 
who failed to attract other tenants. The regulations called for outsiders and non-Zhejiang people to 
be accepted as new cultivators, but Ma worried that people from provinces bordering Zhejiang—
namely Jiangsu, Anhui, and Jiangxi—would prefer to remain in their native places rather than 
migrate to Zhejiang, especially because the Taiping had wreaked havoc and left wasted farmland in 
those provinces as well.33 Nonetheless, Ma envisioned a time when Zhejiang could complete its 
recovery. He estimated that the renewal of  “livelihoods” (shengli 生理) and “vitality” (yuanqi 元氣) by 
means of  agricultural reconstruction could occur within three to five years in areas with relatively 
little wasted property (huang chan 荒產) and within ten to twenty years in areas where there was much 
land to be reclaimed.34 
To hasten reclamation and ensure the new land system's long-term stability, the regulations 
called upon local officials to clarify and delineate private property rights as they pertained to 
environmental resources. Recognizing how settlers lived mixed together, with the “good and the bad 
intermingled,” officials were not only charged with reestablishing systems for public security (baojia  
保甲) and ejecting vagrants, gamblers, thieves, and people who secretly slaughtered their animals. 
They also had to define the geographic boundaries of  property and rights to land use. Wherever 
local people or settlers “gathered firewood, siphoned spring water, or cultivated garden vegetables,” 
32 TZ5/8/22 (1866), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 3:51b.
33 As Ma worried, “Who would be willing to abandon what is near to seek what is afar?” Memorial of 
TZ5/8/22 (1866), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 3:51b.
34 TZ5/8/22 (1866), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 3:51b.
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Ma made officials responsible for clarifying the dividing lines (jiexian界限) between potentially 
conflicting parties. The strict enforcement of  these demarcations was, in Ma's mind, a key means to 
preventing future disputes, avoiding potential unrest, and ensuring the lasting impact of 
reconstruction in Zhejiang.35 
Resettling and Colonizing Northern Xinjiang
Far across the empire, northern Xinjiang's oases and steppe lands also awaited agricultural 
settlers. Stark depopulation of  the territory's cities and countrysides followed in the wake of  Zuo 
Zongtang's final reconquest of  the imperial territory in 1878. Just as Zuo had bemoaned the utter 
destruction of  agrarian production in the Zhejiang countryside, the acting military governor of 
Urumqi in 1879, Gongtang 恭鏜, complained that warfare had lain waste to the city and had caused 
residents to flee. As he reported in May of  that year, “no more than ten or twenty percent of  the 
Manchu and Han soldiers and civilians have survived; all [of  the rest] have drifted away and become 
destitute.” Other officials had attempted to recruit new settlers, but with poor results: because “there 
is nothing left of  houses or tools, there is no way to earn a living.”36 Without these basic implements 
of  daily agricultural life, Gongtang worried, farmers would not return and the land would remain 
without labor.
By the time Xinjiang became a province in 1884, Gongtang had already been transferred 
from his post in Urumqi. But his sentiments about reconstructing agriculture by recruiting farmers 
from beyond the region were echoed by provincial leaders. The province's first governor, Liu 
Jintang, also remarked upon warfare's legacy in the landscape: the vast fields of  useless grasses. 
(Perhaps only coincidentally, Liu identified the weedy culprit as cogongrass, the same organism that 
35 TZ5/8/22 (1866), Ma Duanmin gong zou yi, 3:57a. 
36 GX5/R3/21 (1879), LFZZ 03-9553-47.
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had blanketed abandoned fields in Zhejiang two decades earlier.) Yet Liu recognized the immense 
agricultural potential of  these deserted lands, which belonged not to the worthless stretches of  sand 
and rock—the gobi—but to the realm of  fertile soil.37 Much like Ma Xinyi in Zhejiang, Liu and the 
province's administrative commissioner, Wei Guangtao, devised stipulations to solicit settlers to 
cultivate the soil (zhaoken 招墾) and expand agricultural production. And just as in Zhejiang, one 
overwhelming concern was to determine which groups of  people would be involved in the 
resettlement. The regulations also prioritized water, but said almost nothing about local ecological 
conditions. 
Wei Guangtao apparently drafted formal regulations for soliciting settlers around 1886.38 
Aimed at guiding the process of  resettlement and reclamation, they began with admonitions to 
repair waterways and irrigation facilities, suggesting the absolute importance of  water control in a 
region where mountain springs and snow melt supplied irrigation canals in each new growing 
season. Whereas the irrigation channels of  southern Xinjiang (nanlu 南路) had already been repaired 
by the defense forces (fangying 防營)—a reference to Qing troops—and whereas the region was 
densely populated with relatively few fallow fields (huangtian 荒田), in sparsely populated northern 
Xinjiang (beilu 北路) the greater portion of  ditches were clogged with silt and did not serve the 
function of  irrigation. But given sources of  water, farmers would gradually be able to prosper. So 
the most pressing issue was to devote effort and financial resources to provide water for northern 
districts and stave off  drought in places like Qitai, several hundred kilometers east of  Urumqi, 
whose people suffered through extreme drought the year Wei penned the regulations.
37 GX13/2/12 (1887), Liu Xiangqin gong zougao [Memorials of  Liu Jintang], (Changsha, 1898), 12:16a. 
38 XJDQ 15-34-3258. The document is undated and only partially preserved, but a comparison of  the 
contents with a memorial of  Xinjiang Governor Liu Jintang suggests a date prior to early 1887. See 
memorial of  GX13/2/12 (1887), Liu Xiangqin gong zougao, 12:16a-18a. See also Zhongguo di yi lishi 
dang'anguan, ed., Qing dai zouzhe huibian: nongye, huanjing [Compilation of  Qing-era memorials: agriculture, 
environment], (Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan, 2005), 553.
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As the regulations made clear, however, clearing silt from canals and patching up destroyed 
embankments was part of  the process of  recruiting new settlers, not merely saving the ones already 
there. By all accounts, there was far too little labor power to reclaim all of  the northern lands. Early 
in 1887, Liu Jintang bemoaned how only 20 to 30 percent of  the land had become productive via 
reclamation. Wei's guidelines attributed this apparent waste of  land to sparse population and 
destroyed water resources: “That wasteland still cannot be opened up and taxation still cannot be 
swiftly resumed is indeed because of  the paucity of  people and also because ditches have yet to be 
repaired.”39 Despite the staggering short-term costs of  repairing them, in the long run the 
regulations assumed that such expenditures would enable settlement and would lead eventually to 
surpluses for military coffers. 
Xinjiang's leaders expected to entice local people and migrants to participate in agricultural 
reclamation in zones of  settlement north of  the Tianshan mountains. Yet because there were few 
local people (tuzhu 土著) remaining to cultivate the land, the regulations imagined three large groups 
of  people responding to the government's initiative. A motley mix of  migrants (kemin 客民) 
composed the first group, which was to include soldiers who had taken leaves of  absence as well as 
“people who followed the battalions conducting trade, seeking relatives, or looking for trouble (mishi  
覓事).”40 In the eyes of  officials like Liu and Wei, the presence of  these migrants challenged 
Xinjiang's social stability. The regulations claimed that some labored and adhered to the law, but 
others lived by indolence or mischief, or furtively cultivated opium in the mountains in spring and 
summer, and so they actually undermined Qing state goals through their labor. Others stayed purely 
because they had no money to return home or because business losses elsewhere caused them to 




geographic receptacle for Chinese criminals, an undesirable land where outlaws and exiled officials 
served time away from their home provinces.41 The question for officials in Xinjiang in the 1880s 
was how to transform petty crooks, gamblers, troublemakers, and economic refugees who had come 
to Xinjiang of  their own accord into productive farm laborers, to “change the bad into good” (hua 
you wei liang 化莠為良). Uncultivated land provided just such an opportunity for their transformation. 
Indeed, Liu and Wei saw it as a chance for the mutual transformation of  useless subjects—aimless 
people and wasteland—into productive components of  the landscape.42 The regulations thus called 
for subordinates to thoroughly investigate “peddlers, hired laborers, loafers, and the jobless,” register 
them, resettle (ancha 安插) them on vacant land, and calculate their allotment of  irrigation water. 
Local officials were to provide loans for initial farming inputs because, as the governor recognized, 
all of  the “newly recruited households” were “impoverished.”43 
Turkestanis (chanmin 纏民) from southern Xinjiang comprised a second category of  settlers 
to be involved in state-sponsored reclamation. From the governor's viewpoint, these people 
populated the southern landscape in abundance, leaving little extra land for cultivation in the oases.44 
They could thus “aid in the assemblage” of  cultivators in the north. Appropriating their labor for 
state goals was hardly a new phenomenon; Qing officials had long utilized southern Muslims for 
farmwork in northern Xinjiang.45 Within the first decade of  Qing conquest of  Xinjiang in the 1750s, 
the Manchus brought thousands of  households of  southern Turkestanis to cultivate land in the 
41 Joanna Waley-Cohen, Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1991). 
42 XJDQ 15-34-3258. As the regulations claimed, “Having one more household opening up land, a place will 
have fewer people flaunting the law.”
43 GX13/2/12 (1887), Liu Xiangqin gong zougao, 12:16a.
44 GX13/2/12 (1887), Liu Xiangqin gong zougao, 12:16a.
45 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of  Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 344-345, 351-352. 
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region around Ili.46 The 1887 regulations pointed out that there had been no precedent for 
Turkestani Muslims cultivating in the north except for Gulja (Ch. Gu-le-zha 固勒扎)—the local place 
name for Ili—where they had grown to over six thousand households and generated annual 
revenues of  100,000 shi of  grain. 
Imagining the Muslims as important bodies of  labor and sources of  revenue, the regulations 
departed from precedent and envisioned southern Turkestanis settling into the region around the 
new provincial capital, Dihua  迪化 (lit. “enlightenment”), a Chinese name for Urumqi. Since 
“wasteland is everywhere, and local people (tuzhu 土著) are few and far between,” the land in this 
region awaited settlers. In the eyes of  Qing officials, southern Turkestanis had a clear financial 
advantage over settlers from China proper because to “imitate the methods of  transferring people 
[from the provinces] to solidify the border” would be extremely costly. The “impoverished and 
indolent households” of  the burgeoning Turkestani Muslims of  the south held great potential for 
aiding agrarian expansion. The regulations suggested allowing Muslim households without any fixed 
property (hengchan 恆產) to migrate north with their families, and allocating to them start-up “capital 
(ziben 資本), just like the regulations for soliciting for reclamation among locals and migrants (tu ke 土
客).” But their incorporation into this state-sponsored agricultural project did not indicate full 
integration with the Han population of  late nineteenth-century Xinjiang. A native headman 
(tunzhang 屯長) in charge of  social control would accompany groups of  ten or more households 
from the south.47 After they had been settled (ancha 安插), they were to be “isolated” (gejue 隔絕) 
from local and migratory Han settlers (tu ke 土客) even as they would reclaim land and participate in 
the official project to build the new province. 
46 Dorothy Borei, “Beyond the Great Wall: Agricultural Development in Northern Xinjiang, 1760-1820,” in 
To Achieve Security and Wealth: The Qing Imperial State and the Economy, 1644-1911, ed. Jane Kate Leonard and 
John R. Watt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell East Asia Program, 1992), 30. 
47 XJDQ 15-34-3258.
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Despite the financial benefits of  using southern Muslim labor for reclamation, Liu and Wei 
apparently thought that Muslims would be insufficient for the project. Indeed, neither the 
Turkestanis nor the Han migrants already in Xinjiang could match the “loafers from inside the Great 
Wall” (guannei xianmin 關內閑民)—people from China proper without employment or land—as a 
potential pool of  recruits for agriculture.48 To find these laborers, they looked east to Gansu. 
Although that province's native inhabitants (tuzhu 土著) were “not very abundant,” Gansu 
functioned as a zone of  sojourning and settlement for migrants from the neighboring provinces of 
Sichuan and Shaanxi who worked as hired laborers or peddlers. Gansu's unclaimed land was 
particularly attractive to Sichuan migrants, who faced high population density and land scarcity back 
at home. But as a poor province, Gansu lacked the resources to fund any large-scale recruitment of 
farmers, and Liu and Wei assumed that sojourning migrants faced “perpetual hardship” and the 
prospect of  failure there. So some migrants continued westward in pursuit of  economic refuge. Wei 
claimed to have seen them himself  west of  Jiayuguan, the point of  passage between Gansu and 
Xinjiang: a great many “poor people (pinmin 貧民) who carried belongings on their backs along the 
road, going to Xinjiang to avail themselves of  opportunities for employment.”49 Excited by the 
possibility of  enticing these people to reclaim farmland, the regulations proposed soliciting willing 
settlers from all across Gansu and beyond. Xinjiang province would accept economic outcasts from 
anywhere in the east: “No matter if  the unemployed of  the migrant populace (kemin minren 客民民人)
 are from this province, Sichuan province, or any province, allow all of  them through the pass to 
diligently work for reclamation (qin ken 勤墾).”50 





that some migrants were prevented from entering Xinjiang. So their regulations proposed ordering 
Jiayuguan to stay open from morning to dusk to remove any impediments to outward migration. 
The officials there were also to be “lenient in checking their [transit] tickets and interrogating them” 
such that migrants would not hesitate to move through the checkpoint.51 (People from Xinjiang who 
wanted to enter the pass and travel toward China proper, by contrast, would be checked as usual.) 
With these changes in transit policy, Liu and Wei imagined the future when “all people within the 
pass (neidi gemin 内地各民) would come as soon as they heard the news.” They also imagined a 
screening effect, whereby new settlers from afar who had responded to their solicitations would  “set 
their minds to agriculture, unlike the savage and hard-to-domesticate (han ye nan xun 悍野難馴) who 
have long followed the army.”52 Diligent farm workers from China proper thus held the position of 
model agricultural settlers in one of  the empire's newest peripheral provinces. 
Unlike post-Taiping settlement guidelines in Zhejiang, Xinjiang's regulations contained no 
details about determining land ownership. Recently reappropriated for the Qing state by Zuo 
Zongtang's military forces, the lands of  northern and southern Xinjiang were open ground for 
provincial officials to determine who would be settled and at which location. The regulations did, 
however, spell out clear financial and land obligations to new settlers to be borne by provincial 
officials. Wei's regulations called for each settler household—defined as two people—to receive 60 
mu of  farmland, three shi of  seed, a pair of  draft animals, food stipends and grain rations in wheat 
for eight months, and money for agricultural tools and house construction materials.53 The 
regulations also made sure that tax obligations or repayments of  capital would not hinder the grand 
process of  reclamation. Repayment would be scheduled over the course of  the first two harvest 
51 XJDQ 15-34-3258.
52 XJDQ 15-34-3258.
53 The total financial obligations of  the state to a settler household were calculated at 73.1 taels. GX13/2/12 
(1887), Liu Xiangqin gong zougao, 12:16b; XJDQ 15-34-3258. 
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seasons—longer if  the harvest failed—and only in the third and fourth seasons were local officials 
to begin levying taxes.54 In other words, they were almost wholly concerned with enticing new 
settlers to cultivate land and providing them with the necessary resources. When he reported the 
new regulations in 1887, Governor Liu Jintang also claimed early successes. He calculated that about 
1090 households of  locals and migrants, civilians and convicts, had been resettled near Dihua, near 
cities to Dihua's northeast and northwest, as well as in Hami.55 
Reconstruction, Settlement, and Colonization in the Late Qing
In the era of  post-Taiping reconstruction, Qing officials beyond Zhejiang and Xinjiang 
articulated their intentions to repopulate landscapes with people cultivating crops. In 1865, 
Governor Liu Rong  劉蓉 of  Shaanxi province developed “Regulations for Land Management” 
(Chouban yingtian zhangcheng 籌辦營田章程) to clarify procedures for settlement, which included 
temporarily setting up land bureaus, differentiating between abandoned, absentee-owner, and 
confiscated properties, and surveying land—even in “remote wasteland areas.”56 He had the same 
visions as his counterparts for reviving and extending cultivation where land appeared to lie fallow 
owing to a shortage of  labor. Liu in Shaanxi, Ma Xinyi in Zhejiang, and Liu Jintang and Wei 
Guangtao in Xinjiang all endeavored to solve the fundamental problem of  the landscape, its lack of 
productivity. They repeatedly voiced frustrations that farmland had turned to grass or brambles after 
warfare. Hoping to extract what they conceived of  as the untapped but intrinsic profits of  the soil, 
these Qing officials instituted specific regulations for gathering human capital—farmworkers, 
tenants, and owner-cultivators—and channeling it to the “wastelands” in their provinces. In 
54 GX13/2/12 (1887), Liu Xiangqin gong zougao, 12:16b.
55 GX13/2/12 (1887), Liu Xiangqin gong zougao, 12:17a.
56 TZ0/0/0, LFZZ 03-4967-25, 2a. This document has been published in at least two different compilations. 
See Liu Rong, TZ4/0/0 (1865), in HJWX, 39:64a-72a; Liu Rong, Yang hui tang wen ji (1877), 10:39a-47b.
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principle, the agrarian labor of  these new settlers would yield tax revenues and provide a steady 
source of  funding for extended and costly reconstruction projects. 
Late Qing officials often reported taking appropriate action to suit local conditions (yin di zhi  
yi 因地制宜).57 Liu Rong repeated this axiom as he planned a series of  “public reconstruction 
bureaus” (shanhou gongju 善後公局) across Hanzhong prefecture in southern Shaanxi in the 
mid-1860s.58 Such a claim may have served to rationalize to higher authorities these officials' inability 
to follow standard bureaucratic procedure in the midst of  disaster. It also may have conveyed their 
recognition of  variations in geography, environment, and social customs in the regions where they 
help posts. As Liu tersely explained of  Shaanxi, “the conditions in each location are different.” Yet 
regulations for postwar resettlement in widely divergent geographic and ecological spaces hardly 
mentioned these types of  spatial variations. Qing officials seem to have paid scant attention to 
differences in land and agricultural practice as they hurriedly pursued reconstruction projects. 
Concerns over topographical variation focused almost solely on water—channeling it toward 
parched fields or away from zones of  inundation—if  they existed at all. 
The strong urge to ensure swift settlement and reclamation meant that, in principle, officials 
of  Ma Xinyi's ilk recruited anyone willing to diligently work the fields. In an era of  “mass Chinese 
emigration,”59 laborers who departed their native places seeking new work in new lands may have 
crossed oceans, but many others stayed within the empire and their labor was incorporated into 
provincial projects to expand agriculture. What officials needed most was labor to transform unused 
57 This phrase was used as early as the Eastern Han (25-220 CE), but seems to have been common only in 
the Qing era. A related phrase, “taking appropriate action according to present circumstances” (yin shi zhi  
yi 因時制宜), which reflects a greater concern for temporal rather than spatial difference, seems to have 
been much more common than yin di zhi yi prior to the Qing era. See Luo Zhufeng, ed., Hanyu da cidian 
(Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2007), 1698-99. 
58 For an example, see Liu, Yang hui tang wen ji, 10:35a.
59 Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 
107.
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land into agricultural landscape. This common desire to maximize crop production in the late 
nineteenth century compelled officials to resettle almost anyone who arrived on the doorstep of  the 
local yamen or reconstruction bureau.
In practice, however, Zhejiang and Xinjiang officials categorized migrants, judging them less 
or more suitable as agents of  reclamation. They differentiated migrants by their origins and 
backgrounds, and they elaborated plans for their strategic inclusion or exclusion. In an era when 
native place associations among social elites sojourning or taking refuge in Shanghai were becoming 
a significant aspect of  civic life,60 the origins and perceived characteristics of  agricultural migrants 
shaped officials' decisions about settlement policy. When outsiders moved into a region still 
populated by native inhabitants, officials sensed the potential for conflict. In Zhejiang, leaving the 
door open to supposedly uncouth migrant farmers from Wenzhou and Taizhou but not actively 
recruiting them may have prompted nervous officials to later issue new regulations for their control. 
In early 1879, Zhejiang governor Mei Qizhao 梅啟  照 approved a fourteen-point plan for keeping 
potential social conflict in check, particularly in places like Huzhou that attracted a great many 
migrants. The plan prohibited migrants from a whole range of  behaviors—squatting, tax resistance, 
spontaneous out-migration, forming factions, illegal cutting of  trees, water control sabotage, 
vegetarianism—and established “reclamation inspection bureaus” (qingcha kenhuang ju 清查墾荒局) to 
record the movements of  migrants and issue permits.61 Although the rules pertained to Wenzhou 
and Taizhou people who were suspect in the eyes of  officials because they migrated on a seasonal 
basis, the rules were in fact aimed at the largest group of  migrants, reportedly from Hubei and 
Henan. If  they followed the rules, registered with the authorities, and worked diligently, they would 
60 Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937 
(Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1995). 
61 Chouban Zhejiang tu ke shanhou zhangcheng [Reconstruction regulations for the handling of  locals and 
migrants in Zhejiang], (N.p., 1879), 5b-7a.  
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be allowed to stay. If, on the other hand, they turned out to be vagrants (youmin 游民) without 
permanent residence, farming tools, or capital, officials were to deport them.62     
Xinjiang settlers likewise played integral roles in altering the political and human geography 
of  the region, at least in the minds of  Qing officials. When Liu Jintang and Wei Guangtao claimed 
to incorporate diverse categories of  migrants into their resettlement project, they seemed to 
replicate the all-inclusive style of  the Zhejiang regulations. But in their minds, neither the malfeasant, 
ragtag followers of  Zuo Zongtang's army nor the southern Turkestanis could provide enough stable 
labor to transform the land as they had envisioned. They staked their largest hopes upon poor but 
diligent farmers and laborers who would trudge out to Xinjiang from inside the Great Wall and 
participate in the process of  effacing the social and environmental idiosyncrasies of  the borderland. 
Indeed, reforming patterns and policies of  migration at Jiayuguan accorded with Xinjiang's 
new status as a province like the others of  China proper. “Now that Xinjiang has become a 
province,” Wei's regulations proclaimed, “it cannot be compared with the complete separation of 
domestic and foreign (nei wai gejue 內外隔絕) that existed in the past.”63 This statement indicates the 
great significance that settlers from China proper would supposedly play in the process of  erasing 
differences between the new province and the rest of  the empire. Perhaps like the experience in 
Nanjing after the defeat of  the Taipings, where “new leaders [. . .] transformed the city and 
redefined the relationship between Nanjing residents and the larger polity,”64 Wei and Liu announced 
their intentions to reinforce Xinjiang's new provincial status by transforming the northern Xinjiang 
countryside with a continuous flow of  migrants from China proper. Like the settlers of  Zhejiang, 
their farming labor would play a key role in reviving agriculture and reintegrating the empire in new 
62 Chouban Zhejiang tu ke shanhou zhangcheng, 12a. 
63 XJDQ 15-34-3258.
64 William Charles Wooldridge, “Building and State Building in Nanjing after the Taiping Rebellion,” Late  
Imperial China 30.2 (December 2009): 85.
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ways in the late nineteenth century.  
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Chapter 7
Growth, Population, and the Discourse of  Colonizing Xinjiang
Each additional person who can act as a soldier or farmer in Xinjiang means one less 
person in Beijing who is neither scholar nor civilian [. . .] How could it not be that 
Heaven intentionally left a fallow land, an area of  barren frontier to serve as the 
fluctuating outlet (weilu) for the Central Plains! Enact what is suitable based on present 
circumstances and reduce what is excessive to add to what is insufficient. Such would 
be Your Majesty acting in accordance with Heaven.1  
—Zhang Peilun, Memorial to the Qing court, 1876
 夫新疆多一可兵可農之人，即京師少一不士不民之人 [. . .] 豈非天故留一汙萊之地、甌脫
之區為中原之消息尾閭哉。因時制宜，裒多益寡，是在順天而行之聖人矣。
By late December of  1876, Hanlin Academy scholar Zhang Peilun  張佩綸 (1848-1903) had 
read the official reports: Zuo Zongtang's armies had successfully recaptured the “key to Xinjiang,” 
its northern commercial and transportation center, Urumqi.2 Pleased by the news, the young 
academician contemplated the immediate future of  the imperial frontier. He claimed that, in 
comparison to the reconquest, the postwar process of  “cultivating life” (xiuyang shengxi 修養生息) 
would be quite difficult. But in a lengthy memorial to the throne, Zhang attempted to articulate a 
plan for social rejuvenation centered on the government-sponsored migration of  Manchu 
1 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19, emphasis added. This memorial is reprinted in a collection of 
Zhang's missives and other writings. See Zhang Peilun, Jianyu ji [Collection from Jianyu], (Fengrun Jianyu 
caotang, 1918), 1:3a-7b.
2 Zhang reported that he read this information in the court gazetteer (dichao 邸抄). Zuo called Urumqi the 
“key to Xinjiang” (Xinjiang guanjian 新疆關鍵) in a report to Beijing. GX2/7/18 (1876), ZZQ, 6:494.
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bannermen—the empire's hereditary military corps—from Beijing to Xinjiang. On the frontier, 
these bannermen would take up farming and remain there for the rest of  their lives. After being 
circulated to governing officials, Zhang's proposal sparked a lengthy rejoinder from Zuo Zongtang 
when he was still orchestrating military operations well over 1500 kilometers to the west of  Beijing.3
This proposal to transfer bannermen permanently to the northwest frontier gives us reason 
to reconsider the meaning of  “cultivating life” in late Qing China. Zhang's desire to revive society 
and to promote productive activity after warfare was shared by governors across the empire in the 
second half  of  the nineteenth century in the wake of  destabilizing and destructive uprisings. These 
officials developed policies like crop promotion, land resettlement, household registration, and tax 
remissions and reforms “to restore confidence and to get people back to work.”4 These mundane 
reconstruction policies that were devised to ameliorate the hardships of  everyday life at the local 
level were part of  the process of  what Zhang called “cultivating life.” 
Yet Zhang's ideas for revitalizing society were also attentive to the geography and political 
economy of  the Qing empire as a whole. Writing from the imperial capital, Zhang Peilun took little 
interest in the lives of  war survivors in Urumqi despite the city's devastation and their loss of 
livelihood. Zhang's interest in Xinjiang and in the notion of  “cultivating life” instead grew out of 
misgivings he shared with other scholars about the intensifying contradictions of  demographic 
growth and imperial prosperity. Both of  these trends had their origins in the internal stability and 
unprecedented imperial expansion of  the eighteenth century. Qing emperors had recognized some 
of  the conundrums created by rapid growth, including the intractable challenges it posed for 
sustaining agrarian livelihoods. As Robert Marks has shown, the Yongzheng  雍正 (r. 1723-36) and 
3 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19. In 1876, Zhang served as an expositor-in-waiting (shijiang 侍講), a 
middling position in the Hanlin Academy. For Zhang Peilun's biography, see ECCP, 48-49. 
4 Wright, The Last Stand of  Chinese Conservatism, 124.
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Qianlong emperors attempted to mitigate social insecurity with policies that encouraged farmers to 
expand cultivation into marginal or abandoned lands through on-site agronomic training and multi-
year tax exemptions.5 Over a century later, Zhang's concern for “cultivating life” was likewise a 
response to the growing contradictions between demographic expansion and one of  the central 
ideals of  late imperial Chinese political economy, namely that productive subjects should have access 
to the most fundamental factor of  agrarian production, arable land. In 1876, Zhang identified 
Xinjiang as a solution to the contradictions of  growth because it could provide land to bannermen. 
As I show in this chapter, Zhang Peilun was not the first nineteenth-century scholar to look 
toward the frontier seeking panaceas for growth in China proper. In fact, Zhang participated in a 
discourse of  frontier colonization that had arisen a half-century earlier among scholars with a keen 
interest in frontier studies and in Xinjiang.6 As James Millward has argued, it was in the 1820s that 
“an elite group of  Han scholars adopted the Qing imperial territory as their own and lobbied to 
transform it into a full-fledged Chinese colony.”7 The 1820 proposal of  Gong Zizhen 龔自珍 
(1792-1841) to make Xinjiang a province like those in China proper was emblematic of  this 
movement, and it marked a shift away from the previously ascendant “Qianlong ideology of 
empire” in which “neither Han Chinese nor Chinese culture was granted privileged position in the 
Inner Asian parts of  the realm.”8 This shift was fully apparent only after Zuo Zongtang's reconquest 
of  Xinjiang and its transformation into a province in 1884, when Han officials populated the new 
provincial government and schools were established to train Turkic Muslims in Chinese language, 
5 Robert B. Marks, Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt: Environment and Economy in Late Imperial South China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 299-306 passim.
6 See Nailene Josephine Chou, “Frontier Studies and Changing Frontier Administration in Late Ch’ing 
China: The Case of  Sinkiang, 1759-1911”(Ph.D. diss., University of  Washington, 1976), 81-145. 
7 James Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 250.
8 Ibid., 234. 
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literature, and ethics.9 But by 1877, when Zuo responded to Zhang's proposal to transfer Beijing 
bannermen to the frontier as a measure for “cultivating life,” the discourse of  colonizing Xinjiang 
had already gone a long way toward substantiating the utility of  Xinjiang to China proper.  
Gong Zizhen's Proposal for Balance
In 1820, Gong Zizhen outlined his plan to transform Xinjiang into a province. The plan was 
later reprinted in the widely circulated Statecraft Compilation published in 1827.10 An aspiring scholar-
official who had struggled with the metropolitan examinations and who had purchased a position 
within the Grand Secretariat in Beijing,11 Gong was one among a group of  scholars in the capital 
who studied frontier geography and took an interest in Xinjiang. He was also an active proponent of 
practical statecraft, and it was in this milieu that he developed his proposal to “make Xinjiang the 
antidote to a decadent China” and resolve some of  the empire's most pressing concerns.12 He 
recoiled at the fact that, since the final years of  the Qianlong emperor's reign, imperial subjects had 
succumbed to the morally corrupting habits associated with wealth and prosperity. As Gong 
remarked, “Inheriting the abundance of  peace in the sixty years of  Qianlong, people's hearts have 
become accustomed to arrogance and extravagance, and in their social customs, they have taken to 
9 On Chinese education in late nineteenth-century Xinjiang, see James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A 
History of  Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 142-146.
10 Gong Zizhen, “Xiyu zhi xingsheng yi” [Proposal for establishing a province in the Western Regions], in 
HJWB, 81:6b-9a. The text also appeared in a late nineteenth-century compendium of  essays on geography. 
See Wang Xiqi, ed., Xiao fang hu zhai yudi congchao [Collected transcriptions about territory from the Small 
Square Kettle Studio], (Shanghai: Zhuyi tang, 1877-1897), 2:114a-116a. For an English translation of 
Gong's proposal, see David C. Wright, “Gong Zizhen and His Essay on the 'Western Regions',” in Opscula  
Altaica: Essays Presented in Honor of  Henry Schwarz, ed. Edward H. Kaplan and Donald W. Whisenhunt 
(Bellingham, WA: Western Washington University Center for East Asian Studies, 1994), 655-685. On 
Gong's proposal, also see Kataoka Kazutada, Shinchō Shinkyō tōchi kenkyū [Research on governance in 
Xinjiang in the Qing dynasty], (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1991), 90-97.
11 ECCP, 432.
12 Alexander Woodside, “The Centre and the Borderlands in Chinese Political Theory,” in The Chinese State at  
the Borders, ed. Diana Lary (Vancouver: University of  British Columbia Press, 2007), 11.
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wandering about, especially so in Beijing.”13 Gong claimed that at least half  the population no longer 
fit the socially productive categories of  scholar, farmer, workman, or merchant. Indolence, opium-
smoking, heterodoxy, and capital crimes had consumed their energies, making them useless to 
society. They could not even “make once inch of  silk or one grain of  rice to benefit other people.” 
The result was general social decay, in which “rich households become poor households, and poor 
households becoming starving ones.”14 Moreover, Gong recognized that these social ills did not 
cover all the manifestations of  early nineteenth-century decadence. It was also grave environmental 
and population pressures that troubled the rich but slowly decaying state. “These days in China 
(zhongguo 中國),” noted Gong, “the population is increasing daily, the atmosphere is daily more 
cramped, and the Yellow River is daily more of  a disaster.”15 
The increasingly dismal state of  society convinced Gong to seek an underlying principle for 
resolving the contradictions of  growth and prosperity in China. He asserted that officials ought to 
rely on the “principle of  increase and decrease” (sun yi zhi dao 損益之道), a political and philosophical 
formula for inducing balance within society and for aligning human patterns of  behavior with the 
cosmic order. Gong's innovation in applying this principle to the contradictions of  nineteenth-
century growth was to execute the “increase and decrease” within geographical space, across 
political and ecological boundaries. The balance that he intended to bring about would be arrayed 
from east to west, and west to east, across the empire. In concrete terms, Gong proposed that 
between China proper and Xinjiang, people would flow in one direction and wealth would flow in 
the other direction: “For people, [it means] decreasing the center [i.e. China] to add to the west [i.e. 
13 On hooliganism in Beijing in the Qing dynasty, see Chen Baoliang, Zhongguo liumang shi [The history of 
hooliganism in China], (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2008), 281-286.
14 Gong, “Xiyu zhi xingsheng yi,” 81:7a. 
15 Ibid., 81:7a. Government expenditures on the upkeep of  Yellow River hydrology in the early nineteenth 
century were particularly heavy. See Kenneth Pomeranz, The Making of  a Hinterland: State, Society, and 
Economy of  Inland North China, 1853-1937 (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1993). 
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Xinjiang]. For wealth, [it means] decreasing the west to add to the center.”16 Gong thus argued that 
the western frontier would gradually ease the misfortunes of  Chinese decadence by siphoning excess 
population from the empire's heartlands while also adding to its financial resources.
Despite the apparent simplicity of  this colonial formula, implementing a plan for 
colonization would be complicated by the process of  choosing migrants. Gong did not approach 
population in the aggregate but rather visualized a highly diverse group of  people divided by 
geographic origin, economic status, and psychological temperament. Starting with the “itinerants 
and non-native people of  Beijing,” Gong identified people who he thought would be most suited to 
settle the frontier. This group included civilians of  Zhili, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, and Gansu 
provinces; people from specific prefectures in Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces who “have 
pugnacious tempers, dare to take to the roads, and have not haughtily become habituated to eating 
rice and wearing silk”; and the masses of  “villainous people who grow tobacco” in Fujian and 
Jiangxi provinces and who “greatly harm China (zhongguo 中國).” Gong also left the door open to 
farmers of  any province who were eager to migrate to the frontier, whether or not they had 
occupations. Excluded from the plan were people from south of  the Yangzi River, because Gong 
considered them weak, quick-tempered, and too distant from Xinjiang; civilians from Yunnan, 
Guizhou, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, and Guangxi provinces who also lived at a great distance; 
people from Sichuan province, where open land remained unsettled; and people from Shanxi 
province, who would be unwilling to migrate because theirs was considered the richest province in 
the empire.17  
Gong also pointed to the burgeoning population of  Manchu banner troops stationed 
throughout the provinces of  China proper as suitable subjects for colonization. Just like the civilian 
16 Gong, “Xiyu zhi xingsheng yi,” 81:7a. 
17 Ibid., 81:7a-b.
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population, the Beijing banners were growing numerous, to the extent that grain shipments from the 
south no longer satiated their needs. With a combination of  anxiety and disgust, Gong noted that 
they now ate rice and wore silks. He worried that, “if  they continue to reproduce (shengyu 生育) for 
several more years, the expenses of  this province will be without end.”18 Gong thus suggested that 
banner garrisons in each province should consider sending some bannermen westward to become 
self-sufficient frontier settlers and relieve the financial burdens of  state support for them.
The crux of  Gong's plan was the notion that the arable soils of  Xinjiang would render 
migrants into productive laborers. Once in Xinjiang, they would occupy the land in perpetuity as 
their property, cultivate crops year after year, and entrust the property to their descendants. As 
Kenneth Pomeranz has argued, Chinese political economy had long favored sending waves of 
migrants out to regions with scarce labor and abundant land, owing to a basic preference for 
agricultural labor dispersed throughout the countryside versus industrial labor concentrated in towns 
and cities. In the late imperial period, this preference resulted in massive waves of  migrants settling 
frontier zones and, most of  the time, occupying land as freeholders.19 Gong's plan largely accorded 
with other late imperial Chinese visions of  state-sponsored migration to arable peripheries. 
Geographical divisions aside, Gong identified the “people of  China proper who have no property” 
(neidi wuchan zhi min 內地無產之民) as the primary agents of  colonization. They would also be its 
subjects. Imaginatively prognosticating the future transformation of  these people, Gong proclaimed, 
“What would it be like if  [they] were people with property along the western borders (xibian youchan 
zhi min 西邊有產之民), farming and herding, able to raise their sons and grandsons!”20 Given 
government stipends for the long journey westward, migrants would be alloted land according to the 
18 Ibid., 81:7b. Although unclear, Gong was likely referring to his present location, Zhili province. 
19 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of  the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 84. 
20 Gong, “Xiyu zhi xingsheng yi,” 81:7b.
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size of  their households and resettled in both northern and southern Xinjiang, where they could 
occupy land only if  it had been distributed by the government. They would also be supplied with 
Mongolian yurts, oxen, tools, and seeds.21
 If  the landless of  China proper found their transformation in Xinjiang, colonization would 
also transform the landscape and land ownership. In Gong's vision, as waves of  migrants entered 
Xinjiang, officials would pay homage to the spirits of  natural features of  the landscape with the goal 
of  rendering conditions suitable for agrarian production. As he explained:
All along the frontiers near the desert, every location shall establish a shrine to the 
spirit of  the wind and a shrine to the spirit of  the springs. At specific times of  the 
year, conduct sacrifices; admire and praise the lord above. The land will emit its 
springs and the wind will cease in the skies, so as to be suitable for vegetables and 
grains. Issue words of  praise in those locations.22  
凡近磧之郊，處處設立風神祠、泉神祠，歲時致祭，仰祝上帝，地出其泉，風息於天，
以宜蔬宜稞，頒祝文焉。
In principle, these ritual practices would work in tandem with colonization to make the land 
naturally more productive for agriculture. By performing rites to the spirits of  the winds and waters, 
settlers would reap the agrarian rewards of  fruitful landscapes favorable to production. 
Careful attention to local spirits would not be the only thing enabling productivity. If  the 
sacrifices were unable to subdue the wind and quell dust storms, Gong thought wind barriers might 
21 Ibid., 81:7b. According to Gong's plan, special ministers would supervise the migration and serve for 
seven years. Prior to the migration, they would create a passable route to Xinjiang by “cutting through 
precipitous cliffs, marking off  narrow mountain ridges, drawing out gurgling springs, and draining 
inundated ravines.” 
22 Ibid., 81:8b. Gong also suggested deliberating on how many sacrificial sites should be established at rivers 
and mountain passes: “Examine and discuss how many locations there should be for sacrificial rites at 
large rivers (Ch. guo-le  郭勒 from Mong. gol [?]). Examine and discuss how many locations there should be 
for sacrificial rites at large mountain passes (Ch. daba  達巴 from Mong. daba'a [?]).”
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do the job. He asserted that officials in Xinjiang should distribute a particular kind of  “tall and wide 
object that blocks the wind” for use in the fields, a suggestion he attributed to a fellow native of 
northern Zhejiang province, Wang Xi 王錫. He proposed that these wind-blocking devices be 
manufactured for this purpose.
Gong surmised that these landscape interventions would enable Xinjiang's unused land to 
become private farmland, a transformation that would adumbrate the fullest possible use of  the 
land's productive capacity. At the heart of  the matter was the legal status of  land occupied by 
government troops in the system of  garrison cultivation (tuntian 屯田). As Gong explained, this 
system was not ideal because it “does not use up the strength of  the farmland.” Although the system 
of  garrison cultivation had a long historical pedigree, its original goals were no longer tenable. “The 
Three Dynasties [Xia, Shang, and Zhou] are already long gone,” he noted. “To desire to combine 
soldiers and farmers, to desire to use private efforts (sili 私力) to manage public fields is [now] hardly 
possible.” Because production on garrison farmland was inefficient and hard to manage, Gong 
suggested modifying the landscape with wind barriers as a means to ameliorate harsh conditions and 
initiate the process whereby “tuntian can be completely withdrawn.”23 
The actual dismantling of  the system amounted to the wholesale privatization of  land. Fields 
that had formerly comprised government-supervised military farms would henceforth become the 
private and individually cultivated property of  the soldiers. The Qing state, Gong explained,
should take the current 280,000-odd mu of  garrison farmland and give them to the 
100,000-plus current garrison troops to be their inheritable property. Public farmland 
would become private farmland, visiting soldiers would become registered 






In addition, Gong saw no need for convicts who had been exiled to Xinjiang to be returned home; 
they could farm poor-quality land and pay their taxes on the frontier. He also reasoned that separate 
systems of  land registration for different types of  households could be abandoned in favor of 
permanent, unified registration. Whereas in the past, banner troop registers had been distinguished 
from civilian and Muslim household registers, Gong envisioned a future in which no such divisions 
would be made.25 Along with the civilian migrants from China proper, these people would be 
included in the process of  colonizing and transforming the frontier into a highly productive 
patchwork of  small, private farms.
Wei Yuan's Letter about Xinjiang
One of  Gong's close associates, Wei Yuan, also articulated a vision of  Xinjiang's utility to 
China proper in the early nineteenth century. Like Gong's proposal for provincialization, Wei's 
contribution to the debate—written as a letter to “someone inquiring about the northwest 
frontier”—was published in the 1827 compendium of  statecraft writings.26 In the letter, Wei 
described the geographical reach of  Qing power in superlative language and summarized the 
empire's border regions and peoples in the north and west. Wei was clearly awed by and exulted in 
the power of  the Qing to extend control to what was now an imperial domain of  unprecedented 
geographical breadth, and he briefly recounted how the northwest frontier had been incorporated 
into the state.27 Several decades later, in 1842, just after the Qing state had been defeated by Great 
25 Ibid., 81:8b.
26 Wei Yuan, “Da ren wen Xibei bianyu shu” [Letter in response to someone inquiring about the northwest 
frontier], in HJWB, 80:1a-2a. On Wei's plan, see Kataoka, Shinchō Shinkyō tōchi kenkyū, 100-102.
27 Wei, “Da ren wen Xibei bianyu shu,” 80:1b.
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Britain in the Opium War, he would complete the Record of  the Emperor's Military (Shengwu ji 聖武記), a 
triumphalist and legitimizing account of  the Qing empire's violent incorporation of  vast borderland 
territories into its realm.28
To Wei's chagrin, some scholars had questioned the value of  retaining imperial control over 
Xinjiang. Critics deemed the northwestern territory worthless, or worse yet, damaging to the 
interests of  the Qing state. According to Wei, “Some claim that the land is vast but useless.” Every 
year, so the complaint went, huge amounts of  money were forwarded to the frontier for official 
emoluments and military stipends, a balance of  payments that amounted to “squandering the center 
[i.e. China proper] to deal with the border [i.e. Xinjiang]” (hao zhong shi bian 耗中事邊), an 
arrangement whereby “there is loss but no gain” (you sun wu yi 有損無益).29 Although not in direct 
dialog with Gong Zizhen, these critics employed the same terms he did—“decrease” or “loss” (sun  
損) and “increase” or “gain” (yi 益)—to suggest that there was absolutely no balance in the 
relationship. Xinjiang, the logic went, was fundamentally unprofitable and should therefore be 
abandoned. 
But where the detractors of  the empire's northwestern frontier saw outright and unmitigated 
loss, Wei envisioned an irreplaceable space for living into which the population of  China proper 
could expand. What he found so valuable and unique about Xinjiang was not only its abundant open 
land and sparse population but also its plentiful and inexpensive resources:
The country has grown rich and strong. In China, the land is completely full of 
people. Only Xinjiang is vast and sparsely populated. Its cattle, sheep, wheat, 
noodles, vegetables, and melons are cheap. Cultivation, irrigation, felts and furs, and 
trade are profitable. Gold mining flourishes. Corvée and taxes are light and have 
28 Perdue, China Marches West, 501-504; ECCP, 851.
29 Wei, “Da ren wen Xibei bianyu shu,” 80:2a.
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been reduced. Moreover, all are ten times more so than in China proper.30
國家醰醲孳生，中國土滿人滿，獨新疆人寥地曠，牛羊麥麺蔬蓏之賤，播植澆灌、氈裘
貿易之利，金礦之旺，徭役賦稅之輕且閷，又皆什倍內地。
It was precisely the open space and the potential riches that made the frontier attractive to Wei. And 
he was not the only one enticed by the frontier. According to Wei, a stream of  migrants had headed 
out to Xinjiang—“poor folk engage in trade and lead their cattle out through the pass”—where they 
raised their progeny, settled permanently, and hardly looked back. 
Wei presented this evidence of  westward migration to demonstrate how readily the region 
allured imperial subjects. The evidence also justified and substantiated the role that Wei thought 
Xinjiang should play vis-a-vis China proper: as a site of  colonization to ease the pressures of  growth 
and to induce the same type of  social and cosmic balance that Gong had proposed. In phrasing that 
Zhang Peilun would later appropriate for his own arguments, Wei proclaimed that 
Heaven has left an undeveloped and desolate wasteland to serve as the fluctuating 
outlet (weilu) for the era of  prosperity. The righteousness of  the Your Majesty's 
statesmanship of  balance [lit. “decrease and increase”] necessarily follows from 
this and makes use of  this.31
是天留未闢之鴻荒以為盛世消息尾閭者也。是聖人損益經綸之義所必因焉乘焉者也。
30 Ibid., 80:2a. Some fifteen years later, in 1842, when Wei incorporated parts of  his letter into the Record of  
the Emperor's Military, he was even more forthright about the contradiction between land and population 
growth, and the value of  holding Xinjiang. Compare this to the previous version: “The country is 
immense. The land does not increase, yet the population grows more abundant by the day. In China, the 
land is completely full of  people. Nowadays, in northern and southern parts of  the Western Regions, the 
land is large and the products are vast. Its cattle, sheep, wheat, noodles, vegetables, and melons are cheap. 
Irrigation, cultivation, and trade are profitable. Gold and copper mining flourish. Corvée and taxes are 
simple. Market trade with other countries in teas, horses, cloths, and satins is profitable. Moreover, all are 
ten times more so than in China proper.” 國家提封百萬，地不加增而戶口日盛，中國土滿人滿。今西域南北二路地大
物奫，牛羊麥麺蔬蓏之賤，澆植貿易之利，金礦銅礦之旺，徭役賦稅之簡，外番茶馬布緞互市之利，又皆什伯內地. See Wei 
Yuan, Sheng wu ji  聖武記 [Record of  the emperor's military], (N.p., preface dated to 1842), 4:11a.
31 Wei, “Da ren wen Xibei bianyu shu,” 80:2a, emphasis added.
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In this passage, Wei pointed to the emperor's policy-making as a function of  the geopolitical 
relationship between the hinterland and potential colonies in Xinjiang. He spelled out a rationale for 
dealing with the frontier that paid attention both to the patterns of  nature and to the role of  human 
government. As Wei had asserted earlier in the letter, the constancy of  “ebbing and flowing is the 
way of  Heaven, [whereas] reducing what is excessive to add to what is insufficient is the craft of 
governance.”32 He thus assigned to the ruler the task of  bringing into balance the asymmetries of 
social life even while recognizing an underlying pattern of  fluctuation. Like Gong, Wei understood 
the imbalance somewhat more in temporal terms; it was owing to the “era of  prosperity” that 
Xinjiang had become more meaningful to China proper. Nonetheless, geography mattered. 
Xinjiang's remoteness from China proper and its undeveloped state made the frontier even more 
enticing as a solution for the contradictions of  growth.  
Keenly interested in preserving the frontier and refuting the claims of  critics of  imperial 
policy, Wei attacked them with a barrage of  aspersions that assailed their stupidity and insularity as 
“bumpkinly, near-sighted, Confucian ignoramuses.” He criticized their propensity to “forget what 
happened in the past”—a reference to victorious Qing campaigns along imperial frontiers in the 
previous two centuries and, in particular, the efforts of  the Qianlong emperor to conquer northern 
Xinjiang, all of  which Wei detailed in his Record of  the Emperor's Military. Aside from their lack of 
historical memory, critics were also prone to misjudge the financial stakes of  retaining Xinjiang. 
They “begrudge a tiny trickle of  expenses,” Wei asserted, but “are ignorant of  oceans of  profit.” 
From Wei's perspective, expenditures on Xinjiang were small investments compared to the huge 
benefits awaiting the Qing. Wei's attention to frontier policy showed his deep investment in Qing 
expansion and his commitment to sustain the empire through reform—to “take from what is 
32
且夫一消一息者天之道, 裒多益寡者政之經. Ibid., 80:2a.
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excessive and add to what is deficient.”33
Lu Fu'en's Productive Frontier
The notion of  balancing the population of  China proper with the resources of  the 
northwest borderland was not an uncommon trope of  Chinese colonial discourse in the nineteenth 
century. Probably sometime in the 1840s or 1850s, Lu Fu'en  陸黻恩 (1803-1874), a scholar from 
Changzhou and the author of  the four-part essay Proposals on Money (Qianbi yi 錢幣議), crafted a plan 
for colonizing the frontier that, like Gong's, paid attention to the disparity in resources between 
Chinese hinterlands and the distant frontier.34 In Lu's plan, the impetus for frontier colonization 
arose from the fiscal problems of  the Qing state.35 Although in his essay he was not debating the 
issue of  money per se, his rumination on the frontier started from the problem of  money. Some of 
his interlocutors had taken issue with his assertion that people's problems arose from the price of 
silver, and they challenged him with the claim that, in fact, the issue was population, the “filling in of 
the people“ (ren man 人滿).36 According to Lu, they asserted that
the country's [people] are multiplying and daily becoming more abundant. Farmland 
has not expanded, soil has not been further opened up, and grains have not 
increased. Letting money circulate [provides] little relief  for people's hardships. Yet 
as for the celestial forecasting of  dearth or abundance, it cannot inevitably be from 
33 Ibid., 80:2a.
34 On Lu Fu'en's biography, see Qian Sezhi et al., ed., Jiangsu yiwen zhi: Changzhou juan [Jiangsu bibliographic 
gazetteer: Changzhou volume], (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1994), 697; Zhang Weixiang, ed., 
Qingdai Piling mingren xiao zhuangao [Draft biological sketches of  notable people from Piling in the Qing 
dynasty], (Shanghai: Changzhou lu Hu tongxianghui, 1944), 7:18. ̈ Lu's essays concerning money are 
contained in HJWX, juan 32.
35 For a discussion of  nineteenth-century notions of  state finance, see Man-houng Lin, China Upside Down:  
Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808-1856 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006). 
36 Lu Fu'en, “Mu min tun bian yi” [Discourse on recruiting people to garrison the frontier], in HJWX, 
39:88a.
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Heaven. As soon as famine strikes, bemoaning swans [i.e. poor people] fill the 
countryside. Even though there is money, they have no clothing to guard against 
cold, and no food to guard against hunger. The common people have not half  a 




They argued, in other words, that China faced a serious shortage of  resources relative to the 
population, a conundrum that manipulating currency or letting it circulate freely would not solve. 
They believed that some provinces had reached population saturation—the limits to growth—which 
normal measures could not solve. They implied that there was no good solution to growth, which 
would cause problems regardless of  whether the people stayed put or moved around. 
At present, the Five North Provinces [Zhili, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu] 
are truly full of  people. Although there is widespread cultivation, harvests are 
meager. The productivity of  the soil is not yet exhausted. Yet as soon as an order to 
reclaim wasteland is issued, [it would mean] dispossessing the native inhabitants of 




In the minds of  Lu's opponents, colonization did not present a viable solution to population growth 
because it created political tensions among local people and incoming settlers. But Lu refuted their 
37 Ibid., 39:88a.
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claims and turned a blind eye to the potential pitfalls of  colonization. Instead, he focused his 
attention on sending settlers to the northwest frontier. He had once heard an official who had been 
banished to Xinjiang claim that “out beyond Jiayuguan, for several thousand li  里 as far as the eye 
can see, it is all fertile land.”38 This fertility translated into unimaginable productivity; when it came 
time for the autumn harvest, “grains come like flood and fire without end.”39 But what appeared to 
be such enticing productivity was apparently going to waste. As a native of  densely populated 
Jiangnan, he had a hard time fathoming how northwest borderlands could contain “abandoned 
land” (shu huang 熟荒) or how farmers could abandon ripe harvests in the fields. But as he explained, 
in cases where farmers calculated that income from the harvest would not satisfy the costs of  their 
labors to harvest the grain, they reduced the ripened grain fields to ashes. They also used these 
farmlands to pasture their own animals and the animals of  neighbors, which foraged among and 
trampled the crops. This tremendous loss occurred, according to Lu, because farmers had no 
waterways by which they could ship their grains to distant markets. The frontier was just too remote, 
too disconnected. 
Yet Xinjiang's remoteness also made it incredibly enticing. Lu imagined Xinjiang as an 
isolated Arcadia, a place available for colonizing in the future yet fruitful enough in the present to be 
a site worthy of  fancy and fantasy. As Lu explained, “What all along has been blowing sand for one 
thousand li  里 without signs of  people as far as the eye can see” was now being reshaped into a 
highly productive and well-ordered landscape, a place almost fit for poetry. Here, Lu's perspective 
was of  someone looking out across a landscape settled by farmers and transformed by agriculture: 




今且桑麻蔽野, 雞犬相聞. Ibid., 39:89b.
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second phrase of  this line, Lu alluded to the famous prose work “Record of  Peach Blossom Spring” 
(Tao hua yuan ji 桃花源記) by the poet Tao Yuanming. In the “Record,” Tao had narrated the journey 
of  a fisherman who followed a river through a peach grove only to discover a hidden Arcadian 
village beyond the mountains. In this idyllic community the fisherman found farmers who had 
become rich by their agrarian labors. Among the fields and the orchards, “chickens and dogs are 
both heard,”41 a sign of  the prosperity and vivacity of  village life. The scene evoked images of 
populated and productive rural landscapes beyond the horizon, just the type of  vision for Xinjiang 
that Lu hoped to articulate. 
For Lu, productive Arcadianism would be the result of  migration born of  the desire for 
demographic balance. More than his predecessors Gong or Wei, the scholar from Changzhou 
characterized the process of  inducing balance in financial terms. “I once said,” claimed Lu, “that 
there are two main ways to manage finances (licai  理財).” In phrasing copied almost verbatim from 
one book within the Confucian canon, the Great Learning (Da xue 大學), Lu identified these two 
methods simply as having the “producers be many” and the “consumers be few.” It is not hard to 
imagine that if  these methods were removed from a geopolitical context already characterized by 
structural imbalance, they would lead, in principle, to surpluses of  production—to imbalance—and 
perhaps to the prosperity that Gong targeted for its deleterious social effects. Finding the solution to 
this conundrum meant thinking geographically. It meant creating a relationship between geographic 
regions characterized by structural imbalance that could serve the purpose of  inducing balance. For 
Lu, the fulcrum against which to “manage finances” and adjust the relative balance of  producers 
and consumers became the geographical division between China proper and Xinjiang, or between 
the southeast and the western frontier:
41 On Tao Yuanming's reception in later eras, see Wendy Swartz, Reading Tao Yuanming: Shifting Paradigms of  
Historical Reception (427-1900) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008). 
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At present in the southeast, those who produce would not be considered few, but 
those who consume are especially numerous. In the western borderlands, those who 
consume would not be considered many, but those who produce are few. If  there is 
persistent hardship because [the southeast and northwest] cannot be interlinked, why 




Achieving balance between producers and consumers on an imperial scale meant recalibrating the 
relationship between China proper and the fronter and bringing the two zones into a tighter nexus 
of  interaction and exchange. As James Millward has demonstrated, Qing imperial policy up to the 
1820s had allowed Chinese merchants to trade in Xinjiang but had prohibited them from settling in 
southern Xinjiang, whereas after the 1820s, the Qing state encouraged permanent Chinese 
colonization in the region.43 Lu's suggestion for fuller intercourse between China proper and the 
frontier based on this kind of  comprehensive financial and demographic accounting coincided with 
the state-supported shift toward a closer relationship. 
In practical terms, adjusting geopolitical relations and inducing balance meant colonizing the 
frontier, just as Gong had surmised. Lu devised a plan to “move civilians and station them beyond 
the Great Wall” (xi min tun saiwai 徙民屯塞外). This would enable demographic recalibration without 
unduly draining wealth from state treasuries and without sparking social conflict. Where Lu's plan 
differed considerably from Gong's was in its reliance on private financing, private oversight, and new 
42 Lu, “Mu min tun bian yi,” 39:88b.
43 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 226. On the policy of  separation between Han and Muslims, see Lin Enxian, 
Qingchao zai Xinjiang de Han Hui geli zhengce [The segregation policy for Han and Muslim in Xinjiang during 
the Qing dynasty], (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshu guan, 1988). 
252
regulations for “land management” (yingtian 營田). He envisioned rich people recruiting “indigent 
people and those without occupations” from their home villages and providing them with food and 
funding for the migration. Yet Lu was also open to the possibility that landowning farmers within 
China proper would decide to migrate of  their own accord, or that rich families in the northwest 
would sponsor poor folk from the southeast. Lu had no apprehensions about the potential for social 
antagonism between these groups despite the fact that they came from widely different origins; after 
a long time of  “friendly feelings” they would “naturally be harmonious.”44 It is unlikely that Lu 
imagined well-to-do Muslims of  the northwest recruiting poor settlers from the southeast, for he 
said nothing of  their overcoming religious and linguistic differences in the process of  colonization.  
Private initiative and funding for colonization may have set Lu's proposal apart from others, 
but the details of  the plan largely coincided with nineteenth-century regulations for land 
resettlement. Rich sponsors “ushered households into the settlements,” where each household 
would be allocated 20 mu  畝 of  farmland and supplied with money for oxen, seeds, and housing.45 
Settlers would thereupon farm the land and pay taxes starting after three years, apparently at reduced 
rates according to “middle and lower grades for northwest provinces.” Lu anticipated that farming 
would become the new “hereditary occupation” (shiye 世業) for previously indigent and jobless 
migrants. The elite who managed the lands and households of  these colonies—including 
supervising their legal affairs, taxes, and rent payments—were correspondingly rewarded with 
salaries and minor bureaucratic posts based on the number of  households they recruited, with the 
44 Lu, “Mu min tun bian yi,” 39:89a.
45 Colonization was also a communicative process. Lu suggested that settlers be ordered to promote 
colonization by “sending letters for the sake of  persuasion” (yushu quandao 寓書勸導). The epistolary targets 
would be colonists' relatives in their home villages. Lu imagined that once the people back at home had 
heard about life on the frontier, they would endeavor to make the journey. Evoking the language of  feudal 
relations, Lu suggested that these new recruits would “come in a steady stream to submit as vassals” 
(yuanyuan laigui 源源來歸), supposedly to the rich people who would supervise their agricultural work and 
provide them with the necessary supplies. Lu, “Mu min tun bian yi,” 39.89b.
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most adept receiving hereditary posts (shiguan 世官).46 Lu also suggested that several new Grand 
Minister Superintendents (banshi dachen 辦事大臣) be created to supervise the settlement areas (tunsuo 
屯所) and to pay special attention to land reclamation, irrigation works, and agricultural promotion. 
They would also oversee projects to build infrastructure like city walls, granaries, government offices, 
and schools.47
For Lu, colonization also offered the prospect of  creating an almost utopian society on the 
frontier at a time when the society he knew was encountering grave problems. He was tantalized by 
this prospect. After ironing out all of  the details of  colonization, he listed what the future would 
bring because of  his plan: 
The well-field [system] will be restored as a result. The system of  enfeoffment will 
follow as a result. Rites and music will flourish as a result. The army will be trained as 
a result. Corvée labor will be normalized as a result.48 
井田復於是，封建由於是，禮樂興於是，軍旅講於是，力役準於是。
Lu imagined frontier colonial villages as sites for the reincarnation of  idealized forms of  Confucian 
social organization from China's pre-imperial and early imperial periods. His invocation of  the so-
called “well-field system” (jing tian zhi 井田制) is especially provocative, given its history as a 
politically charged and divisive symbol of  social ideology.49 Mencius had originally described the 
system as a community based upon idyllic rural cooperation, security, and conviviality. A 
community's farmland would be arranged in the shape of  the character for “well,” 井, with the 




49 Joseph R. Levenson, “Ill Wind in the Well-Field: The Erosion of  the Confucian Ground of  Controversy,” 
in The Confucian Persuasion, ed. Arthur Wright (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960).
254
land.50 Lu's description of  the cohesion of  colonial villages matched the way in which Mencius 
framed the well-field community. Whether or not Lu believed the system to have been an actually-
existing form of  social organization in the distant past, his invocation of  it suggests that he saw the 
frontier as a space for the re-creation of  ideals that, in his day, did not exist in China proper.
In principle, Lu's colonialism would translate into clear and distinct advantages for people at 
opposite ends of  the empire. Once the system of  land settlement had been established and frontier 
landscapes were being transformed, “the strength of  the land (dili 地力) in the northwest will be fully 
used and the spirits of  the people (minqi 民氣) of  the southeast will be at ease.” In this equation, Lu 
united the material and psychological rewards of  colonization. As the southeast gave up people to 
the northwest, those who stayed behind would experience a sense of  relief  from the tensions of 
land scarcity and economic deprivation. And as the northwest accommodated new colonies, laboring 
migrants would exhaust the productive capacities of  lands along the frontier.51 
Colonizing Xinjiang could also induce pecuniary solvency for the Qing state, strengthening it 
vis-a-vis other colonial powers. Opened up to farming, frontier lands would yield new tax revenues, 
and Lu supposed that “the taxes of  the northwest would provide for army provisions in the 
northwest.” It may have appeared that Lu was advocating a kind of  financial autarky for Xinjiang, 
but his plan was framed by larger conceptions of  national financial and military strength. Aside from 
sending Han farmers to the northwest, Lu wanted to dispatch bannermen to regions north of 
Beijing, beyond Dushikou and Zhangjiakou, where the “fertile wilderness [extends for] a thousand li 
” 里 and “everywhere can be cultivated.” By having these “surplus bannermen” (yuding 餘丁) colonize 
lands beyond the Great Wall in the same system of  elite sponsorship and supervision that he 
planned for Xinjiang's colonies, Lu imagined that the financial rewards would empower China to 
50 Yang Bojun, ed., Mengzi yizhu [The annotated Mencius], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 119. 
51 Lu, “Mu min tun bian yi,” 39:89b.
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confront the challenges posed by European imperialism.52 If  everything went according to plan,
the country's military funds will not be completely reliant upon the southeast, and 
with its surplus [we will] pay great attention to military affairs and skillfully build 
ships and cannons. [We will] be both rich and strong. The foolish and petty 
foreigners will certainly be unable to cause China any worry.53 
國家之兵餉，不盡仰給於東南。以其有於，講求軍政，精造船礮。既富且強，蠢爾小夷，
固不足煩中國之慮矣。
In other words, colonizing frontiers was a competitive enterprise. Pursuing the systematic 
exploitation of  frontier landscapes would boost wealth and create financial surpluses, which could 
be invested in military preparations and armaments.
Zhang Peilun's Plan for Banner Colonies
The discourse of  colonization to which Zhang Peilun contributed in 1876 took 
overpopulation and social degeneracy in China proper as the starting point for thinking about 
relations between frontier and hinterland. Whereas Zhang's predecessors had largely envisioned the 
agents and subjects of  colonial migration to be the landless, poor, or malfeasant commoners of  the 
empire's most densely populated provinces, he called upon the Qing state to sponsor the 
resettlement of  a large proportion of  Beijing's Manchu bannermen in the area around Urumqi. Yet 
this discrepancy was largely inconsequential for the political economy of  late Qing colonialism, 
which favored divvying up the frontier into parcels of  farmland and allocating them to laborers as 
property in perpetuity. His plan viewed the frontier as open space that could support the financial 




Zhang identified the excess banner population in Beijing as a formidable financial challenge 
for the Qing state. After the Manchu conquest of  China, in the era of  the Shunzhi emperor (r. 
1644-1661), the banner population in Beijing had numbered 80,000 jia —甲 in principle, a unit of  ten 
households54—but in the intervening two centuries, the banners had multiplied enormously, to the 
point where a single jia contained “several tens or several hundreds of  men, which the grain rations 
for one jia could no longer support.” Even under the Qianlong emperor in the eighteenth century, 
imperial officials had “all worried about the means of  livelihood of  the eight banners.”55 As Mark 
Elliott has argued, fears about banner livelihoods coincided with anxiety about their loss of  Manchu 
customs. Eighteenth-century scholars had attributed the gradual evisceration of  the “Manchu way” 
to urban, sedentary lifestyles coddled by guaranteed emoluments from Qing state coffers.56 Now, in 
the late nineteenth century, Zhang largely dispensed with worries about the bannermen's incapacity 
in Manchu language or their lack of  equestrian skills and martial spirit. Instead, he focused on the 
fact that “the population is ever increasing, and if  we discuss pay and provisions, [we would say that] 
they are exceedingly inadequate.”57 
Just as Gong Zizhen had identified landlessness as a fundamental obstacle to ameliorating 
social problems in a prosperous and populated China proper, so Zhang recognized that the problem 
of  livelihoods for Beijing bannermen turned upon questions of  labor and property. Like Gong, he 
understood it as an issue of  having access to the means of  production, without which bannermen 
succumbed to social malfeasance. According to Zhang, 
The means of  livelihood of  the bannermen have long been inadequate. They have no  
54 On the system of  mutual household supervision, see Kung-chuan Hsiao, Rural China: Imperial Control in the  
Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of  Washington Press, 1960). 
55 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19.
56 See Mark C. Elliott, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2001). 
57 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19.
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property. None succeed in borrowing money. Of  those who are rather cunning, some 
end up drifting about and doing nothing, deciding for themselves what is right and 
what is wrong.58
旗丁生計久絀，產業無存，借貸莫遂，其稍黠者，或至流為不肖，良非得已。
Being “neither scholar nor civilian,” many unproductive but able-bodied bannermen no longer had 
recognizable roles in society. Zhang implied that their lack of  property caused their rootlessness, 
spurred their deviancy, and made them poor.
To reduce their burden on the state treasury and give them new social roles as productive 
farmers, Zhang argued for sending bannermen to the frontier. He called upon officials to undertake 
a flurry of  activity to prepare the way for bannermen. He suggested that Zuo Zongtang dispatch 
subordinates to survey (lukan 履勘) the land to determine which places could be opened up for 
farming and how many bannermen those places could support. Back in Beijing, officials were to 
select a set number of  “young and vigorous” men who had not yet married, give them supplies for 
the journey, and send them with chaperoning supervisors out to Xinjiang, where groups of  them 
would conduct “trial reclamation” (shiken 試墾). In frontier villages (tun 屯), they would be 
“conferred land to serve as their life's work.” Once bannermen had turned useless expanses into 
productive soil, their per-head rations (koufen 口分) would cease, and they would supply themselves 
from then on, cultivating the fields for three-fourths of  their time and doing military drills for the 
remaining time. When off  duty, they were to be sent back to Beijing to find wives; upon their return 
to the frontier, they would bring their families with them. For the rest of  their lives, bannermen 
would spend their time trying to create wealth from Xinjiang's soils, and in Zhang's vision, this 
would be the key to their gradual but inevitable prosperity. And since they would no longer be in 
58 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19, emphasis added.
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Beijing, government outlays for bannermen could be reduced.
To be sure, the pecuniary benefits of  Zhang's plan for Beijing did not completely 
overshadow the advantages accruing to Xinjiang's security. Zhang speculated that the Manchu 
bannermen could become a “crack force” (jinlu 勁旅) competent to handle security matters after 
devoting several years of  their non-agricultural time to military training. Indeed, Zhang's memorial 
argued that these Manchu settlers would be able to regain their customs and their skills for 
horsemanship and archery if  given the chance to settle the frontier. Depending on the successes of 
Zuo's army in retaking the Russian-occupied Ili Valley by the time they arrived, the transplanted 
bannermen could either spend their efforts stockpiling grain or creating a strong defensive 
perimeter. In either case, Xinjiang's security would be improved. 
At first glance, Zhang's demographic and financial calculus of  colonizing the frontier 
appears to be little different from how Gong, Wei, and Lu considered the advantages of  sponsoring 
migration to Xinjiang. Like many parts of  China proper, Beijing was home to a surfeit of  people 
who consumed but did little labor or who lacked the means of  production to support themselves. 
Zhang determined that sending them out beyond the western end of  the Great Wall was a sure, if 
tedious and costly, way to provide new opportunities to create wealth. I am almost certain that 
Zhang borrowed from Wei Yuan's text in describing the relationship between Xinjiang and China 
proper. Almost exactly like Wei, Zhang asserted that the emperor should accord with cosmic forces 
by “reducing what is excessive to add to what is insufficient.” In this way, Zhang's articulation of 
relations between the frontier and China proper reproduced a discourse of  colonization rooted in 
conceptions of  balance. 
Zhang's language was also unique in the way that it placed more emphasis on the 
geographical, rather than temporal, quality of  the relationship. Fifty years earlier, Wei Yuan had 
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written of  Xinjiang as the “fluctuating outlet for the era of  prosperity (shengshi 盛世).” His choice of 
words highlighted the temporality of  affluence and Xinjiang's role as a function of  that temporality. 
The space of  affluence—prosperity manifest in a particular geographic location—was less 
important than the occurrence of  affluence at a particular moment in time. In borrowing from Wei's 
language, Zhang removed the temporal reference—“era of  prosperity”—and replaced it with a 
geographical one. So for Zhang, Xinjiang became the “fluctuating outlet for the Central Plains 
(zhongyuan 中原).”  This subtle shift suggests that the terms of  the relationship between China's most 
developed regions and Xinjiang were now somewhat more fixed than they had been for Wei. They 
were less a function of  temporality and circumstance than a structural function of  geography.59
 Yet Zhang was not averse to rallying temporal arguments for the plan to send bannermen to 
Xinjiang. Indeed, one of  the reasons Zhang wrote his proposal in 1876 was to respond quickly to 
military events on the ground. Having heard that Zuo Zongtang's armies had recovered Urumqi, 
Zhang eagerly asserted that tense relations with Xinjiang's Muslims created a perfect opportunity for 
colonization. He recounted how relations had been completely devoid of  animosity in the mid-
eighteenth century, when the Qianlong emperor's armies had conquered northern and southern 
Xinjiang and “Uyghurs respectfully submitted” (Huamen gong shun 花門恭順) to Qing imperial power. 
According to Zhang, it had been appropriate at that time to resettle them in separate “Muslim 
colonies” (Hui tun 回屯) at locations with rivers and springs sufficient for irrigation. Perhaps most 
telling of  social relations between local Muslims and the Qing was Zhang's notion that the imperial 
newcomers “could not bear to dispossess [the Muslims] of  the profits of  their lands.”60 Yet, 
however amicable relations had been in the past, Zhang recognized that times had changed. He laid 
59 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19.
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the blame for recent animosities and violence squarely on them and argued that the crisis had 
created the perfect opportunity for colonization.
In recent times, the Muslims made themselves antagonistic to the Nurturing [of  the 
Qing]. Thereafter, the army traveled to that remote region. There was no alternative 
but to launch punitive expeditions against [the Muslims], and comfort anew the good 
Muslims. Recently, there have been hardly any Wuhuan [i.e. Turkic people]. The land 
is vast and sparsely populated, so it is possible to set up more agricultural colonies 
and more broadly open up the land to cultivation.61
今回人自外生成，然後移師絕域，不得已而討之，新撫良回。比則無幾烏桓，地曠人稀，
可以多置營屯，廣為墾闢。
With little remorse over the passing of  an era of  peaceful relations between Turkic Muslims and 
Qing people—Manchu, Mongol, and Han—in Xinjiang, Zhang proceeded to argue that the crisis 
could well be a boon to the Qing. The conflict had resulted in depopulation among local Muslims, 
which had left even more land available for colonization. At the same time, Zhang's silence about 
the issue of  native people's dispossession implied that, in great contrast to the eighteenth century, to 
dispossess them after the present conflict posed no moral quandary.
Like those who had pioneered the nineteenth-century colonial discourse, Zhang foresaw the 
transformative influence of  frontier settlement. In simple terms, this meant turning unused land into 
productive agricultural fields. Although Zhang noted that the area around Urumqi already contained 
many undeveloped but naturally fertile “places with sweet spring and rich soil,” adding people and 
their labor to the landscape would increase its value. 
In the future, as colonial sites are increasingly abundant, the [land's] fertility will be 
61 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19.
261
increasingly developed. As the household population naturally multiplies, the local 
place will naturally become rich and fertile.62
將來，屯政日豐，膏腴日闢。戶口自然蕃衍，地方自然富饒。
The process of  increasing population as a means to improve productivity would also be self-
catalyzing. Although he reserved a special role for agriculture as the centerpiece of  political economy 
and the central mechanism for colonization, Zhang nonetheless realized that merchants, too, would 
participate in the search for wealth: “If  wasteland beyond the Jiayuguan is opened up, merchants will 
be able to go out [beyond the Great Wall] and seek profit (mou li 謀利).” Zhang thus conflated new 
settlements, the enrichment of  Xinjiang's landscape, and the possibilities for making profit on the 
frontier as he imagined the future success of  colonization.63
Zhang also gestured to the past to persuade the Qing court and Zuo Zongtang to support 
his proposition. Although there is no evidence that Zhang had traveled out to the frontier, he noted 
how the landscape contained traces of  the past that would be beneficial to migrant bannermen. 
Around Urumqi, on land that had previously been reclaimed, they could seek the “old traces of 
waterways and the boundaries of  fields,” supposedly as starting points for renewed cultivation. 
Zhang also turned to history to demonstrate the precedent for military colonization. In 1764, for 
example, the Qianlong emperor had sent Manchu soldiers to colonize and cultivate the Ili Valley, 
where they had successfully “dedicated themselves to agriculture” and had raised their families and 
horses. But as Zhang argued, even more important than the proof  of  the historic success of 
agricultural colonies in Xinjiang was the great men of  the past who had overseen frontier 
colonization. He offered the names of  two generals, Zhao Chongguo  趙充國 (137-52 BCE)64 and 
62 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19.
63 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19.
64 In 1867, Zuo Zongtang also lauded Han general Zhao Chongguo for his perseverance in advocating for 
and implementing colonization in the Gansu-Qinghai region after fighting the Qiang (Xianlian Qiang) 
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Guo Ziyi  郭子儀 (697-781), and honored them for their great success with military agrarian 
colonization (tuntian 屯田). Most importantly, Zhang used them to woo Zuo Zongtang's support. By 
his “planning and management,” Zhang sycophantically asserted, Zuo would “certainly be able to 
follow in the footsteps of  previous worthies.” Praising Zuo for the fact that his “discernment is firm 
and he clearly knows the border situation,” Zhang suggested that Zuo would be able to join the 
pantheon of  great frontier generals by adopting the plan to colonize Xinjiang with bannermen.65   
Zuo's Rebuttal of  Zhang's Plan
Within five months of  Zhang Peilun's proposal's being circulated among the empire's top 
officials, Zuo Zongtang responded with a lengthy memorial rebutting the idea of  banner 
colonization near Urumqi yet broadly agreeing on the urgency of  dealing with the burgeoning 
population in Beijing.66 Zuo astutely recognized that even though Zhang had claimed to be making a 
proposal for “opening up colonies to secure the border,” his real intention was to ameliorate the 
financial and social burdens of  unproductive bannermen in the capital, a goal that Zuo supported. 
Indeed, he fully acknowledged the conundrum presented when banner populations far outstripped 
the resources available for their support. According to Zuo, 
The population of  the Eight Banners grows more numerous by the day. The 
allotment [of  provisions] per jia [i.e. group of  households] is set. The country 
despite repeated admonishments from Emperor Xuan. Zuo reiterated Zhao's eventual success with the 
colonies—although by what measure, he was not clear—as an indication that military ventures in the 
northwest necessitated agricultural colonization after a thorough assessment of  the situation. See 
TZ6/1/10 (1867), ZZQ, 3:373. For an early Qing perspective on Zhao that was reprinted in the 1827 
statecraft compilation, see Chen Qianhe, “Zhao Chongguo lun” [On Zhao Chongguo], in HJWB, 77:17a-
b.
65 GX2/11/7 (1876), LFZZ 03-9553-19.
66 For Zuo's rebuttal, see “Fu zou choudiao qiding tuntian Xinjiang shu” [Response to memorial for 
transferring bannermen to take up tuntian in Xinjiang], in HJWX, 40:31a-36a; GX3/3/29 (1877), LFZZ 
03-9553-2; and GX3/3/29 (1877), ZZQ, 6:635-640. 
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supports a limitless population with provisions that are set. Given these 
circumstances, there will certainly come a time when everything is used up.67 
謹按八旗生齒日繁。甲分有定。國家以有定之錢糧，養無限之丁口。勢必有時而窮。
Framed in this way, the future would almost inevitably bring deprivation and dearth to the 
overpopulated capital. 
Zuo Zongtang also agreed with Zhang that bannermen faced a crisis of  productivity and 
morality. This was particularly the case for Manchus who had no skills in agriculture, craftsmanship, 
or commerce, and who were not among the brightest or strongest who could usefully serve as 
scholars or soldiers. The remaining bannermen, Zuo lamented, “waste their days in frolic” and 
“meander as they please,” and even “those who were fated with talent gradually turn into wasted 
talent.”68 But it was not merely a question of  degeneracy. As Zuo explained, “the young ones have 
no professions in which to engage,” a predicament that left them impecunious.69 
If  Zuo subscribed to Zhang's analysis of  the banner predicament, he wholeheartedly 
disagreed with the solution. For one thing, he emphasized the impracticalities of  funding their 
migration to Xinjiang, which would unnecessarily drain treasury reserves. Zuo complained that 
supplying them with housing, tools, draft animals, seeds, and grain upon arrival would add untold 
expenses at a time when coastal and frontier defenses awaited urgent funding. In this sense, Zuo 
disputed Zhang's assumption that banner colonization would save money for the state treasury, that 
sponsoring migration for the purposes of  greater demographic balance would have any kind of 
fiscal payoff. He also predicted that the presence of  bannermen along the frontier could prompt 
suspicion among local civilians and engender mutual antagonism. If  frontier officials in Xinjiang did 




not adeptly handle such cases, Zuo feared that they could explode into outright hostility, causing 
needless headaches for officials and residents.   
Zuo most adamantly objected to Zhang's plans because he judged the bannermen almost 
completely unfit for agriculture. He assailed them for having no knowledge or experience of 
cultivation, which set them in stark contrast to the sons of  farmers who had grown into their 
professions. For Zuo, this was reason enough to fear what might happen if  they were sent to act as 
farmers on the frontier.
Government troops of  the Eight Banners usually have not personally [used] ploughs 
and plowshares. The do not know suitable ways of  cultivation. They have not 
studied the works of  the agronomists. Abruptly ordered into the fields and made 
responsible for the effectiveness of  agriculture, they would rightly fear “cultivation, 
yet hunger in its midst.” It would be a great burden to plan for aid.70  
八旗官兵，平時未親耒耜，未知種植之宜，未習農家諸務。驟驅之隴畝，責以為農之效，
正恐耕也而餒在其中，重煩籌濟。
Zuo railed against the thought that bannermen could productively use land or farm tools, as Zhang's 
plan seems to have taken for granted. He thought that, rather than supporting themselves, they 
might just starve in the fields. And so Zuo could only surmise that the plan would entail detrimental 
losses on multiple fronts. From his perspective, the bannermen colonies would not become self-
sufficient. In fact, for “state finances” (guoji 國計) and “borderland reserves” (bianchu 邊儲), Zuo 
worried that Zhang's plan would result in losses (sun 損). In other words, it would not induce 
demographic or fiscal balance between distant locations within the empire. 
Although Zuo denied the Beijing bannermen a role in colonizing farmland around Urumqi, 
70 Ibid., 40:32b.
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he suggested transforming them into laborers and employing them to repair the hydrological 
infrastructure in Zhili province, surrounding Beijing. He recalled how previous officials like Yinxiang 
 胤祥 (1686-1730),71 a son of  the Kangxi emperor and a favored statesman of  the Yongzheng 
emperor, had overseen the repair and upkeep of  Zhili's waterworks.72 But, Zuo lamented, their 
achievements had largely been forgotten, and the current state of  disrepair of  the waterworks 
resulted in frequent droughts and floods. Given the circumstances, Zuo proposed dispatching 
bannermen to live in Zhili and to work on refurbishing waterways, because whereas they were unfit 
for frontier agriculture, they could surely master the skills of  dredging canals. For the talented 
bannermen, Zuo proposed ushering them into the governing bureaucracy or into new state-
sponsored technical training bureaus (jiqiju 機器局) to study manufacturing.73 Here, Zuo appeared to 
depart from the dominant ideology of  late imperial political economy whereby state support for 
self-sufficient agrarian livelihoods was a top priority. But aside from special cases like these, he 
surmised that bannermen who worked in Zhili would eventually learn the value of  hard labor and 
would come to take agriculture as their “hereditary occupation” (shiye 世業). Sending them to nearby 
locations would greatly reduce the cost of  their migration, but it would be no less transformative 
and important for their self-sufficiency. Zuo even suggested that the skilled farmers among them 
could eventually be transferred to the northwest provinces and out into Xinjiang to colonize and 
cultivate the land at an undetermined point in the future.74
Despite his hesitation about bannermen, Zuo was wholly convinced of  the urgency of 
colonizing Xinjiang. For one thing, he saw migration and settlement as means to substantiate Qing 
71 ECCP, 923-24.




claims to the territory. Yet he was also enticed by the possibilities for highly productive agriculture, 
possibilities that seemed to go unexploited. Even if  “upper Gansu province (longshang 隴上) is 
basically wide open land with few people, and the border area (biansai 邊塞) is also mostly gravel, 
stones, and barren soil,”75 Zuo reported that “Xinjiang is wide open land with few people, and its 
soils are mostly abundantly fertile.”76 It was an enticing prospect, a place to imagine bountiful 
harvests. Zuo's visions of  the frontier had been influenced by Lin Zexu, with whom he had 
discussed northwestern agriculture years earlier, after Lin's exile in Xinjiang and his experience with 
building arid land irrigation systems there in the 1840s.77 They were also influenced by the reports 
of  his commanders. As Zuo envisioned it, the richest agricultural land extended from east to west 
across northern Xinjiang, with Urumqi at the center: “the farmland is fecund and moist, and if  one 
plants one shi 石, one can harvest multiple tens of  shi.”78 This hypothetical return on potential 
investments of  seed and labor suggested to Zuo that the land was well worth populating. Since most 
of  the local Muslims and Han had not survived the reconquest, Zuo recognized that it would be 
difficult to revert to old patterns of  settlement and that Xinjiang's regrowth required colonists from 
China proper. 
The implication of  Zuo's refusal to allow bannermen to migrate to Xinjiang because they 
lacked agricultural knowledge was that the reconquered frontier would be largely the colonial 
preserve of  Han Chinese. Postwar insecurity and financial belt-tightening surely entered into his 
calculations. But unspoken intentions to make the most of  agriculture in Xinjiang, to make the land 




78 Zuo, “Fu zou choudiao qiding tuntian Xinjiang shu,” 40:35b.
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bannermen were fit for agricultural labor, Zuo implied a certain degree of  correlation between 
identity and technical aptitude, particularly for rendering the material resources of  the natural world 
into the products of  basic existence and into valuable commodities. On the basis of  this 
assumption, then, people like himself  were most capable of  farming the frontier. In practice, this 
meant that the soldiers of  the Hunan and Hubei region (Chu 楚) whom he commanded in the field 
were accustomed to agricultural labor, and he used them strategically as “agrarian specialists” (nongjia  
農家) to cultivate grains, grow vegetables, plant elms, willows, and poplars alongside roadways, open 
up irrigation channels, and develop local water resources (shuili 水利).79 His military officers, too, had 
“come from being engaged in toilsome farmwork,” and so were supposedly prepared for agrarian 
labor in northwest countrysides. Once refugees and laborers for hire had returned to a locale, Zuo's 
plan was to transform sites of  military farming into zones of  civilian settlement. As Manchu 
bannermen were barred, at least initially, from the agrarian reconstruction of  the frontier, the 
movement to reclaim land and exploit its productivity would largely be a process carried out by 
those who were assumed to be the empire's best agrarians.80 
Conclusion: Xinjiang as an “Outlet”
In the discourse of  nineteenth-century Qing colonialism, Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan were 
pioneers. By the time their works were published in 1827, Xinjiang had been incorporated into the 
empire for at least sixty years and was no longer a “new frontier territory” (xinjiang 新疆), in spite of 
its name. But their proposals presented the frontier in a new light. Xinjiang became a geographical 
solution to the conundrums of  growth—landlessness, fiscal deficits, decadence—that had already 
79 Ibid., 40:33a. 
80 Ibid., 40:33b.
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started to become apparent in the previous century. Xinjiang offered the hope of  overcoming the 
intensifying contradictions of  the late imperial economy. Some of  these contradictions comprised 
what Kenneth Pomeranz has called the “ecological bottleneck” that acted as a “severe constraint on 
further population growth, per capita income growth, or movement out of  agriculture” by the end 
of  the eighteenth century.81 The ideals of  political economy dictated that, in order to solve these 
problems of  growth, more people had to be given access to land to support themselves and to be 
productive taxpayers. And so starting with Gong Zizhen's proposal, Xinjiang's arable land was to be 
subordinated to the ideals of  Chinese political economy. In principle, colonization would transform 
fertile but unused land into productive landscape and transform city vagrants, the rural poor, or 
Beijing bannermen into productive agricultural subjects. The various proposals of  these scholars 
largely agreed that Xinjiang could ease China's growing pains.
Inasmuch as Wei Yuan chose the term “outlet” (weilu 尾閭) to characterize Xinjiang, the 
nineteenth-century discourse of  Qing colonialism may have also initiated new conceptions of  the 
population within China proper as a unified body politic with a life of  its own. It is unclear which 
late imperial texts mediated Wei's selection of  the term, but the term had originally appeared in a 
passage from the Zhuangzi (莊子), a work of  Daoist philosophy dating to the Warring States period 
(475-221 BCE). In a chapter on autumnal floods, the text stated,
Among all the waters of  the world, none is larger than the ocean. Ten thousand 
rivers flow into it without end, yet it does not overflow. It incessantly drains off  at 
the outlet (weilu), yet it is never empty.82 
天下之水，莫大於海，萬川歸之，不知何時止而不盈，尾閭泄之，不知何時已而不虛。
81 Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, 234, 241. 
82 This translation is amalgamated from Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of  Chuang Tzu (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1968), 176; and Herbert A. Giles, trans., Chuang Tzŭ: Mystic, Moralist, and Social  
Reformer, second ed. (New York: AMS Press, 1974), 201. 
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In this chapter, I have rendered the term “weilu” in English as “outlet” to convey its meaning as a 
place made valuable by the function it serves in relation to another geographic location.83 In the 
conceptions of  Wei and Zhang, Xinjiang was to become an important site for re-channeling China's 
unproductive population away from densely populated urban areas or countrysides and into agrarian 
livelihoods. Yet the allusion to the Zhuangzi is also significant because it begs the question of  the 
nature of  the source of  the water flowing into the outlet. By this analogy, the population of  China 
would be rendered metaphorically as an undulating ocean. It would be a massive body constantly in 
flux, a living entity that, by its very nature, must have an external means to remain in balance, to stay 
healthy. Within the nineteenth-century discourse of  colonialism, this allusion may very well have 
functioned to naturalize the population of  China proper as a distinct body politic with its own 
metabolism. It also served to legitimize the vision of  Xinjiang as a colony for China proper, because 
the demographic body would naturally require such an “outlet” to stay in balance, and would also 
naturally overflow into regions beyond its perimeter. Perhaps the metaphor of  China's population as 
an ocean also conveyed to other scholars the enormity and gravity of  the situation, as well as the 
urgency of  finding an “outlet.”  
As I have shown, Zhang Peilun borrowed Wei's language to make a case for colonizing 
Xinjiang with bannermen. Although he failed to convince Zuo Zongtang, he was not the last 
Chinese scholar to frame the process of  colonizing in terms of  finding an “outlet” for a country's 
people. In 1916, one of  the brightest and most influential reformers of  the early twentieth century 
employed the term “outlet” and used the metaphor of  flowing water in his definition of  what he 
83 Defining the term, however, is by no means simple or straightforward. For example, R.H. Mathews 
defines it as “a rock called, 'the eye of  the sea,' to which all the waters of  the ocean converge” and also 
“the posterior.” See R.H. Mathews, Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary, revised American ed. (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1943), 1055. In his translation of  the Zhuangzi, Burton Watson leaves 
“weilu” untranslated but notes one definition as “a huge fiery stone against which the sea water turns to 
steam.” Watson, 176n5. 
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called “national imperialism.” In his Discourse on the New Citizen (Xin min shuo 新民說), a text 
describing the formation of  a national citizenry, Liang Qichao  梁啟超 (1873-1929) wrote,
What is national imperialism? Having filled up the interior, citizens' strength is bound 
to overflow into the exterior, whereupon they anxiously seek to extend authority to 
other lands, which they use as “our outlet” (weilu).84
民族帝國主義者何？其國民之實力，充於內而不得不溢於外，於是汲汲焉求擴張權力於
他地，以為我尾閭。
Unlike other scholars in this chapter, Liang was not explaining a proposed or imagined geopolitical 
relationship between China proper and Xinjiang, even if  he considered colonization important for 
the development of  a nation, and in particular for a national literature.85 He instead used the term to 
define the imperialism of  European nations in the nineteenth century, when the people of  those 
nations surged beyond national borders and into other lands and asserted their authority with claims 
expressed in the language of  morality and inevitability. Despite his focus on Europe in this passage, 
it is possible that Liang's conception of  imperialism may have been influenced by the language of 
Qing colonial discourse. His choice of  “outlet” to describe the process of  imperialism raises the 
possibility that legacies of  nineteenth-century colonial discourse lay hidden in Chinese nationalist 
thinking of  the twentieth century. 
84 Liang used the English phrase “national imperialism” within the text. See Liang Qichao, Xin min shuo 
[Discourse on the new citizen], (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1936 [1916]), 4.
85 Xiaobing Tang, “'Poetic Revolution,' Colonization, and Form at the Beginning of  Modern Chinese 
Literature,” in Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China, ed. Rebecca 
E. Karl and Peter Zarrow (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 245-267. On Liang's 
interest in historical Chinese colonizers in southeast Asia, see Zhongguo weiren zhuan wu zhong [Five types of 
biographies of  great men from China], (Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua shuju, 1957), part 4, “Zhongguo zhimin 
ba da weiren zhuan” [Biographies of  eight great Chinese colonists].
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Conclusion
Environmental Interventions and Lines of  Connection
The great general who deals with borderland affairs has yet to return,
As the sons and brothers of  Hunan fill in the Tianshan,
And newly planted poplars and willows extend three thousand li,
Introducing a spring wind across the Jade Pass.1
大將籌邊尚未還，湖湘子弟滿天山，新載楊柳三千里，引得春風渡玉關。
—Yang Changjun, ca. 1878-1880
Travelers to northwest China sometimes caught sight of  the massive trees from a distance. 
Claude Pickens, an Episcopal missionary from Virginia traveling through the northwest “in search 
of  Moslems” in the spring of  1936, noticed the trees in the vicinity of Pingliang, Gansu, and in his 
journal entry for May 12, he made a note about “the stately old willow trees lining the road.” 
Perhaps inspired by their stature in the landscape, he seems to have snapped a photograph of  the 
trees along the roadway that day (see Figure 4). From the standpoint of  Pickens' camera, the trees 
appear to be giant pillars running alongside the dusty treads and separating the road from cultivated 
fields. Their upper branches reach above the tops of  the hills in the distance, and they tower over 
wayfarers, whose horse-drawn carts have pulled their loads past them. The trees seem to provide the 
1 Yang Changjun, “Gong song Zuo gong xi xing gan tang”  恭誦左公西行甘棠 [Respectful recitation of  Duke 
Zuo's benevolent governance on the westward journey], in Gansu sheng difang shizhi bianzuan 
weiyuanhui 甘肅省地方史志編纂委員會, ed., Gansu sheng zhi  甘肅省志 [Gazetteer of  Gansu province], (Lanzhou: 
Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1999), 20:42. See variants of  this poem in Wang Yitang 王逸塘, Jin chuan shi lou  
shihua  今傳是樓詩話 [Notes on poetry from the Contemporary House of  Transmitting Truth], (Tianjin: Da 
gong bao she chuban bu, 1933), 366-367, reproduced in ZZYS, 215; and Wu Aichen 吳藹宸, ed., Lidai xiyu 
shichao  歷代西域詩鈔 [Collected poetry of  the western regions from past dynasties], (Urumqi: Xinjiang 
renmin chubanshe, 2001), 270-271.
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only source of  shade for single travelers who go by foot. For Pickens, they were perhaps the most 
eye-catching sights in the landscape, juxtaposed against the light tones of  the soil and the hues of 
the sky. He recorded no more about the willows by the roadside, save for their origin: “These were 
planted by Tso [Zuo], the general who conquered Yaku[b] Beg of  Kashgar about 1875.”2
Pickens was not alone in his attribution of  northwest trees to Zuo Zongtang. In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, poplars and willows became living monuments to the leader 
of  the military campaigns that suppressed rebellion across the northwest and saved Xinjiang for the 
Qing empire. One traveler, Pei Jingfu, recognized the immensity of  Zuo's arboreal work in 1905. In 
his estimation, the poplars and willows tracing the roads westward from eastern Gansu all the way 
out to Jiayuguan formed over a thousand kilometers of  “continuous shade” (lianyin 連蔭).3 The 
stature of  individual trees sometimes shocked Pei, who found willows near Pingliang set in four or 
five tiers that were “tall enough to reach to the sky and too large to reach around.”4 Yuan Dahua 袁
 大化 (1851-1935), who was traveling west to Urumqi in the spring of  1911 to assume the 
governorship of  Xinjiang, encountered the arboreal signs of  Zuo Zongtang's army scattered in 
various locations from eastern Shaanxi province to points west of  Lanzhou. In one place, trees had 
grown together so densely and their shade had blanketed the roadway so completely that the 
thoroughfare by which they stood appeared to be a “narrow gorge road” (xialu 硤路). In another 
location, poplars planted in the 1870s now reached over thirty meters tall, “towering and sticking up 
into the heavens.”5 In his journal of  the journey westward, Yuan seemed to coin a new appellation 
2 Claude L. Pickens, Jr., “In Search of  Moslems in China”: The Story of  a Journey through Northwest China, April 30-
July 2, 1936, ed. Martha Lund Smalley (New Haven, CT: Yale Divinity School Library, 2004), 15.
3 Pei Jingfu 裴景福, Hehai kunlun lu  河海崑崙錄 [Record of  the Journey to Kunlun Mountains], (Anhui, 1914), 
2:32a
4 Pei Jingfu, Hehai kunlun lu, 2:11b.
5
高聳插天. Yuan encountered the dense clumps of  trees in Tongguan and Huayin in eastern Shaanxi, 
whereas he spotted the poplars in western Gansu near a town called Hongcheng. Yuan Dahua 袁大化, Fu 
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for these roadside trees. He called them “Duke Zuo's Willows” (Zuo gong liu 左公柳). Near the border 
between Shaanxi and Gansu, he wrote that he had seen “pleasant lines of  Duke Zuo's Willows still 
in order, without many missing.”6 
 Observers imbued the trees with the mantle of  benevolent governance that they imagined 
Zuo Zongtang to have employed in his northwest campaigns. Pei Jingfu compared the poplars and 
willows planted by Zuo's army to the “sweet pear trees of  the Earl of  Shao” (Shao bo gantang 召伯甘
棠),7 an allusion to a verse from the ancient Classic of  Poetry (Shijing 詩經). People of  ancient times 
had composed the lines entitled “Sweet Pear Trees” (Gantang 甘棠) to honor the Earl of  Shao. 
Originally enfeoffed in Northern Yan 北燕, in the region around present-day Beijing, the Earl of 
Shao had gained a reputation for his adroit and just governance in towns of  the west (xifang 西方), 
where he conducted the business of  government under the branches of  sweet pear trees. After he 
died, people honored him by turning the trees into symbols of  his rule and vowing not to harm 
them.8 The term gantang  甘棠 thus came to bear a double meaning, referring to sweet pear trees and 
to the benevolent rule of  the person with whom they were associated. In adopting this term and the 
allusion to the Earl of  Shao, Pei represented Zuo's legacy as the living organisms in the landscape as 
well as the effects of  Zuo's benevolent governance which they represented.9 Perhaps Pei had 
Xin ji cheng  撫新記程 [Record of  the journey out to govern Xinjiang], (1911), 1:8b, 1:35b.
6
左公柳甘界尚整齊，無甚短闕. Yuan, Fu Xin ji cheng, 1:20a.
7 Pei Jingfu, Hehai kunlun lu, 2:11b.
8 For the original poem, see the Classic of  Poetry. A short record of  the Earl of  Shao's administration in the 
western regions is contained in Sima Qian, Shiji  史記 [Records of  the Historian]. For a translation, see 
William H. Nienhauser, Jr., ed., The Grand Scribe's Records, Volume V.1: The Hereditary Houses of  Pre-Han 
China (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 171. Although Sima Qian records the region to 
which Shao went to govern as the “western regions,” other records indicate that the Duke of  Shao 
governed not in the west but in “southern states” (nan guo 南國). See the introduction to the poem 
contained in the “Mao Preface to the Poetry” (Mao shi xu 毛詩序). The poem itself  is included in a section 
of  the Classic of  Poetry entitled “Shao and the South” (Shao nan 召南). 
9 The only difference, noted Pei, was that Zuo's “far-reaching strategy” (yuanlue 遠略) quite surpassed that of 
the Duke of  Shao. Pei Jingfu, Hehai kunlun lu, 2:11b.
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followed the lead of  Yang Changjun, whose poetic encomium to Zuo's transformative influence on 
politics and environments in the northwest—the epigraph of  this conclusion—had adopted the 
term gantang as part of  its title. From this perspective, it was not just the colonizers from Hunan who 
spearheaded the transformation of  northwest lands and communities but also the trees that they 
planted, symbols of  Zuo's righteous leadership. 
Wayfarers in Shaanxi and Gansu may have had the chance to observe the poplars and 
willows firsthand, but periodical readers far to the east caught glimpses of  them in print. Shanghai's 
illustrated periodical, the Dianshizhai Pictorial (Dianshizhai huabao 點石齋畫報), published a two-page 
spread depicting rows of  trees planted by Zuo's armies (see Figure 5). The title of  the illustration, 
“The Remaining Benevolence of  Sweet Pear Trees” (Gantang yize 甘棠遺澤), alluded to the same 
fruitful trees of  the classical verse, the living arboreal signs of  magnanimous governance. In the 
illustration, a long road guides travelers—and the Pictorial's readers' eyes—from the foreground off 
into the distance. Lining the roadway on both sides, trees serve as immobile ambassadors 
accompanying travelers out west, and their straight, slender trunks hoist a canopy of  branches and 
leaves over passersby. The road appears to cut through a topographical corridor of  natural and 
human origin. On the right side, a small, nearly hidden section of  wall peeks out from amongst cliffs 
overlooking a stretch of  cultivated soil. To the left of  the roadway, the outlines of  distant mountain 
peaks rise above the tallest branches. With the Great Wall to the north and the Qilian mountains to 
the south, the roadway traces a route through Gansu and out toward Xinjiang. The travelers form a 
long camel train laden with goods. One rider appears to be looking backward, toward the east, but 
the rest file onwards to points further west, places beyond the view of  the periodical's readers. 
The illustration in the Dianshizhai Pictorial suggests that trees were planted not only to form 
swaths of  shady leaves amidst dusty fields or deserts but also to create connections between one 
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part of  the empire and another. Willows and poplars gave travelers shelter from the elements and 
drew lines linking distant places along the roadway. They made the lengthy and arduous westward 
journey more enticing, and travelers who experienced the respite provided by shade under their 
canopy may have been prone to attribute their existence to Zuo. After more than ten years, the trees 
created
a thick shade concealing the sun, an emerald tent linked to the clouds. In the 
sweltering summer heat of  the sixth month [of  the year], [people] take shelter from 
sunstroke underneath. All feel the shade of  benevolent favor from Zuo Zongtang 
and their praise [for him] does not subside.10 
濃陰蔽日，翠幄連雲。六月徂暑者蔭暍於下。無不感文襄之憄庇而稱道勿衰。
In the visions of  those who esteemed Zuo, the trees created a hospitable environment all the way 
out to the Jade Pass  玉關 (or Jade Gate Pass 玉門關), a relic of  the Han dynasty whose poetic and 
rhetorical uses had long outlived its actual function as the point of  passage between Chinese 
hinterlands and regions further west, a function in which it had been superseded by Jiayuguan. The 
Jade Pass was a time-honored place of  geographical differentiation between the land inside and the 
land beyond, but it was also a point of  connection. And from the perspective of  late nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century observers, it was Zuo Zongtang's trees that brought this connection alive. 
“At present, the springtime sun is clear and warm and the fine shade is still verdant,” the caption 
claimed. “Into the distance, poplars and willows set each other off  alongside the Jade Pass.”11 The 
trees seemed to guide travelers up to the pass and out beyond it. 
10 Fu Genxin 符艮心, “Gantang yize”  甘棠遺澤 [The Remaining Benevolence of  Sweet Pear Trees], in 
Dianshizhai huabao daquan  點石齋畫報大全 [The complete Dianshizhai Pictorial], (Shanghai: Jicheng tushu 
gongsi, 1910), 38:54b-55a.
11
今當春日晴和，美蔭蔥蘢依然。與玉關楊柳遙相掩映。Fu Genxin, “Gantang yize,” in Dianshizhai huabao daquan, 
38:54b-55a.
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Despite the laudatory representations of  Zuo's trees, their growth in the last decades of  the 
Qing empire did not always match their imagined significance as signs of  upright governance. Some 
of  them literally did not stand upright. West from Pingliang, Yuan Dahua saw willows “bending like 
a fist and barren, unlike the uninterrupted luxuriance of  the balsam poplars.”12 This sight prompted 
him to question whether the “nature of  the soil” (tuxing 土性) in the west was perhaps better suited 
to poplars than willows. But even some of  the poplars could not remain straight, as they had 
appeared in the Dianshizhai Pictorial. At a place near Pingliang called Sishilipu, Yuan discovered 
poplars “bending and slanting; perhaps in the high mountains and cold air, [they are] forced [over] 
by the wind.”13 Battered by weather and shaped by climate, the trees could do little more than reflect 
the conditions in which they grew. Pei Jingfu recognized this correlation between land and their 
development. “For barren saline soil,” he wrote, the trees “wither as soon as they are planted. In 
fertile soil, they are abundant and luxuriant, tall enough to reach into the skies and surpassing several 
arm-lengths [in girth].” Tree growth was an expression of  the quality of  the land, and Pei asserted 
that “as soon as you observe if  what's growing is prospering or declining, you'll know whether the 
land is rich or barren.”14 Pei himself  had used the laudatory rhetoric of  “sweet pear trees” to bring 
recognition to Zuo's arboreal work, but in making these observations, he admitted that the efforts 
of  Zuo's soldiers could not, in the end, determine how well they grew.  
People also had a hand in damaging the corridors of  trees in the northwest. Pei Jingfu 
discovered a placard by the roadside in Gansu warning people against furtively chopping down 
(daofa 盜伐) the trees. The placard ascribed to the trees the pedigree of  Zuo Zongtang's military fame 
12
拳屈瘠薄，不如青白楊之條達肥美。Yuan Dahua, Fu Xin jicheng, 1:24b.
13
拳曲欹斜, 或山高氣寒為風凌逼耳。Yuan Dahua, Fu Xin jicheng, 1:27b.
14
凡苦滷不毛之地，旋植旋萎。沃土則薈蔚干霄，逾數抱。[. . .]一觀所植之盛衰，而知土地之肥瘠。Pei Jingfu, Hehai  
kunlun lu, 2:32a.
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and imbued them with the profundity of  living monuments. The second two lines of  the prohibition 
read: “Who introduces the spring wind, a thousand li all jade green? Do not cut and do not fell what 
Marquis Zuo planted.”15 Living expressions of  a novel state of  affairs, the trees were not to be 
chopped down and hauled away. But interdictions like this apparently had not worked. For some 
people, the trees became a readily accessible resource awaiting their use. The caption in the 
Dianshizhai Pictorial noted that even though people “did not have the heart to cut and chop” the trees 
immediately after Zuo departed from the northwest for Beijing in late 1880, they later lost interest in 
their preservation. “Rascals and the like came to take advantage of  the situation and chopped them 
down with axes, making [the land] as barren as Niu Mountain,”16 an allusion to a mountain 
mentioned in the Mencius where people had cut down forests and grazing animals had stripped the 
land of  vegetation.17  In March 1911, Yuan Dahua happily reported that willows near Tongguan, in 
eastern Shaanxi, had grown mature and robust, strong enough to supply wood for tool-making, but 
he had also heard the news of  willows being “secretly cut down by local people.”18 Further to the 
west in Gansu, where he saw some of  Zuo's poplars huge and reaching to the sky, he found that 
“many have been felled by villains,” and even the remaining ones had had their branches lopped 
off.19 Pei Jingfu had blamed local officials for the destruction of  these living legacies of  Zuo's work 
because they had not actively admonished people to spare them. But he soon discovered that he had 
not been adequately vigilant. One of  his own servants who had gone to purchase firewood had 
15
誰引春風，千里一碧。勿翦勿伐，左侯所植。Pei Jingfu, Hehai kunlun lu, 2:32a.
16
無賴之輩往乘間，研以斧斤，致同牛山之濯濯。Fu Genxin, “Gantang yize,” in Dianshuzhai huabao daquan, 38:54b.
17 Mencius employed the metaphor of  the barrenness of  the hillside to discuss human nature and the lack 
of  humaneness. See Mencius 11.8, in Yang Bojun 楊伯峻, ed., Mengzi yizhu  孟子譯注 [The annotated 
Mencius], (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 263.
18
被土人偷伐. Yuan Dahua, Fu Xin jicheng, 1:8b-9b.
19
多為奸民翦伐. Yuan Dahua, Fu Xin jicheng, 1:35b.
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returned with wood from “government willows stealthily chopped down.”20  
•   •   •
The disappearance of  willows and poplars or even just their stunted growth hardly tarnished 
the reputation of  Zuo Zongtang in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His reputation, 
in the end, was not built upon the success of  agriculture or the growth of  trees. Zuo gained 
posthumous fame as the military general who had reconquered Xinjiang, preserving its connection 
to China proper. It was the urbanites of  Shanghai and other cosmopolitans of  the emerging Chinese 
nation—readers of  periodicals like the Dianshizhai Pictorial—who became enthralled by the military 
man who had achieved imperial victory in an era of  defeat after defeat by European nations.21 
Popular memories of  the dead general and his military victories lived on well into the twentieth 
century, and they have risen and fallen along with the fortunes of  Chinese politics and the tenor of 
Chinese nationalism. Zuo has played many roles in history, including the late Qing modernizer who 
introduced important foreign technologies to China and the feudal reactionary who suppressed the 
anti-imperial uprisings of  the masses. But above all, Zuo Zongtang was considered a patriot for his 
efforts to unite the borderland with China proper.22 
By early 1878, Zuo's army had completed its reconquest of  Xinjiang. But it was the year 
20
盜伐官柳. Pei Jingfu, Hehai kunlun lu, 2:32a.
21 Such was the public appeal of  tales of  Zuo's military adventures that they were composed into a new 
drama (xinju 新劇), entitled Duke Zuo Pacifies the West (Zuo gong ping xi 左公平西). Staged at Shanghai's Tianyi 
Tea Garden  天儀茶園 in the spring of  1895, the drama was reviewed on the front page of  the Shenbao 
newspaper and was later published in several different editions with line illustrations depicting the cast of 
characters in opera costume. “Guan Zuo Gong ping xi xin ju you gan”  觀左公平西新劇有感 [Feelings upon 
seeing the new opera Duke Zuo pacifies the west], Shenbao, no. 7933, GX21/4/29 (May 23, 1895), 1. For 
examples of  the publication of  the drama, see Xin ji Zuo gong ping xi zhuan  新輯左公平西傳 [Newly edited 
story of  Duke Zuo pacifying the west], (Shanghai: Shanghai shuju, 1908); Zuo Wenxiang gong zheng xi yanyi  
 左文襄公征西演義 [The romance of  Zuo Wenxiang's conquering the west], (Shanghai: Jinzhang tushuju, 
1930).
22 For the various roles and interpretations of  Zuo Zongtang, see Sun Zhanyuan 孫占元, Zuo Zongtang ping  
zhuan  左宗棠評傳 [A critical biography of  Zuo Zongtang], (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1995), 1; 
Lipman, Familiar Strangers, 129n85.
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1884 that marked a more significant turning point in relations between China proper and Xinjiang. 
In that year, the Qing court accepted the proposal to transform Xinjiang from an imperial territory 
into a province and establish the organs of  civilian government modeled upon the provinces of 
China proper. Several years prior to this decision, Zuo had ridiculed Gong Zizhen's early nineteenth-
century suggestion that Xinjiang become a province. He did so on the grounds that Gong was 
unfamiliar with the terrain. “There is much in Gong's proposal that cannot be implemented,” wrote 
Zuo in 1880. “For he did not personally go through the territory and he was not very familiar with 
the arrangement of  mountains and waterways.”23 Nonetheless, he accepted the utility of  Gong's 
proposal for Xinjiang insofar as it promoted civilian institutions of  governance in a territory long 
guarded by military garrisons—a change in status that would be the key to making the “frontier and 
hinterland indivisible” (bian fu bu fen 邊腹不分).24 When Xinjiang's transformation to provincial status 
came in late 1884, it marked the realization of  Gong's plan for civilian government and the 
culmination of  Zuo's military intervention and his advocacy for provincialization. Xinjiang province 
acquired a new governor—the first civilian governor was Liu Jintang, Zuo's top military commander 
during the reconquest—and a new administrative hierarchy of  prefectures and districts. Historians 
have described this as “administrative sinicization,” “inlandization,” or part of  the process of  the 
“domestication” of  Xinjiang,25 and the replication of  the provincial form in Xinjiang seemed to 
formalize and justify the Qing empire's renewed control over the territory after a period of  political 
23
龔議多不可行。蓋未親歷其境，不習知山川條列。Letter to Tao Guang 陶桄, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:596.
24 Letter to Tao Guang 陶桄, GX6/0/0 (1880), ZZQ, 12:596.
25 These descriptors appear respectively in Ping-ti Ho, “In Defense of  Sinicization: A Rebuttal of  Evelyn 
Rawski's 'Reenvisioning the Qing',” The Journal of  Asian Studies 57.1 (February 1998): 148; Kataoka 
Kazutada, Shinchō Shinkyō tōchi kenkyū, 202-213, quoted in Sugawara Jun, “Tradition and Adoption: 
Elements and Composition of  Land-Related Contractual Documents in Provincial Xinjiang (1884-1955),” 
in Studies on Xinjiang Historical Sources in 17-20th Centuries, ed. James A. Millward, Shinmen Yasushi, and 
Sugawara Jun (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2010), 120n1; and Millward, Beyond the Pass, 232. 
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absence. In the decades when the empire increasingly faced military and diplomatic challenges to its 
territorial integrity from imperial Russia along the extensive land borders and from European 
nations and Japan along its seacoasts, provincialization also exemplified the move to shore up the 
borders of  the empire, and the process was repeated in Taiwan, formerly a prefecture of  Fujian 
province, one year later in 1885. 
Zuo's ability to marshal financial resources and orchestrate the reconquest and 
reconstruction of  the borderland suggests that, while the Qing empire may have been imperiled in 
many ways and on many fronts in the nineteenth century, it was by no means inevitably headed for 
collapse after the Opium War.26 This study demonstrates how officials dealt creatively with the crises 
of  the century, including the question of  the social and environmental contradictions of 
demographic growth, by turning to colonial solutions. While Zuo was sent by the imperial state to 
suppress the Muslim rebellions and was later given the imperial mandate to recover Xinjiang, he 
viewed northwest lands with imaginative eyes and envisioned agrarian abundance. Like Gong Zizhen 
and Wei Yuan, he speculated that places where the “land is vast but people are few” (dikuang renxi 地
曠人稀) were places where Han people from China proper could reproduce their agrarian lifestyles, 
draw profit from the land, and ease the social and ecological tensions of  growth elsewhere in the 
empire. The late nineteenth-century process of  expanding agriculture in the northwest must be 
viewed in light of  these contradictions and the attempts on the part of  Qing scholars to find spatial, 
or geographical, solutions for them. 
Several years earlier, in November 1876, the Shenbao newspaper had reported upon the logic 
behind colonizing the northwest when the fortunes of  the Hunan army seemed to be heading for 
26 Philip Kuhn has recently argued that “the nineteenth century is best viewed as a permanent summons to 
flexible thinking.” He argues against older, juxtaposed categories of  historical interpretation that have 
generally shaped our thinking about the nineteenth century. Kuhn, “Toward the Nineteenth Century,” Late  
Imperial China 29.1 (June 2008), 6. 
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victory. At the end of  an article describing the army's stunning maneuvers and capture of  Urumqi, it 
touched upon the postwar plans for Xinjiang devised by Zuo Zongtang and the Manchu 
commander Jinshun  金順 (1835-1885), or what amounted to their strategy for “political-economic 
management” (jingji 經濟)27 of  land and people through ecological transformation. The plan called 
for colonization by settlers from China proper in order to modify the social and natural 
environments of  the northwest and make them places of  cultivation. The plan would require 
moving soldiers and civilians from within the pass [i.e. Jiayuguan] to solidify [the 
borderland]. It will thus be possible to transform overgrown wilderness into 
prosperous bustle. Compared with merely defending it with soldiers, this seems like a 
more successful scheme.28
徙關內兵民以實之，如此可化狉榛為繁華。較之僅戍以兵者，似更得計。
In this conception of  securing the borderland for the Qing, settlers would defend the territory by 
their presence and their ability to enrich the landscape through agrarian work. The political economy 
of  colonizing the borderland thus hinged upon the shared perception among late Qing officials that 
northwest lands could yield abundant harvests in places where the the potential productivity of  the 
soil went untapped but where the land could be settled with labor. 
In the thirty years after Zuo's reconquest, migrants flowed to Xinjiang with the official 
sanction and encouragement of  Qing settlement policies. Although records of  the number of 
migrants to the northwest frontier in the last three decades of  the empire are sparse, existing 
27 This term was an abbreviated form of  “ordering the world and aiding the people” (jingshi jimin  經世濟民), 
but it would come to be translated as “political economy” by the end of  the nineteenth century under the 
influence of  foreign translations and loan words from the Japanese lexicon. Wolfgang Lippert, “The 
Formation and Development of  the Term 'Political Economy' in Japanese and Chinese,” in Mapping  
Meanings: The Field of  New Learning in Late Qing China, ed. Michael Lackner and Natascha Vittinghoff 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), 119-128.
28 “Lun kefu Wu-lu-mu-qi ge cheng shi”  論克復烏魯木齊各城事 [On the recapture of  Urumqi and other cities], 
Shenbao, no. 1383, GX2/9/19 (November 26, 1876), 1.
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evidence suggests that the post-reconquest era was a time of  significant land settlement and 
demographic growth. Indeed, this period may have witnessed a “high tide” (gaochao 高潮) of 
movement from the provinces of  China proper to the new province of  Xinjiang, and rough 
estimates suggest that the population of  the territory increased around sixty percent over the 
twenty-five years between 1887 to 1912, from approximately 1.2 million to two million people.29 
Some migrants traveled out to the frontier for the opportunities of  commerce,30 but many others 
apparently took advantage of  the provincial government's offer of  60 mu  畝 of  high-quality land—
or even more for lower grades of  land—for households willing to trek out to Xinjiang, settle down, 
and grow crops.31 Migrants arrived from different regions of  China proper bearing their own 
selection of  plants and their own methods for making frontier agriculture a successful and profitable 
venture.32 But from the perspective of  late Qing officials, perhaps the most important thing was that 
they were coming at all and supplying the borderland with new labor. In 1912, the Xinjiang gazetteer 
noted with a certain satisfaction that the longevity of  peace after Zuo's reconquest had created the 
conditions in which the “population is multiplying” (shengchi zifan生齒滋繁)—precisely the 
phenomenon in China proper that had alarmed Gong Zizhen and other observers almost one 
hundred years earlier and had made them look to the frontiers for solutions. In the year when the 
29 Zhao Zhen 趙珍, Qingdai xibei shengtai bianqian yanjiu  清代西北生態變遷研究 [Research on ecological change in 
the northwest in the Qing dynasty], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2005), 175, 181.
30 Kataoka Kazutada 片岡一忠, Shinchō Shinkyō tōchi kenkyū   清朝新疆統治研究 [Research on governance in 
Xinjiang in the Qing dynasty], (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 1991), 278-282.
31 The regulations devised by Wei Guangtao in the mid-1880s suggested that each settler household would 
receive 60 mu of  land without specifying the quality of  the land (see Chapter 5). In 1912, the Illustrated  
Gazetteer of  Xinjiang recorded that, in the postwar era, land was doled out at three levels: settler households 
could claim 60 mu of  land at the highest grade (shang di 上地), 90 mu at the middle grade (zhong di 中地), or 
120 mu at the lowest grade (xia di 下地). Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, Xijiang beicheng, 2:5; Li Wenru, 
Xinjiang dili zhiwu kao, 2:6a.
32 Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, Xijiang beicheng, 2:6; Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a; Li Wenru, 
Xinjiang dili zhiwu kao, 2:9b.
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last Qing emperor abdicated the throne, the flow of  migrants out to Xinjiang appeared to have 
some momentum and may have provided some reassurance, however meager, to anxious officials 
worried about the future: “People from inside the pass who come, arm in arm and side by side, are 
increasingly numerous.”33
One of  the strongest legacies of  Zuo's intervention in the northwest was continued 
optimism about the future prosperity of  agriculture in Xinjiang. Other nineteenth-century scholars 
had envisioned abundant landscapes along the frontier, but Zuo was the most famous advocate for 
settlement late in the second-half  of  the century, and later boosters echoed the rhetoric of 
enrichment through profitable uses of  the environment. In 1909 and 1910, when scholar Sun Anfu 
wrote the chapter about Xinjiang's agriculture for the provincial gazetteer, he placed Xinjiang's soils 
into the middling echelons of  fertile lands within the empire. Despite its remoteness and its 
inferiority to the most productive agrarian zones in the empire, it had a certain unfathomable and 
untapped natural richness. 
Xinjiang is remotely located on the frontier. Its climate and soil fertility cannot be 
compared with the Central Lands. Yet its skies are rich even without rain and its land 
is fertile even though not heaped [with fertilizer].34 
新疆僻處邊陲，天時地利宜不得與中土比。然天不雨而膏，地不壅而腴。
According to Sun, it was this natural fecundity that allowed Xinjiang to have decent harvests on a 
regular basis despite what he considered to be the indolence and self-contentment (zi'an 自安) of 
native labor. He suspected such people to be the kind who would claim the natural productivity of 
Xinjiang's environment as a function of  their own work. “Aren't such [people] greedy to take the 
33
關內之民，連袂接軫，來者益眾。Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, Xijiang beicheng, 2:8; Li Wenru, Xinjiang dili  
zhiwu kao, 2:11a.
34 Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4b.
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achievements of  nature (tiangong 天功) as their own ability?”35 Sun asked rhetorically. The people who 
worked the fields did not have the capacity to “exhaust the strength of  the land” (jin di li 盡地力) 
owing to their lack of  diligence and to their “poor, inferior tools which they have not changed for 
generations.”36 But it was precisely the fertility of  the natural environment which could create the 
basis for even greater material prosperity as soon as new workers and new tools arrived.
In spelling out future policies, Sun echoed the language Zuo Zongtang had used decades 
earlier when he wrote in his 1838 exam essay about the need to survey the environmental conditions 
of  a place before implementing agrarian policies. Sun emphasized the need to accord (yin 因) with 
the seasons and to estimate (duo 度) what would properly grow in Xinjiang's soils. But just like Zuo, 
Sun devised an agrarian strategy shaped less by observations of  local conditions than by imported 
notions of  what would be most productive. It would be necessary to reshape and standardize the 
contours of  the land's fields and waterways to suit the goals of  agrarian prosperity. It would require 
improving the technologies available to farmers—the tools (qi 器) of  cultivation and the methods (fa 
法) of  fertilization—which, as it had been thirty years earlier, would be imported from China proper 
and drawn from the technical knowledge of  Chinese farming practices. Finally, taking a phrase from 
the pre-imperial text Zuo zhuan 左傳, Sun proclaimed that if  the people “abandoned their old 
[practices] and take [what is] new as the correct stratagem,” they would become rich (fuhou 富厚).37 
This was the same vision of  a prosperous future in Xinjiang that Zuo attempted to realize and it was 
35
若此者豈非貪天功為已力者耶。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4b-5a.
36  呰窳之器，世守而不改。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4b.
37 The entire passage reads as follows: “If  we are able to follow the seasons, estimate what's suited to the 
land, and on their behalf  open up wasteland, rectify boundaries and divisions, dredge the rivers and 
ditches, punish the tyrants and evaders, equalize the farmland, repair tools for cultivation, perfect the 
methods of  fertilization, abandoned their old [practices] and take [what is] new as the correct stratagem, 
they would be materially rich. What a superb assessment! What a superb assessment!” 誠能因天之時，度地之
宜，為之闢草萊，正疆理，濬川澮，懲豪隱，均田畝，繕耕耘之器，精土化之法，舍其舊而新是謀，其為富厚。豈勝量哉。豈
 勝量哉。Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:5a.
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a vision that he had propagated among his subordinates who took the reigns of  civilian government 
in the 1880s.  
•   •   •
Yang Changjun saw Zuo Zongtang's work in the northwest through rose-colored glasses. In 
his poem, which is the epigraph to this conclusion, he lauded Zuo's ability to transform northwest 
regions by introducing life forms—trees and people alike—who would colonize and alter the lay of 
the land in these geographically and ecologically marginal territories. Having served among Zuo's 
top military advisors, Yang was certainly aware that it had been devastating, bloody, and sometime 
punitive warfare that had enabled Zuo and his army to lead the way in forging these material 
connections. This was quite the opposite of  a “spring wind” which represented the invisible yet 
powerful influences of  benevolent governance, education, and other forms of  acculturation. 
Yang was also silent about the social and environmental obstacles that Zuo had faced as he 
attempted to rebuild and expand agriculture in the 1860s and 1870s. Plants were not as resilient in 
the environments of  the northwest as laudatory accounts suggested they were. Mulberry tree 
saplings from Zhejiang withered on the long road out to Xinjiang in the late 1870s. Trials of  cash 
crops and vegetables sometimes floundered upon local conditions: plants perished in cold weather, 
succumbed to aridity, or did not take to local soils. Local people and migrants sometimes proved 
uncooperative or acted in ways that undermined official visions of  a cultivated, settled, and 
agriculturally productive borderland. Some farmers resisted efforts to change their production 
practices while others continued to invest their labor into morally dubious and illicit productive 
activities. These included the opium growers of  Shaanxi and Gansu who became infamous in the 
last thirty years of  the empire for clandestinely planting poppies in the hills and mountains of 
northern Xinjiang and for being sojourners invested not in long-term agrarian development but only 
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in the quick profits of  opium.38 They also included the Turkic workers of  the sericulture workshops 
who protested pay scales and undermined the smooth development of  sericulture in Xinjiang in the 
1880s. And they included local people who were branded as bandits for chopping down willows and 
poplars for use as firewood. 
The obstinacy or noncooperation on the part of  locals and migrants and the seeming 
inhospitableness of  the environment were obstacles for Zuo and other officials to overcome as they 
worked to lay claim to the potential wealth of  the land. Moving people, plants, silkworms, and 
agricultural tools to these borderlands and disseminating the technologies of  agrarian production 
made these northwest regions, especially upper Gansu and Xinjiang, increasingly subject to the 
productive practices of  people from China proper, perhaps more so than at any time in previous 
history. Questions about how to overcome the particularities of  land and environment and how to 
convince farmers to adopt production methods and crops from elsewhere connected Zuo's postwar 
work to the intellectual trends of  the Qing period. As I have tried to show, one of  the key issues in 
his scholarly upbringing was how best to judge the most productive uses of  the land. For him, 
38 Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century migrants from Shaanxi and Gansu were not the borderland's 
first growers of  the poppies, which had been observed growing in Xinjiang as early as the late eighteenth 
century. (David Bello, “Opium in Xinjiang and Beyond,” in Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan,  
1839-1952, ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi [Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
2000], 129.) But their opium cultivation subverted the late Qing state's attempts at long-term agrarian 
development in Xinjiang because they typically rented land already under cultivation rather than applying 
to the provincial government for new land for reclamation. (Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, Xijiang  
beicheng, 2:6; Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a; Li Wenru, Xinjiang dili zhiwu kao, 2:9a.) Moreover, of 
the estimated thirty to forty thousand who migrated to Xinjiang to profit from opium cultivation, perhaps 
a small minority stayed. According to one early twentieth-century account of  opium in Qitai in northern 
Xinjiang, “Opium poppies are everywhere in the southern mountains. In any given year there are about 
20,000 migrants from Shaanxi and Gansu who come, greedy for its profits. All believe that it is common 
to come empty-handed and return full [of  riches].” 罌粟徧南山。關隴敖民饕其利而來者歲約二萬人。皆虛往實歸以
為常。(Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, quoted in Kataoka, Shinchō Shinkyō tōchi kenkyū, 286n13.) The red 
and white poppies that they planted created a “riot of  color across the mountain valleys” (lanman shan gu 爛
 熳山谷 ), but by their connection to the opium trade, their labors did not contribute to the moral vision of 
environmental transformation that underscored Zuo's conception of  borderland political economy. 
(Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, Xijiang beicheng, 2:6; Yuan Dahua et al., Xinjiang tuzhi, 28:4a; Li Wenru, 
Xinjiang dili zhiwu kao, 2:9a.) 
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obtaining profit or benefit from the land (dili 地利) was a question to be addressed on the basis of 
textual studies and experiences in the local environment, where agrarian techniques could be tested 
out and put on display for farmers. When Zuo attempted to expand agriculture in the northwest, 
however, what seemed to be most critical was not observations of  environment or custom but the 
dissemination of  agrarian manuals, the propagation of  techniques and plants from the south, and 
the movement of  specialists to train people in new ways of  farming. He still had to convince local 
farmers of  the profitability of  crops and techniques, but it was this constant attempt to overcome 
the obstacles posed by local environments and farming practices that was a primary trope of  Zuo's 
environmental interventions in the northwest. 
At the heart of  these processes, as I have argued, was the pursuit of  the “profits of  nature.” 
Zuo was certainly not the only Qing scholar-official to think about these material rewards. The idea 
that these profits would inevitably result from well-managed regimes of  agrarian production was 
shared among late Qing officials, Han and Manchu alike. In 1863, for instance, Manchu military 
commander Pingrui  平瑞 wrote to Beijing arguing that the imperial pasture lands of  northern 
Xinjiang should be divided up into sites where agrarian laborers could settle and tap into the 
“vastness of  the profits of  the land.”39 This kind of  wealth, drawn from the soil and rendered as 
taxes to the government, was crucial for the health of  the empire in an era of  fiscal uncertainty. He 
therefore urged officials to “rely on the profits of  nature as the long-term strategy,” a plan which 
would mean transforming what had been horse pasture into arable land for intensive cultivation.40 
The same kind of  proposition framed plans for agrarian development after Zuo's reconquest. The 
acting superintendent of  Xinjiang, Gongtang, speculated that land throughout the Urumqi area 
39
地利之溥。Ping Rui, “Wulumuqi kaiken changdi shu”  烏魯木齊開墾廠地疏 [Memorial for opening up the 
pasture land in Urumqi], in HJWX, 39:81a.
40  因自然之利為久遠之謀。TZ02/01/08 (1863), LFZZ 03-9559-18.
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could yield rich harvests in direct proportion to the quantity of  labor power. In a simple calculus 
about labor and profit, he wrote in 1879 that “Using up one more portion of  agricultural labor 
means [gaining] one more portion of  profit from the land.”41 These expressions about the material 
rewards to be gained by combining human labor with the environment exemplified the notion 
among Qing officials that borderlands were places of  great potential wealth in the late nineteenth 
century. But they also expressed deeply held assumptions about forms of  material wealth within the 
environment that could be brought to the fullest fruition and extracted through the application of 
human knowledge and labor. It was the potential for these profits that made the frontiers such 
enticing places for agrarian expansion and colonial development in the late nineteenth century. 
•   •   •
Despite these uses of  “profit” in the late nineteenth century, the word and the idea retained 
their connection to the Mencius and to a moralizing discourse about the profanity of  certain forms 
of  profit-seeking and commercial activity.42 Zuo Zongtang not only railed against opium in the 
1860s and 1870s but was also sometimes fond of  pointing out that profit had corrupted the hearts 
of  common people, as in this line from a letter he wrote in 1877: “In recent eras, people's minds 
have been completely corroded by the word 'profit,' and it is really difficult for them to free their 
minds [of  it].”43 Despite these moralizing claims, however, he and others wielded the idea of  profit 
41
盡一分農力，即多一分地利。GX05/R3/21 (1879), LFZZ 03-9553-47.
42 Timothy Brook has written about the long-existing “cultural framework that preferred to praise moral 
reciprocity over profit taking and to see in each the diminution of  the other.” Brook, “Profit and 
Righteousness in Chinese Economic Culture,” in Culture and Economy: The Shaping of  Capitalism in East Asia, 
ed. Timothy Brook and Hy V. Luong (Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 1997), 32. Profiting from 
commercial activity, however, was never fully circumscribed and, in fact, sometimes was considered an 
honorable activity in late imperial times. See John Lufrano, Honorable Merchants: Commerce and Self-Cultivation 
in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of  Hawai’i Press, 1997).
43
近世人心，被一利字蝕盡，實難放心。GX3/0/0 (1877), ZZQ, 12:214. Six years later, Zuo lamented almost 
exactly the same issue, for which he thought the only solution was to turn a blind eye. In an 1883 missive 
to the Zongli Yamen, he wrote, “In recent times, people's hearts have been completely corroded by the 
word 'profit.' They speak of  it with deep feelings. At present, there is no other method to deal with it 
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to train the focus of  peasants on activities like agriculture deemed important for the social stability 
of  the Qing state. If  profit was sometimes a dirty word, it was also a significant rhetorical tool 
employed by scholar-officials to mobilize peasants to adopt crops, reclaim land, implement 
cultivation techniques, build waterworks, or focus their energy on other productive endeavors. 
Insofar as these profit-making labors almost always required collaboration with some part of 
the natural world beyond humans—land, plants, animals, water—the rhetoric of  profit was not only 
a social question, but an environmental one as well. If  we are to focus on one important 
contradiction of  rhetoric and practice in human relations with the environment in late imperial 
China, we may gain some insight by asking why scholar-officials railed against profit as a mediator 
of  social relationships on the one hand while being fully committed to “exhausting” the “profits of 
land” or the “profits of  nature” on the other hand. The unease about commercial profit's potential 
to disorder social hierarchies seems not to have translated into misgivings about motivating people 
to seek as much profit as possible for their labor within the environment. 
• • •
The Qing-era push to make productive use of  land, water, mineral, arboreal, and other 
resources in the empire intensified as the density of  market exchange grew and as the population 
expanded and pushed outward, to the margins of  China proper and beyond. Within this context, 
Zuo Zongtang's work for agrarian development and the expansion of  settlement along the 
northwestern frontiers amounted to a form of  late Qing colonialism. Although the territory that he 
and his armies sought to control—Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang—had all once been within the 
geographical ambit of  Qing imperialism, the late nineteenth-century endeavor to reconquer them 
besides paying no attention.” 近日人心被一利字蝕盡。言之慨然。此時惟有以不睹不聞之法處之而已。GX9/0/0 
(1883), ZZQ, 12:796. On at least three other occasions in missives in 1846, 1878, and 1879, Zuo 
complained about profit using similar language. See ZZQ, 10:58; ZZQ, 12:417; and ZZQ, 12:458.
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and expand settlement and agrarian cultivation matches nominal definitions of  colonialism as the 
process of  settling people on land far away and even echoes the English word's Latin root, colere, 
meaning “to cultivate.”44 Yet this examination of  late Qing colonialism has also revealed how the 
processes of  territorial incorporation were supported by the logics of  normalizing patterns of 
agrarian practices, making these depopulated regions into productive landscapes, and using the 
northwestern borderlands as a lifeline for late Qing political economy. 
Much recent historical scholarship on nineteenth-century colonialism has focused on 
relations between European bourgeois societies and their colonial subjects. As Frederic Cooper has 
pointed out, “the principal meaning of  colonization has come to involve people rather than land: 
coercive incorporation into an expansionist state and invidious distinction” in which colonial 
authorities tightly circumscribed the political rights of  subjects and increasingly policed the 
boundaries of  their identities.45 Yet in studying colonialism, to so simply shift the focus from land to 
people—to analyze the cultural and discursive practices of  colonialism without the political 
economy—would diminish the prospects for coming to terms with how cultural practices inhered in 
the material concerns that motivated those who sought to benefit from colonial relations, as well as 
those who sought to contest or subvert colonial relations. In other words, as Cooper and others have 
recognized, histories of  colonialism need to pay attention to both the cultural and material practices 
inherent to the relationship.46 This is precisely the nexus, I have argued above, that environmental 
44 Several definitions of  colonialism refer to this process of  land settlement. Frederic Cooper recognizes an 
older meaning of  colonialism as the “bringing of  new territory into use by an expanding society, including 
settlements for trade and agriculture.” Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: 
University of  California Press, 2005), 27. Edward Said defined colonialism as the “implanting of 
settlements on distant territory.” Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993), 9, quoted in Teng, 
Taiwan's Imagined Geography, 8. 
45 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
2005), 27. 
46 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler have called for a “more dynamic relationship between the two 
approaches” to studying colonialism, namely research into the “culture of  colonialism and its relationship 
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historians should unravel to explicate and thereby overcome the contradiction seemingly peculiar to 
Chinese history between philosophies of  human-environmental harmony and the practices leading 
to ecological degradation. 
In Zuo Zongtang's push to circulate agrarian knowledge to farming communities in the 
northwest, both people and land became subject to his observations and oversight. His assessments 
of  the productivity of  local people in agricultural efforts—made explicit, for example, in his 
statements about how Turkic Muslims wasted their sericulture resources—shows that he was often 
classifying people based upon their ability to use their environments productively. At the same time, 
he surveyed the land with an eye toward attempting to make it more productive, as when he judged 
Gansu's climate and soil to be well-suited to cotton. In both of  these ventures to train land and 
people, Zuo Zongtang and other officials relied upon technologies of  agriculture and sericulture—
seeds, plow animals, farming tools, looms, tree saplings, and silkworm eggs. The standards of 
technology and productivity by which he judged land and people along the frontier were not only 
borrowed from certain highly developed parts of  China proper, but were also identified with Han 
people. In this sense, his work evinces the process of  distinguishing between groups of  people 
based on their knowledge and technological level, a process that echoed the categorization of  people 
in parts of  Africa and Asia so seemingly characteristic of  early modern European imperialism.47 
Another characteristic of  what I have called late Qing colonialism was the will to imagine the 
Qing northwest, and particularly Xinjiang, as a lifeline for the political economy of  China proper. 
Qing documents refer to the “reconstruction” of  agrarian society, but in light of  the fact that the 
to modernity” on the one hand and “political economy” on the other. Their article is “Between Metropole 
and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in Tensions of  Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, ed. 
Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1997), 4.
47 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of  Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of  Western Dominance (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
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proposals of  Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, and others were under active consideration and framed the 
way in which scholars like Zuo Zongtang thought about frontier territories distant from China 
proper, reconstruction should not be construed as signifying the attempt to return to what had 
previously existed. By the nineteenth century, with the growing interest in the geographies, histories, 
and languages of  the frontier territories and their peoples on the one hand, and with the increasing 
worry over demographic and ecological crises on the other hand, scholars looked toward the 
frontiers for solutions to the problems of  China proper. And in the late nineteenth century, when 
Zhang Peilun and Zuo Zongtang both sent memorials debating the expediency of  sending Beijing 
bannermen to settle along the frontiers, the subtext of  their debate was the idea that Xinjiang could 
provide open land for excess population and thereby ease social contradictions that had arisen over 
the course of  the previous century. At least in principle, the frontiers were to play an integral role in 
the maintenance of  a system of  agrarian political economy that had allowed the empire to prosper 
in the previous century.48 In this way, the lands of  the northwest, and the profits to be had by using 
them productively, came to be viewed as the solution for the environmental and social dilemmas that 
plagued China proper in the final century of  Qing rule.
 
48 Promoting agrarian expansion into Xinjiang in the late nineteenth century was neither qualitatively nor 
quantitatively similar to how Immanuel Wallenstein has considered the expansion of  the capitalist world-
system to peripheral territories in the early modern period. Nonetheless, his effort to attempt to 
understand the political economic nexus between colonies and metropoles in a systematic fashion begs the 
question of  how colonial settlement along the frontiers in the Qing period functioned in a systematic way 
to support and reproduce the dynamics of  Qing agrarian political economy. See Immanuel Wallerstein, 
World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), esp. chapter 2. 
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Figures
Figure 1. “Tso Tsung-tang [Zuo Zongtang],” from Mesny’s Chinese Miscellany 4.1 (January 1, 
1905), 2-3.  
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Figure 2. “A depiction of  qutian.” The caption explains that the white squares are to be 
cultivated with grain. The black spaces remain fallow and are left to facilitate  
ventilation and irrigation. Sun Zhaikui 孫宅揆, Jiao jia shu  教稼書 [Book for 
instruction in agriculture] (preface, 1721), reprinted in Zhao Mengling趙夢齡, ed., 
Qu zhong wu zhong  區種五種 [Five titles on plot cultivation], (Lianhuachi, 1878), 2:2a. 
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Figure 3. Instructions and illustrations for Huzhou mulberry trees. From Shen Bingcheng 
沈秉成, Cansang jiyao  蠶桑輯要 [Summary of  Sericulture], (Chang Zhen tong hai dao 
shu, 1871), zashuo:11a-12b. 
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Figure 4. “Along the old Silk Road to Europe. Trees planted by General Tso Chung-t'ang [Zuo 
Zongtang] on the campaign to capture Yakoob Beg in 1876.” Photograph taken by 
Claude L. Pickens, Jr., on about 12 May 1936 on the road running northwest outside 
of  Pingliang, Gansu Province. Pickens Collection, Harvard-Yenching Library, 
Harvard University. Copyright © President & Fellows of  Harvard College. Used by 
permission.
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Figure 5. “The Remaining Benevolence of  Sweet Pear Trees” (Gantang yize 甘棠遺澤), an 
illustration by Fu Genxin 符艮心, appeared in the Shanghai periodical Dianshizhai 
Pictorial [Dianshizhai huabao 點石齋畫報]. Taken from Dianshizhai huabao daquan 點石齋




Writing about the late nineteenth-century northwest in Chinese history presents two 
particular problems related to historical sources. The first is the limitation on the quality and 
diversity of  sources. The so-called Muslim rebellions were the primary focus of  attention for high-
ranking officials in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang from the 1860s to the 1880s, so many of  their 
writings deal primarily or even solely with the patterns and outcomes of  military operations. Details 
about what happened on the ground in the aftermath of  warfare in specific locations are often 
nonexistent or quite sparse, which is a result both of  the chaos of  the era and the extent of 
destruction and dislocation caused by warfare. Compilers of  several late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century gazetteers from Gansu province, for example, noted that it had been difficult to 
gather information about local areas and local customs because few informants had been available 
for interview (caifang  采訪) or because local populations had been completely dispersed.1 It is 
perhaps for these reasons that new gazetteers for districts and prefectures in Shaanxi, Gansu, and 
Xinjiang were often not edited or published until decades after Zuo Zongtang's army had moved 
through the region. Although some authors recognized that compiling gazetteers was both a symbol 
and a measure of  postwar reconstruction, many were not published until years after the fall of  the 
Qing dynasty in 1911. 
The second problem is one of  restricted access to documents pertaining to late nineteenth-
century history in what is now northwest China. Restrictions are most easily perceived when one 
inadvertently comes up against them. This happened to me twice during the course of  my fieldwork. 
1 Pingyuan xian zhi  平遠縣志 [Gazetteer of  Pingyuan county], ed. Chen Rixin  陳日新 (1879), fanli:1a; Xinxiu 
Guyuan zhou zhi  新修固原州志 [Newly revised gazetteer of  Guyuan prefecture], ed. Wang Xueyi  王學伊 (1909), 
fanli:3b-4a.
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In the first case, librarians in the rare books room at the National Library of  China in Beijing 
informed me in August 2008 that several maps of  the Qing empire's northwest regions dating to the 
1870s and 1880s had been placed in “war preparations storage” (zhanbei ku 戰備庫) during the 
Cultural Revolution decade (1966-1976) and had remained inaccessible to readers since then. Judging 
by their electronic catalog titles, I suspect these maps depict the geographic boundaries of  the 
northwestern provinces and Xinjiang in relationship to imperial Russian territory, and given that they 
were produced right around the time when Zuo Zongtang's army was in the region, they would have 
added to my understanding of  the geopolitics of  northwestern lands in the immediate postwar and 
post-reconquest eras.2 The second instance in which I encountered restrictions was at the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region Archives in Urumqi. In April 2009, archivists there informed me that 
the section of  the Qing archives devoted to the topic of  “reconstruction” (shanhou 善後) was closed 
to readers. The Qing archives in Xinjiang are divided into seven sections, six of  which correspond to 
bureaucratic offices, commonly known as the “six boards” (liu bu 六部), which comprised important 
organs of  imperial governance in Ming and Qing times. The seventh archival division, however, was 
off  limits. Indeed, such was the level of  control over materials pertaining to “reconstruction” that I 
was denied permission to ask the archivists, who controlled computerized searches of  the digital 
catalog database, to search the catalogs of  the other six archival divisions for the term shanhou. Given 
that “reconstruction” in late Qing Xinjiang history refers not only to a group of  activities but also 
roughly corresponds to the period after the intervention of  Zuo Zongtang's army, such restrictions 
significantly frustrate and limit historical analyses related to the environmental and political 
2 These maps, listed in the National Library's electronic catalog as of  August 2008, included Xibei ge sheng yu  
E'guo fenjie tu  西北各省輿俄國分界圖 [Map of  demarcated borders with Russia in the northwest provinces], 
catalog number /066/25/1875, and Qing Guangxu jiu nian Zhong E huajie tu  清光緒九年中俄划界圖 [Map of 
divided borders for China and Russia in the ninth year of  Guangxu (1883) of  the Qing], catalog 
number /066.1/255/1883.
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